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                                                   Abstract 
Conventionally, historians of the Second World War have focussed on political strategies, 
military operations, social and individual oral histories. Despite a vast secondary literature, 
investigations relating to landscapes of the era, other than in terms of theatres of war, are few. 
This thesis brings a landscape history perspective to studying the impact that the war, and 
particularly the military, had on the landscape and working lives of people in one English 
county. Landscape history is the study of the effect of human activity upon the natural 
environment; how communities, agriculture, industry and commerce have changed the places 
in which people live and work. The landscape provides opportunity and constraint; it may 
facilitate or complicate human endeavour. The approach benefits from its inter-disciplinary 
nature, being most closely associated with archaeology but crossing into social and cultural 
history, ecology, geology and environmental studies. It combines the study of extant and lost 
standing structures with documentary sources in examining the relationships between their 
intended function and the physical evidence in their environment. Dispositions and networks 
of monuments in the landscape represent powerful evidence in their own right that aid 
understanding of historical processes and narratives.  This thesis will examine six integrated 
themes – anti-invasion defences, airfields, training areas, logistics and infrastructure, country 
houses and agriculture – each of which impacted upon the landscape in different ways in the 
six years of the Second World War. It will also discuss pre-history and post-war legacy in 
each category, to demonstrate that there is a longer chronology that informs events and 
outcomes. A landscape history of the war has yet to be written and this thesis aims to explore 
ways in which it might realistically be approached at a regional level, as an effective way of 
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                        Chapter 1  -  Introduction 
 
   ‘Modern arms are insatiable in the matter of land; new weapons and new 




The Second World War is possibly the most exhaustively addressed episode of modern 
history visited by military, political and social historians. Eventually global in scope, the 
complexities of changing international geopolitics between 1939 and 1945 impacted upon 
national, regional and local communities in every nation state drawn into the conflict, 
whether by decision or default. This thesis seeks to examine the extent and impact of 
landscape change in one English county during the war, and does so from the perspective of 
landscape history. There is a holistic contribution to knowledge to be gained from this 
approach, which reinforces the relevance of regional identity in the wider geographic and 




Conventionally, historians of the Second World War have focussed on political strategies, 
military operations, social and individual oral histories.
2
 The study of the conflict from a 
landscape perspective offers insight into a somewhat disjointedly researched area. Despite a 
vast secondary literature, investigations relating specifically to landscapes of the Second 
World War have long been absent. 
 
Although landscape history as a discipline emerged from the 1950s, only relatively recently 
has attention been accorded it in relation to landscapes of warfare.
3
 For early writers such as 
                                                          
1
 Ministry of Information (Laurie Lee) Land at War (1945) p.1 
2
 Noted examples include Liddell Hart, B.H. A History of the Second World War (London, 1970); 
Gilbert, M. The Second World War (London, 1989); Keegan, J. The Second World War (London, 
1989). For social commentary see Calder, A. The People’s War (London, 1969); Longmate, N. and 
How We Lived Then: a History of Everyday Life during the Second World War (London, 1971, 2002); 
Gardiner, J. Wartime Britain, 1939-1945 (London, 2004);  
3
 Doyle, P. and Bennett, R. Fields of Battle - Terrain in Military History (Dordrecht, 2002); Pearson, 




Hoskins and Rackham the war was, respectively, a calamity and an irrelevance.
4
 The rapid 
growth of interest in material remains of conflict has however initiated interest from an 
archaeological and conservation perspective. English Heritage has published a number of 
discussion reports recommending actions to be taken, from a combined archaeology and 
heritage stance, although they take a national approach.
5
 Colin Dobinson’s very thorough and 
detailed series of studies for the Council for British Archaeology focus on the higher echelons 
of command at national and regional level, viewed through divisional and corps 
documentation, whilst William Foot’s series of localised case studies demonstrate how the 
military archaeology of anti-invasion defences differed across England in 1940. Both agreed 
however that there was a need for regional studies to show how national defence strategy 
manifested in local practice and how local sites sit in the wider historical context.
6
  
Monuments and structures are still, however, discussed in isolation with little reference to 
context. A valid archaeological horizon exists here, where artefacts that identify a culture and 
are found widely, though restricted to a particular area for a particular time period, are 
appropriate to regional studies. Further, study of the conflict landscape is somewhat 
unconnected in the secondary literature; agriculture is not discussed alongside country 
houses, nor anti-invasion defences with training areas, yet they are all holistically connected 
in time and place at a regional level.  
 
Nonetheless, studies have emerged in recent years, investigating contemporary landscapes in 
Europe and from the perspective of human conflict. Notable examples include Christopher 
Pearson’s monograph on the relationship between war and nature in Vichy France during the 
Second World War, in which he explores the regime’s approach to land use from a 
productivity and cultural perspective and, for the Resistance, a platform for activity and 
refuge; Stephen Badsey’s overview of the opportunities and threats posed by the Normandy 
                                                          
4
 Hoskins, W.G. The Making of the English Landscape (London, 1955). Rackham, O. The History of 
the Countryside (London, 1986) p.26. Rackham observes that the seventy years between 1870 and 
1940 and even the Second World War itself were less destructive to the countryside than any five 
years since.  
5
 Schofield, J., Modern Military Matters: Studying and Managing the Twentieth-Century Defence 
Heritage in Britain: a Discussion Document (York, 2004).   
6
 Dobinson, C. Twentieth Century Fortifications in England Volume II: Anti-invasion defences of 
WWII (Council for British Archaeology, York, 1996);  Vol. VI.1–2 Coast Artillery: England’s Fixed 
Defences Against the Warship (York, 2000);  Vol IX 1 Airfield Themes - Studies in the evolution of 
Britain’s military airfields, 1918-45 (English Heritage report, 2000);  Vol X Airfield Defences - 
Policy and fabric for the ground defence of airfields 1940-45 (English Heritage, 2000); Foot, W.,  
Beaches, fields, streets, and hills - the anti-invasion landscapes of England, 1940 (English Heritage 
and Council for British Archaeology , York, 2005) 
3 
 
terrain in 1944, positing that terrain had a significant and hitherto overlooked impact upon the 
conduct of both sides in the campaign; and Passmore, Tunwell and Harrison’s study of the 
forgotten landscape of German 7
th
 Army supply depots in the forests of north-west 
Normandy. This last study makes the point that conflict landscapes are often obscured or 
obliterated by post-war reconstruction, urbanisation or agriculture but that those located in 
historic forests have remained relatively unchanged; their obscurity also explaining the lack 
of inclusion in battlefield tours and tourist guides, a characteristic shared by U.K.’s and 
Norfolk’s anti-invasion landscapes.
7
 Conversely, these three examples are examples of 
conflict landscapes, that is, where direct confrontation between military protagonists took 
place, whereas this thesis investigates a landscape of military preparation. The distinction is 
not pedantic; the point is that the Norfolk landscape could have, in 1940, become the focus of 
active conflict, but transitioned subsequently to one of military preparation.  
 
Given the significant impact of wartime exigency on the agricultural landscape, examples of 
the co-existence between agriculture and the military are rare. William Foot’s investigation of 
the impact of the military on British agriculture is comprehensive and thorough but presents a 
national, rather than regional perspective.
8
 Martin and Langthaler’s comparison between 
wartime and post-war agricultural practice in Britain and Austria appears unique in 
contrasting wartime and post-war agricultural practice across two quite distinct countries.
9
 By 
contrast, Woodward’s concept of militarised geographies as the legitimisation of control of 
civilian spaces by advanced capitalist economies focuses on the later twentieth and early 
                                                          
7
 Pearson, C. Scarred landscapes : War and Nature in Vichy France (Basingstoke, 2008); Badsey, S. 
‘Terrain as a Factor in the Battle of Normandy, 1944’ in Doyle and Bennett (eds.)  Fields of Battle- 
Terrain in Military History (Dordrecht, 2002) pp.345-363; Passmore, D., Tunwell, D., Harrison, S. 
‘Landscapes of Logistics: The Archaeology and Geography of WWII German Military Supply Depots 
in Central Normandy, North-West France’ in Journal of Conflict Archaeology 8, 2013, Issue 3 
pp.165-192 
8
 Foot, W. The Impact of the military on the agricultural landscape of Britain in the Second World 
War (MPhil thesis, University of Sussex, 1998) and Foot, W. ‘The Impact of the military on 
the agricultural landscape of England and Wales in the Second World War’ in Short, B., 
Watkins, C. and Martin, J. (eds.) The front line of freedom – British Farming in the Second 
World War Agricultural History Review Supplementary Series 4 (British Agricultural History 
Society, Exeter, 2006) pp. 132-142 
9
 Martin, J. and Langthaler, E. ‘Paths to Productivism: Agricultural Regulation in the Second World 
War and its Post War Legacy in Great Britain and German-Annexed Austria’ (2009)   
https://www.kuleuven.be/icag/files/John_Martin_Ernst_Langthaler.pdf (accessed 13 August 2018) 
4 
 
twenty-first centuries; it does however offer relevant discourse on the theme of military 




Launched in 2005, the Journal of Conflict Archaeology in its first editorial suggested that 
battlefield archaeology had gained popularity and academic credibility in very recent years, 
evidenced by major conferences in Britain, Europe and the U.S.A.  Concern was however 
expressed for a lack of respect for more modern sites.
11
  A recent study makes the point that 
archaeology can indeed add to local and regional interpretation of strategies of the Second 
World War, and demonstrated that buildings and structures were often products of local 




Landscape history - an inter-disciplinary approach 
Landscape history is the study of the impact of human activity upon the natural environment; 
how communities, agriculture, industry and commerce have changed the landscape and been 
directed by it. The landscape provides both opportunity and constraint; it may facilitate or 
complicate human endeavour. Its study is inter-disciplinary, being most closely associated 
with archaeology but crossing into social and cultural history, ecology, geology and 
environmental studies. It combines the study of standing structures – extant and lost – with 
documentary sources in examining the relationships between their intended function and the 
physical evidence in their environment. Dispositions and networks of monuments can 
represent powerful evidence in their own right that aid understanding of historical processes 
and narratives.
13
 Human activity in the present is invariably influenced by what has been 
inherited from the past. Patterns of settlement, urban and rural, agricultural and industrial 
processes all inform perceptions of landscape and local and regional identity. Studies have 
however often focused on regional and local themes in isolation, separated from the national 
and international perspective. Few studies have integrated the micro and macro issues, that is, 
the local with the regional, directed by the national, to give historical context. The close 
association between landscape history and other disciplines offers the opportunity to utilise 
                                                          
10
 Woodward, R.I. Military Geographies (London, 2004) 
11
 Pollard, T. and Banks. I. ‘Why a Journal of Conflict Archaeology and Why Now?’ in Journal of 
Conflict Archaeology, 1:1, iii-vii 
12
 Liddiard, R. and Sims, D. ‘A Piece of Coastal Crust’ in History (Journal of the Historical 
Association) Vol.97, 327 pp.402-430 
13
 Liddiard, R. and Sims, D. A Very Dangerous Locality – The landscape of the Suffolk Sandlings in 
the Second World War (Woodbridge, 2018) p.1 
5 
 
documentary sources, archaeological evidence, cartography and geographic information 
datasets to give cross-referenced interpretation and corroboration. Landscape studies have 
tended to explore pre-historical and medieval periods rather than the modern era. Perhaps the 
perceived lack of archaeology has been a deterrent; the reality is, however, that there is no 
shortage of structures that inform and instruct. The absence and importance of modern 
military studies has been recognised in recent years and English Heritage is of the opinion 





A landscape history of the Second World War has yet to be written and would be a vast 
undertaking in covering all theatres of the war. This thesis aims to explore ways in which it 
might realistically be approached at a regional level, an effective way of studying the range of 
inter-related material and physical evidence. County-based studies have a pedigree in 
landscape research and Norfolk has characteristics which make it eminently interesting for 
study.
15
 As a landscape it is diverse, encompassing heaths, marshlands, claylands, coastline, 
expansive waterways and variable topography, contained within two thousand square miles 
of the fifth largest English county. Each variation is characterised by different historic 
structure and evolution of land use. Wartime changes in these sub-regional variations 
impacted differently according to top-down directive and the constraints of the land itself.  
 
Norfolk was historically an area of the English coastline vulnerable to invasion from across 
the North Sea. The twentieth century in particular saw the county utilised by the military for 
training purposes, airfields and, during both world wars, for the construction and deployment 
of anti-invasion measures.
16
 Strategically the location on the east coast presented a threat 
followed by an opportunity; the first, an exposed coastline which made it highly vulnerable to 
invasion between 1939 and 1941 and, the second, proximity to the continent for the 
                                                          
14
 Schofield, J., Modern Military Matters: Studying and Managing the Twentieth-Century Defence 
Heritage in Britain: a Discussion Document (York, 2004) p.5 
15
 Wade Martin, S. A History Of Norfolk (Chichester, 1984, 1997); Dymond, D. The Norfolk 
Landscape (Bury St Edmunds, 1990); Williamson, T. England’s Landscapes: East Anglia (London, 
2006); Wade Martin, S. and Williamson, T. The Countryside of East Anglia: Changing Landscapes 
1870-1950 (Woodbridge, 2008) pay particular attention to the variations in landscape and their 
associated characteristics of human activity. 
16
 Kent, P. Fortifications of East Anglia (Lavenham, 1988); Osborne, M. Defending Norfolk- the 
Military Landscape from Pre-history to the Present (Croydon, 2015) offer a sound pre-cursor to, as 
well as a chronology throughout, the twentieth-century. 
6 
 
Combined Bomber Offensive from 1942 to 1945. The county is not unique in being heavily 
militarised during the Second World War but the landscape history approach can present 
aspects of Norfolk that, firstly, differentiate the area from other English regions and, 
secondly, help explain how military structures relate to the wider national wartime context. 
The physical remains are numerous but vulnerable, perhaps more so than archaeological 
artefacts from earlier periods of history and, whilst this thesis will primarily assess the 
wartime and post-war impact of the military presence, there are strong elements of cultural 
and regional identity, sense of place, heritage and commemoration that populate the narrative. 
Norfolk, already an important agricultural region, was heavily subject to the wartime food 
production campaign at the same time as the military was requiring land for airfields, training 
and defence sites. This thesis explores the conflict in this county by investigating six different 
themes of wartime activity, not usually discussed together but all of which agglomerated to 
bring about many irreversible changes in the landscape and accelerate others which had 
already begun. 
 
These six themes are concurrent, contemporaneous and closely interlinked operationally. 
Each has distinctive characterisation however and their historiographies, though not mutually 
exclusive, are best addressed individually. Each chapter following therefore carries its own 
individual historiography in preference to a generic historiography in this introductory 
chapter. 
 
The geo-political chronology of the war impacted Norfolk with different emphases 
throughout the duration. Broadly the years 1939 to 1941 were characterised by defensive 
operations. However, 1942 to 1945 saw a radical swing to offensive operations. Chapter Two 
assesses the anti-invasion defence landscape along the Norfolk coast and across the interior in 
the early years and the gradual withdrawal from and abandonment of those defences. Chapter 
Three reviews the extent of the airfield building programme, which expanded exponentially 
through to 1944, with particular emphasis on the quantity of agricultural land subsumed by 
new airfield sites. Of all standing structures in the landscape, airfields are the most prominent 
and have left a heavy footprint across the county’s landscape. They are also those which have 
most frequently been put to alternative post-war use, principally agriculture, commerce and 
light industry. Chapter Four looks at military training areas; Norfolk had been used for army 
training exercises from before the First World War but specific sites proved ideal for training 
in modern mechanised warfare from 1941 onwards; issues of population displacement arose 
7 
 
which are still controversial in the twenty-first century. Logistics are explored in Chapter 
Five; nationally, the railway network was put under enormous strain for the duration. In 
Norfolk the need for the delivery of vast quantities of construction materials and storage of 
ordnance placed very particular pressure on the rail and road network, requiring enhancement 
of existing infrastructure. Chapter Six explores to what extent country houses were subjected 
to requisitioning for military purposes throughout the war across Britain. They are here 
accorded a chapter of their own because of their profusion across Norfolk, being a significant 
feature of the history of land ownership in the county more so than most other English 
counties. It is generally held that the war contributed greatly to their demise but other factors 
were already at play throughout the twentieth century. The final theme, in Chapter Seven, is 
agriculture. It is analogous for, in Norfolk, an already highly agricultural county, farmers 
were to experience the demand from government to bring in more land to increase food 
production for the war effort, and also faced potential requisitioning of land from the Air 
Ministry and War Office for land for airfields and training areas. The conclusion of the thesis 
will revisit the outcomes of the preceding chapters, and the longer-term legacies in terms of 
how much the Second World War did, or did not, create the modern landscape of Norfolk. 
Given that landscape history is inter-disciplinary, the conclusion will also briefly visit 
important themes that emerged post-war and continue to evolve – commemoration, 
environmentalism, popular culture and collective memory. Finally, it is worth noting that 
other typologies of standing structures such as decoy airfields, Q, K and Starfish sites, Diver 
anti-aircraft sites, airfield defence, radar installations and searchlight deployment have not 
been overlooked – they are beyond the scope of this thesis in investigating the six main 
themes. 
 
Methodology and sources 
Cartography is an essential element of landscape study. Pre-war land-use survey maps, 
historic Ordnance Survey and military maps and official site plans provide helpful 
comparisons for placing archaeology and events within measurable timescales. The pre-war 
Land Utilisation Survey of Great Britain comprises a detailed study of land use in the 1930s, 
based originally on six-inch (1:10560) field maps and subsequently published using one-inch 
(1:63360) Ordnance Survey base maps; these are valuable for comparison against the 
8 
 
R.A.F.’s 1946 aerial photographic survey.
17
 Vertical and oblique aerial photographs held at 
Norfolk County Council’s Historic Environment Service are also helpful for feature 
identification and date comparison. Secondary literature proves a useful source of detailed 
typologies and location references when compiled as databases to inform the creation of 
Geographic Information System maps.
18
 These are utilised in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 to 
illustrate, respectively, anti-invasion defences, airfield distribution, military training areas, 
key logistical locations and, where appropriate, road and rail networks.  Air Ministry, War 
Office and Ministry of Agriculture documents at the National Archives demonstrate the 
nature of liaison between the government departments and other agencies. They also show on 
occasion that simply because a directive is set out in a document does not necessarily mean it 
appears exactly so on the ground. Norfolk Record Office holds fewer records, primarily 
agricultural. Army unit war diaries and R.A.F. operations books record primarily the 
chronology of military activity along with insight into local interpretation of higher strategy 
such as defence plans, unit locations, dispositions and changes in strategic thinking. It was 
often middle-ranking officers who implemented strategic decisions, equipped with some local 
knowledge and an awareness of the resources immediately available to them. Divisional and 
battalion war diaries are informative, cascading to local level; company diaries are especially 
good in offering anecdotal local evidence.  
 
Militarised landscapes 
The relationship between terrain and the military is symbiotic. Landscapes contain the 
entirety of features that pre-exist, regardless of their relevance to military purpose. It is the 
terrain within the landscape which is important to the military and battlegrounds have 
historically been chosen for their topography favourable to attacker or defender. At an 
anthropological level, the soldier and airman have been taught to understand the ground, to 
become familiar with its attributes. Doyle and Bennett assert that terrain is closely connected 
to human interaction and is therefore multidisciplinary in nature.
19
  This succinctly validates 
the landscape history approach to militarised landscapes. Two levels of engagement are 
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described; strategic and tactical, each of which may be interpreted in the context of this thesis 
as national policy and local implementation. This is pertinent to the aims of this thesis, for 
Norfolk’s militarised landscape in the Second World War was initially that of defence and, 
later, of offensive operations. Technically it was a landscape of military preparation, but 
militarised nevertheless.  Additionally, a more appropriate term, in the sense of competition 
for priorities in land use in a period of national and local crisis might be contested landscape. 
The military, with authority and even force, could over-ride the interests of local populations 
but oft-times worked by consensus, and at other were thwarted or directed by the landscape 
itself. The concept includes all aspects of militarisation and military influence, from physical 
sites to their impact on the natural, agricultural and commercial environments, to the 
influence of military personnel on the personality or character of places and landscape. It is 




Culture and memory are powerful impactors on the way the recent past is viewed and 
remembered by civilians, service veterans and later generations. Locations occupied by 
military units often acquire characteristics that reflect their presence and the heritage industry 
has given impetus to the representation and commemoration of the Second World War.
21
 
Memory and culture are closely connected to senses of community and identity in the 
landscape. Nowhere, in the context of this thesis is this more keenly felt than in relation to the 
human cost associated with airfields, and recent research by Edwards and others has given 
more precise understanding to this popular and very human aspect of the wartime 
experience.
22
 These subjects are explored briefly in the thesis as a further aspect of landscape 
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In September 1939, the area of land occupied by the army was 235,000 acres.
24
 By June 
1944, 3.5 million military personnel were sharing the land with the civilian population, and 
11.5 million acres were directly or indirectly under military control – twenty per-cent of the 
total British land surface.
25
 Ironically the extended military occupation of some locations has 
by default protected archaeology, flora and fauna that might otherwise have been destroyed 
by modern development and intensive agriculture.  
 
Requisitioning and the legislative framework 
The war years saw an unprecedented level of state intervention in everyday activity and the 
requisitioning of land and property is a major theme throughout this thesis. A range of far-
reaching legislation governed military and civilian life.  Land and buildings were 
requisitioned for airfields, battle training areas, accommodation, oil pipelines, anti-invasion 
defence areas and variety of support infrastructure services. As will be seen, the need for land 
for military use often conflicted with that required for increased food production.  
 
The legislative measure that brought about the most dramatic change in land use was the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, previous powers having been reliant upon legislation 
dating back to 1842. The associated Compensation (Defence) Act 1939 provided for loss of 
rent or income or damage caused whilst under occupation. Other powers were enacted 
subsequently to acquire land for government use and support the war effort, notably the 
Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1944. The durational Defence Regulations, all 
prefixed ‘DR’, established measures such as the establishment of protected zones to which 
civilian access could be denied, the removal of persons or property, the prevention of trespass 
on agricultural land and the ability for any authorised person to enter any land or property for 
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The regulations most relevant to this thesis are DR50, allowing entry onto land to facilitate 
the prosecution of the war without formal requisition; DR51, enabling the requisitioning of 
land, primarily for military purposes, by force if necessary and, with provision under the 
Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1945, to be permanently acquired; and DR52, 
allowing land to be used for military purposes but from which civilians were not necessarily 
excluded.
27
  These three were the most frequently enacted upon by the War Office and the 
Air Ministry on behalf of the Army and R.A.F respectively. DR51 was the most draconian 
and is that which applied to airfield sites and led to the long-term controversy over the 
civilian evacuation of the Stanford Battle Training Area.
28
  In addition, DR16 related to the 
stopping-up of highways and public rights of way and DR50 allowed entry onto land to 
facilitate the prosecution of the war without formal requisition.
 
The course of the war also 
informed post-war legislation such as the Requisitioned Land and War Works Acts 1945 and 
1948.  Towards the end of the war and post-war the Ministry of Works dealt with the 
derequisitioning of property and compensation claims, disposal of surplus buildings and 
stores, and the removal of temporary defence works, and some land was retained permanently 
for military use in a new international geo-political environment. 
 
Formal requisitioning documentation exists at the National Archives for just six English 
counties, not including the eastern counties; the remainder are lost. The Ministry of Works’ 
central register of accommodation of 1938 formed the basis of the requisitioning of land and 
buildings for the army, navy, R.A.F. and civil service departments. County War Agricultural 
Executive Committees were empowered to direct agricultural production and, where 
necessary, take possession of land to improve its productivity. In total, some 14.5 million 
acres of land, 25 million square feet of industrial and 113,350 non-industrial premises were 
requisitioned in Britain during the Second World War. The War Office alone requisitioned 
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This introduction does not seek to offer a rigid template for similar research in other English 
counties. Rather it explains the methodology and rationale behind the perspectives adopted in 
the following chapters, employing archival, documentary, cartographic, photographic and 
interpretative evidence to understand how the landscape of Norfolk was impacted upon by 
wartime exigencies. The assessment of human activity and standing monuments offers the 
opportunity to observe how contemporaneous functions of war interacted in a shared 
geographic environment. It is helpful to consider throughout the thesis the context of the 
militarised landscape not as a single short event in one location but as an ongoing, organic, 
longer term phenomenon. This will become apparent as the following chapters examine, in 
turn, anti-invasion defences, airfields, training areas, logistics and infrastructure, country 
houses and agriculture and their inter-relationships in the rural landscape. 
 





Chapter 2 – Anti-Invasion Defences 
 
Introduction 
Britain’s Second World War anti-invasion defences are most closely associated with the 
highly vulnerable period of the summer of 1940, though vigilance against invasion ensured 
their operational history lasted a further three years, before eventual decline through 
obsolescence. Continued threat of invasion prompted continued investment in, and 
consolidation of, local anti-invasion defences through to 1943, followed by abandonment, 
‘care and maintenance’ and in some cases, dismantling, in the light of changing priorities. 
The varied pattern of construction and removal leads ultimately, post-war, to a highly 
dispersed and visually unconnected relict landscape, apparently randomly scattered across the 
interior, but with more obvious presence along isolated parts of the coastline.  
This chapter will address the impact of the wide variety of anti-invasion defence works on 
Norfolk’s coastal and rural landscape, the topography of which rendered it strategically 
vulnerable as an invasion route to the rest of the British mainland.  A focus on the strategies 
that determined their distribution, and their chronology, will serve to place their deployment 
and use in the national military context. Their short service life, subsequent abandonment 
and, in many cases, swift demolition, resulted in physical isolation in the landscape, and a 
lack of understanding about their true function and connectivity. An overview of the rationale 
behind the rapid response to the invasion threat and then the longer term strategy will assess 
the significance of defence structures upon the wartime and post-war landscape. G.I.S. 
mapping of the disposition of stop-lines, nodal defence points, pill-boxes and coastal artillery 
batteries across the Norfolk landscape, together with reference to supporting documentation, 
will illustrate where strategic points were prioritised and natural defensive features utilised, 
and where vulnerable terrain required protection. Whilst many secondary sources cover 
defensive typologies in detail, an overview of their use and function is needed to understand 
their inter-relationships. This chapter discusses home defence, then regional and local 
strategy, incorporating a case study which will show the character of a particular locality as 






The official war history is clear about national strategy and the chronology of defence 
measures but carries little local detail; the regional and local stop lines, for example, are 
hardly mentioned, nor are they mapped, despite their crucial importance to the anti-invasion 
strategy.
1
 This oversight in the official history may go some way to explaining decades of 
misunderstanding about the locations of these early-war linear defences. The War Diaries of 
corps, divisional hierarchies, brigade, battalion and company units and fort record books, held 
at the National Archives, contain detailed operational orders which give helpful insight into 
the local implementation of grand strategy. They also include sporadic listings of locations of 
unit headquarters, offering a useful indicator that more country estates and houses were 
occupied, albeit for very brief periods, than might generally have been thought or recorded.
2
 
Some nominally populist publications are thorough and well-researched. Henry Wills’ book 
from the 1980s initiated interest in the subject matter though much corrective detail has been 
added since.
3
 Bird’s detailed categorisation a decade later offers a concise but thorough 
overview of Norfolk’s defences, supported by a comprehensive listing of sites.
4
 Kent’s 
history of East Anglian fortifications written in the 1980s features detailed information on the 
longer history of the county’s defences.
5
 Academic interest begins some forty years post-war, 
notably with the nationwide Defence of Britain project between 1995 and 2001.
6
 Dobinson’s 
examinations of anti-invasion measures and coastal artillery present detailed accounts of 
national and regional strategies, including Eastern Command within which Norfolk was 
situated.
7
 Dobinson’s work is very much drawn from high level War Diaries and Cabinet 
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Papers which had not thereto been investigated in such a connective methodology. Added 
detail and perspective is provided by William Foot’s extensive study, based very much on 
fieldwork, of sixty-seven localised sites across England in 1940; this work does broadly 
categorise the sites into coastal, stop line and area defence but, due to its broad national 
coverage, itemises just four sites in Norfolk in isolation rather than as part of a regional 




There is generally a tendency to focus either on national strategy, accompanied by gazetteers 
or, conversely, close study of localised survivals in isolation that do not necessarily elaborate 
on the significance of the structures in the wider, connected, militarised landscape. Osborne’s 
study of Norfolk from pre-history to the present stands apart as a useful guide to strategy and 
its implementation, as well as the structural typologies.
9
 There is however a dearth of 
analytical narrative about how the landscape itself informed, supported or hindered localised 
implementation of strategic decision-making process. The exceptions, which integrate 
archaeological, historic and societal aspects of a militarised landscape into a single study, are 
two recent studies by Liddiard and Sims, focused on the Suffolk coast.
10
 The Norfolk Record 
Office contains a number of large scale maps that record post-war surveys of defences along 
the coast, and correspondence relating to categorisation and potential removal of war works.
11
 
Background and context 
The East Anglian coast has historically been a popular potential site for invasion from 
mainland Europe and anti-invasion defences had been built along Britain’s coastline since the 
sixteenth century. The twentieth century saw a steady chronology of militarisation but the 
scale and speed of coastal and inland defence construction was, in 1940, given a sense of 
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urgency presented by the modern threat of mid-twentieth-century technology, offering new 
strategic options to the German invader in the form of combined seaborne and air assault. A 
curving salient of quiet coastline, from The Wash west of King’s Lynn to mid-way between 
Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft on the east made Norfolk a suitable focus for enemy invasion 
from the continent.  There are numerous hazardous landfalls; the Wash is shallow, and the 
north coast characterised by expansive areas of mudflats, saltmarsh and narrow, winding 
creeks, making swift inland progress difficult. Further east, extensive cliffs obstructed an 
easy landing, though offered secretive defiles at key points. Historically, Weybourne Hoop 
(Hope) was considered the most favourable landfall, with its deep water anchorage just off-
shore, wide flat beaches, along with direct access inland. Overall, much of the coast and 
immediate inland areas offered prime landfall access points, many made more vulnerable by 
the new combined technologies of air, sea and land attack.  
The first military presence heralding concerns about the coming war manifested itself in the 
establishment in 1937 of two anti-aircraft practice camps at Stiffkey and Weybourne. Local 
residents objected – and Sir Thomas Cook, MP for North Norfolk enquired about 
compensation for alleged loss of trade.
12
  Early radar stations appeared at the same time, a 
‘Chain Home’ site at West Beckham and another at Stoke Holy Cross.
13
  In September 1939 
the strategic threat was initially from Germany itself but from mid-1940 the occupation of the 
Low Countries and France shifted the primary threat to the south-eastern coast of Kent and 
Sussex, the most direct route across the English Channel.  East Anglia was nevertheless still 
highly vulnerable, for the gently undulating terrain of Norfolk offered fast access inland and 
thence south to London.
14
 Following eight months of the so-called Phoney War, during which 
time there were no sustained military actions in mainland western Europe, the geo-political 
and military map changed. Events moved rapidly after April 1940 with the German invasion 
of Denmark and Norway followed on May 10
th 
by the invasion of France and the 
Netherlands. The British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from Dunkirk in late May and, 
with the capitulation of France, the government and military now anticipated, imminently, an 
invasion of the British mainland.  By mid-1940 the Wehrmacht – or at least the Heer (Army) 
and Luftwaffe in combination - had demonstrated the remarkable speed and efficiency of its 
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Blitzkrieg strategy; there seemed little the Germans could not achieve, given they were 
prepared to accept high initial manpower losses. 
 
Home defence strategy - linear versus all-round defence 
Construction of anti-invasion defences had begun in earnest in early 1940 under General Sir 
Walter Kirke who understood the importance of mobile defence and, understandably prior to 
the fall of France and the Low Countries, feared an invasion via East Anglia.
15
 However, the 
most intense period of construction began under the direction of his replacement, General Sir 
Edmund Ironside – with whom the defences are most closely, though not in terms of his 
length of tenure, associated.  Even before the formal announcement of his appointment on 
27
th
 May Ironside had formulated a plan of ‘defence in depth’, consolidating an existing 
series of defence lines across the country intended to successively delay an invader. The 
following month saw the creditably fast construction of static defences, transforming 
extensive areas of coastline – the ‘coastal crust’ - and inland areas of stop lines and 
demolition lines into a prepared battlefield.
16
 The plan was based on the increasingly outdated 
premise of linear, static defence which, to be fair, Ironside himself recognised but, with a 




‘The general plan of defence is a combination of mobile columns and static  
defence by means of strong points and 'stops'. As static defence only provides  
limited protection of the most vulnerable points, it must be supplemented by the  
action of mobile columns. However mobile such columns may be, they cannot be  
expected to operate immediately over the whole area in which it is possible for  
the enemy to attempt invasion by sea or air. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt  
measures for confounding his action until such time as mobile columns can arrive  
to deal with him. This will be done by means of 'stops' and. strong points prepared  
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for all-round defence at aerodromes, which are necessary to prevent the enemy  
obtaining air superiority, at the main centres of communication, and distributed  
in depth over a wide area covering London and the centres of production and 
            supply. This system of 'stops' and strong points will prevent the enemy from  





The rather bellicose and superior final sentence detracts from the fact that resources available 
to Ironside were extremely limited, partly because the units were not front-line battle-ready 
troops but, more importantly, the British Expeditionary Force had abandoned huge numbers 
of tanks, vehicles and heavy weapons in France.
19
 Essentially Ironside had neither the 
number of troops nor were they sufficiently mobile. He realistically had little choice but to 
devise a system of static, linear defence, backed up by the few mobile reserves that were 
available. Detractors of ‘old-school’ strategy criticised the immobility of fixed defences. 
Static fortifications could be over-run, or simply circumvented, by a mobile enemy. Ironside 
was replaced on 19
th
 July by General Sir Alan Brooke, who advocated a more offensive 
strategy. Much has been made of apparently differing strategies between Ironside and 
Brooke, the latter benefiting from rapidly increasing material resources but the two strategies, 
though different, were not mutually exclusive. Ironside had envisaged a four-point plan for 
large-scale anti-invasion defences. First, airborne and amphibious assault would be defended 
by obstructions across potential landing grounds up to five miles inland; secondly, beach 
exits would be defended by pillboxes and mines; thirdly, linear pillbox defences would 
protect the beaches themselves; and finally, minefields would be sited across vulnerable 
beach areas.
20
 Contemporary wisdom envisaged the Germans moving inland at speed with 
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armoured vehicles. Recent continental experience had demonstrated that they kept to main 
roads. Therefore, locations where roads intersected were chosen as nodal defence points.  
 
The Coastal Crust and inland defences 
With the emphasis on air and naval defence between the wars, land-based coastal defence 
against invasion was paid little attention. With the rapidly deteriorating situation on the 
continent, a fast deployment of coastal gun batteries was instigated and on 19
th
 May 1940 the 
Navy formally advised GHQ Home Forces that it could supply suitable weapons.
21
 
Comprising naval guns drawn from First World War ships they were, though of older design, 
capable of delivering large-calibre shells up to ten miles seaward. Given that one hundred and 
twenty-five Emergency Coastal Defence Batteries were constructed around the English coast 
between the summer of 1940 and early 1942, and that they were the largest and most 
imposing typology within the genre of coastal defence structures, it is not surprising that they 





Supplementing these was the variety of obstacles and beach obstruction hurriedly emplaced 
around the coast in the summer of 1940. Minefields at sea, iron stakes at the water line, land 
mines laid on vulnerable beaches, together with tall ‘admiralty’ scaffolding hung with 
dannert (concertina-coiled) barbed wire, formed initial defensive barriers. Lines of concrete 
anti-tank obstacles were fixed in lines at vulnerable beach exits and further inland section of 
steel rail were positioned to obstruct vehicles. Flame barrages were installed, with fuel fed by 
pipe to the beaches, along with the traditional contrivance of flame fougasses at suitable 
defiles.  
 
A strategy characteristic of linear defence was the series of stop lines that were set out across 
England to delay, though not repel, the invader. Some of the early stop lines close to the 
Norfolk coast were, for example, clearly intended more as ‘demolition belts’ than defended 
                                                          
21
 TNA WO 166/11  War Dairy  GHQ Home Forces (Coast Artillery), 19 May 1940 
22
 Dobinson, C. Twentieth Century Fortifications in England Vol. VI.1–2 Coast Artillery: 





  The Corps Lines inland were more strategic, with the General Headquarters (GHQ) 
Line being most heavily defended.  An important distinction between Ironside’s linear 
defence strategy and that of Brooke’s emphasis on all-round defence and mobility was, 
firstly, greater emphasis on nodal points – key towns, village and strategic crossing points on 
road, rivers and railways and secondly, on reinforcement of coastal areas whilst reducing 
isolated fixed-point defences inland. The word ‘ubiquitous’ can perhaps be over-used, but 
aptly describes the number and variety of pill-boxes that still stand along the cliffs of the 
English coast with many more strategically distributed across the interior. They have a 
precise purpose and were not intended to operate as isolated features but their operational life 
was short.
24
 The prevention of troop-carrying aircraft landing and, or, taking off again was a 
variable measure. Open fields and long, straight stretches of road within five miles of 
airfields were obstructed initially, later to include areas within five miles of the coastline. 
Based on the minimum landing distances required for German transport aircraft, fields and 
straight roads of more than five hundred yards were obstructed. Any reasonable resource was 
employed – post and stakes, scaffolding, trenching and old motor vehicles; farmers were even 
encouraged to build haystacks in the centres of fields.
25
 
Throughout this chapter the defence features have been mapped using Geographic 
Information System methodology to demonstrate not just their general distribution but also 
the importance of key strategic points. Mapping helps distinguish between the sometimes 
nebulous physical nature of the stop lines and the longer duration of the built structures. It 
also identifies areas where pillboxes existed in greater or lesser profusion, indicating where a 
modified strategy was implemented. For example, one of the earliest stop lines in north-east 
Norfolk is well-served by pillboxes installed in a linear manner; a stop line in the south-east 
of the county markedly lacks them. Whilst it is not necessary to explore the well-documented 
variety of pillbox typology, some variants occur more frequently in particular locations. and 
G.I.S. mapping assists meaningful interpretation of feature distribution. Fig.1 is the base layer 
map which will be used throughout this and following chapters. 
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Fig.1 Base map. The county boundary appears to encompass offshore waters at several 
northern and north-eastern locations. This is accurate, denoting areas of very shallow water 
and mudflats which technically are part of the local authority land base. 
 
Linear defence based on static fixtures was soon, then, to be rejected. From August 1940 
building work on the GHQ line was greatly reduced, and a new strategy of all-round defence 
at key nodal points such as road and river crossings was instigated.
26
  Frontline locations 
were to be manned by highly mobile units with armour and artillery support and anti-tank 
obstacles were now rejected as preventing the fast raid movement of defenders. Constraints 
on the supply of concrete and steel were a pragmatic factor although pillboxes had already 
been constructed in great numbers across Eastern Command which had been accorded less 
than half the cement needed to build the pillboxes and anti-tank obstacles called for in 
Ironside’s plans.
27
 Mobility was the key to successful defence.  
This overview of the form and function of national defence structures has set the scene for a 
detailed explanation of the implementation of anti-invasion defences across Norfolk. The key 
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features of Ironside’s strategy as it applied to East Anglia were the series of coastal defences, 
thence via stop lines and nodal points, the aim being to slow down the enemy’s advance at 
each stage to allow mobile reserves time to move forward to engage. 
 
The Norfolk military district 
Militarily, England was divided into eight regional commands. Norfolk was included in 
Eastern Command which in 1940 encompassed an area much greater than East Anglia; it 
reached as far as the south coast at Newhaven in Sussex, with its northernmost boundary 
covering The Wash on the west side of Norfolk. East Anglia was, in early June 1940, under 
the command of 12 (XII) Corps, replaced by 2 (II) Corps on 28
th
 June 1940, comprising 
Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Bedfordshire, headquartered at Madingley 
Hall near Cambridge.
28
  Under 2 Corps was 18
th
 Division in forward areas of Norfolk, with 
52
nd
 Division in reserve. Eastern Command was too big, and too differentiated. Ironside 
observed that it comprised 11,200 square miles.
29
 Kent and Sussex faced short-distance 
invasion from across the English Channel, whilst Norfolk faced the German-occupied 
continent, was less densely populated and more suitable for airborne assault and re-supply. 
The two sectors were restructured only after most of the defence systems had been built, but 
it helped formulate strategy through into 1941.
30
 The differing topographies, road networks 
and population densities must have been a governing factor, as would re-supply issues for the 
invader. Vigilance did not decrease into the winter of 1940, there being ‘no closed season of 
the year for invasion.’
31
 Construction work was carried out by private local builders as well 
as military engineering companies, overseen by larger civil contractors and Royal Engineer 
officers respectively. Progress was reported up the command chain to GHQ Home Forces for 
monitoring of expenditure and materials consumption.
32
 The work programme in Eastern 
Command far outpaced that of other regions by the end of July 1940, with nearly two-thirds 
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of pillboxes in situ by that time.
33
 Norfolk in fact saw the highest density of pillboxes of any 
sector, with Eastern Command building an average of eleven pillboxes per mile of beach, 




Local strategy and implementation 
Each army formation at division level was required to formulate a detailed defence plan. The 
function of 18
th
 Division, to which the work of defending Norfolk fell, was confirmed 
unequivocally in G.O.C. Major-General Bernard Paget’s note to commanders on 26
th
 May 
1940.   
 
‘The role of the 18
th
 Division and attached troops is clear:  we do all in our  
power to hold up a hostile invasion by air and by sea and impose as much  
loss and delay as possible on the enemy. THERE WILL BE NO WITHDRAWAL  





Tactically, an infantry division, in this case 18
th
 Division, might be expected to defend a 
linear front of five or six miles, perhaps ten at most.  A conservative estimate of the coastal 
frontage covered in mid-1940 by 18
th
 Division from Guy's Head, west of King’s Lynn, to 
Lowestoft, Suffolk is approximately ninety miles.
36
 This, even aside for the woeful lack of 
armour and weaponry illustrates the near impossibility of defending the entire coastline in a 
linear manner, a more pragmatic strategy being mobile defence, as favoured by Brooke.   
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          Fig.2: 18
th
 Division from Guy’s Head to Thetford and Lowestoft, indicating Sector    






Beach Reconnaissance 1940 
The importance in the early summer of 1940 of understanding the vulnerability of the 
Norfolk coast to enemy invasion was not underestimated. On 18
th 
June GHQ’s 
Reconnaissance Unit undertook a thorough survey and its report is instructive in 
contemporary appreciation not just of areas requiring defensive measures but also topography 
that could be exploited, for example, narrow defiles that could facilitate heavy defensive fire 




In summary the eastern coastline featured beaches suitable for landing craft but not aircraft 
and vehicle exits that were easily blocked, although the hinterland to the south offered 
potential aircraft landing grounds.  Great Yarmouth was vulnerable and main road exits were 
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available to north, south and west but the river and marshy countryside restricted vehicles to 
roads. Breydon Water offered good landing for seaplanes but would be blocked. Further 
north were high sand dunes and cliffs. Free exit from the dunes to the flat, featureless 
countryside was a clear hazard however, made worse by gaps in cliffs. Tanks could make 
good speed across country until hitting the Rivers Bure and Thurne several miles inland. 
‘Taking into consideration the long stretches of coast with no or few exits for  
vehicles, the general nature of the hinterland, and the restricted sphere for tank  
operations due to marshy country and large areas of inland water, the section  
would appear to be an unlikely objective for this form of attack… Light  
vehicles also could be disembarked at almost any point except where a few local  
offshore obstructions exist. It is also vulnerable to infantry landing by seaplane  




Deep water channels along the northern coast presented landing opportunities and were 
therefore the most vulnerable of all. Inland was assessed as first class tactical country. 
Generally, the flat terrain inland could be negotiated by AFVs and the Broads provided 
opportunities for sea- or floatplanes. The cuttings and embankments of the Norfolk and 
Suffolk Joint Railway provided excellent obstacles inland however.  North Norfolk’s 
characteristic creeks, shifting channels and salt marsh would be difficult to negotiate. Finally, 




Admiral Dreyer had made recommendations in early June, in particular, the removal of a 
section of Cromer Pier to make it useless to the enemy.
41
 Later that month he expressed 
concern that the pier was still intact, recommending demolition charges being set. He added 
that ‘The Wash is in my opinion a dangerous area which we must be prepared to deny to the 
enemy.’
42
 Ships of 12 to 15 feet draught were deemed able to navigate anywhere over the 
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shore of The Wash at or near high water. Even aside from direct assault, the enemy could 
land near Skegness and rush The Wash area with shallow draft motor boats laden with troops, 
and open sluices at Boston to flood the countryside to the south to block defenders moving to 
engage. The Dock Master at Lynn wrote of shallow draught Dutch vessels whose masters 
knew well the channels all along the coast; others reported similar skills of German captains 
with fast boats that could carry tanks and troops.
 
Snettisham Beach was thought an even 
better choice, for a fast run to RAF Bircham and Sandringham.  Inland topography was not 
ignored in the reconnaissance report – it was suggested that the enemy securing the high 
ground in West Norfolk could facilitate disembarkation of airborne troops. Conversely, larger 
craft would have to lie six to eight miles offshore from high water mark, with light craft then 
being needed to off-load vehicles into shallow water. The small creeks and tidal scourings 
would present obstacles, though would not stop infantry.; and enemy military objectives 
might actually be limited if the bridges over the Ouse and Welland were blown by 
defenders.
43
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  Fig.3  Red markers indicate coastline deemed highly vulnerable to seaborne landing in 1940    
 
 
Ongoing preparation against the invasion threat 
2 Corps’ War Diary for December 1940 assessed the invasion threat as follows:  
‘…he is most likely to aim at obtaining a high degree of air superiority in  
the first instance.  He is likely to land parachutists to capture landing  
grounds for the airborne troops … The possibility of landings from gliders…  





Landing of tanks was, logically, said to require a port or suitable beach, and light tanks might 
even be landed by air. There were reported to be large numbers of flat-bottomed barges at 
moorings in Dutch ports, capable of transporting two to three hundred men below deck.  The 
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possible scale of invasion was thought to be between ten and fifteen thousand troops in one 




If anything, the anticipation of invasion had not receded after the Battle of Britain, but 
intensified. 
Forward units such as 18
th
 Division were responsible for defending, in order of priority, 
fighter aerodromes, beaches, bomber airfields, vulnerable points and nodal points en route to 
London.
46
 Aerodromes covered by 18
th
 Division were Watton, Swanton Morley, Coltishall, 
Horsham St Faiths, Bodney, Matlaske, Oulton and East Wretham. All troops were required to 
be prepared for all round defence, whatever locality they might be defending.  2 Corps H.Q. 
noted that: 
‘Lack of opportunity for training in mobile warfare and paucity in both numbers  
and equipment make a somewhat static defence necessary on the part of troops  
of forward divisions. There can be no question of withdrawal on the part of any  
troops detailed to hold specific defences. Such troops will hold on to the end.’ 
47
    
 
The combination of winter flooding and dykes being breached called for anti-flood 
precautions, with pioneer companies being charged with the responsibility of maintaining or 
repairing flood defences. There was always danger of winter flooding in the Fens, now added 
to by the possibility of dykes being breached by bombing, the most vulnerable area being the 
River Ouse northwards from Denver Sluice north to Wiggenhall St Germans.
 48
 In the event 
the flooding crisis never arose. The flooding of inland areas would of course have presented 
difficulties for both invader and defender. Main roads with straight runs of 600 yards and 90 
feet clear width to the sides were deemed vulnerable as potential landing grounds. Roads 
could be obstructed by wires 20 feet above ground at 150 yard intervals. The vulnerability of 
open water, especially to seaplanes, was emphasised in the precise instruction that: 
‘The Broads Flotilla will engage any enemy who land on or approach  
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 August 1941, 2 Corps Troops RE Operation Instruction 
No.4 of 1941 SECRET 9 June 1941   
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the rivers Bure, Yare, Waveney, Thurne and broads leading off except  




Little, if any, documentation of the Broads Flotilla exists, despite it being an enterprising 
local initiative in direct response to the risks posed by local landforms. Photographs show 
mixed army and naval crews and the craft moving at speed, armed with Lewis Guns. They 
were also active in mining and staking areas of open water. 
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                    Fig.5  Stop Lines in Norfolk, with pillboxes (all types) and coastal batteries 
31 
 
Emergency Coastal Defence Batteries 
The most prominent features of static defence along the Norfolk coastal crust were thirteen 
heavy gun emplacements, sited at strategic intervals between The Wash to the west and 
Gorleston to the east, to provide cover for vulnerable landing areas and harbours. Whilst 
Dobinson discusses the role of ECDBs nationally, some explanation of their regional 
disposition explains the placement strategy around Norfolk’s coastline. Hunstanton’s battery 
was operational by 6
th
 June, with King’s Lynn (Ongar Hill), Cromer, Sheringham, Winterton, 
Great Yarmouth, Brancaster, High Cape (Wells-next-the-Sea), Cley Eye, Mundesley and 
Happisburgh being emplaced by the end of the year. Their important role is emphasised by 
the fact that a thousand yards of ‘dead water’ lay below their muzzles – they were intended to 
engage the enemy’s larger craft even before a landing could be attempted. Most were sited to 
provide flexible or intersecting arcs of fire, as distinct from being sited directly within port 
locations. This relates to Dobinson’s assertion that the ECDBs were characteristic of linear 
defence rationale.
51
 The guns protecting Holkham Bay and Wells-next-the-Sea harbour, for 
example, were located on a small projection of land called High Cape; the site is well-
concealed even on RAF vertical aerial photographs of 1946. The battery at Ongar Hill was 
four linear kilometres from King’s Lynn’s central dock area but covered the long approach 
from The Wash. Unfortunately it was found that the guns could not be depressed far enough 
to engage a close target even at high tide; the guns were removed to Druridge Bay in 
Northumberland a year after installation.
52
  The majority were of 6-inch calibre, except those 
at Happisburgh (4.7 inch) and Winterton (4-inch). Hunstanton was operational by early June 
1940 and the physical size of the ECDBs is testament to the speed of their construction. Their 
morphology is well documented. Though not all were fully embrasured, brick and concrete 
gun-houses were eventually accorded to all of them. All were accompanied by a pair of 
powerful searchlights.  Bolted onto heavy duty baseplates in concrete plinths, each gun was 
connected to magazines and shelters by subterranean corridors.
53
 Outlying buildings included 
generator houses, observer’s post and accommodation, the latter either built especially or 
requisitioned. In the context of continuing defensive works through to 1942, most of the 
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batteries did not initially have reinforced concrete roofs built over them. Dobinson asserts 
that no two battery constructions were alike.
 54
 The design of the gun sites in Norfolk bears 
this out, some being of a nucleated type, with surface gun casements linked to underground 
ammunition magazines and crew compartments.
 55
 The remaining surface archaeology at 
Mundesley illustrates this well.  Others featured dispersed service buildings, the Ongar Hill 
battery notably being characterised by a tall observation tower that still stands, isolated but 
accessible, in the landscape. This particular archaeological feature is a prominent example of 
a building, now alone in the landscape, whose purpose is not generally understood. Though 
little remains of most of the gun houses along the coast , their localised impact should not be 
underestimated, each battery requiring a complement of perhaps one hundred and fifty troops, 
all requiring billeting nearby, and workshops and services areas close to.
56
 Camouflage was 
especially important for such big structures, granular textured paint and canvas strips proving 
especially effective. Dummy sites were built but unsurprisingly no remains survive, being 
largely constructed of timber.
57
 The batteries did not operate independently in the event of a 
major attack but were co-ordinated from a central communications HQ.  Mobile howitzers 
and field guns of differing calibres also provided off-shore capability. Mobile units by their 
nature tend not to leave a permanent footprint on the landscape but notable extant remains are 
the shell-proof gun houses for 6-inch guns at Nova Scotia Farm, Caister, covering the 
seaward approaches to Great Yarmouth. In December 1940 the anti-aircraft training site at 
Weybourne, though not technically part of the coastal crust defence scheme, had two 3.7-inch 
guns that could be directed onto enemy shipping as needed.
58
 The three distinctive 5.25-inch 
A.A. gun open platforms were not installed until after the invasion threat had receded.
59
 
Though all the batteries except Ongar Hill remained technically operational until the end of 
the war, most were staffed at care and maintenance standard only, considered unnecessary by 
1943 when the serious threat of invasion had receded.  
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Fig.6  6-inch ECDB on the east coast of England, 19
th
 July 1940 
60
    
               
    
         
Fig.7  Gun arcs, described in appended note as 12,000 yards, except for Winterton  
at 11,000 yds and the Gorleston batteries at 8,000 yards.
61
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Coastal Battery examples  – Winterton and Mundesley 
The battery was sited at sixty feet above mean sea level, 500 yards from the sea, with the 
guns themselves sited at the top of a 20 foot bank. The searchlights were located in sand 
dunes nearby, with a minefield between.
62
  A note on topography states:  
‘The surrounding country is extremely flat and with the exception of church  
 towers there are few prominent points.’ and later ‘the water is comparatively 
 shallow and numerous sandbanks abound. Only one entrance is suitable 
 for shallow draft boats and this only at suitable tides….The tide through 




This describes so much of the terrain inland of the east Norfolk coast. The battery’s arc of fire 
served its role as the close defence of the north approach of the Great Yarmouth inner 
channel. The site also accommodated a 75 mm field gun and a 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft 
weapon. The guns themselves at 4 inch calibre were smaller than most, hence the shorter 
range.  
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    Fig.8  Sketch from the Winterton Battery Fort Book showing the disposition of the main    
    guns and ancillary weapons and buildings.
64
   
 
The gun houses were constructed of brick, with concrete roofs, connected by a brick tunnel to 
the shelters, and the magazines at the far end. Four Nissen huts were erected for 
accommodation and nearby Hill House was requisitioned. A bungalow was also requisitioned 
as the officers’ mess. 180 personnel could be accommodated but at least 100 or so were on 
station. Winterton was constructed during the heightened tension of August 1940. By 
comparison, the battery at Mundesley is thought to have been built no earlier than 30
th
 July 
1941, being completed as late as January 1943, put under ‘care and maintenance’ in 1944, 
and its guns removed in late 1945 or early 1946. The similar battery at Brancaster was once 
considered to be the best preserved of its type in Norfolk but, it having suffered badly from 
coastal erosion, Mundesley was noted in the mid-1990s as the best example in the county and 
a ‘very rare’ item.
 65
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The octagonal gun platforms for the 6-inch guns can clearly be seen, with the semi-
subterranean connected tunnels to the rear. The concrete roofs are long gone and, although 
the site appears prominent, it would have been well-camouflaged to conceal from air and sea 
observation. The role of the Mundesley battery is described in common with others as 
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               Fig.10  Mundesley: 20-bolt holdfast for one of the 6-inch guns (author’s photo) 
 
             
               





A combination of defensive measures – such as minefields, stakes, and barbed wire described 
on page 5 above – was installed at key sections of coastline, starting at the waterline on the 
beach itself and layering back to beach exits and roads leading inland. Individual devices 
included an eight-kilometre net and canvas boom offshore in The Wash, preventing landfall 
at vulnerable points on the western coastline.  Further inland, minor roads and access points 
were set for obstruction or demolition. Major roads were a different matter, for they would be 
needed by mobile defenders moving forward; the compromise was partial temporary 
blocking if and when needed.
68
   
 
Stop lines 
The stop lines that traversed East Anglia were characterised by a clear north-west to south-
east orientation, the aim being to slow down the invader at each line until mobile reserves 
could engage. 2 Corps had operational experience on the continent prior to the Dunkirk 
evacuation and had seen how hard defences were constructed and used in practice.
69
 The 
easternmost stop lines were in fact technically demolition belts, where bridges and roads were 
prepared for destruction, intended as a second line of delay after the beach defences. The 
first, known as FI (F1), was closest to the coast, starting at Winterton, leading via Hundred 
Stream to the River Thurne, then to Barton Broad and to the road bridge at Swafield on the 
North Walsham and Dilham Canal. Fourteen pillboxes were built early on along its route – 
suggesting a line to be defended. North Walsham is a sizeable market town and was prepared 
for all-round defence. FII (F2) followed the River Bure upstream from Great Yarmouth to 
Ingworth, north of Aylsham, with fifteen bridges prepared for demolition. No new pillboxes 
were built but Acle, Coltishall and Aylsham were nodal points. FIII (F3) began at Oulton 
Broad and followed the Rivers Waveney and Yare, via the New Cut to a junction with the 
River Yare at Reedham to Norwich, with five bridges prepared for demolition but with far 
fewer defending pillboxes.
70
 These natural landscape features were all formidable anti-tank 
obstacles in their own right but they also provided key communication routes, so demolition 
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was a last resort as mobile reserved would have needed to move forward to engage the 
enemy.  The main linear stop lines ran along river routes - but what is not made clear in 
earlier histories is that their purpose was two-fold; firstly, to act as further obstacles to enemy 
progress across country and, secondly, to protect key roads between towns and strategic 
points with the aim of stopping enemy traffic moving west on highways.  2 Corps Line ‘A’ 
started at Beccles and ran through Norwich, through to Fakenham and up to Burnham 
Market, stopping almost at the coast.
71
  The aim was to delay the enemy’s advance, allowing 
mobile reserves to move forward to engage. 2 Corps Line ‘B’ followed a broad parallel line 
from Felixstowe, entering Norfolk at Harleston, thence via Attleborough, Watton and 
Swaffham to King’s Lynn, protecting main roads. Eastern Command Line, heavily defended 
in advance of the General Headquarters Line further to the west, ran from two start points in 
south-east Essex, running north-east to terminate at King’s Lynn, forming the frontage of the 
main mobile reserve, the hierarchy of defence lines increasing in importance and strength 
from east to west. An additional stop line covered the nodal point defences at Thetford and 
Brandon, linked by demolition points on the River Ouse westwards from Thetford to the 
Great Ouse between Littleport and Downham Market.
 72
 Osborne describes the wider context 
succinctly when he writes that invaders landing in Norfolk would have had to negotiate 
twelve stop lines before reaching Trafalgar Square.
73
  
Stop lines were poorly understood post-war, even in Collier’s official history and were only 
accurately represented diagrammatically as recently as the mid-1990s.
74
 This is 
understandable in four respects. Firstly, they are primarily a feature of the natural landscape 
and not formal built structures, even if sometimes militarily enhanced, with some deepening 
and widening of narrow channels. Secondly, they were not garrisoned by serried ranks of 
soldiery along their entire length which may go some way to explaining why they were 
thought for some time not even to be formally documented.
75
 Thirdly, they were of short 
operational duration. Fourthly, the forward lines were really demolition belts, with charges 
placed at key crossing points. For example, whilst the northern-most section of Defence Line 
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F1 has pillboxes at regular intervals, much of the remainder of lines F1, F2 have very few 
built pillboxes on their routes; aside from an early surge of pillbox building, this suggests that 
F1-F3 were very much intended as demolition belts, with bridges prepared for demolition, 
rather than as defensive lines to be garrisoned or patrolled. The demolition belts accounted 
for approximately 75 miles of waterways in length, and the stop lines for approximately 110 
miles – a percentage differential of 68 per-cent, or a ratio of roughly two-to-one.
76
  
It is significant that even recent experts appear to differ in their interpretation. Dobinson 
refers to the Corps lines as ‘blocked roads’. He asserts that neither Lines ‘A’ nor ‘B’ were 
‘conventional’ stop lines, both being ‘based around main roads offering no definite obstacle 
to AFVs’ and that the River Wensum is not identified in sources as an anti-tank obstacle.
77
 
He does acknowledge that Bird favours the rivers option.
78
  Bird clearly states that Norfolk’s 
lines were based on river courses, functioning as natural anti-tank ditches as were, for 
example, railways cuttings elsewhere in other regions.
79
 This is entirely logical, especially as 
they could still afford protection to adjacent highways – the Norwich to Fakenham road 
running broadly parallel to the River Wensum being a good example. The stop lines were 
then somewhat nebulous, and perhaps better understood as adapted natural features than built 
structures. The GHQ lines have been better understood as a feature of national rather than 
local defence, and were better defended being seen as the main rearguard. 
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Fig.12 ‘Hairpin’ anti-tank obstacles at Narford on 2 Corp Line B (author’s photo) 
 
A series of thirty-six anti-tank hairpins survive at Narford, between Swaffham and King’s 
Lynn. Like so many remnants they appear to exist in isolation until mapped in conjunction 
with other archaeology and documentation, which show they are sited along on Corps Line B.  
Such structures give credibility to the stop lines as physical evidence – and the pillboxes, 
spigot mortar mounts and anti-tank obstacles that can still be found along their routes. The 
archaeology provides the evidence. 
 
Pillboxes 
The most iconic structure symbolising the defence against the invader is the pillbox. The first 
new pillboxes were being built in Norfolk in early June 1940, and perimeter defences were 
established around Great Yarmouth, Norwich, Thetford and Brandon. About 5,054 pillboxes 
had been built in Eastern Command by October 1940, 1,339 of them on the coast.
80
  A variety 
of designs was prescribed by the Directorate of Fortifications and Works in May 1940, all 
well-typologised by researchers.  Norfolk Heritage Explorer gives a figure of 672 recorded 
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pillboxes; Bird lists 633 of all types. The statistics include lost examples, amounting to 
around thirty per-cent.
81
 Of these, about one hundred and eighty are listed as ‘unknown 
design’, twenty ‘non-standard’ and in excess of two hundred and fifty as Type 22s. This 
design – officially FW3/22 - is the most obviously recognisable in the Norfolk landscape, 
hexagonal in shape, about ten feet wide, with walls between one and two feet thick, with rifle 
loops in five sides and a door in the sixth.
 82
 Late 1940 saw more emphasis being put upon the 
strengthening of coastal pillboxes, and thinner-walled versions inland, though entirely new 
ones were being built at more than twenty locations across north Norfolk in mid-1941, along 
with new beach minefields.
83
 February 1942 saw the official abandonment of pillbox 
construction in favour of fieldwork defences.
84
  
Their present-day landscape presence is popularly perceived as representing wartime defence 
but, almost eighty years since their installation began, little is understood of pillboxes in the 
Norfolk landscape. They appear as isolated structures without precise meaning; little trace 
remains, for example, of the trench systems that connected front line pillboxes. A perpetual 
myth is that some face the wrong way. One clear statement refutes this; 
‘The primary objective of defence in 53 Infantry Brigade sector will be to  
repel invasion from the sea. To enable this to be done without molestation  
by parachute troops from the rear, certain of the defences will be sited to  




Moreover, since they are not conserved as historic monuments, little has been done to 
represent them in an educational or heritage context. 
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Fig.13 The trench systems connecting pillboxes in the front line of                         
defence. ‘A soldier of the 4
th
 Battalion, The Royal Norfolk Regiment,  
                        mans a trench near a pillbox at Great Yarmouth 31 July–2 August 1940’
86
   
     
 
Norwich, as a major defendable urban area, was encircled by sixteen pillboxes.
87
 Airfields 
already each had their own complement of pillboxes and anti-aircraft defences; 18
th
 Division 
was early on charged with defending airfields at Barton Bendish, Bodney, Feltwell, Marham, 
Methwold and Watton. Nodal points were deemed to be any location, at smaller urban and 
rural locations on river crossing, rail lines and road intersections.    
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Through the Autumn of 1940 to summer 1941, 18
th 
Division’s emphasis came to be placed on 
nodal points defended with thinner-walled pillboxes – fifteen inch walls instead of forty-two 
inches – at Norwich, Fakenham, Attleborough, Watton, Harleston, Loddon, Acle, Coltishall, 
North Walsham, Aylsham, Saxthorpe, Holt Dereham, Wymondham and Diss. The shortage 
of construction materials, particularly cement, almost certainly contributed to the decision to 
place greater emphasis on more fieldwork obstructions.
88
  Beach defences were considered 
the top priority; then nodal points, graduating from five miles from the coast back to the 
General Headquarters Line. By spring 1941 Eastern Command’s defences had reached their 
limit of heavy structural installations, though more minefields and wire were installed.
89
 
‘You cannot prevent the enemy….from penetrating a very wide perimeter;  
therefore have the smallest possible perimeter. Cling like a leech to the  




Forty-one nodal points are identified across Norfolk.
91
  All comprise towns and larger 
villages. The road network across Norfolk is characterised by relatively evenly distanced 
links between market towns, and with King’s Lynn to the far west, Yarmouth to extreme east 
and Norwich in the centre. The nature of their locations puts them on road, rail or river 
routes. Some excellent archaeological examples remain, notably the well-known loophole in 
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             Fig.14 Acle, mid-way between Norwich and Gt Yarmouth, was a Category ‘A’  
             Nodal point. Concealed pillbox incorporated into flank wall of The Manor House,   












                  Fig.15 An explanatory nodal point defence plan, describing key features of  
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Category A nodal points were expected to be able to hold out for at least seven days and 
Category B – at lesser locations - for two days.
93
 This bears testament to the level of 
organised all-round defence at nodal points compared with, for example, the expectation that 
linear defences should hold for just a few hours. Allusion is made to the successful use of 
nodal points by the Russians at Vyasha, Bryansk and Smolensk with the caveat that: 
‘The problem in East Anglia is slightly different – towns can be easily by-passed. 
Therefore nodal points are centres of communications and (the) object is to  
deny use of the routes through these centres to the enemy; minor nodal points  
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             Fig. 16 Nodal points across Norfolk by 1942, shown against stop lines 
48 
 
An interesting retrospective summary of strategy, unascribed and undated but indicated as 
written after 3
rd
 June 1941, states that there was no reason to suppose the enemy would 
employ tactics greatly different from those employed successfully in France, namely, rapid 
penetration by armoured vehicles. One difference was, however, felt to pertain. In the open 
country of Northern France, German armour did not readily leave the roads, and returned to 
them as soon as possible.  
‘In southern and eastern England however, the country is much closer,  
and the roads narrower and less direct. Moreover they nearly all converge 
on towns, small and large. The deduction made was that defence was best  
extended in depth inland by holding these towns, as they not only provided  
anti-tank opportunities but also commanded the nexus of roads.  
 
Later still, as defences became more organized, it was decided that each nodal point  
should have its keep made tank proof, by means of road blocks between houses, and  
that an outpost ring of defences, usually on the outskirts, should be constructed. The  
expression ‘fortress’ came to be used to designate an inland town or village which  





1942 onwards: maintenance, Abandonment and Clearance  
The presence of so much anti-invasion archaeology across Norfolk can obscure the fact that 
the lifespan of these defences was very short – for all practical purposes no more than three 
years for most of the coastal batteries; as little as one year for the additional pillboxes built in 
mid-1941. By December 1942 it was acknowledged that the threat of invasion had receded 
considerably and the Army advised the Cabinet accordingly.
96
 It was thought highly unlikely 
that a major invasion was logistically feasible by this time. By early 1943 a regime of 
maintenance, some abandonment and also clearance had begun.  Beach defences were only to 
be kept in readiness in areas susceptible to opportunistic raids. Nevertheless concerns were 
still being expressed in April that year about the possibility of seaborne raids. It was 
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calculated that between four and seven hours would be required for fast sea passage in one 
direction, but airborne raids could happen day or night.
97
 
Even with invasion being a remote possibility by this stage of the war it might seem 
surprising that efforts were being made to actually dismantle anti-invasion defences. The 
entirely practical reason was that the materials were needed elsewhere; preparations for the 
invasion of mainland Europe required vast amounts of iron, steel and reusable ordnance and 
explosives.  Inland, defences were still being reviewed and sometimes improved upon, at 
airfields, with the threat of solitary raiders.  Even so, as late as May 1943 the Commander–in-
Chief Home Forces acknowledged that the possibility of ‘a sudden and unexpected change in 
the war may alter conditions for the worse.’ 
98
 It appeared however that the events of June 
1944 finally negated the need for any extended network of anti-invasion defences. Clearance 
was rather diplomatically termed ‘restoration’, meaning occupied land could be restored to its 
former use or ownership, or compensation extended. Typically, agriculture and transport 
were prioritised and, if defence works were in the way, they had to go. Though minefields, 
anti-tank obstacles, beach scaffolding, dannert wire, began to be cleared by both civilian 
contractors and military engineers, much would remain post-war.  Landowners were paid 
compensation for the use of land on which pillboxes, gun batteries, searchlights and so on 
were built; the intention was that these were ‘temporary defence works’ but often there was 




Temporary Defences Works were in 1946 categorised as ‘removal urgently required’ (A), 
removal eventually required’ (B) and ‘removal not in the public interest’ (C). Many sites 
were later downgraded for want of the effort to remove them. Clearly priority was accorded 
where public safety or roads were involved, or agriculture obstructed.  Understandably, the 
removal of unsightly or dangerous wartime defence structures from coastal areas was 
important to the revival of tourism. In May 1947, a survey of the beach and cliff footings in 
the Trimingham area by 14
th
 Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers, apparently prior to 
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mine clearance, suggests that the minefields were extended into the footings of the cliffs 
themselves.
100
  The county archive holds a number of documents detailing the categorisation 
and, in most cases, retention of structures defined as Categories ‘B’ or ‘C’.
101
 A collection of 
25-inch O.S. 2
nd
. Edition maps records a survey of the eastern and northern-most Norfolk 
coastal defences between 1947 and 1950, from Ongar Hill, King’s Lynn across to Holkham. 
Extant defence works, from major structures such as gun houses to abandoned piles of 
dannert wire, are annotated. The word ‘accretion’ features in some of the notes, indicating 
where military structures are deemed to be assisting retention of natural sea defences. One 
sheet, covering Titchwell, itemises the oft-mentioned tank hulks that can occasionally be seen 
on the foreshore.
102
  Much of Norfolk’s coastline was altered by the 1953 floods and at 
Titchwell little attention was paid to repairing the damage, after which time the present dunes 
and shingle spit began to form; it is suggested that the original sea wall was weakened by the 
large number of armour-piercing shells that had struck it, thereby allowing the sea to break 
through.
103
 The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds states that part of the coastal 
defence strategy would have included a reversal of drainage and encouraging flooding, 
though there is no documentary evidence to support this notion at this location. The main 
banks were constructed for firing practice, with targets set at one-thousand yard intervals. 
Both these actions resulted in a subsequent by-product, of helping re-establish wetland 
biodiversity, with freshwater wildlife being protected from saltwater inundation.
104
  Minimal 
surface structures remain but the relationship between wartime military activity and its 
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Case study : Weybourne and Muckleburgh 
Introduction 
A good deal of defence archaeology survives in the Weybourne area on the north Norfolk 
coast, meriting closer study in understanding the phased implementation of defences. The 
location was included in Foot’s national study of sixty-seven anti-invasion sites as they 
existed in 1940 but a further consideration of the archaeological remains helps place them in 
the wider context of Norfolk’s defence in the longer chronology of the war and their presence 
in the twenty-first century landscape.
106
 The archaeology and documentation at Weybourne 
demonstrate distinct phases of defence strategy through to the later war years.  
From fears of Spanish invasion in 1588, through to anti-invasion preparations in 1914, 
Weybourne has long been a vulnerable landing place. A survey of 1839 recommended gun 
batteries being installed at Weybourne but nothing came of it.
107
  Trenches and barbed wire 
were laid to the beach in the First World War, augmented by mobile 60-pounder howitzers at 
both Weybourne and Mundesley. The anti-aircraft (AA) gunnery school established in 1936 
to the west, at Muckleburgh, was well-placed to defend the locality though there it was not 
constructed in situ for that specific reason.
108
   
Topography 
Weybourne Hope is a linear expanse of shingled beach, with deep water anchorage offshore 
suitable for large ships to off-load smaller craft.  These favourable beach landing conditions 
lead directly half-a-mile inland along Beach Road to Weybourne Village, with strategic 
routes thence to east and west. Defendable high ground further inland includes several hills, 
notably Muckleburgh and Telegraph Hills to the south-west, Kelling Heath beyond and 
Weybourne Heath and Sheringham Park to the south-east. The foreshore topography is 
striking in its vulnerability. Without defences, an attacking force could press towards arterial 
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roads unhindered. With defences, the topography presents a killing ground before and around 
the village, itself a ‘defended place’. Even today, an informed visitor will be aware of 
concrete structures from almost any view perspective, although cliff erosion has seen some 
structures topple or shift position post-war.   
There are four distinct areas of defence; the coastline itself, centred on Weybourne Hope; the 
AA school at Muckleburgh; Weybourne village; and the close-lying environs of Sheringham 
Park to the south-east, where further defences were sited. Defence features are visible on 
aerial photographs from December 1940, especially a curving, linear stretch of wide ditch 
around seven metres wide, running east to west below the training camp and terminating at 
the beach at Weybourne Hope.  
Chronology and disposition of troops 
In November 1939, 53
rd
 Infantry Brigade was responsible for holding the coastline between 
Sheringham and Salthouse, with 6
th
 Norfolks in the centre and 5
th
 Norfolks to the west.
109
  
The following year the brigade sector was further divided into three sub-sectors.  The right 
flank, from East Runton Gap to Beeston Regis Hill and exits southwards from Sheringham, 
was guarded by 6
th
 Battalion Royal Norfolk Regiment, the centre by 5
th
 Norfolks, and the left 
by 6
th
 Battalion Cambridgeshire Regiment.
110
  Weybourne fell within Defence Sector ‘A’ 
staffed by infantry and supporting units including, most importantly, artillery.  
In September 1939 engineers from 287
th
 Field Company, Royal Engineers reconnoitred 
coastal defence positions in the wider brigade area and the brigade commander inspected 
proposed battle positions and fieldworks. In early December all twenty existing First World 
War concrete blockhouses were inspected, most being reported as being in fair to good 
condition structurally, with just two rated as poor. Ballistic tests were conducted, however, 
and the results proved disappointing.
111
  Sustained fire, causing cementing to fail, led the 
Officer Commanding to propose sending a block to the engineering laboratory at Cambridge 
for further testing.  The clear conclusion was that the extant pillboxes were not sufficiently 
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robust to withstand contemporary modern weapons fire, and also that the lack of interior 
baffle walls meant that any soldiers inside the structure would be highly vulnerable to 
ricochet injury.
112
  There arose an urgent need for a construction programme rather than 
relying on older fixtures. By Christmas the area was being surveyed for new-build 
pillboxes.
113
   
Pillbox engineering and placement is known to have been influenced by experience on the 
continent before the fall of France.  A report of experiences in France engaged in the 
construction of concrete blockhouses describes a ‘standard design…with minor variations to 
meet local conditions and designed to give protection from a direct hit by a 6-inch shell’ and 
with 3ft 6ins thick walls. The officer clearly intended to offer advice, recommending a 
properly organised approach, including the use of well graded aggregate, and of pre-cast 
concrete for reinforcement points.
114
 The temptation for civilian contractors, in both wars, to 
use low grade shoreline sand and beach material for aggregate must have been appealing.
115
 
Given the short timescale in which Norfolk’s pillboxes would be intended for use, no-one 
contemporarily would have need to consider the effects of coastal erosion and loss to the sea. 
At the beginning of 1940 the specific objective of 53
rd
 Infantry Brigade was  
‘to oppose any sea-landing between East Runton Gap and Salthouse….and to  
protect aerodromes at West Raynham and Bircham Newton and the R.D.F.  
station at West Beckham.’ 
116
   
 
News of the surrender of the Belgian army and the B.E.F starting its evacuation from 
Dunkirk understandably heightened the tension – the new Brigadier ordered the Battalion to 
stand-to at dusk and dawn therefrom onwards. Substantial preparations of battalion battle 
H.Q.s were also being made at this time and on 14
th
 June Royal Marines officers arrived to 
make arrangements for emplacement of the two 6-inch guns in the coastal battery at Skelding 
Hill, Sheringham. 
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        Fig.17  Close view of exposed wall section of pillbox on Weybourne beach, showing     
        quantity of local beach stone used as aggregate. (Author’s photo) 
 
‘The whole of the past month (June) has been spent on improving defensive  
positions. Section posts, dug-out and communication trenches have been dug  
and revetted. Practically every fire trench has now overhead cover, many miles  
of wire have been put up and road blocks consisting of concrete blocks and  




A brigade operation instruction of 7
th
 June draws attention to the importance of mobile 
platoons, giving some indication of not relying exclusively upon fixed defences and remote 
mobile reserves.
118
 Camouflage of pill-boxes was a priority, those on the beaches being piled 
around with shingle and painted grey on the upper half, others painted grey and green to 
harmonise with the background ‘and others…made to look like bathing huts or hen 
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 Four hundred anti-personnel mines were to be laid in cliff gaps and beach exits 
passable to infantry; beach mines could be laid either in front of or behind the wire but, in the 
latter case, more wires would be needed to prevent animals straying on to the minefield. An 
accurate record of every mine laid was to be kept, with a numbered post marking every one 
hundred yards of line.
120
 All this indicates that preparations for defence against imminent 
invasion had reached their maximum within existing capacity by the end of June. July was 
characterised by training exercises with particular attention being given to the mobile column 
whose main task was to oppose parachutists and airborne troops and reconnaissance.  
 
Prior to the fall of France a large-scale invasion was considered less likely than raids by 
landing parties or naval raids against coastal towns – though supported by intensive bombing 
of military and communication objectives.
121
 By late May however, heavy bombing, 




 Norfolks’ War Diary entry 
for 22
nd
 May reflects on the success of the rapid and unorthodox methods of the German 
army witnessed on the continent, commenting that a parachute landing was not out of the 
question.
123
 By the end of June the tension had heightened.  
‘France has capitulated and the country is waiting and preparing for a German  
invasion. This unit naturally considers itself to be situated in the most vulnerable  




With the fall of France and the Dunkirk evacuation the intention was clear. 
 
‘The primary object of defences in 53 Inf.Bde.Sector will be to repel invasion 
 from the sea. To enable this to be done without molestation by parachute 
 troops from the rear, certain of the defence will be sited to prevent attack 
 from the land. Protection against parachute troops however must be  
 regarded as a secondary object in the defensive layout.’ 
125
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This key statement regarding local strategy validates the decision to heavily fortify the coast 
at Weybourne and its vicinity. Though pillboxes were sited on the cliffs, they were also 
placed on the shore itself to facilitate close enfilading fire at the points of enemy landing. The 
local strategy appears to have been to stop the enemy as much as delay. 
 
     Fig.18  Heavy machine gun pillbox extant on cliff at Weybourne in 2018. It commands an       
     unrestricted view along the shoreline to the west. (Author’s photo) 
 
Emphasis was placed upon the use of Bren guns to provide enfilade fire along the beach from 
those beach-sited pillboxes.  An Operation Instruction of July 1940 advises that the enemy 
could land anywhere along 53
rd
 Infantry Brigade’s coast, even at technically unsuitable sites, 
but clearly states that Weybourne Hope is the most dangerous. By comparison, the sea fronts 
at Cromer and Sheringham presented difficult exits from the beach, with implications for 
street fighting.
126
  Slit trenches were dug all across the greater Weybourne area and across to 
the AA camp to the west. The high ground offered numerous observation and fire points; 
machine gun positions were sited at Muckleburgh Hill, Granborough Hill and Telegraph 
Hill.
127
 Weybourne village itself was a Category ‘C’ defended place, with all-round defence 
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 Battalion Norfolk Local Defence Volunteers.
128
 The effect of General 
Brooke’s preference for more mobile defence is reflected in an amendment to an operation 
order which refers to ‘defended localities’ being constructed for all-round defence - an early 





Fig. 19  Dispositions of artillery at Weybourne, 31st August 1940. The anti-tank ditch is the 
thin blue at centre.
130
    
 
                                                          
128
 Foot, W. Beaches, fields, streets and hills – the anti-invasion landscapes of England, 1940 
(English Heritage, Council for British Archaeology Research Report 144,  Oxford, 2006)  p.140 
129
 TNA WO 166/4176 2
nd
 Battalion Cambridgeshire Regiment War Diary no.20 2
nd
 Sept 1940 
130
 TNA WO 166/4560  5
th




Fig.20  Luftwaffe photograph dated August 1940, indicating defensive positions. The clearest 
feature is the anti-tank ditch below Muckleburgh AA camp extending to Weybourne Hope. 




A detailed Defence Scheme replaced all previous battle order documentation in late August 
1940. It was thought the enemy would aim to obtain air superiority first, followed by 
preliminary bombing and parachutists targeting objectives; troop carrying aircraft would fly 
inland and landing craft would deposit troops and tanks at the coast. The most important 
landing place was stated as Weybourne. The high ground of Kelling Heath might be a good 
position for defenders but similarly a potential objective for enemy parachutists.
132
 The 
Scheme makes specific reference to the importance of machine guns in the forward defended 
localities being sited so as to cover the beach at all probable landing places. Lyon Lights were 
positioned in front of the defences at nine key points, including Weybourne Hope, Kelling 
Hard and Gramborough Hill, the idea being to switch them on as assault craft landed on the 
beach, as much to dazzle and disorientate as illuminate.
133
  The disposition of forward 
companies and siting of platoon weapons is indicated on contemporary maps, and alternative 
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positions comprising narrow slit trenches are advised as alternatives.
 134
 This may explain the 
apparent random archaeological evidence of trenches across the area. The reserve company 
and mobile group’s task was to counter a beach landing in the event of forward defences 
being over-run,  to protect the rear against parachutists, and re-inforce the R.D.F station at 
West Beckham and airfields at Matlaske and Oulton. Whilst beach mines were to be laid to 
five rows above the highest tide level, mines were not to be laid on the exit routes until the 
roads were actually closed. It is worth noting that public access to the beaches was restricted 
but not prohibited entirely; the Officer Commanding was responsible for deciding which 
parts of the beach could be accessed and during what hours. The area was well-served by 
artillery and use of the landscape is indicated in the setting-up of observation points at 
Weybourne Windmill and Muckleburgh, Telegraph and Bard Hills.  In addition to the 6-inch 
battery at Sheringham, Weybourne was equipped with two 4-inch naval guns, two 6-pounder 
and four 2-pounder anti-tank guns, a battery of two 9.2-inch howitzers , eight 4.5-inch 
howitzers, eight 75 mm guns and two 18-pounder guns.
135
 At the lesser extreme, Home 
Guard personnel were expected to use ‘Molitoff [sic] Bottles’ to destroy tanks and ‘crowbars 
can also be used to spike tank tracks.’ 
136
   
 
Following an infantry and artillery disposition summary, the seriousness of the situation in 
September is stated as follows: 
 
‘The enemy will be met and attacked by every available man, weapon and gun 
 of the Bn whether he attempts to land by sea or air. He is at his weakest 
 Immediately after landing and that is the moment to strike him. All ranks  
 must be imbued with the spirit of the offensive form of defence and reserves  





The sobering tone of these words is unequivocal in stressing the severity of the situation. 
This, or similar wording, appears in many contemporary war diaries. Mention is made of 
forward companies being supported by reserve platoons and defended localities being 
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prepared for all-round defence.
138
 There is an element of mobility and flexibility indicated 





 Infantry Brigade succeeded 53
rd
 Infantry Brigade in November 1940, with 11
th
 
Battalion Royal Sherwood Foresters allocated the Blakeney-Weybourne area.
139
 Particular 
stress was placed upon defended localities being constructed for all-round defence but with 
capacity to move out for offensive action if necessary.
140
 This was new thinking, quite 
different to the older approach of completely static defence. 
                         
Vigilance did not slacken in 1941. Engineers were busy draining flooded pillboxes in January 
and officers reconnoitred demolition lines F1 and F2 for new schemes. Minefields were 
cleared and new ones laid in February extending eastward to Dead Man’s Gap. Work 
continued though perhaps with not such a sense of urgency as in the previous summer, as 
work schedules indicate. A significant ‘Defensive Fire Test’ – a live firing exercise - took 
place on 25
th
 February, to test deployment times and assess the effectiveness of concentrated 
artillery fire on the Weybourne beach area. A new defence scheme was implemented in April. 
Langham aerodrome was identified as being at risk and the open ground to the brigade’s left 
flank vulnerable to troop-carrying planes – and it was noted that those areas were being 
covered with anti-landing obstructions. Work was started on new Type 27 pillboxes at 
Weybourne and two Type 350/40s at Dead Man’s Hill, and more still at Sheringham, this 
work still in progress in May.  A demonstration of artillery firepower  from Muckleburgh Hill 
was undertaken in July ‘for the edification of members of the press assembled…’ 
141
  The 
coastal defence battery at Cley was not installed until May 1941, a late measure. 
Significantly, in November 1941, 53
rd
 Field Regiment’s sixteen 75-mm and eight 4.5-inch 
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howitzers were replaced by more modern twenty-four 25-pounder guns.
142
 All this underlines 
the importance still placed on coastal defence measures in late 1941.  
 
Clearly, the continuing installation of defensive structures emphasised front-line defence 
intended not just to delay the enemy proceeding inland but also to prevent or disrupt a 
successful landing. It also marks a contradiction with strategy being enacted along the 
Suffolk coast to the south during the same period, where no new pillboxes were being built. 
There, the new strategy saw the abandonment of linear defence entirely, with examples of 
pillbox loopholes being blocked to render them useless.
143
 In the absence of documented 
explanation, the Norfolk ‘continuation’ would seem to suggest autonomy at brigade and 
battalion level in the interpretation of strategy. 
 
William Foot rightly cites Weybourne as an important example of the defence measures of 
1940 and 1941.
144
  Weybourne’s story does not end there however. In January 1942 a review 
of topography and dispositions prefaced yet another detailed Defence Scheme identifying 
Weybourne and Holkham as the most likely landing places.  Methodology emphasised 
defence in depth, that is, against seaward and inland attack, and all round defence. The 
importance of beach scaffolding, erected by naval staff, and road and rail blocks were also 
underlined.
145
 Pillboxes not required for use were to be made unusable to the enemy by filling 
with wire. An important addition to the AA site was the emplacement of three 5.25-inch dual 
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          Fig. 21  Defences Weybourne – Sheringham area 1940, based on Foot (2005). Later    













 Fig,22  Troops of 8th Battalion, Royal Lincolnshire Regiment, abandon their bicycles and     




















    
 
                        Fig.23  anti-aircraft battery at Primrose Hill in London, 27 August  
                              1943 similar to those installed at the AA Camp in 1942.
148
  
                                                          
147
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1943 saw quieter times with discussion of the possibility of German airborne or seaborne 
raids for propaganda purposes, obtaining technical information or interfering with coastal 
convoys.
149
 A continuing focus on the role of the Home Guard in forward positions confirms 
a lesser state of full-scale alert. Regular units were in training mode by this stage and only 
likely to mobilise to a war footing if the threat of invasion re-presented itself.   
 
‘If the threat of enemy invasion becomes greater it is probable that the units  
of 220 Inf Bde would cease their present trg [sic] role and mobilise at or near a war  
footing. 220 Inf Bde is cannot therefore be considered as available for static  
defence as it might be called upon to take offensive action against enemy  




The positions of machine gun posts and spigot mortars were simply to be ‘marked’ by Home 
Guard piquets and all ranks were warned to avoid disclosing the position of any undefended 
areas. Essentially, regular troops were no longer to fulfil a static defence role. Nevertheless, 
Weybourne was still seen to be the most vulnerable area and an instruction in late 1943 
distinguished between measures required to deal with an enemy air raid as against a full-scale 
invasion.
151
 Invasion of the U.K. mainland was no longer considered a serious threat and 




Abandonment and removal 
Surviving archaeology and archives provide complementary evidence of all-round, in-depth 
defences within an area of just a few square miles. The chronology demonstrates distinct, 
changing strategy and construction phases in 1940, 1941 and 1942, through to reduced 
vigilance in 1943, by which time national resources were geared towards preparations for the 
future invasion of mainland Europe. As with almost all Norfolk’s anti-invasion defences, 
abandonment soon followed operational obsolescence. The impact and legacy lingered 
however. The Ministry of Works’ Temporary Defence Works Programme saw pillboxes and 
weapon mountings being reviewed from 1948 through to 1951. The anti-tank ditch was 
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recorded as non-injurious and partly filled in. Most features were deemed to be Category ‘C’ 








Gunnery practice continued at the anti-aircraft camp throughout the 1950s until final closure 
in 1958.
155
 Finally, the by-law which allowed the firing of anti-aircraft weapons at the pre-
war AA practice camp was formally rescinded as late as 2016.
156
 Still prominently visible on 
the clifftop and shore are machine gun posts, with commanding views of the shore approach 
and pillboxes at the shoreline are backed up by further pillboxes inland. The Muckleburgh 
Collection has done much to preserve and reinstate some memory and imagery of the 
wartime military presence, though a heritage agency-led approach to bringing in an 
understanding and appreciation of the conjoined militarised landscape might offer a unique 
educational opportunity for future generations. Foot’s study of Weybourne in 1940 specifies 
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the locations of around ninety defence locations, many removed or fates unknown, but many 
still extant in 2002 at the time of his survey.
 157
 Coastal erosion and storm have since shifted 




      Fig.25 RAF vertical photograph 1946 showing detail of Muckleburgh AA Camp with      






It is difficult to measure the extent of land subsumed by anti-invasion defences between 1940 
and 1942 in terms of acreage. The coastline was not an important part of the agricultural 
economy, although the disruption to tourism and local commerce was significant. The 
upheaval was perhaps more at a social level in the sense of prohibited areas and prevention of 
free movement; and yet flexibility with the civilian populace was demonstrated, as seen in 
Fig.25.  The dispersed nature of the archaeology, combined with the fact that the anti-
invasion defences 
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 Fig.26 Barbed wire defences at Sheringham on 12
th
 July 1941, with members  




were never tested in anger, has led to a niche curiosity about their significance in the 
landscape. Few lives were lost in the course of construction or military exercises, but it is 
lives lost that are the central tenet of commemoration. Lives were lost late- and post-war 
however.  By August 1946 one hundred and forty men working on mine clearance, 
nationally, had been killed. Later that year the minefield at Trimingham was one of only three 
such locations nationwide that was recommended for indefinite closure; the following year a 
holidaymaker was killed by a mine lodged in the cliff. Constant erosion resulted in the 
degradation of tracing wires and detonators – the mines were more dangerous than during 
wartime. Trimingham and Sidestrand beaches were not reopened to the public until 1966.
160
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Fig.27 German Prisoners of PoWs removing beach scaffolding on the North  




Across the county as a whole it was estimated that one thousand miles of derelict barbed wire 
remained.
162
 Commemoration has emerged much later, again perhaps reflecting a delayed 
resurgence in interest in isolated archaeology. Few monuments exist to recall those who died 
clearing beach mines but one example was erected in 2004 at Mundesley, adjacent to the 
local maritime museum. It commemorates twenty-seven Royal Engineer bomb disposal 
personnel who lost their lives in the locality whilst clearing beach mines; the irony is that 
these, being British weapons, qualify the deaths incurred as friendly fire.
163
 
As wartime architecture, the diverse range of pillboxes, gun emplacements, anti-tank 
obstacles and associated buildings fulfil the maxim of ‘form follows function’. They have 
minimal aesthetic value and the smaller structures are often of basic, hurried construction. 
Many were removed, demolished or abandoned long before the war’s end, their purpose 
served. Some remain but their isolated position in the landscape has little meaning unless 
viewed in the wider strategic context. Lack of historic interest is perhaps understandable 
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given that their importance in the wider military landscape was little appreciated for many 
years post-war.  Their isolated positioning in the landscape may, paradoxically, have helped 
engender a growing curiosity over subsequent decades and an appreciation of them as 
archaeologically and historically significant. An understanding of the connectivity of 
complex linear defence lines and, later, nodal points that combined natural landscape features 
with artificial structures encourages an appreciation of their context and meaning in Norfolk’s 
historic militarised landscape, as this chapter has demonstrated. This also reinforces their 
value as archaeology, and a concern for their preservation and conservation. Throughout the 
chapter a recurring theme has been that the strategy which directed the typology and 
distribution of defence structures, along with local expediencies in placement and 
construction, serves to heighten the impact that landscape conversely has in accommodating 
and directing human activity. Additionally it underscores in context the uniqueness of the 
Norfolk landscape, comparative to other regions. This theme will also be very evident with 
regard to airfields, in Chapter 3, following. 
The structures have disappeared in quantity over the decades and are still doing so. There is a 
case for preservation and conservation, particularly where the archaeology is gathered, or 
clustered, in an accessible area such as Weybourne. Curiously, Lord Fisher was permitted in 
1946 to retain a pillbox on his land at Croxton as a ‘war memento’. Perhaps his motives were 




The next chapter will investigate how aviation operations impacted upon the Norfolk 
landscape, over a longer timescale and intensifying as the war progressed.   
    __________ 
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Chapter 3  -  Airfields 
 
Introduction 
Airfields are an integral physical characteristic of the Norfolk rural landscape.  A cursory 
study of the six modern Ordnance Survey 1:50000 scale Landranger maps that cover the 
county shows clearly the unmistakeable outlines of remnant military airfields at regular 
distribution intervals. The landscape context of airfields has not properly been approached in 
detail and this chapter aims to assess the extent and impact of their wartime presence and 
legacy in Norfolk’s rural landscape. The rationale behind their distribution, site selection 
criteria, competition for other contemporary land use and their post-war re-utilisation are 
quantifiable factors, and will be supported by case studies. 
Military airfields are a prime example of relict structures in the landscape whose distribution 
and form follow function – they were, for the most part and, with the exception of pre-war 
permanent stations,  militarily functional and devoid of aesthetic merit.  Yet since the conflict 
they have found a place in the cultural identity of the local landscape. In common with all 
other man-made impositions on the land, they are part of the continuing history of the 
landscape, not anachronistic aberrations. For strategic reasons explained below, Norfolk was 
to bear a greater allocation of airfields than almost all other English counties, and the 
competition with agriculture for land use would prove to be intense. 
 
Historiography 
Strategic air power, technical and operational histories, anecdotal volumes and airfield 
‘biographies’ enjoy perennially popular readership at both general and academic level but 
have increasingly found their popularity rivalled by architectural conservation and cultural 
connection themes. There exists a considerable canon of ‘gazetteer’-style secondary literature 
documenting airfields, their fabric and, most popularly, their operational histories.
1
 The 
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interest in conservation and commemoration has increased exponentially from the 1970s 
onwards, fuelled by many, often locally-focussed histories centred on the social and cultural 
impact of airfields and their personnel. Particular secondary sources stand out in terms of 
thoroughness, integrity and detail. Roger Freeman’s extensive volumes on the USAAF and 
RAF units and operational histories have become standard reference sources in their own 
right, followed closely by the ‘Action Stations’ series from the 1980s onwards.
2
 Possibly the 
most comprehensive publications available are Smith’s Britain’s Military Airfields, Higham’s 
Bases of Air Strategy: Building Airfields for the RAF, 1914-1945, and the government’s own 
The Royal Air Force Builds For War, all three providing thorough analysis and chronology of 
the ethos, politics, planning and technology behind airfield construction, along with clear 
analysis of airfield evolution over four decades.
3
 The most exhaustive and detailed however 
are, as with anti-invasion defences, Dobinson’s research reports for the Council for British 
Archaeology, which cover the philosophy of air strategy and the RAF’s implementation of it, 
combined with considerable attention to fabric, architecture and political strategy from 1918 
to the scaling down of facilities in the 1980s.
4
  An extensive range of re-workings of these 
standard works, published in smaller, ‘rapid-read’ volumes, often with surprisingly poor 
acknowledgement to their precursors, have capitalised on the earlier original research; they 
also focus much more on operational histories and personal anecdotes drawn from testimonial 
sources. Many such publications, though clearly designed to appeal to readers with an interest 
in local history, make little or no reference to the very landscape they pertain to, the omission 
demeaning its significance in the wider contemporary military rationale and strategy. Given 
the often cross-disciplinary nature of landscape history study, geology figures prominently in 
several studies by Ron Blake.
5
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Commemoration has a particular resonance in relation to airfields, generated by the human 
factor. No single aspect of the militarisation of the Norfolk landscape has been more 
associated with extensive loss of life than air operations, amplified by cultural and social 
upheaval. This aspect has not been explored academically until relatively recently and 
positively affirms the significance of landscape in memory and culture.
6
 Earlier contemporary 
accounts offer vivid and emotive personal experiences of the landscapes on and around 
wartime airfields, most notably that of Robert Arbib and John Tate Appleby.
7
 Blake’s 
academic work on the national geo-environmental impact of airfields and their legacy offers 
helpful insight into, primarily, a further little-studied perspective, that of geology.
8
 To date, 
however, no studies directly address the importance of airfields in the regional landscape 
context, and that is the purpose of this chapter. 
Official publications, drawn from original documents and intended as detailed histories of 
strategies, events and outcomes, comprise what might be termed ‘interim’ historiography 
between the primary sources and secondary texts. These are valuable for their recounting of 
official policy and strategy; notable among these are Works and The RAF Builds for War, 
both from the 1950s.
9
 Extensive RAF Operations Books exist at The National Archives, 
recording the day-to-day activities of squadrons and airfields, though by their nature contain 
little of value to the landscape historian, other than those sites not directly involved in air 
operations, which by contrast contain much useful information.
10
 Moreover, many RAF 
records at The National Archives are to be found in Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
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(MAF) records rather than Air (AIR), Works or War Office (WO) papers, requiring 
considerable lateral thinking on the part of researchers. This does however reinforce the very 
close connection between the wartime needs of agriculture and military aviation, and the 
correlative aspects are particularly helpful in supporting calculations of, and conclusions 
about, the true extent of military land use. The Air Ministry’s Directorate of Works and 
Buildings site plans are held at the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon and, specifically for 
USAAF bases in Norfolk, at the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) 2
nd
 Air Division 
Memorial Library in Norwich. The RAF vertical aerial photographic surveys of 1946 and 
1988 provide helpful land use and spatial relationship comparison as do oblique photographs 
held at Norfolk Archaeological Unit at Gressenhall Museum. Norfolk Historic Environment 
Record database contains archaeological data about military installations, useful for 
corroborating against other sources. 
 
The national and geo-political background 
Through the 1930s the series of Expansion-era airfield construction programmes formed the 
basis of Britain’s burgeoning network of airfields and there is a clear distinction between 
these and the wartime ‘fast-build’ airfields. The former were built for the long term, and are 
aptly referred to as ‘permanent stations’, characterised by solid, architect-designed, 
aesthetically pleasing buildings. The latter were constructed for immediate use, for the 
obtaining of a major strategic objective in time of war – essentially short-term but durable. It 
is the earlier era airfields which generally survived, because of their relative permanence and 
redevelopment potential, to enter long term post-war use. Norfolk has examples of both 
categories, as will be discussed below. This chapter is not a gazetteer of operational histories 
of airfields, but operational chronologies and phases will be explained where they relate 
directly to their landscape impact. Case studies will detail the individual and localised impact 
and demonstrate characteristics shared with other Norfolk airfields. The aim is to assess the 
extent of their subsuming of the Norfolk landscape and, in particular, the agricultural land.  
The political climate in which expansion took place was directly related to European geo-
politics and the growing apprehension of the need for an effective air war capability. Britain 
entered the Second World War with no more than one hundred airfields of all types across 
Britain.
11
 Six were fully operational in Norfolk. RAF Bircham Newton was a survivor from 
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the First World War, albeit with a brief reversion to agriculture in the 1920s. Feltwell and 
Marham opened in 1937 with Methwold, Watton and West Raynham following in early 
1939. Coltishall, Horsham St Faith and Swanton Morley became operational in 1940, the last 
of the county’s complement of permanent bases.
12
 All were permanent stations, characterised 
by the aesthetically pleasing, neo-Georgian designed permanent brick buildings designed by 
the likes of Edwin Lutyens and Clough Williams Ellis. Fine examples include Bircham 
Newton and Marham. Conversely, the buildings on airbases constructed during wartime were 
rapid-build, economically costed and temporary by virtue of their very design and intent. 
They are the epitome of form following function, even to the extent of their usefulness being 
constrained to the duration of the overall strategic objective. The physical distancing of 
technical and accommodation buildings from the flying areas of later airfields was deliberate, 
in order to minimise risk to personnel and materiel in the vent of enemy aerial attack.   
The remaining twenty-nine would be true wartime airfields. In 1939 deployment was 
primarily for defensive, maritime and short-range offensive operations but from 1941 was 
geared more towards offensive bombing operations into occupied Europe. Geo-political 
change came with the entry of the United States of America into the war in November 1941 
and the arrival of the first United States Army Air Force (USAAF) units in 1942. The 
American government was persuaded to broaden its scope from a war against the Japanese in 
the Pacific, to major involvement in a series of second fronts in Europe. The air strategy, 
which became enshrined in the Combined Bombing Offensive, led to a rapid rate of increase 
in airfield provision for USAAF units, militarily co-existing and co-operating with an 
increased RAF bomber strength.
13
  It is important to appreciate that a major airfield 
construction programme was already in place but assumed greater proportion when the 
USAAF arrived in Britain. 
Airfields, therefore, were already being built in the eastern counties before 1939 but the 
numbers, size and rate of construction increased throughout the war. The peak year, 
nationally, for airfield building, was 1942 during which, nationally, 125 new airfields were 
opened – one every three days - and this was reflected across Norfolk.
14
  Thus the search for 
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suitable sites intensified along with the attendant physical impact upon the landscape itself. 
More than six hundred new airfields were constructed nationally between 1939 and 1945, 
comprising some 160 million square yards of runways, perimeter tracks and dispersals. Sir 
Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air from 1940, equated this to a nine-thousand mile 
long concrete road reaching from London to Peking. Thirty million tons of hardcore and 
336,000 miles of electrical cable were used, along with huge amounts of timber and steel in 
building accommodation and technical buildings, often in dispersed areas. By 1945 
approximately 360,000 acres of the British landscape were occupied by airfields.
15
  An 
estimated three hundred thousand workers were employed in their construction.
16
  By the 
war’s end 740 operational military airfields were distributed across Britain.
17
 Given that some 
airbases hosted up to three thousand personnel, the cultural and economic interaction with 
surrounding communities had profound cultural, economic and social effect on the lives of 
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                  Numbers of wartime airfields by county  
Lincolnshire                            48 
Yorkshire                            43 
Norfolk                             38 
Suffolk                             34 
Hampshire                            28 
Essex                                          24 
Wiltshire                            24 
Oxfordshire                            10 
Berkshire                            18 
Gloucestershire                                        18 
 





Region % 1935                 % 1945 
London and South-East 13.3 5.8 
East 18.3 19.6 
South 18.3 11.1 
South-West 11.7 11 
Midland 1.7 7.2 
North-West - 3.5 
East and West Yorks. 3.3 4.2 
Northern 5 4.7 
Wales 3.3 4.6 
Scotland 8.4 11.1 
Northern Ireland 1.7 3.2 
 
Table 2. Regional distribution of military airfields 1935 and 1945 by percentage
19
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Norfolk is about 77 per-cent the size of Lincolnshire, and had a ratio of wartime airfields of 
around 0.79 to 1 compared with Lincolnshire. A simple measure of numbers of airfields by 
county against land area, whilst indicative, does not however represent an analysis of the 
impact on local landscapes. Table 2  demonstrates that whilst, for example, airfields located 
in the Midlands increased more than four-fold to 1945, they still amounted to little more than 
one-third those in the eastern counties.  
 
 
An ominous demeanour – the Norfolk dimension20  
‘What else has happened in the immemorial landscape of the English  
countryside? Airfields have flayed it bare wherever there are level,  




Perhaps, as the progenitor of modern landscape history, W. G. Hoskins may be afforded an 
emotive observation with one brief but memorable reference to the blight of airfields in the 
landscape.
 
Airfields collectively comprise the largest sub-category of defined military 
structures across Norfolk, with thirty-eight complete examples being in operation during all 
or part of the Second World War. This figure includes twelve satellite airfields which were 
later upgraded to main station status, one which was abandoned before the war’s end and one, 
Fersfield, often overlooked because of its ‘clandestine’ status, but which nevertheless made a 
sizeable structural impact upon the landscape. Of the ‘thirty-eight’ Barton Bendish presents 
by far the lightest remnant footprint in the local landscape; no crop marks evidence its short 
life, the only extant structure being a perimeter pill-box.
22
 Many of the remainder made 
significant impact upon the contemporary Norfolk landscape – and surviving examples 
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1936 2 2 
1937 1 3 
1938 1 4 
1939 3 7 
1940 10 17 
1941 6 23* 
1942 12 34 
1943 2 36 
1944 1 37 
1945 0 37 
  
    Table 3. Military airfields in Norfolk 1936-45. (*Barton Bendish  
    abandoned 1941) 
 
 
Norfolk is popularly closely associated with the ‘friendly invasion’ of the United States Army 
Air Force (USAAF) but more than half the airfields were primarily RAF bases.  The 
distinction is not clear cut as there were periods of shared use and occasional reversion to 
original user after operational interregna. This however has little or no influence on the 
landscape context and is not an area of enquiry undertaken here, for it is location and 
typology rather than corporate identity that determined impact on the landscape. The 
implications for the landscape were in the decisions made by Air Ministry surveyors about 
how the chosen sites were, in the first instance, to be utilised then, later, how many could 




             Fig. 28:  Norfolk airfields distribution by location and name 
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Selection Criteria      
 
‘A concave ground should always be treated with suspicion... A convex  




Strategically and geographically there was a fortuitous correlation between preferred regions 
of the UK in which to site airfields. Though a less than objective exercise, it is interesting to 
speculate on the topographic difficulties that would have been encountered  had strategic 
offensives been required to be launched from, for example, the north-west of England. The 
terrain would have proved impossible to work with. Though official documentation does not 
specify a particular predilection for choosing sites based on geological assessments, many 
airfields, nationally, were built on scarpland areas, and particularly ‘high crestal’ sites, often 
facing south or west facilitating take-off into the prevailing wind and safe descent over 
unobstructed areas, prime examples being Waddington on the Lincoln Edge and Biggin Hill 
on the North Downs.
24
 Perhaps not surprisingly then, there is some early correlation at 
national level between the siting of airfields and the well-established concept of England’s 
Highland and Lowland Zones. The wartime shifts of emphasis would see more airfields built 
across East Anglia, Lincolnshire and the Vale of York, not for reasons of geological 
preference but in support of military strategy. 
Whilst Bomber, Fighter, Transport, Coastal and Training Commands of the RAF were 
responsible for the strategic deployment of air operations, the Airfield Board of the Air 
Ministry oversaw airfield site selection and construction, along with the continuing 
maintenance of sites, depots and buildings.
25
  The Directorate General of Works was 
therefore responsible for the production of all airfield site plans.
26
  A ’Lands Officer’ was 
assigned to survey a potential site.
27
 In practice this individual would liaise with local 
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surveyors and officials after a particular location had been deemed to be favourable. In 1935, 
at the commencement of the RAF’s final peacetime Expansion phase, little recognition was 
afforded the need for paved runways, though wartime practicalities would soon emphasise 
their importance.  
 
 
Topography, soils, transport, existing land use 
 
There are four identifiable criteria that logically determined the choice of airfield sites in 
Norfolk and, for that matter, anywhere else in Britain. The  strategic decision to locate in the 
east of England already having been made, the first and most important criterion is that of 
topography – the lie of the land - followed closely by suitable soil composition or terrain. The 
third is the availability and proximity of adequate transport links and the fourth, the 
minimisation of disruption to agriculture.  Without a suitable soilscape on which to build and 
operate an all-weather airfield, the second and third criteria were irrelevant. Where a site was 
chosen all criteria were carefully assessed but compromises were clearly made between the 
needs of military strategy and those of agriculture. Fig.29 is a simple diagrammatic flow 











Fig.29:   The priority relationship between airfield site selection criteria. In an ideal situation, 
all four elements would be complementary; as the war progressed and sites became more 










The ideal topography for an airfield was a large, open area of relatively unobstructed 
countryside with a slightly convex contour to allow drainage. An acceptable alternative was 
flat but not completely level terrain, again for drainage purposes. The capability for natural 
drainage such as might be found on natural interfluves would prove to be crucial and even 
here require extensive artificial drainage to clear surface water quickly in times of operational 
urgency. Norfolk was not chosen as a suitable location for airfields because of the suitability 
of its terrain but because of its proximity to the North Sea and the European continent. 
Norfolk’s popular reputation as a ‘flat’ county is misleading; the topography is variable and 
the terrain comprises a range of quite different soil sub-structures and land forms. The RAF 
had employed aerial photography in the First World War for military reconnaissance but its 
additional value emerged during the inter-war period in topographic surveying and 
photogrammetry, saving time in time-consuming land-based surveying. Shadow, shading and 
oblique perspective were instructive factors in identifying distance, height, obstruction and 
soil types. The application of aerial photography for airfield selection was championed by the 




The ideal sub-surface conditions were light, free-draining soil. No landing ground could 
operate at peak efficiency when waterlogged, especially where the surface was undulating or 
the soil was heavy, clay-like and intractable. Royal Air Force surveyors were well aware of 
the importance of soils. The geological underlay was less of a consideration but still a factor.  
Soils, though highly important for good drainage and surface compaction, became secondary 
to topography as the war progressed, and the number of potentially ideal sites dwindled.  The 
twenty-three soil categories shown in Fig.29 can broadly be reduced to three – freely-draining 
and of low fertility; slowly permeable clay with impeded drainage and high fertility; and 
shallow lime-rich soils over chalk and limestone, of medium fertility. Ultimately, perhaps 
eighteen of the wartime airfields could be said to be in the first category, fourteen in the 
second, and six on the intermediate soils. Most of the older pre-war airfields such as Bircham, 
West Raynham and Coltishall were located on the free-draining, slightly acid loams. Later 
airfields grouped in south Norfolk – Hardwick, Hethel, Fersfield, Thorpe Abbotts, and 
Tibenham for example - were on the seasonally wet, base-rich loam and clay soils. Similarly, 
Wendling and Shipdham in central Norfolk suffered from impeded drainage. This is not 
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chronologically exclusive however; pre-war RAF Swanton Morley also experienced drainage 
problems.  
Agricultural consideration, though a ‘third tier’ priority, had of course direct implications for 
the selection, negotiation and subsequent acquisition of suitable sites, with later-war airfields 
being increasingly sited on areas of high fertility. This is explored further in Chapter 6. 
Despite the apparent free-ranging scope for suitable airfield sites the land resource was not 
infinite; this would become apparent as landing surfaces at individual sites proved 
operationally problematic and the conflict with agricultural requirements intensified.  Whilst 
a heavily-wooded area was clearly not suitable, topographically suitable sites across Norfolk 
would include farmed landscapes with hedged boundaries. This invariably meant that 
hedgerow and field trees had to be felled where they impinged upon the flying field. 
Conversely, but no less importantly, hedged landscapes with woodland provided excellent 
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A further factor that compressed the search for airfield sites to the east of England was the 
inability to use neighbouring regions because of existing military activity. Land of poor 
agricultural value and good topography in south-east Essex, where aerodromes sites would be 
less disruptive from an agricultural perspective, was rendered unusable because of the 
balloon barrage across the Thames estuary.
31
 Conversely, the lack of large centres of 
population across Norfolk allowed the majority of airfields to be sited away from populated 
areas. 
Given the unprecedented levels of consumption of, firstly, construction materials and, longer 
term, operational resources to airfield locations, road and rail transport from distribution 
localities were crucially important. This might appear to present a dichotomy if, given that if 
almost most airfield sites were located away from centres of population, they were not close 
to rail links. The national rail network during the 1940s was however far more extensive than 
would be the case twenty years later. The private motor car revolution was nearly two 
decades distant; freight and passenger traffic needs were in reality well served by rural rail 
services across Norfolk.
32
   
  
Militarised and conflict landscapes are conventionally measurable by distance and area. The 
air war could however be said to add a new dimension, that of vertical air space. In the first 
two years of war, both friendly and enemy aircraft were shot down, or crashed as the result of 
mechanical failure or pilot error. As air activity changed and intensified, larger aircraft were 
manoeuvring in greater numbers, on a daily basis. Training accidents became more common.   
Assembly areas for heavy bomber formations en route to the continent led to ever more 
crowded skies above East Anglia.
 
 2,500 aircraft are said to have crashed in Norfolk and 
Suffolk during World War Two.
 33
 This equates to at least one a day, and presented a serious 
risk to the civilian population and property, let alone service personnel and structures. Figure 
27 shows each airfield at the centre of a nominal six-mile diameter ‘flying zone’, allowing for 
landing, laden take-off and assembly areas.  Clear overlap can be seen with the proximity of 
some airfields to their neighbours.  
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Fig.31:  Norfolk airfields distribution with 6-mile diameter fly-zone indicating proximities 
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Typology and geometry 
 
Wartime military airfields lend themselves to classification into three sub-typologies. The 
first category comprises the ‘permanent’ Royal Air Force stations commissioned and 
completed or part-completed by September 1939 under the Expansion period programme 
dating from 1934. These airfields were grass surfaced, with a broadly square or rectangular 
flying field.  Contained within this would be the ‘bombing circle’ so called because of its 
convenience for bombing practice and usually a minimum 1,100 yards in diameter, and with 
four runway strips.  Three, four or even five ‘C ‘type hangars would be grouped in a close 
quarter circle at one edge of the landing field, with an intense cluster of technical buildings 
behind. This arrangement could be seen at Bircham Newton, Feltwell and Marham, all 
grassed airfields when built; and it illustrates the distinction between the vulnerability to 
attack of the operational flying field and important buildings, compared with the later 












Fig. 32   RAF Feltwell plan of 1935, showing major buildings clustered behind five ‘C’  
  type hangars, the flying field sited immediately to southward.
34
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     Fig. 33  Oblique aerial view of Feltwell, Norfolk, from the west. The flying  
                 field extends south from the clustered buildings. The airfield has been  




A second category is that of wartime temporary airfields built as fighter stations, which 
remained grassed and of conventional layout. 
The third type is that of the wartime ‘temporary’ airfields commissioned and operational 
between 1941 and 1945, designed and built or re-developed as ‘A’ class airfields. They merit 
some explanation since they are the most numerous and physically enduring in the Norfolk 
landscape and indeed across much of East Anglia; despite their ‘temporary’ designation their 
design and construction has, where they have not been formally removed, left their remains 
highly visible in the landscape both from above and at ground level. Some were even 
expanded further towards the end of the conflict. From December 1940 the spatial 
arrangement of new airfields changed dramatically, partly in response to concerns about 
vulnerability to aerial attack, and partly in recognition of the need for hard runway surfacing, 
as larger and more powerful aircraft with greater laden weights were deployed. Bomber 
airfields – the majority – were now being designed with three interconnecting strips, the 
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primary being built to a length of 1,400 yards and the two subsidiaries being 1,100 yards; six 
months later the standard was 2,000 yards and 1,400, all three 50 yards wide and with grass 
over-run side-strips of 400 and 200 yards respectively. The three runways were set at, or as 
near as possible, sixty degrees to each other, the main runway lying north-east to south-west 
where possible orientated to the prevailing wind, although the two ancillary runways were 
available when needed.
36
 It is this configuration, with hard-surface runways, that, seen from 
the air, gives an airfield built between 1941 and 1944 its unmistakeable crooked ‘A’ shaped 
tri-axial appearance in the landscape, clearly visible in contemporary aerial photographs and 
indeed in very recent photographs too. Class A airfields were standardised to specifications 
from the Air Ministry’s Directorate-General of Works (AMDGW) in August 1942, becoming 
the standard template, representing the product of years of discussion over the merits and 
costs of concrete runways, and differing radically from earlier flying fields with grass 
runways.
37
  From 1944, selected locations were extended as ‘very heavy bomber airfields’ 
beyond Class A standard, the Norfolk examples being Marham and Sculthorpe; the main and 
secondary runways at each site were extended to 3,000 and 2,000 yards respectively, and 
widths increased to 100 yards.
38
 The third prominent feature was the perimeter track which 
facilitated access to hardstanding dispersals of self-descriptive frying-pan and, later, 
spectacle, shapes. And in all wartime hard-surfaced airfields, some remnant of this 
characteristic triangulated layout remains, clearly visible even on small-scale maps, including 
where the airfield has long been abandoned or set to re-use. Lastly, unlike the earlier 
permanent stations, the ancillary technical buildings and accommodation areas were well-
dispersed away from the flying area.  
                                                          
36
 Smith, D.J., Britain’s Military Airfields, 1939-45 (Wellingborough, 1989) pp.24-26; Bowyer, 
(2000) pp.12,24; Francis, P., Flagg, R., Crisp, G. Nine Thousand Miles of Concrete - A Review of 
Second World War temporary airfields in England (Historic England, 2016) 
37
 Francis, P., Flagg, R., Crisp, G. Nine Thousand Miles of Concrete – a review of Second World war 





      
             Fig.34  RAF Wendling: standard site plan showing ‘A’ plan runways and identifying  




          
Fig.35  RAF Attlebridge in 2009, closed as an airfield in 1950, long used for  
poultry sheds – but still showing the distinctive ‘A’ class runway layout.
40
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 Air Division Memorial Library / Richard E. Flagg 
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Airfield ‘life phases’ or chronology 
 
The impact on each location may be viewed in four phases. Firstly, survey and affirmation 
marks the relatively short period of time between a location being considered for an airfield 
site and the confirmation to proceed - usually no more than a matter of months. It could be 
extended on occasion by appeals directed via the County War Agricultural Executive 
Committees, via the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, to the Air Ministry. The tensions 
and uncertainty generated in the farming community during this phase should not be 
underestimated. Extended correspondence between MAF, the Air Ministry and WAECs attest 
to the genuine efforts made in alleviating such problems. Secondly, construction took up to a 
year, sometimes longer if disrupted by bad weather, characterised by intense sub-phases, 
from site clearance and levelling, runway construction, erection of buildings and laying-out 
of dispersed areas. Thirdly, operational duration may appear self-evident but wartime military 
operations, even though not located in a hostile environment, represented ever-present 
accident potential to the local populace. Constant and considerable transport activity in 
supplying food, water, munitions and other materiel to the site presented disruption to local 
community and commercial activity on a daily basis. Fourthly, the post-1945 period might be 
termed the ‘legacy’ phase, many airfields being de-requisitioned, returned to agricultural use 
or re-utilised in another commercial role. Some were retained into the 1950s but the number 
declined gradually. As at 2019, Marham is the sole remaining major RAF base in Norfolk.  
These four phases witness the impact upon the landscape, but each is characterised by 
differing activity and intensity. Although phase three is clearly the ‘object’ or purpose phase, 
the first and second phases are those that had the most immediate dramatic impact upon the 
landscape; the first because of the disruption to existing, established, human activity in the 
landscape and the second characterised by the physical changes wrought to that landscape. 
 
Acquisition – an uncertain time for agriculture 
‘I am directed to inform you that the Air Ministry have decided to construct  
            an aerodrome in the above district and certain land believed to be in your 
occupation is embraced therein…. Formal notice of requisition will be  
forwarded to you in due course and a Lands Officer will call upon the  
occupier and discuss details as to possession and the harvesting of crops. 
92 
 




The County War Agricultural Executive Committees were empowered to overview and direct 
agricultural production for the duration and liaised with the Air Ministry’s lands officers and 
surveyors. It was through the CWAECs that landowners and tenant farmers made 
representation of objection to land being taken over. In Norfolk acquisition is inextricably 
linked with agriculture, for it was the latter’s continued function in the landscape that would 
be most threatened. Few records of contemporary acquisition procedures actually remain in 
the archives.
42
 Late 1941 saw a large number of sites still to be decided upon. 
Correspondence between the Air and Agriculture and Fisheries Ministries acknowledged the 
scale of the problem and the need to move quickly, whilst at the same trying to see each 
department’s point of view. 
‘It is rather late now for long-term planning and no useful purpose is 
served by arguing about what might have been…. I have walked sites  
with the reconnoitring officers and can say that the greatest care is  
taken by them; they study and try to safeguard the best interests of 
the farmers, compatible with certain definite and essential requirements  




Correspondence illustrates the tensions that arose between the concerns of farmers and 
landowners, expressed via county WAECs thence via MAF to the Air Ministry. The needs of 
agriculture, though clearly not the Air Ministry’s highest priority, were not arbitrarily over-
ridden. Some understanding of agricultural practice was recognised and acceded to when and 
where possible, and with some diplomacy. The issue that appears to have given most cause 
for concern and uncertainty was perceived lack of final decisions on site acquisition, of which 
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numerous Norfolk examples are recorded. Frank Rayns, the CWAEC’s Executive Officer, 
raised the issues of lack of information about proposed sites at North Pickenham, Deopham 
Green, Thorpe Abbotts and Tattersett.  
‘Pending a decsion of the Air Ministry farmers are naturally not inclined 
to spend money on cultivations, seeds and manures….I am most anxious  
to minimise the loss of agricultural land in Norfolk as much as possible.  
The total loss due to defence measures is really alarming, but I know of  




Rayns also alleged that contractors at many sites had been accessing land too early and 
destroying existing crops, notably at Denton and Topcroft in the south and Wendling and 
Shipdham in central Norfolk.
45
  The Air Ministry’s Aerodrome Construction Programme 
incorporated agricultural needs in its Priority Construction List, under the heading 
‘Aerodrome sites not required until September (after Harvest)’. Specific reference was made 
to aerodromes which would be acquired and developed within the next three months (before 
Harvest) 1941, including Shipdham, Wendling, Foulsham, Downham Market, Hardwick, 
Great Snoring and Hethel.
46
 The Air Ministry advised the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries that ‘sites which we shall not take this side of September [include] Great Snoring 
and Deopham but continued sites we think we must have and will need to start at once 
include...Tibenham and Horham.’ 
47
  Great Snoring and Tibenham were in any event deferred 
whilst sites outside Norfolk took priority.
 48
  Great Snoring was itself replaced by Sculthorpe 
following objections from landowners via the County War Agricultural Executive Committee 
and MAF.   Given that it is sited on some of the best quality agricultural land in Norfolk, 
Deopham Green was taken under advice and eventually selected in preference to Hingham, 
from where even stronger objection was received. 1942 was the busiest year of construction 
of airfields, and it follows that the preceding two years must have been an intense time for 
finding suitable sites, nationally and in Norfolk. 
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Although many sites are popularly associated with the USAAF, some were selected in late 
1940 and very early 1941. The USAAF was not operating formally from England until late 
1942. A number of sites were chosen as RAF bomber stations as part of the Air Ministry’s 
1941 Expansion programme but re-assigned for American use. Construction contracts were 
not issued for tender until May, July and September of 1942.
49
  The Air Ministry continued to 
make efforts to address farmers’ concerns. In an especially diplomatic and lengthy letter, 
centred on concerns raised by MAF about the proposed site at Old Buckenham, the Air 
Ministry acknowledged that mid-Summer commencement of contracts presented a problem.  
 
‘Unless the arable land can be used for a pulse of fodder crop, I cannot see  
how it can be reasonably cultivated without an almost certain risk of loss. 
If occupiers are permitted to carry on normally we may have a regrettable  
waste of labour, manures and foodstuffs; if cultivations are stopped and 





It suggests that sites such as Old Buckenham, where the airfields were scheduled for early 
summer commencement, could be ploughed, and then if the airfield construction were 
deferred or delayed, the land could still be sowed for summer harvesting.  Consistency of 
notification seems to have been achieved by, for example, use of standardised 
correspondence. Overall, the Air Ministry became ever more aware of the need to consult 
with a variety of bodies, including local Boards of Health, Works, the Electricity Generating 
Boards, Post Office and other military authorities with allegedly stronger claims. Basically, 
land available for any military operational purpose, and not objected to by one agency or 
individual or another, was becoming very limited indeed. 
 
Construction 
‘As each new field was invaded by our crushing machines, as each new hedgerow  
was smashed and uprooted and shattered, as each great oak succumbed before  
axe and dynamite and bulldozer, we felt a pang. For there is nothing quite as  
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final, quite as levelling, as an aerodrome...It was  as if a flood had risen and  
hidden a beautiful landscape, and then subsided, leaving a desolate wasteland  




Fig.36 American construction engineers concreting runways. The image conveys the 




Whilst individual and hedgerow trees were subject to removal, densely wooded areas were to 
be avoided when choosing a location, regardless of the topography. Exceptions were notable 
by their rarity. Over a million small trees, not long planted by the Forestry Commission, were 
cleared to make way for RAF Woodbridge in east Suffolk.
53
 No such extreme clearance 
occurred in Norfolk. Generally, woodland was removed only out of practical necessity on the 
flying fields of aerodromes but otherwise proved very useful for practical purposes in 
dispersed areas.
54
 Spring Wood at Hardwick contained dispersed sites, access to the bomb 
dump and several aircraft dispersals and Hethel Wood contained a number of dispersed 
buildings. Perhaps the best example of partial concealment for bomb storage is the bomb 
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dump at Honeypot Wood adjacent Wendling airfield.
55
 Rackham suggests that airfield 
construction may have been one of the few causes of loss of woodland during the Second 
World War, but that little compared to loss in the inter-war period from and from 1950 to 
1973 and from 1945 onwards.
56
  Whilst Rackham’s survey is based on a very local sector of 
north Essex, it is still part of eastern England’s  ‘airfield country’ and may reasonably be held 
as an indicator that airfield construction was not responsible for mass loss of ancient or 
established woodland.  
Having committed to a chosen site, the first major operation was to clear hedges and trees, fill 
ditches and remove root crops from the air operational area. This made the local topography 
more evident, at which stage depressions were filled and undulations levelled by state-of-the-
art earth scrapers. Contouring could actually be created at this stage if needed.  The flying 
area was pounded and rollered, and then ploughed to facilitate the sowing of grass. Great care 
was taken to analyse the soil and local climatic conditions to determine the best type of grass 
to be sown.
57
  Pre-war, the Air Ministry had a somewhat anachronistic and unscientific 
method for determining the suitability of the established grass for flying operations; a small 
saloon car would be driven across the sward at no more than twenty miles per hour and, if the 
passengers experienced no particular discomfort, it was deemed serviceable.
58
 This last 
element would change fundamentally with the later redevelopment and construction of deep-
impact concrete runways and hard-standings. Site clearance was always a hazardous 
business.  Sixteen year-old Reg Wyatt was employed on blasting tree stumps at Shipdham.  
‘The land was negotiated and compulsorily purchased pre-1940 and work  
started that year. Oaks were cut down, leaving the stumps to be removed. 
The explosives were stored in a small brick shed, two doors, four locks,  
partitioned with two rooms back-to-back, gelignite in one side and fuses in 
            the other. We took the explosives to the airfield in cars. 
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A mallet was used to drive a hole for the gelignite, then the gelignite was  
inserted, fused and lit  – and this would blow a decent sized hole under the  
stump of the tree. When cooled, usually the next morning, we would pack  
the hole with more gelignite and blast the stump out. 
 
Meanwhile, bulldozers were being used to remove farm buildings.  When the  
site had been levelled, the company supplied hardcore and shingle, quarried  
from its own quarries at Shipdham, for the runways, peri and dispersals.  
All this was laid to a depth of 1.5 to 2 metres, depending on levels. The  




Drainage was ever to be a problem on some of the heavy clay soils of Norfolk, made worse 
by ground compaction by heavy bombers, and most deleterious when taking-off with a full 
payload. There were implications for farmers, with the potential for existing field and stream 
drainage systems being completely over-whelmed, damaged or destroyed. Many airfields had 
modern, heavy-duty drainage systems constructed adjacent to the runways but this did not 
address the question of where water run-off would be discharged. In apparent response to 
concern expressed by the National Farmers’ Union with regard to potential damage to 
farmers’ field systems, the Air Ministry discussed the idea of bringing in local water 
Catchment Boards and Land Drainage authorities to help with the necessary work. It was not 
just the practicalities of the work that concerned all parties but, in war as in peacetime, the 
monetary cost and material resources required for the task. 
‘In the preparation of our new aerodromes with their large areas of hard runways... 
we are faced on almost every site with a problem of effecting satisfactory surface  
water drainage, usually necessitating improvements to ditches or other  waterways  
taking the main outfall drainage from the completed landing ground.  Sometimes it  
is a mere matter of persuading farmers to clean out their ditches but not  
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A characteristic unique to airfields of the Second World War was their physical relationship 
to their immediate environments. Whilst late-twentieth-century airfields are physically 
separated from local communities by ‘hard’ landscaping and rigorously enforced security 
zones, wartime airfields were notable by their integration into the existing landscape – see 
Figure 35. There is no disputing their starkness in the landscape but their peripheral features 
often intruded into the surrounding working landscape without disrupting its function. Field 
boundaries were often retained as formal concession to the incumbent farmer or landowner.  
 
  Fig.37 Snetterton Heath, August 1944. It is typical of many airfield boundaries, illustrating    




This may have evolved by default rather than original design. Whilst land was requisitioned and 
compulsorily purchased when and where needed, individual landholder objections were not always 
ignored and so not only fields but occasionally homesteads would appear themselves as apparent 
intrusions into the ‘militarised zone’ – an inverse intrusion in effect.  
Figure 38 is a 1946 RAF aerial photo of Attlebridge (actually centred on Hungate Common, West 
Longville) showing clearly the tri-axial runways and perimeter track, but also demonstrating the 
manner in which many of the ‘spectacle’ dispersals intruded into the surrounding fields. This feature, 
whilst an operational necessity, helped break up the outline of the airfield somewhat. The site is 
starkly apparent from the air but during wartime operations, camouflage would have partially - but not 
completely - obscured and obfuscated the runways and perimeter track. 
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 Fig.38 RAF Attlebridge showing spatial intrusion of  
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       Fig.39  Tibenham airfield looking east, runways and perimeter under construction by        
       W&C French Ltd, 8 March 1942, field patterns are clearly visible under the tri-axial   




















      Fig.40 Aerial photograph of Wendling airfield looking east, 18 April 1944. The perimeter    
      mirrors the prominent field boundary line to the north (left of image). There is no  
      evidence that this is intentional but it is striking nevertheless.
64
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A further feature, unique to air operations, is the airspace itself which, whilst not part of the 
physical landscape, impacts upon the landscape as what may be termed ‘operational flying 
radii’.
65
 Whilst many overlap, the issue is further added to by assembly ‘layers’ and flight 
corridors to the continent, which would always extend broadly eastward. Assuming a heavy 
bomber travelling at 200 miles per hour would traverse a three mile radius in less than one 
minute, the capacity for aerial traffic congestion is immense. Whilst no activities in the flying 
radii technically impede ground activity beyond the airfield, they nevertheless exist and could 
at least be construed as visually and audibly disruptive to any or all activity not directly 




Discussions took place at the Air Ministry regarding the rapidly dwindling number of suitable 
sites for airfields. Acknowledging that the whole country had already been thoroughly 
surveyed and that the finding of suitable sites would inevitably entail the taking of more 
valuable agricultural land, one option suggested was simply to increase the number of 
aircraft, and therefore, squadrons at each airfield, or the number of aircraft in each squadron. 
Further, indicating that ‘planes no longer have to be under cover’, there should be no need for 
extended dispersal areas. Finally, if more space were to be needed, ‘the taking of additional 
space on existing sites would be, certainly in some places, better from a food production 




Architecture – the prominent buildings 
Prominent among airfield structures are hangars, used throughout the duration and 
characteristic landmarks on all major airfields. There are known to be more than fifty Second 
World War hangar designs but some are iconic by survival, such as the austerity steel-framed 
Bellman hangar and the later T2.
68
  Two basic variants were the 1934 Type ‘C’ and the 1941 
‘T2’. The pre-war permanent stations were characterised by stepped and gabled designs, 
sometimes with later additions, generally set in a curve adjacent the flying field. RAF 
Bircham Newton had three each of the original ‘C’ type and Bellman hangars, along with a 
number of blister types. The ‘C’ featured a steel framed, lattice girder design with an apex 
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roof covered with timber and asbestos, along with large windows that served not only to 
admit light and give an aesthetic appearance but allowed for blast exit. Concrete between the 
steel sheets offered anti-shrapnel protection. The T2 was enormous – 300 feet long with a 150 
feet wide entrance area.
69
  Both marques of hangar survive in situ at many sites, having been 
re-used for a variety of modern commercial purposes. Blister hangars were a fast-build 
wartime expedient and quickly became service facilities, for aircraft were soon to be parked 
at dispersal in all weathers. From 1940, fighters were often parked on hard-standings 
protected on three sides by brick walls, themselves backed with earth and grass revetments.
70
 
It is these that survive whilst little else does, for example, at Matlaske. From mid-1942 
hangars were very much seen as service areas and aircraft were generally parked in the open 
on the characteristic – and highly visible - ‘frying-pan’ and ‘spectacle’ hard-standings.  Fear 
and actual danger of large-scale and sustained enemy air attack had reduced considerably by 
then.
71
 At ‘A’ Class airbases technical and accommodation buildings were deliberately 
dispersed rather than grouped behind the flying field. The vast range of service building types 
varied from the ubiquitous ‘half-cylinder’ Nissen huts and Handcraft and Quonset huts. 
‘Half-brick’ buildings comprised simple stretcher bond brickwork with steel-framed 
windows. Timber shortages led eventually to fully pre-cast concrete structures.
72
 Many of 
these variants survive in varying stages of dilapidation or re-use. The more portable buildings 
were quickly sold off post-war, with examples being evident in farmyards and commercial 
premises across Norfolk. 
 
Woodland and hedgerow  
Whilst extended areas of woodland were clearly a counter-productive feature in terms of site 
selection and construction and consequently to be avoided, adjacent woodland was a positive 
asset in two respects. Firstly, concealment and camouflage for aircraft and sensitive buildings 
away from the flying areas was an established pre-requisite. This would be a particular 
landscape feature of individual sites. Secondly, blast protection, especially for ordnance 
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stores and, occasionally, aircraft. Woodland would prove key to the storage and concealment 
of bomb stores at airfields and particularly so in the cases of the three major forward 
ammunition depots at Earsham, Hockering and Barnham Heath. This second practice 
eventually extended beyond the core militarised zone to utilise roadside verges. 73  
Whilst woodland in Norfolk suffered little destruction during the Second World War, 
considerable quantities of field and hedgerow trees were cleared for airfield construction. 




It is possible to interpret the airfields of Norfolk geographically as being grouped in four 
loose clusters, plus one ‘singleton’ at Ludham, in north-east Norfolk. This however would be 
misleading, as a ‘buffer zone’ representation indicates more clearly a relatively even 
distribution. Clearly, the wetland areas to the east were entirely unsuitable for airbases but the 
area towards the Cromer ridge in the north-east of the county appears to have been 
overlooked. This may have been due to an official inclination to leave well alone that large 
belt of high quality farmland but more likely is the wariness of locating airfields in coastal 
areas vulnerable to attack and invasion. The large tract of light soils in Breckland would have 
suited airfields but the area was secured for the Stanford Battle Training Area by 1941.
75
 The 
siting of a cluster of later airbases on the clays of south and mid-Norfolk endorse that level 
land was the primary criterion, with soil composition a secondary, though still important, 
consideration.  All airfields were built on farmland, though of varying quality and 
importance. Construction began at Deopham Green in 1942, on land well suited to airfield 
construction yet defined as very high quality agricultural land.
76
 The few pre-war airfields of 
the 1930s were almost all sited to the west of the county, on the Good Sands, Breckland and 
even, in the case of Feltwell, to the very edge of the Fens. The exception was Coltishall, 
located to the north-east of Norwich, and this was a later choice of site, as the geo-political 
situation was becoming more defined. As pressure for numbers of airfields increased, sites on 
the Central and South Norfolk claylands were chosen. By no means ideal, the problems of 
draining surface water from later sites proved to be a major operational obstacle. This does 
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not mean the sites should not have been chosen, simply that as the war progressed the 
availability of ideal sites became almost non-existent.   
 
Land use – Perspective and Proportion  
‘[The] very large loss of agricultural land to the fighting services, especially  
for airfields and training grounds, must be recorded. Apart from large tracts  
many small pieces of ground were required for searchlight stations,  
anti-aircraft posts, strongpoints and so on. These areas, though, often  




The volume of resources in labour and materials consumed for airfield provision during the 
Second World War is extraordinary even by modern standards. Dobinson has it that military 
airfields present as ‘one of the most numerous and complex settlement types to have appeared 




 Pre-war, the impact of military airfields on 
the Norfolk landscape could hardly be said to be significant, with just four permanent stations 
– Bircham Newton, Feltwell, Marham and Watton – in evidence. The nearest county thereto 
already experiencing greater land loss to aerodromes was Lincolnshire. Military airfields 
occupied an estimated 25,000 acres nationally in 1935, not dissimilar to that which Norfolk 
alone would host by early 1945.
79
 By 1945 approximately 360,000 acres of land across 
Britain were occupied by airfields.
80
  In terms of land denied other uses, airfields subsumed 
around 162,000 hectares – 0.7 per-cent of the national land area of the United Kingdom.
81
  In 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Oxfordshire the airfield footprint exceeded two per-cent of the total land 
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 Pre-war, an RAF airfield might cover nearly 350 acres, with a major 
bomber station reaching nearly 500 acres. By 1945 a standard A-class bomber airfield would 
easily subsume 670 acres whilst an average grass-runway airfield might still be 250 acres.
83
  
The statistics acquire meaningful proportion when put into local context. By calculating the 
proportion of air bases sited in Norfolk against the national total, Norfolk’s total of thirty-
eight represents 5.1 per-cent of the 740 airfields across Britain by 1945. A polygonal survey 
of contemporary aerial photographs shows that around 23,000 acres were subsumed to 
Norfolk’s airfields, not including off-site accommodation and service buildings.
84
   
To contextualise further, the key point is that almost all the land taken for airfields was 
agricultural land, at a time when land was desperately needed for wartime agricultural 
production. The contemporary land base of Norfolk in 1940 was 1,307,333 acres.
85
  The 
proportion of land in the county covered by airfields, then, amounted to a little under 1.8 per-
cent, not including off-site buildings. This is similar to the generally accepted figure for an 
‘airfield county’. However, of the total land area of Norfolk, approximately 982,600 acres in 
total were used for arable, permanent pasture and rough grazing, including about 21,000 acres 
described as ‘agriculturally unproductive’.
86
 Given that almost all the land taken for airfields 
was agricultural, this indicates that approximately 2.34 per-cent was lost to airfields, this at a 
time when agricultural land was needed as never before.    
The militarisation of the landscape during the Second World War is popularly seen as a 
significant marker in change of land use – principally because of the impression of a dramatic 
overhaul of farming practice and an imposed increase in productivity as part of the war effort. 
The evidence bears closer study. Whilst airfield and training areas in particular subsumed a 
considerable quantity of agricultural land, the war economy was but one factor in the 
chronology of agriculture. And it should be noted that increases in productivity are a separate 
issue to any increase in the amount of land brought into production.  Dudley Stamp’s pre-war 
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Land Utilisation Survey of Great Britain and the government’s own Agricultural censuses 
from 1920s to the 1970s provide a chronology within Norfolk itself and a comparison with 
national levels of land use.
87
. Mosby’s 1938 survey of land use in Norfolk provides a detailed 
view of land use before radical change. Nationally, agriculture was depressed, marginal land 
neglected and low ratios of land under the plough.
88
 Interestingly, military airfields across 
England sometimes appeared as red areas in maps supporting the original survey, the legend 
defining them as ‘agriculturally unproductive areas’.
 
This would of course highlight their 
locations to anyone with tactical interest in where airfields were located. Therefore the 
surveys maps of eastern counties had some locations concealed, indicating simply the prior 
use of that land.
 89
 In practice however, agricultural land in the east of England was already 
being used more efficiently than in other areas of the country. There was proportionately less 
grassland available to be ploughed for the war effort. Only a marginal increase in cultivated 
farmland was possible. As Dudley Stamp puts it  
‘[in the]...arable Eastern counties all land which could be ploughed in conformity 
 with good husbandry was, in fact, under the plough and it has only been possible  




Given the dichotomy of land needed for airfields against that required for elevated levels of 
agricultural production, the added pressure of existing intense levels of land use for 
agriculture along with the sheer numbers of airfields required in the east, meant that the 
reality, for Norfolk at least, was that airfields were inevitably often to be sited on areas of 
highly productive land.  
Dudley Stamp notes that whilst it is true that a greater proportion of the agricultural 
landscapes of the eastern counties of England were actively cultivated than anywhere else in 
the country, agriculture was in depression. Landed estates were being broken up and between 
the two world wars Britain was heavily dependent on imported food-basics to an extent that 
is almost unimaginable and politically unacceptable seven decades on. This would of course 
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require most urgent attention from 1939 and its legacy would fuel the drive to maximise 
agricultural self-sufficiency after 1945, reaching its apogee in the 1970s.
91
 
Every airfield in Norfolk, operational during the Second World War, was sited entirely or 
largely on agricultural land. The four pre-existing permanent stations at Bircham Newton, 
Feltwell, Marham and Watton are relevant to this study because of the military activity 
associated with them between 1939 and 1945 – and their post-war roles. RAF West Raynham 
was operational by May 1939 but is essentially a war-time airfield. Their physical presence 
emphasises continuity in the landscape. 
The direct result was a direct conflict of interest between the ever-increasing need for 
agricultural land and that needed for military purposes. Dudley Stamp made a prescient 
observation in his post-war assessment of land use, reinforcing the permanence and physical 
nature of the land, geological structure and climate, and their constraints upon development, 
even with the help of modern methods. 
‘Any efforts in levelling, considered in relation to the country as a whole,  
are puny in the extreme... such works are dictated by the physical nature  
of the land…. most land can be upgraded into a sphere of usefulness  
which is not inherent to it, but can be upgraded only to a certain extent,  




Dudley Stamp described the characteristics of the working landscape in the context of 
agriculture. Whilst observing that geological structure and mineral disposition are even less 
alterable than the land itself, and that the climate cannot be controlled, he acknowledges that 
it is possible to change to implement changes in the landscape. This is strikingly apposite to 
the building of military airfields, especially given basic characteristics of the Norfolk 
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Case Studies  
 
Bircham Newton 
The only surviving First World War airfield, Bircham saw an unbroken operational history 
through to the mid-1960s. It was decided to base a peacetime bomber station here as part of 
the 1922 policy review, pre-dating the longer-term inter-war Expansion schemes of the 
1930s. The site possessed contemporary hangars which, though supplemented with later C-
type hangars in the 1930s, survived the war. Some 1922-style buildings survive which, 
together with the characteristic neo-Georgian permanent buildings, built to those very precise 
and exacting design standards, preserve a continuity almost unique to Bircham. As with many 
East Anglian airfields, the water supply came from boreholes. There were three here, 
supplying 100,000 gallons to storage tanks. The area is farmland, bordered by Honey Hills to 
the west but with marshy ground to the east. Hyde Park Plantation, Polney Plantation and 
Magpie Plantation were all close by the site but unaffected. A technical site was located in 
woodland at the southern boundary of the aerodrome. Total airfield area was 3.59 square 
kilometres and the perimeter ran to 11.84 kilometres. 
The airfield pre-dated the Second World War. The contemporary landscape impact, therefore, 
was not especially increased when compared with other, newer airfields. It was a prestigious 
aerodrome and a focus of public engagement; in May 1939, 5,000 people watched a major air 
display.
93
  A wide range of aircraft and functions operated from here over forty years, always 
from grass runways. Wartime operations saw accommodation expand to 3,000 by December 
of 1944. The 1950s saw consideration given to extending the runways to 2,000 yards but 
ground undulations would require heavy grading work.
94
  From 1945 to 1962 Bircham was 
variously occupied by Fighter, Transport and Technical Training Commands and finally 
closed in 1962.
95
  It has long been a training site for the Construction Industry Training Board 
but with extensive remaining contemporary architecture. 
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Fig.41  Bircham Newton in the 1980s with a complete C-type hangar and contemporary 
ancillary buildings fronting the main flying area, now used for construction industry training. 
Accommodation blocks are in the foreground.
96
 













Fig.42  RAF Bircham Newton shown on the Land Utilisation Survey maps, which often show 
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Horsham St Faith 
All airfields were rural except one – Horsham St Faith, at the outer fringe of Norwich. It 
presented a suitable large area of flat farmland, though immediately adjacent suburban areas 
to the south and west, and so was unusual in its proximity to a densely populated area. In 
1938 farmland predominantly to the east of the main Norwich to Cromer highway was 
chosen on which to site a permanent RAF bomber station. The Land Utilisation Survey 
denotes the land as arable, with very small areas of new housing area or allotments. New 
residential housing and commercial building had been encroaching from the city for many 
years pre-war.
98
 The main Norwich road ran north across the western side of the site and was 
diverted to where it remains as the present-day A140.  
 
Map measurements taken from contemporary O.S. -maps suggest some 13.7 miles of field 
boundary was lost. Much of this must have been hedgerow and presumably a number of 
trees. About 2.25 miles of minor lanes and tracks were subsumed. Heath Farm remained, 
accessible from the North only; Wood Farm to the west had gone as had Heath Farm sited in 
the middle of the airfield. Just over 1 mile of the Norwich- Horsham St Faith village road was 
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        Fig.43   shows the original route of the main road to St Faith village before diversion.  




      
 
        Fig.44 Horsham St Faith in 1940, showing the flying field and five C-type hangars in    
        south-east corner. This spatial layout borders but does not block the St Faith road.
 100
   
     
                                                          
99
 Map created using 1:20000 Edina Historic Digimap Service 
100






Fig.45 Redevelopment as a Class ‘A’ airfield in 1943 presented a much more intrusive 
configuration, and shows the closed-off Norwich road overlaid by the airfield western runway101  
 
 
It is interesting to note that the decision to build was made before the outbreak of war and at 
least three years before the search for suitable wartime airfield sites began its most intensive 
phase. Whilst no definitive official record has come to light during the course of this 
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research, it appears objective to conclude that topographic criteria simply took priority over 
community safety concerns. According to Freeman, the airfield proposal was not welcomed 
by the populace.
102
 Proximity to Norwich brought risk to the civilian population, sadly borne 
out by events. Six crashes occurred at urban sites, with two child deaths.
103
  Building began 
in 1939 and the site opened for operations in 1940.
104
 Five contemporary pre-war design C-
type hangars were built at the south-eastern corner of the bombing circle. Permanent brick 
and tile buildings were constructed, with central heating and high quality accommodation, all 
in accordance with a typical permanent station layout. In September 1942 the airfield was 
transferred to USAAF. Construction work on upgrading to Class A standard began during 
1943 and accommodation capacity was extended to two thousand. 
 
Existing public concerns about safety and proximity were not allayed by the fact that the 
upgraded main runway was orientated in the direction of the city. In November 1940 a 
Blenheim bomber crashed narrowly missed housing to the south-east, crashing in a field, 
injuring the crew. One of the engines hit a nearby house, with no injuries. Another Blenheim 
crashed in a residential area of Hellesdon in May 1942, killing the crew.
105
 As larger, heavier 
and more powerful aircraft, with more aircrew, came into service the potential for disaster 
increased. On 2
nd
 March 1944 a B-24 failed to climb high enough before clipping the roof of 
a bungalow in Hellesdon, before coming to rest against a house in the next road. The bomb 
load did not explode and no civilians were injured, but seven of the ten crew perished. Whilst 
crashes clearly occurred in the vicinity of more rural sites, it seems providential that more 
regular incidents involving civilians did not materialise in the urban areas adjacent to 
Horsham St Faith. The accidents that did occur clearly vindicated the local populace’s fears 
for the wartime present and post-war future. 
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 Fig.46  A B-24 bomber crashed on a house in Berkley Close, Hellesdon on 14th    






The total area encompassed by the flying area, buildings and accommodations in 1945 was 
nearly 1.42 square miles (911 acres). The total boundary distance, that is, the site perimeter 
was approximately 5 miles. Whilst it would be unrealistic to speculate that this entire area 
would have stayed under the plough in peacetime, even with the increased intensity of 
cultivation during wartime, it is a significantly large tract of land to be denied to agricultural 
use. The choice of proximity to the north-east boundary of Norwich was always controversial 
and has never been fully explained. Whilst occasional accidents on, and near, the environs of 
operational airfields were inevitable they were certainly less likely to cause human fatality 
and damage to property in a more rural setting; the risk was ever present in an urban 
environment.  Indeed this continued to be a cause of concern to the populace of Norwich, 
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expressed by Member of Parliament for East Norfolk, Brigadier Medlicott, in a House of 
Commons debate in 1948. 
 
‘We have no wish to make any request which would embarrass the Air Ministry 
             in the great responsibilities with which it is now faced, but we say that a grave 
mistake was made in the original siting of this air station..... and in view of the 
vast expanse of ground in the county which is suitable for airfields, why this  
particular site should have been chosen on the very fringe of the city passes  
comprehension. To the layman it does not seem as if this site has any particular  
tactical advantage over the many others that could have been chosen…’ 
 
To which the MP for Norwich North, John Paton, added: 
 
‘The real truth is that this aerodrome should never have been put there at all. It  
is not only in the wrong situation but I am informed... that it is only possible 
for pilots to gain or lose height by manoeuvring over the City of Norwich itself.  
            That seems to me to be an incredible stupidity on the part of whoever is responsible.’ 
 
Even the Under Secretary of State, Geoffrey de Freitas’ reply, appeared to concur and even 
empathised, but also misinformed the questioner: 
 
‘…in recent years we have repeatedly examined the airfields of Norfolk to see  
if we are making the best use of them. We are satisfied that we are. We must  
not forget, in talking of the many airfields in Norfolk, that most of them have  
neither concrete runways nor permanent buildings. They are grass airfields. 
It is tempting to go back 11 years to the time of a Conservative predecessor  
at the Air Ministry and comment upon the wisdom of building this fighter  




The issue continued to fester in the public consciousness, as presented in Parliament five 
years later, again by Brigadier Medlicott. He formally petitioned on behalf of over 2,600 
residents who were increasingly disturbed and anxious that: 
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‘…the nearness of this air station to so many houses and schools is a source  
of danger not only to the residents but also the pilots and crews of the  
aircraft… and, lastly, that with the increase in the speed and power of  
aircraft, all these tendencies will be increased with a consequent worsening  
of the conditions of which your petitioners complain.’ 
108
 
The east-west runway was extended eastward in 1956 to avoid take-offs and landings over 
built-up areas. RAF Horsham St Faith continued as a post-war military airfield until 1963, 
when it was sold to Norwich Corporation for redevelopment as Norwich Airport. 
Consequently the area was never to revert to agricultural use in any form. The 
accommodation areas on the south-eastern side of the site, both sides of Fifers Lane, were in 
used until 1993 as University of East Anglia student residences. Most of the A-class runways 
and dispersals tracks remain in but only the extended east-west runway is principally used as 
part of Norwich International Airport. 
 
Matlaske 
Matlaske is as different an example of land use and operational duration from Horsham St 
Faith as may be seen in Norfolk.  By comparison it has left one of the lighter military aviation 
footprints in the county’s landscape. Originating as a satellite for RAF Coltishall, Matlaske 
was never redeveloped as a stand-alone or principal station. It therefore never had imposed 
upon it the massive constructional and logistical impact of concrete runways. Operationally, 
it varied on several occasions between RAF and USAAF occupation, and almost always by 
fighter aircraft requiring no more than grass landing and take-off areas, but with concrete 
perimeter tracks and hard-standing dispersals. 
The area was requisitioned in 1940, a year into hostilities, as it became apparent that pressure 
on fighter parking at Coltishall necessitated a satellite field. The airfield was described as 
‘hastily built’, leading to severe drainage problems throughout its operational life. 
Accommodation was established in the grounds of Barningham Park, with officers in the Hall 
itself, described as ‘charming’. 
109
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‘Then work began on the fields beside our school with round the clock  
working with heavy plant and lighting through the night…. This was   
to be an overflow airfield for Coltishall. The RAF also took over the Hall 




Matlaske even became a prisoner of war camp for a time. 
 
‘Hundreds of huts were being built in the park. It was not long before we  
found out what the huts were for, when our peace was shattered one  
evening… The road beside our house was filled with military vehicles and  
troops in all, and it took about three hours to pass through. The Americans  
were here, they had been airlifted into Sculthorpe air base and travelled  
by road to Matlaske Airfield, where they stored their vehicles, the troops  
billeted in the huts on the park. .... Just as suddenly as they arrived so they  
were to depart.  
 
For a while the village was quiet then the huts in the park were filling up  




Though technically a ‘grass’ landing area, areas of Sommerfeld net tracking were laid, made 
in Norwich by Boulton & Paul.
112
  The 3
rd
 US Engineer Aviation Battalion underwent 
training work at Matlaske, specialising in rapid airfield construction; they may have installed 
and removed Pierced Steel Planking and SMT of the type used in Normandy.
113
 There were 
only ever two directions of landing and take-off – one of 1,600 yards and another of 1,300. A 
variety of fighter aircraft operated from Matlaske and there is passing reference to the site 
being ‘unsuitable for Mosquitoes’ – a heavier aircraft – and one of the squadrons moving to 
Swannington in late 1944 because of the surface becoming waterlogged.
114
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Fig.47 Matlaske in June 1946. The lack of formal, concreted runways allow for speedy 
regression. Only the perimeter track and hardstandings were highly visible, being the 




The airfield was closed in October 1945 and reverted to agricultural use. Little remains of the 
wartime structures, the most significant being areas of concrete perimeter track and 
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The Norfolk County War Agricultural Executive Committee included Thorpe Abbotts in a 
list of proposed sites that gave cause for concern because of the uncertainty over final 
decisions on choices of airfield sites. It had been known for some months in 1941 that Thorpe 
Abbotts had been under consideration but no decision had been forthcoming. 
‘We have continually been stressing the importance of a decision at Thorpe  
Abbots [sic], for the time has come when land of that character must be  





Thorpe Abbotts was built in late 1942 as a satellite for Horham, Suffolk as a Class A airbase. 
The main contractor, John Laing & Son Ltd., is said to have excavated 330,000 cubic yards 
of soil, and laid, respectively 149,000 cubic yards of concrete and 35,000 yards of tarmac.
 118
 
Typical of airfields designed originally for RAF use but then reassigned to the USAAF, the 
number of hardstandings was increased from 36 to 50. As was often the case in such hurried 
circumstances, there was still a good deal of work to do when the first operational units 
arrived. On one occasion an RAF Blenheim attempting an emergency landing on the partially 
completed runway and collided with the giant concrete mixers thereon.
119
 
A local twelve year-old recalled the pressure on local services.  
‘The local roads were narrow as they are today [2009] and were never intended  
to carry the thousands of tons of ballast and cement needed to lay the runways,  
dispersals and hut bases. A one-way system operated for lorries on and off the  
base but in spite of this the roads soon became rutted with a raised area in the  
centre on which cars grounded. Some local lorries were used but I can clearly  
recall the Dodge and Ford tippers imported from the U.S. and Canada…On one  
occasion one of the drivers had stayed too long at a local pub and veered off  
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Rapid construction was ever-hampered by mud, the heavy soil not taking well to being 
churned by heavy plant. The contemporary lack of security or spatial separation from the 
community is illustrated by the absence of guard posts on the approach roads, and the locals 
being able to wander around the aircraft parked near the public road. Even with later 
restriction it was possible to cross fields to access the dispersals areas. Following the first 
serious crash at Thorpe Abbotts, local boys were able to collect unspent ammunition as 
souvenirs, open the bullets to extract the cordite and set the cordite ablaze.
121
 Local resident 
Ken Everett cites many examples of danger that the close geographic relationship brought to 
the civilian population. Aside from the many crashes that attended any large operational 
airbase in wartime, just one of them illustrates the bizarre and haphazard nature of proximity. 
A ball turret gunner on the airfield was removing the guns when one weapon fired by 
accident, randomly, in multiple directions. Not only were buildings and aircraft damaged, but 
local farmer Walter Brown escaped death or injury whilst enjoying a cup of tea at Rectory 
Farm as a bullet passed through the window and into a cupboard beside him.
122
 
Notable for the use of woodland stretching to the south and bordering the A143 Diss to 
Harleston road, for technical and domestic sites, accommodation for 2,900 was provided. The 
concrete runways extended to 2,100 yards for the main and 1,400 yards for the two transverse 
runways.
123
 Sold in 1956, some relict buildings survive at the site; the control tower and 
several Nissen huts house a memorial museum. Much of the main runway remains intact. In 
principle however, the greater part of the site has reverted to agricultural use.  
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     Fig.49 Thorpe Abbotts 21 June 1946. A prime example, to the  
                            south-west, of use of woodland to accommodate dispersed sites.
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Fig.50 Thorpe Abbotts in the 1990s, showing woodland-based dispersed sites. No obvious 
evident World War Two remains are obviously visible but as of 2017 archaeological digs 
have revealed objects of interest.
126
   
 
 
Aftermath – redundant airfields 
After the war and, indeed, before its end, the Ministry of Works dealt with the 
derequisitioning of land and claims for additional compensation related to the restoration of 
the land, via the Requisitioned Land and War Works Acts of 1945 and 1948. Some land was 
not returned for decades, if at all, because of continued military use or permanent structures 
having been built. For many farmers, though their land may have been returned, they found 
themselves having to bear the cost of removal of hard structures. In the case of concrete 
runways this was a daunting and expensive task.       
Gazetteer publications often refer to ‘reverted to agriculture’. This generic phrase requires 
some definition and quantification to present the true picture. It seldom transpires to be a 
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genuine reversion to agricultural use as understood in contemporary terms; and it is no simple 
task to return a concrete-surface airfield to former use; the removal of wartime airfield 
buildings is minor compared with the effort required to excavate concrete and hard-core 
runways.  Contractors were said post-war to have paid £30 an acre to remove concrete, a 
typical runway yielding 100,000 tons capable of being broken up to provide hardcore for 
several miles of modern motorway.
127
  Of the thirty-seven sites, thirteen, or 35 per-cent, 
could be said to have reverted completely to some form of agricultural use, though often 
fragmented by relict structures. Some airfields have had their concrete hard-standings utilised 
for intensive poultry rearing sheds, a practice unknown before the Second World War and 
which, therefore, should be seen as an entirely new function. Others have turned to hosting 
light industry and commerce on site. Four have developed some element of civil aviation, 
utilising wartime facilities. Two were partly incorporated into the STANTA military training 
area and of those, one, RAF Wretham, has become a nature reserve. Snetterton’s runways 
formed the basis of the modern race-track. As of 2019 only Marham remains as a fully 
operational RAF base. 
 
Post-war function Number of sites 
Agriculture 19 
Poultry 4 
Commercial / Light Industry 5 
Civil aviation 4 
Military aviation (part) 2 
Military aviation (fully) 1 
Military, army 1 
Part agricultural, part STANTA 1 
Part nature reserve, part STANTA 1 
        Table 4:  Modern use of Norfolk airfields as at 2019 
One issue which is seldom addressed in the historiography, perhaps because it is less visually 
obvious, is that of toxicity, or contamination.  A sediment of aviation fuel, lubricants and 
other oils will have permeated the ground and its ingress will depend upon the nature and 
density of the soils. Concerns are presently being expressed over radioactive deposits 
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associated with scrapped aircraft at sites across the UK, including Norfolk. The First World 
War airfield at Pulham, famously used for airship operations in the 1930s, though not an 
operational airbase in the Second World War, was used as a major aircraft salvage and 
disposal facility for the east of England during and after the Second World War.
128
 The site is 
generally known to be contaminated by large numbers of scrapped, buried airframes. Press 
reports confirm findings of radioactive contaminants at Vaunce's Farm on the site. In 
particular, Radium-226 was used for luminosity in dials and instruments on military aircraft 
before and during the Second World War.
129
 Elsewhere, Fersfield, Little Snoring, North 
Creake, Oulton and Swannington airfields were all used for redundant aircraft storage post-
war. Seething was also used post-war for munitions storage. Whilst similar direct correlations 
with Pulham cannot be made without forensic investigation, storage of materiel and 
associated degradation should not be discounted when considering the subsequent re-use of 
airfield sites. Environmental contamination of the airfield landscape is an issue that will 
undoubtedly be investigated in even more detail in the future. 
In summary it is, in landscape terms, that the permanent buildings of the pre-war stations 
survive to be preserved and re-used, whilst the operational flying areas have largely 
disappeared. Conversely; the runways and dispersal areas of the wartime bases have been 
more difficult to eradicate, but their buildings have proved to be far more vulnerable.  In 
general, it is the pre- and early-war stations that saw extensive post-war service into the Cold 
War era and beyond; Marham, Feltwell and Coltishall, precisely because of their buildings 
infrastructures; and also Sculthorpe, built during the war but deemed suitable for retention 
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This chapter has drawn a distinction between the relatively low land use impact of the six 
pre-war airfields in Norfolk compared to the proliferation of successor wartime airfields; in 
particular the transition from grass runways to concrete, the nominal acreage subsumed by 
each site, and the level of operations increasing to an industrial scale between 1940 and 1944.  
The fortuitousness of the East Anglian landscape being conducive to the siting and 
construction of airfields cannot be underestimated when compared with, firstly, almost any 
other large, contiguous region of Britain and, secondly, with its convenient proximity to the 
European mainland. Nor, even given that East Anglia generically offered an apparently 
predominantly flat and level landscape, can the importance of site selection criteria in terms 
of topography, soils, transport infrastructure, and existing land use be under-emphasised. 
Ironically perhaps, it was the fourth criterion, that of existing land use, that proved the most 
problematic, for it was a landscape very much required land for agricultural production. This 
is examined in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
Airfields have also been shown to add a new dimension, that of the vertical, to the militarised 
landscape, presenting its own hazards to the landscape and local populace. Moreover the 
airfield is the category that transitioned from being a militarised landscape of defence and 
preparation to a landscape of offence and conflict, wherein enemy action engaged in and 
beyond that landscape. It is perhaps this last which has most served to reinforce the enduring 
cultural identity of the airfield in the landscape, along with the spatial relationships with 
adjoining agricultural land, the social impact upon surrounding communities and physical, 
visual presence which remains in evidence in all but a few locations across the county. 
In terms of quantifying the impact on the agricultural landscape, a broad computation of total 
land surface in Norfolk, compared with total of agricultural land, against the acreage taken by 
















Norfolk total land area 
(acres) 
1,307,333 1,307,333 - - 
Crops and grass +  
rough grazings 
976,746 982,615 - 100% 
7 airfields @ 500 acres 3,500 - - 0.36% (a) 
38 airfields @ 600 acres - 22,800 - 2.32%  
Increase 
factor from 
(a) = 6 
Plus 20% allowance  
for dispersed sites 
- - 26,640 2.7% 
Increase 
factor from 
(a) = 7.5 




The maximum figure of 2.71 per-cent seems low, given the radical impact on hundreds of 
local communities of the relatively sudden appearance in their midst of what amounted to an 
additional small town, multiplied by thirty-eight across the county. An arithmetic 
computation can, however, be less descriptive than imagery in comparative terms. Twenty-
first century Norwich covers an administrative area of approximately 13,000 acres, that is, 
around just half that of the maximum estimate for airfield coverage in Norfolk in 1944.
131
  In 
an additional convolution, Mr J Christie, chairman of Norfolk WAEC suggested in late 1946 
that approximately 35,000 acres of airfields remained available to be handed back to farmers, 
exclusive of 3,324 acres already returned.  If true, this would increase the percentage of 
agricultural land lost to airfields to 3.9 per-cent. The National Archives advises that, 
unfortunately, land acquisition records exist for only six English counties, not including 
Norfolk and so more precise figures are unavailable. The impact upon the agricultural 
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landscape might, then, be concluded to be less than severe in arithmetic terms but the figures 
need to be considered against the intensity of increase in agricultural productivity required 
contemporaneously. A quantitative approach cannot therefore fully, comparatively, measure 
the transitional disruption wrought by the four phases of airfield tenure described earlier – the 
requisition of land, construction, operations and long-term legacy. Nor can it begin to reflect 
the qualitative nature of rapid social, cultural and economic change over six, sometimes as 
little as two, intense years.   
The next chapter will examine the impact and legacy of military training areas and their 
encroachment upon the landscape. 
 












 Chapter 4  :  Military Training Areas 
 
Introduction  
It is in many ways a truism that the military is always preparing for war. Land for training 
purposes is a pre-requisite for a modern army and, to some extent, an air force.  The principal 
training grounds used by the British army in the Second World War are well known; many 
others less so. As with airfields, much of Norfolk’s terrain was ideal for land-based training. 
The profusion of sites represents the whole of the twentieth century, the county having 
experienced army training during The First World War in the form of, for example, trench 
networks at Weybourne and tank training at Berner’s Heath on Lord Iveagh’s estate between 
Elveden and Thetford, along with extensive infantry encampments at Barnham Cross 
Common.  Major exercises took place across the county in 1912, predicated upon an invasion 
at Wells-next-the-Sea, sweeping southwards toward London, involving 30,000 troops and 
fourteen early aircraft used for aerial observation, in pursuit of modernising the British 
Expeditionary Force.
1
 Modern military training had visited even before that, as early as 
1906.
2
 The Second World War however saw an unprecedented expansion of training facilities 
and their disruption to civilian and particularly agricultural life proved to be considerable. 
This chapter will assess the extent of their impact upon the county’s working rural landscape 
and, in particular, the issue of long-term exclusion from domicile. Two case studies in 
particular will focus on radically different training areas in terms of use, profile, tenure and 
civilian disruption.  
 
Historiography  
Records in The National Archives provide an extensive and detailed chronology of the larger 
military training areas across Britain. This is especially so of the Stanford Battle Training 
Area, the largest training area in Norfolk, in greater part because of the associated 
controversy over the circumstances of requisition land and post-war continued controversy. 
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The negotiations between tenants, landowners, the County War Agricultural Executive 
Committee (CWAEC), the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), the Army and the 
War Office demonstrate the strenuous efforts from all parties to reach some form of realistic 
agreement up to the point of final ultimatum from the military. Equally informative are the 
documents that chart the post-war controversy over land not returned to occupiers and owners 
after the cessation of hostilities. Documents can consequently be found across Ministry of 
Agriculture, War Office, Home Office, Cabinet Office and Air Ministry. Considerable lateral 
investigation is required to correlate their contents and ensure continuity of chronology, 
though the post-war period tends to gravitate towards Home Office documentation due to 
wider national and political interest in the unresolved issue of civilian evacuation. Landscape 
historians have incorporated the Stanford episode into twentieth-century agricultural 
histories; its fascination lies in the oddly blank area that appears on any modern map of 
Norfolk to the north of Thetford, bordered by Mundford to the west, Great Hockham to the 
east and Bodney and Watton to the north.
3
  Local and personal histories abound, inspired by 
the controversy arising from the eviction of the population. Perhaps the most moving and 
illustrative example is the autobiographical account by Lucilla Reeve, an enigmatic, 
determined and tenacious figure who took on the tenancy of a farm which would, in 1942, be 
subsumed by the Stanford training area; her account is both informative and engaging thanks 
to her description of farming in The Brecks in the immediate pre-war and wartime period, 
along with her encounters and negotiations with the military authorities.
4
 The drama of the 
civilian eviction continues to resonate to the present day, with features in local and regional 
media, often re-worked to include some new aspect pertaining to an individual’s experience 
or memory.
5
 More recent research has focused on the conservation and environmental 
perspective, arising from the fact that undisturbed areas of the training facility have 
safeguarded important flora and fauna – of which the Ministry of Defence makes much in its 
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assumed role as a conservator of the countryside.  This theme of military environmentalism is 
a study in itself, described by Woodward as ‘khaki conservation’ or military ‘greenwash’.
6
  
It should be noted that, contrary to the documentary and archaeological evidence that 
supports investigation into Stanford and Fritton, little survives survives to mark activities at 
the many short-term, much smaller training sites that proliferated across Norfolk as 
temporary measures associated with wartime military exercises or garrisoning.  
 
Strategic background 
Following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk in 1940, 
retrenchment and consolidation were the over-riding priorities for the returning army, 
paralleled by the need for readiness against invasion.
7
 Geo-strategically, ongoing successes in 
North Africa through 1941 were about to be reversed following the arrival of Rommel and 
the Afrika Corps and further overshadowed by setbacks and military humiliation in Greece 
and Crete in early 1941, followed by the fall of Singapore in February 1942. And yet 1942 
was a key year for the British war effort. Retrospectively it marked the chronological mid-
point of the Second World War – at least as understood by the British. It witnessed the first 
real British military and strategic successes of the wider conflict – particularly those of the 
Second Battle of El Alamein and the Anglo-American invasion of French-occupied North 
Africa. Strategic retrenchment had, however, begun to turn to offensive planning well before 
this point, even as the threat of homeland invasion receded. In the context of pursuing the war 
to a conclusion, plans were already being formulated for invasion of the Axis-occupied 
European mainland. The raid on St Nazaire – a largely naval operation – in March 1942 and 
the combined services Dieppe Raid in August point to the determination of political and 
military strategists in testing military capability. The latter was a disaster in human and 
logistical terms, underscoring the need for realistic and relevant training.
8
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Churchill’s view in March 1941 was that it was impossible for the Army to play any 
significant role in defeating Germany. Home defence remained a priority for the Army until 
1942.
 
Up until then home forces were training to repel a well-equipped and highly trained 
German invader.
 9
 In fairness, this did not mean they trained to fight defensively; offensive 
tactics were employed, and provided the basis of subsequent large-scale training.
 
 Some 
radical thinkers within the Army had proposed a new emphasis on mobility and surprise 
tactics, as opposed to the conventional doctrine of superior firepower, but change was slow.
10
  
With British military strategy having moved from the defensive to the offensive, land was 
needed for training of infantry and armoured units on a thereto unforeseen scale. This then, 
was the context for the establishment of new, expansive, training areas, facilities specifically 
designed for that phase of military activity which precedes offensive operations. The ever 
increasing need for army training areas was a recognition of the need to employ modern 
operational tactics and strategies, in realistic environments with live ammunition and, 
especially, large areas in which to manoeuvre modern mobile armoured units. This, along 
with the subsequent progress of the war and the strategic long view, led to a huge expansion 
of militarily occupied land.  
 
The national scale of military training  
In September 1939 the British army occupied 235,000 acres of land, not including that 
utilised for training. By February 1944, training areas alone accounted for 9.8 million acres.
11
 
By June of that same year, three and a half million military personnel were based in England, 
with 11.5 million acres – almost twenty per-cent of the entire land surface of Britain – being 
under some form of military control.
12
 By that time, the influx of American service 
personnel, along with those of exiled nationals, had greatly added to the roll call, and eighty-
five per-cent of militarily controlled land had being given over solely to training. The great 
majority of land requisitioned did not involve the exclusion of civilian residents but 
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evacuation was to prove the most contentious issue for the largest training area in Norfolk. 
The effect upon the contemporary landscape was often temporary; it is the longer-term 
impact of certain training areas that are most historically and culturally significant. 
 
Understanding militarised landscapes 
In the landscape context, training areas and bombing and gunnery ranges represent a sub-
category of the militarised landscape which may be categorised as landscapes of military 
preparation, as opposed to subsequent offensive operations, logistics, administration or 
homeland defence. Moreover these are, typically of military installations imposed on a 
civilian environment, contested landscapes. Unlike airfields, training areas were not 
necessarily characterised by extensive areas of land disappearing under concrete or tarmac – 
the objective was to find terrain that best matched where the military was anticipating future 
operations to take place. However, the dichotomy for the larger training areas is that they 
denied to alternative use extensive contiguous areas of land; in that sense, training areas had 
more potential disruptive impact on the regional landscape than any individual airfield or 
defence installation. This new concept was relatively rare in Norfolk up until 1942, a county 
well known thereto for its military training activities. They were few in number and though 
Norfolk had historically been a defended landscape, extended offensive training sites were 
rare. They would come to subsume vastly greater areas of working land and, in some 
instances, on a permanent basis. As will be seen, the chronologies of significant training 
landscapes were heavily characterised by the personal influences of key administrative, 
political and military figures, some partisan and some with a keen sense of social 
accountability.  
 
Norfolk’s training sites   
A wide variety of military training sites can be identified through listings at Norfolk Heritage 
Environment Record. Most were temporary, and clearly associated with adjacent 
encampments, airfields, defended areas, coastal defence installations, anti-aircraft batteries or 
barracks. Other sub-genres, such as bombing or gunnery ranges, had no ongoing garrison 
presence, were relatively remote and, despite mapped demarcation, are somewhat nebulous in 
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their chronology. Examples include the Brest Sand coastal bombing range at The Wash, for 
which records remain, but it impacted little on the adjacent landscape although in use into the 
1950s.
13
 Still others manifested themselves in a ‘mayfly’ existence of very limited duration, a 
bizarre example being a temporary airstrip at Kelling Heath, apparently hurriedly created for 
a one-day D-Day preparatory exercise by DC-3 transports of the USAAF.
14
 These are 
relatively insignificant as occupiers of their landscapes – though landowners were 
undoubtedly inconvenienced - and they present a very light landscape footprint. Stanford,  by 
contrast, and by far the largest training area in Norfolk, proved to be contentious and 
controversial from its inception in 1942 and well beyond the end of the war. Fritton Lake to 
the east, small in area, intensively utilised late in the war and unused after the mid-1950s, is 
all but forgotten as a military site. Weybourne on the north Norfolk coast, in addition to the 
intensive anti-invasion defences of 1940, hosted a busy anti-aircraft training facility, as did 
nearby Stiffkey. Further west along the coast Titchwell and Brancaster were the locations for 
armoured and amphibious training exercises. Snettisham Scalp was the site of a gunnery 
range from the First World War, further utilised for USAAF aerial gunnery practice from 
1943. To the south lay the bombing range at North Wootton. Bombing ranges were also 
incorporated within the Stanford Training Area. The coastal locations were thinly populated, 
thereby minimising public disruption, but also offered suitable conditions for air, amphibious 
and ordnance training. 
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Two contested landscapes  
By mid-1941, the Army’s Land Commissioners had already turned their attention to an area 
of south-west Norfolk. There was indisputably a need to practise manoeuvres on land whose 
topographical characteristics emulated those to be found on mainland Europe. One important 
criterion was that of physical open space in which to manoeuvre large armoured formations, 
off road, and with few physical obstacles; a second was that Breckland’s topography and 
flora were similar to much of the continent. The Thetford area within Breckland also had a 
history of military training from the First World War. Moreover it was believed that the land 
was of poor agricultural quality, though this was rather a superficial assessment. Breckland 
therefore stood little chance of escaping the attention of the War Office surveying suitable 
areas for training.  In the end, the polite considerations of disruption to agriculture and 
displacement of civilian population were over-ridden. 
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Two individual areas stand out as significant training landscapes, each with unique 
characteristics and operational histories. By far the single largest, most extensive intrusion 
into the wartime landscape of Norfolk was – and still is - the Stanford Training Area, centred 
to the north of Thetford.
16
  Stanford, along with the second largest training site at Fritton 
Lake or Decoy, is rare as a military site dedicated exclusively to both wartime contemporary 
and post-war ongoing training. These two sites therefore are particularly worthy of detailed 
attention, not least because their topographic characteristics and military utilisation were 
entirely different. 
Stanford equates to Otterburn in Northumberland and Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire as a 
significant contemporary and subsequent consumer of regional landscape; but it stands apart 
from those comparable contemporaries in that it was devised and created during the war.  
Half the size of Otterburn and smaller still than Salisbury Plain Training Area, Stanford was a 
Second World War project, Salisbury Plain having been developed from 1897 and Otterburn 
from 1911. Moreover, Stanford, though marginally agricultural productive compared to all 
other regions of Norfolk, still had considerable potential for expanded wartime food 
production. The quality of the land proved to be a factor in its selection, though not the 
primary criterion. In late 1941, Breckland – ‘an area of low agricultural value’ – defined as an 
area of 24 miles north to south and 12 miles east to west, fitted the requirement for open 
country of ten to fifteen miles depth and width deemed suitable for training an armoured 
division. Most of the land required would be requisitioned under D.R.52 though some, 
particularly that owned by the Forestry Commission, might be subject to the more stringent 
D.R. 51.  To clarify, the whole of the ‘Thetford’ training area was 117,000 acres, exclusive of 
the proposed Stanford Battle Area. It was the Stanford area that would be subject to 
requisitioning under Defence Regulation 52.
17
  At this early stage MAF had already 
expressed its objection though Norfolk CWAEC recognised the inevitability of the army 
moving in. CWAEC Executive Officer Frank Rayns met the newly-arrived Major-General 
Crocker, G.O.C. 6
th
 Armoured Division, as early as 26
th
 May 1941 and it was resolved that 
though the southern area would be mostly on Lord Iveagh’s land on the county border, the 
northern – and ultimately most contentious sector – would be for the C.W.A.E.C to negotiate 
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over.  Its significance however came to be heightened by the compulsory evacuation of the 
inhabitants of six villages to allow the subsummation of 118,000 acres of land. This, when 
associated with the post-war refusal to allow residents to return to their homes and pre-war 
livelihoods, generated a controversy which remains unresolved for many of the descendants 
of those evicted, and which is still examined regularly by the media. The circumstances give 
meaning to the expression ‘contested landscape’ and have become part of the popular culture 
and social history of the area. 
‘The Army must have land on which to train and the population and the  
Services must have food to eat…. Although troops may have a legal right  
to train over land they should remember that it has been ploughed and  
tended for generations and it may therefore be difficult for the farmer  




Given that the army had to be trained somewhere there was clearly some contention about the 
choice of Norfolk, considering the profusion of air bases being built at the same time. Again, 
land would be denied to agricultural use but even a cursory overview of contemporary land 
use indicates that Stanford was very much on the geographic periphery in terms of existing 
land use, soil quality and population.  Although Stanford and Fritton qualify as contested 
landscapes the two sites were quite different in terms of their landscape features and 
typologies, not least because a large proportion of Fritton comprises water – and water was a 
pre-requisite for the specialised training planned there. The point is that the military 
requirements for each were completely different. Planning for Stanford was under way in 
1941 at a time when large-scale armoured vehicle training at divisional level was innovative; 
the physical area required was bigger than anything yet proposed in the east of England. 
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Stanford   
The agriculture and geography of Breckland 
Stanford was located in the northern part of a broad swathe of that very particular district of 
Breckland, and one that possessed a distinct social and farming culture of its own. Much of 
the land was considered marginal because of the poor, sandy soil. Only half the land was 
under the plough, the remainder being given over to grazing.
19
 As marginal land, during the 
1930s many tenant farmers had paid no rent, whilst others had absconded when unable to pay 
workers’ wages.
20
  The new practice of afforestation with conifer plantations was well 
established as a significant function of land use in Breckland by the beginning of the war.
21
 
The Forestry Commission was established in 1919 as a direct government response to huge 
depletion of timber resources during the First World War. Many Norfolk estates were being 
sold or broken up in the 1920s or being used for game shooting rather than agricultural 
production and Breckland in particular was characterised by decay and neglect, as indicated 
in the Commission’s acquisition reports.
22
  1922 saw the Commission’s first purchases, near 
Swaffham and Elveden, then buying up estates on poorer quality marginal land at Downham 
Market, Lynford, Weeting, Didlington and Croxton.  Extensive blocks of land were 
purchased up to the early 1930s; by 1939 the Forestry Commission controlled 59,000 acres, 
about three-quarters of which was freehold, the remainder on long leases up to 999 years.
23
  
All this contributed to a culture of separation for Breckland, an identity all its own, 
characterised by small settlements and yet the district was no stranger to incomers. The 1930s 
saw unemployed workers from the depressed North of England being resettled in the area 
and, in a radical measure reminiscent of reactionary political response, labour camps were 
established by the Ministry of Labour from 1928. The ultimate aim was to encourage 
overseas settlement, and four of twenty-two camps nationwide were sited in Breckland.
24
 The 
area was however considered ecologically important. At the start of the century naturalists 
viewed heathland as of special ecological interest, and Breckland in particular as one of the 
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most important in East Anglia, perhaps nationally.
25
 The Norfolk Naturalists’ Trust 
purchased Wretham Heath in 1938, followed by Weeting in 1942. 
Breckland is a good location for a military training area for two predominant reasons; partly 
because it comprises some of the poorest agricultural land in Norfolk, and also because it was 
one of the least populated areas of the county.
26
  Though being poor quality land is not 
necessarily itself a pre-requisite for selecting land for military use, it becomes an important 
factor when assessed against neighbouring landscapes, and so it was to this land of a mixture 
of middle-class leisure pursuit and expanding forestry that the military’s attention turned in 
1941. 
 
An inevitable choice of site 
‘You will see that reconnaissances have been carried out in conjunction with  
the Ministry of Agriculture in order to discover an area in East Anglia suitable  
for use by armoured formations.’ 
27
     
 
The Stanford Training Area was established in 1942 as part of the overall national military 
strategy of training for the later invasion of Europe.  Detailed reconnaissance of the area had 
been carried out as early as April 1941, however, which raises a genuinely interesting 
question as to the extent of geo-strategic aspiration and associated military forward planning. 
In 1941 the British armed forces were in no position strategically, militarily, numerically or 
technologically to pursue a war on another front.  The immediate threat of German invasion 
of the British mainland had receded slightly by the end of 1940 and a vast amount of German 
military resource had been committed to Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, from 
June 1941; and the United States had not yet entered the war. Yet the more forward looking 
of British strategists were looking to the offensive. The War cabinet and Chiefs of Staff still 
assessed the risk of a German invasion as high.
28
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‘Everything points to the most strenuous endeavours by Germany to win the war in 
1941. Economic evidence in particular supports the view that German hopes for a 
short war…. If she could succeed in bringing in Japan, without the United States 
coming in our side, she would have hopes of success without having to attempt 
invasion.’ 
Given that it was thought the United States would enter the war eventually, and therefore  
Germany would strike before the might of American contribution was fully deployed,  the 
Chiefs of Staff considered that an urgent change of strategy was needed.  The raid on St 
Nazaire – a largely naval operation – in March 1942 and the combined services raid at 
Dieppe in August of that year, point to the determination of political and military strategists 
in testing military capability. The Dieppe Raid in particular could not have been undertaken 
without intensive training exercises. 
 
Therefore the search for open, accessible areas of land for training of armoured formations 
was under way early in 1941.  Fourteen areas and regions nationally were considered but East 
Anglia was judged to offer the most favourable conditions.  
           ‘Several of the areas which have been offered are suitable from the Ministry  
of Agriculture’s point of view, since they consist in the main of moors and  
heathland, i.e. BODMIN MOORS (sic), EXMOOR etc. but the disadvantage  
is that the ground is either exceedingly rocky or very swampy and therefore  




The Welsh Border country presented a workable terrain but was so far distant from existing 
locations of armoured formations that it was logistically impractical and the south-east of 
England was too enclosed.
30
 In conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, as 
represented by the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, the army investigated the 
heathlands between Woodbridge and Hollesley, Bridgham and Brettenham Heaths, east of 
Thetford. Cavenham and Mildenhall Heaths and heathland between Barton Mills and Elveden 
were reconnoitred. Massingham and Grimston Heaths and ‘the poor, gravelly soils adjacent 
thereto’ up to the eastern approaches of King’s Lynn including Roydon Common and 
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Grimston Warren were all considered, as were East Rudham Common and – again – ‘poor, 
gravelly soil’ between Fakenham and Docking. Breckland, described as running from 
Swaffham to within a few miles of Bury St Edmunds, with an average width of about ten 
miles was the inevitable choice.
31
 This last point is key. An armoured division required an 
area of around twenty miles in width and similar in length in which to advance as a cohesive 
unit operating on a broad tactical front. For this purpose an extensive, contiguous, connected 
area of land was essential. Most existing training areas could accommodate one armoured 
brigade at a time; Breckland was deemed able to accommodate three. It was quickly decided 
that one brigade of 9
th
 Armoured Division and two of 6
th
 Armoured could train there.  
Two further factors, albeit temporary, arose in choosing Stanford. At a meeting In April 1941 
General Crocker, GOC 6
th
 Armoured Division, presided over a meeting at which he reminded 
delegates that Breckland was closest to a potential invasion landing, still thought possible at 
this time; and his  division was already billeted in the nearby Newmarket area. He added that 
‘Thetford heathland offers the most suitable areas of low grade agricultural land where a 
measure of freedom of movement might be possible.’ Frank Rayns, Executive Officer of 
Norfolk CWAEC is recorded as stating that the land could be spared for such use.
32
 Six 
months later Exercise ‘Bumper’ demonstrated that the army’s mobile units were still inclined 
to be road-bound, rather than deploy across country; cross-country training was a mindset to 





In the case of the Thetford area two prime interests were originally concerned, that of 
agriculture (and by association, the Ministry of Agriculture) and the Forestry Commission. 
The latter had already acknowledged the necessity of conceding adequate tracts of land for 
the training of armoured divisions. The inevitable questions for both parties was how much 
and under what conditions. It seemed, optimistically, that Defence Regulation 52 might 
suffice for the locations required.  
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‘It is unlikely we shall have to requisition any of this area. Since you are doing  
[sic] liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture in connection with DR52 area, I  




This was of course, for some of the local populace, to end rather differently, and this is why 
Stanford is worth investigating as a particular case study. It is a prime example of the concept 
of identity in and identification with the landscape, and how long-established human 
interaction with the landscape came to be radically disrupted. The human aspect is reflected 
in two phases of narrative – between 1941 and 1944, within which requisition, eviction and 
wartime training took place, and a further period to 1950 when anticipated derequisition did 
not happen. 
It is perhaps a measure of how seriously the proposition of the acquisition of such a large area 
of land was taken that a meeting on 10
th
 May 1941 was attended by no less than eight 
generals. The area was primarily required for 6
th
 Armoured Division for which it was decided 
that ‘Thetford will provide adequate facilities if two conditions are overcome (1) forestry 
areas taken over (2) recently ploughed land taken over.’ 
35
  An associated memorandum 
added 9
th
 Armoured Division to the equation with the succinct summation that ‘thus it will be 
seen that the taking over of the Brecklands area is of first importance.’ 
36
 Negotiations with 
the Forestry Commission began the following month. Major General J T C Cole, then 
president of the Army’s Claims Commission, communicated personally with the 
Commissioner of the Forestry Commission to agree a way forward.
37
 Military vehicular 
training conventionally, but unrealistically, took place on roads. The idea of training across 
open countryside, particularly farmland, was novel. The army recognised that there would be 
real difficulty in persuading troops ‘to leave the roads and run across land which is obviously 
bearing crops when the situation demands this.’ The same memorandum appears to 
demonstrate an understanding of the damage that the fauna of the area could wreak if, as was 
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suggested, fences were removed to facilitate manoeuvrability. ’In many parts of the area 
rabbits will cause more damage than tanks.’  Alternatively it could be a deliberately cynical 
underemphasising of the potential damage caused by armoured vehicles. Conversely, a 
companion memorandum does note that ‘Considerable negotiations and adjustments will be 




Military training already took place in the Brecklands, and indeed had done so during the 
First World War, but it was fragmented in nature by its avoidance of existing agricultural and 
general civilian activity. The army was conscious of the need to avoid damaging crops under 
cultivation, thus far.  
A meeting of interested parties in May 1941 established the realities of military requirements. 
Major General J T Crocker explained that at least one armoured division would be stationed 
in the Thetford area for the duration of the war and that the area was one of the most likely to 
be affected in the event of invasion.
39
 This is a significant statement as it underlines the 
ongoing concern about an invasion threat even in mid-1941, suggesting both an offensive and 
defensive role for armoured training. Crocker went on to explain that the existing billeting 
area west of Newmarket offered no scope for off-road training ‘owing to high grade 
agricultural development.’
40
 Thetford simply offered the most suitable areas of low grade 
agricultural land where a measure of freedom of movement would be possible. Even where 
areas of heath were relatively small, such as Berners, Cavenham and Lakenheath Heaths, it 
should, Crocker suggested, be possible to conjoin them.  
Two important considerations were agreed upon by all parties, that of the negative effects on 
food production and forestry. These might appear obvious in context but the detail is 
significant. It was deemed important to try to use ground which minimised the adverse effect 
on national food production, though ‘not in the interests of private individuals but in the 
public interest’. The proposed training area was provisionally demarcated as ‘Southern’ and 
‘Northern’, the former being centred on Elveden with Lord Iveagh being the only landowner, 
whilst the interests of landowners and tenants in the latter would be represented by the 
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CWAEC.  The army recognised that the proposed Northern area was more problematic but 
the CWAEC felt committed to the inevitable. Executive Officer Frank Rayns in fact 
suggested that  
‘food production did not worry them much, and if it was necessary to take  
any land, the south-west of Norfolk was the area most easily spared.’  
 
This was pragmatic, coming from a senior agricultural representative whose role was to 
consider the interests of farmers and landowners across the county as a whole. In response, 
General Crocker clearly stated that the army must be prepared to compensate the small 
farmer, for damage under D.R.52, promptly and generously, adding encouragingly that ‘many 
farmers might never see a tank on their land’ 
41
   
It was requested that troops be educated to avoid unnecessary damage to crops and that 
recently planted Forestry Commission areas that could not produce timber for the next four of 
five years would be made available for training. Lord Iveagh raised no objection other than a 
request that crops being grown to feed his stock should be protected.  Suffolk WAEC raised 
concerns about more highly-developed agricultural land in the Southern area. General 
Crocker frankly explained that perhaps seventy per-cent of young trees might be destroyed 
and, where concerns were raised about rabbit damage, that the relevant plantations could 
simply be written off.  All concurred that swift agreement had to be reached but perhaps few, 
even the army, appreciated the long term implications of such large tracts of land being ceded 
for military training. Subsequent internal correspondence within the Army Council 
Secretariat expressed the inevitable need for intensive training practices which would impact 
severely upon any mutually inclusive land use.  It became clear by late 1941 that nothing less 
than unrestricted access over a substantial area would do, to allow  
‘…new armoured formations to train in a realistic manner… and be equipped  
to meet German armoured forces on equal terms. The road-bound mentality  
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heavy casualties and risk disaster when it again meets the Germany army in  
the field.’
 42
   
 
Those last few words, by default or design, emphasise the importance of everyone, civilian 
and soldier alike, in helping support the army improve its capability. Further pressure on 
Breckland resulted firstly from a reconnaissance of Pockstones Moor, west of Harrogate, 
deemed in October 1941 to be unsuitable for tank training because of difficulty of access, the 
frequency of large stones and a tendency to bogginess. Secondly, in December 1941 it was 
announced that tank training was to be reduced on the South Downs, Sussex because of the 
effect on the corn crop.  Thirdly, there was already an armoured billet presence not far 
distant, at Newmarket.
43
  In short, Breckland fitted the bill perfectly. 
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         Fig.52 Survey working map, 1941, showing extended and proposed Thetford manoeuvre    
                areas, RAF bombing ranges, Forestry Commission land and restricted areas
44
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  Fig.53 Alternate version, 1941, showing extended and proposed Thetford manoeuvre     
        areas, RAF bombing ranges, Forestry Commission land and restricted areas
45
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 July 1942, Tottington, a small village in South Norfolk ceased to exist  
 as a community.’ 
 
Succinctly and precisely, this single statement somehow underlines the swift and dramatic 
change in the fortunes of the communities uprooted by the arrival of the battle training area. 
The issue of residents being prohibited from returning to their homes is an emotive and on-
going one, though few personal accounts are ultimately as balanced and objective as that 
given by Hilda and Edmund Perry. 
46
 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries R. S. Hudson 
informed Henry Upcher, chair of Norfolk WAEC, with regret, to say that the Ministry could 
no longer object to the land centred on Stanford being taken but that liaison between the 
Committee and the military was important to ensure a ‘smooth handover’.
47
  It was in July 
that around 750 men, women and children were required to leave their homes and livelihoods 
contained in an area of approximately 18,500 acres.  The villages of Stanford, Tottington, 
Buckenham Tofts, West Tofts, Langford and Sturston are generally held to be the centres of 
de-population directly affected, though parts of the parishes of Lynford, Ickburgh, 
Hillborough, Little Cressingham, Merton, Thompson, Wretham, Stow Bedon and Croxton 
were also included. It has to be said that some of the villages were sparsely populated, even 
Stanford itself. In particular, Sturston had been ‘a ghostly place for at least 350 years’, 
White’s Directory or 1845 recording a population of just 47, along with ‘a prolific rabbit 





‘Settlements that first peeped forth out of the Neolithic gloom, survived the  
Norman Conquest, the Black Death, centuries of soil erosion, the Reformation,  
the Civil War and the Agricultural Revolution succumbed without too much  
fuss to Part IV of the Defence Regulations 1939.’ 
49
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Realistically, the use of live firing meant that civilians could not be permitted to remain on 
the training area. In May 1942 a Mr Chester Riches was accidentally shot dead whilst driving 
his cattle onto marshland at the Orford training area in Suffolk.
50
 More than half the 
requisitioned land was of the eighth Lord Walsingham’s Merton estate, one of the oldest in 
Britain. At least six of the evicted families claimed to trace their lineage back five hundred 
years in local records. Walsingham was himself a retired army officer, brought back as 
commander of 30
th
 (Home Defence) Battalion, Royal Norfolk Regiment, defending East 
Anglian airfields. In the often ironic manner of uncertain times, his battalion headquarters 




Official files contain any number of heartfelt letters of objection from residents, dignitaries 
and even businessmen at national level. A recurrent theme is why plenty of nearby heath was 
not taken so urgently since ‘of course the War Office will maintain that the heath is 
unsuitable for someone’s convenience’.
52
 Of immediate concern to the CWAEC was the 
imminent harvest of around 3,000 acres of corn crop awaiting.
53
 Local farmer Mr Sanderson, 
who in fact stood to lose more land than any other, was prepared to help with the harvest. The 
question of need and waste was raised in the House of Commons, with local MPs asking 
Secretary of State for James Grigg about compensation for the overall loss of 26 square miles 
– or 23,000 acres – of land.  
The depth of the relationship between people and the landscape in which they live and work 
is no better illustrated than by the public meeting on 18
th
 June at the edge of a meadow in 
Tottington. Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth Anderson, now G.O.C. Eastern Command 
announced that just four weeks’ notice was to be given.   
‘This is the most unpleasant task of my army career. There is little you  
 will want to hear in the way of sympathy, and the last thing anyone wants 
 to do is turn Englishmen from their homes…I don’t deny we are causing a  
 lot of grief, pain and trouble, and I am deeply sorry for it, but this is one of  
 the places where the disturbance will be least felt.’   
 
He posited that people talked about a Second Front without realising what it really implied.   
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‘Those of you on leave and many of you in the Home Guard and Civil Defence  
know how futile many of the defence exercises are in their stupid imaginary 





Anderson promised protection of homes and churches, along with ‘time corridors’ to allow 
harvest of grain and later sugarbeet. Curiously, a spontaneous burst of applause followed, and 
Lord Walsingham was moved to say ‘My word, I am proud to belong to an area where such 
people live’ whilst still seeing the situation as calamitous but that hopefully the training 
would help shorten the war.
55
 Walsingham is said to have obtained a written guarantee from 
the Commander Home Forces that land and property would be handed back after the war – 
and therein lies the key to the vast amount of correspondence between the public and 
government departments post-war. At this stage the only compensation offered was the value 
of standing crops, less cost of harvesting.
56
 
There followed the legendary harvest of 1942 when a mixture of farmers, soldiers and 
schoolboys brought in the crops in a record two weeks. The War Office commended the 







 The official schedule states 2,854 acres in total were harvested, most by 
the WAEC, the crops including wheat, barley, oats, rye, mustard, peas, potatoes, carrots and 
blackcurrants.
58
 This rather gives the lie to the image of an unproductive part of the county. 
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                 Fig.54 Churchill tanks advancing over open country near Thetford,  







Legacy – post-war continuation and ‘The Pledge’ 
As early as August 1944 Frank Rayns, Executive Officer of the CWAEC, was starting to ask 
if and when the area might be reclaimed.  Lord Cranbrook too was becoming concerned in 
early 1945 that 
 
‘…as one who, on official instructions, gave the most solemn assurances (and  
the only one of those who hopes to live in East Anglia after the war) I want  
to try and see that the soldiers stick to their promises.’ 
60
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In May the War Office formally said it had no idea when it might be able to give up the area, 
as 35 Tank Brigade needed training at Stanford, as did reserve divisions. Later that year 
Rayns asked for clarification about derequisitioning of the 18,000 acres, of which 5,655 were 
arable.
61
 Before the year’s end Members of Parliament were becoming agitated about the 
apparent coyness of the military, and began reminding the War Office of the undertakings to 
allow residents to return. Cranbrook expressed relief that Orford and Dunwich training areas 
were to be released – but concern for Stanford. The County Planning Committee 
unanimously resolved: 
 
‘That in the interests of displaced persons, food production and the burden  
placed upon highways adjacent to the area in question, the County Council  
is strongly recommended to urge the government to return the land  




The CWAEC and MAF repeatedly maintained, from the outset to post-war years, that whilst 
the training area could conventionally be termed light land it was capable, under modern 
farming methods, of yielding good root crops – especially sugarbeet. By 1947 the National 
Farmers’ Union had joined the fray, writing that  
 
‘This branch strongly urges the necessity for the immediate return to agricultural  
cultivation of the Stanford Battle Training Area. The Branch views with alarm  
the danger of this becoming waste, derelict, vermin and weed infested, and  




Concern from an academic perspective arrived in the form of a report from the Botany 
School of Cambridge University, asserting that in scientific, cultural and historical interests, 
Breckland is unique’, stressing the importance of glacial and inter-glacial deposits, the 
richness and diversity of archaeological remains and highly characteristic flora and fauna. 
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Military use of the land was alleged to be ‘tantamount to destruction of scientific material of 




Two key elements characterise the post-war legacy of Stanford. The first was the decision 
that Stanford was still needed by the military, and not in a reduced form, but expanded to take 
in more acreage – a reflection of rapidly changing geo-politics in the 1940s and concomitant 
maintenance of large numbers of serving regular and incoming national service soldiers. This 
led to the second. Unique to Norfolk, and prominent in living and written memory, is the 
infamous broken pledge. The government’s promise to allow residents of the Stanford 
training area to return to their homes and farms was never honoured, but this is not to say it 
was ignored. The matter was extensively discussed at Cabinet level and the decision to 
effectively renege on the pledge seems to have genuinely presented a moral issue to senior 
government ministers, who recognised the principle. A public enquiry was held and the 
Commissioner took the view that, whilst he acknowledged the need for retaining Stanford, 





Though a great deal has been written as personal testimony and recorded in official 
documents about the ‘promise’, one figure in particular links the plight of residents of the 
Sanford area and Fritton. Lord Cranbrook’s position as Deputy Regional Commissioner for 
Civil Defence during the war placed him often in the role of messenger to the affected 
communities, but that role also allowed him to mediate to the point of offering alternative 
proposals that could protect those same communities. He was moved to write to The Times in 
1947 as follows: 
 
‘Sir, I was one of those officially concerned with the evacuation at the Stanford  
Battle Training Area in 1942… I was in charge of the arrangements made to  
move the inhabitants of the villages involved and was present with the  
G.O.C.-in-Charge Eastern Command at the public meetings…  Both of us gave  
the most categorical undertakings that the people would be allowed to return  
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when the war was over…. They were told that every care would be taken to  
preserve houses and farm buildings intact against their return…and that any  
accidental damage would be repaired. Relying on these undertakings the  
inhabitants co-operated willingly.’  
 
‘Military necessity may again demand that this area is used for military purposes,  
but the authorities should realise that this can only be done by breaking  
promises freely given. I have no doubt but that most of the inhabitants, relying  
on these promises, have made no attempts to set up permanent homes  
elsewhere; if they are not to be allowed to return to their homes they should  




A detailed County Council report details the cost to the landscape and community of the 
army retaining the northern training area. Twelve parishes were affected. Just 500 acres had 
been returned to agriculture. 5,600 acres of arable and 7,800 acres of heath were retained, as 
were 16 farmhouses, 132 cottages and 5 schools and schoolhouses. Transport links were still 
affected, with 4.5 miles of the B.1108 Watton to Brandon road were still closed and 5.25 
miles of the Watton-Thetford road; with Class 3 and unclassified roads, the total closured 
amounted to 33.75 miles, together with four public rights of way. The reports adds that as 
early as 1942 it had been suggested that the area was deserving of national nature reserve and 





In addition, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England held that:  
 
‘…as Norfolk has already made so much contribution to National Defence  
affecting agriculture and the amenities of the county  and is to keep  
permanently not less than 22 out of 37 airfields and many AA camps that  
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The Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, Health, Transport and the Forestry Commission 
also wanted to see the land returned.  The War Office alleged it could find no trace of a 
promise and, in an interesting twist of interpretation, considered it reasonable to assume that 
such an assurance had been given – but that it could be over-ridden on grounds of national 
security.
69
 By the summer of 1947 it was clear that the war Office wanted to formally extend 




By 1949 ‘the pledge’ was being discussed at length at parliamentary and cabinet level.  The 
new Ministry of Town and Country Planning became involved, the minister explaining that 
were it not for the pledge the public enquiry commissioner would have recommended 
retaining the land. Stanford was one of five sites proposed nationally for retention. Honouring 
the pledge might prejudice opinion in the other four. The Minister of Defence suggested that 
if Stanford were not retained then other land of higher agricultural value would be taken 
instead. The Cabinet acknowledged the pledge but resolved they would ask to be released 
from it.
71
  It was subsequently decided that government departments so far involved would 
not be able to give much assistance to the resettlement of evictees, and that ‘displaced 
persons’ settlement should be directed by the Cambridge-based Regional Controller of Town 
and Country Planning. No government department seemed willing to accept responsibility for 
the cost – estimated at about £70,000 in all. The practical costs were thus far being borne by 
local authority housing departments, especially those of Wayland and Swaffham Rural 
District Councils. The War Office finally agreed to recompense councils on the basis of 
‘lump sum payments actuarially calculated upon the life of the displaced person and, where 





In the end, it fell to Lewis Silkin, Minister of Town and Country Planning to call a meeting 
with the dispossessed residents. It is worth quoting at length from his opening address, since 
he clearly felt considerable sympathy for the people. 
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‘…this is one of the most difficult meetings that I have ever had to attend  
in my life. I have been in some nasty jams before, but I do not think I have  
ever had so distasteful a duty to discharge as I have this morning.  I  
recognise that some six or seven years ago, during the war, you were  
induced to leave your homes by solemn pledge given to you by H.M. 
            Government that when the war was over you would be able to return to 
your homes once more’.
73
   
 
He went on to state clearly that the government accepted that a pledge to return had indeed 
been given but added that it was his duty to put to them that in the considered view of the 
government it was absolutely necessary to ask them to release the authorities from that 
pledge. Enlarging on the very much changed geo-political circumstance of the late 1940s he 
added: 
 
           ‘I need not enlarge on the international situation today… The world is mad, but  
whether we like it or not…there is real danger of a conflagration even greater  
than the last, and it is the duty of the government to make preparations. They  
[peacetime-conscripted soldiers] have got to be trained in such a way that we  
shall avoid the heavy losses of life which we suffered in the last war as a result  
of our people not being adequately trained in war conditions. 
 
Therefore in the larger interests of the people in this country as a whole I feel  




An alternative area had long been mooted locally, that of an expanse of heath broadly to the 
south-west of the Stanford Battle Area in the direction of Lakenheath and Mildenhall. The 
Minister explained that the area did not have the right characteristics and it would be broken 
throughout by the main Norwich-London road; any rerouting would have to be for twenty 
miles, at great expense.  
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Over the course of the next two years, arrangements were made to compensate dispossessed 
farmers at market value; tenants with offers of similar livings elsewhere, and householders – 
‘the saddest case of all’ as expressed by one official – with alternative permanent housing.
75
 
1950 saw the final, formal decision to retain the Stanford Training Area in perpetuity, with 
compensation paid at 1938 land values of £25 an acre on the basis that owners ‘ought not to 




Civilians were generally willing, as part of total war involvement, to allow unprecedented 
access to, and use of, their land. It was the contemporary culture of the ‘People’s War’.  
Official documents, correspondence and reports convey a sense of reasonably good 
relationships between farmers and the army, probably because civilians thought the 
arrangement to be temporary, for the duration. All this was to change rapidly in the five years 
following the war. They were, understandably,  and as evidenced by the extent of 
documented correspondence referred to in this chapter in the less willing to do so in 
peacetime when the Ministry of Defence wanted even more land, less in a spirit of pulling 
together than in pursuit of measures in response to a new world order.  
 
The longer term 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Stanford Training Area (STANTA) 
encompasses an area of about 24,300 acres and facilitates 340,000 training days annually, for 
the Regular and Territorial Army, cadet units, police and overseas forces.
77
  It continues to be 
one of the UK’s current major live-fire training and manoeuvring facilities up to battalion 
level, including supporting mortars, artillery, ground-attack aircraft and parachute drops. 
STANTA now is a smaller but significant remnant of the original wider training area which 
peaked at 120,000 acres.
78
  The battle area still includes four historic churches, including the 
Pugin-restored example at West Tofts.
79
 Urban and chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear training also take place in purpose-built areas and the airspace is permanently 
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 Six churches, one already ruinous, each with its own characteristic architecture, were included in 
the 1942 requisition. Laishley, A.L., East Anglian Magazine May 1956 pp.377-379 
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designated a danger area.
80
  Surviving former villagers and their relatives are allowed to visit 
the area annually, and particular familial sentiment is attached to the church graveyards. 
Organised tours under the supervision of the military are welcomed.
 
The story of the enforced 
evacuation of Buckenham Tofts, Langford, Stanford, Sturston, Tottington and West Tofts is 




Conservation and environmentalism 
STANTA’s use as a military training area has safeguarded a substantial archaeological 
landscape. It is also the home of a wealth of rare species of flora and fauna and about 70 per-
cent of the area comprises a Site of Special Scientific Interest.
82
 The Ministry of Defence is 
the second biggest land holder in the U.K., comprising around one per-cent of the total land 
area and has made strenuous efforts to support and initiate conservation efforts on its land. 
Whilst there may be a paradox in the concept of a natural environment side by side with one 
of busy military activity, safe havens are undoubtedly created.  The MoD has for many years 
encouraged an image of military training areas as sites of environmental conservation, 
prompting extensive discourse as to the rationale behind this. One perspective describes the 
metamorphosis of military training areas into conservation as ‘khaki conservation’.
83
 
Notably, the MoD publishes ‘Sanctuary’ an annual magazine bringing reports and events 
from training sites across the regions; the 2009 edition featured two articles about otters and 
rare flora at STANTA.
84
 The conservation benefits to the natural environment of STANTA 
are well known, and it is questionable as to whether those benefits would have been achieved 
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had the area been fully returned to agriculture in 1945. Live rounds dating from the Second 
World War are, however, regularly found during clearance operations. This, along with the 
intensive and understandably at times secretive usage of the area, restricts public access. 
Limited arable and pastoral agriculture takes place however, in organised conjunction with 
military usage. There is also a footpath along the Watton Brook from Great Cressingham to 
Bodney. The Army’s awareness of the value of good public relations is not new; in a 1965 
television interview Major General Talbot, Commanding Officer 54th Division Territorial 
Army, discusses the retention of Stanford Battle Training Area, as it was then still known. He 
presents a map showing the extent of the area used for training during the Second World 
War, emphasises the comparatively small area that being used in the 1960s, and stresses the 
difficulty of giving up any more land. The interviewer thinks this perfectly reasonable and 
asks the officer about an area of interest to naturalists but which cannot be relinquished for 
safety reasons. 
 
        
        
      
         
   
     
       













       Fig 55 1965 television interview between Hugh Sykes Davies and Major General   
       Talbot. The dashed line is referred to as ‘Breckland’ though the region is much  
       larger than shown. The small central area is the retained Stanford Battle Training  
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Fritton Decoy or Lake 
‘We have a very urgent proposal to use an area at Fritton Decoy for training  
of a specialised nature…the area…will be requisitioned under Defence  
Regulation 51, and in order to obtain adequate security it will be necessary  
for complete evacuation to take place within this area. 
 
It is most important that it should not get about in the area that there is  
anything special about this requisition except its urgency, and we hope to  




The second largest training area in Norfolk was centred on a large ribbon expanse of 
freshwater, bounded by the parishes of Fritton and Ashby. Prior to local government re-
organisation in 1972, and therefore during World War Two, it fell within the Lothingland 
Rural District, then part of East Suffolk County Council. The point is technical and yet for 
historic military purposes, entirely moot. As a formal, identifiable training area Fritton differs 
in many respects to Stanford. The circumstances and approach to requisition helped it avoid 
the controversy surrounding Stanford. It had quite different purpose, yet still technically 
qualifies as ‘landscape’ though the greater part of it comprised water. Extensive remains of 
this strategically significant tract of training landscape are to be found on the borders of the 
two counties. Here, from 1943, was established a facility specifically for the training of tank 
crews learning to operate the Duplex Drive amphibious tanks employed in the invasion of the 
Normandy coast in June 1944, along with subsequent amphibious operations into the 
Netherlands and eventually across the Rhine into Germany itself.  
Fritton Lake was chosen as the principal experimental and training site for 79th Armoured 
Division’s Duplex-Drive amphibious Sherman and Valentine tanks, one element of Major 
General Percy Hobart’s legendary ‘Funnies’ – the variety of  specialised, adapted armoured 
vehicles which included amongst many the Churchill Crocodile flamethrower, Sherman Crab 
‘mine-flail’ and armoured bulldozers. Planned relatively late in the war, it remained 
nominally in use until 1947. It was unique as an army training area in that a key part of its 
function required large tracts of water. The site, when fully operational, comprised 
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accommodation, workshop and maintenance buildings, slipways, an extensive tank park, 
numerous tracks and roadways linking the sub-sites and, perhaps most intriguing of all, an 
underground water-filled training chamber specifically for training tank crews in emergency 
escape techniques.  Due to the secret nature of the facility relatively little is known about its 
operations. Much more is now known following Suffolk County Council’s Archaeology Unit 
survey of 2013 to further understanding of the site.
87
 Following its decommissioning, the site 
was cleared and the majority of ground structures demolished. Despite this, significant 
evidence is preserved at this site in the form of foundations, floor slabs, trackways, and areas 
of hard-standing as well as the structural remains of the landing craft slipways. The entire site 
lay undisturbed in historical and archaeological context until the early years of the twenty-
first century when the then Country Park Manger of the Somerleyton Estate, Stuart Burgess, 
undertook personal research and investigation into the site’s history, with the ultimate aim of 
bringing recognition to the site’s historical significance and to further explore the important 
role it played in the Second World War.  
 
Fritton offers intriguing comparisons with Stanford from four important perspectives. Firstly, 
the site was, as with Stanford, established during wartime - but not until 1943. Secondly, it 
was designed for a specific medium-term and highly specialised training operation. Thirdly, it 
was highly secretive in nature, with attendant efforts to conceal its presence and, fourthly, 
water, not land, was the key component of the training operations.  Fritton was a contested 
landscape from the agricultural and social perspective but not nearly as intensively as 
Stanford and its environs – not least because the former covered a fraction of the area of the 
latter. 
The decision to use Fritton Decoy was made and implemented swiftly, especially when 
compared to the build-up to Stanford. A straightforward interdepartmental memorandum in 
May 1943 simply stressed the urgency and importance of the matter.
88
 Lord Cranbrook, 
Regional Commissioner, Eastern Civil Defence Reserve, was already aware of the proposal; 
his view was that the area was not large and given that only about forty people lived there, 
resistance to the proposal was not justified.
89
 Cranbrook met soon after with Major-General 
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Hobart and five other senior officers to consider the implications for residents. It was agreed 
to hold a public meeting with the local populace to explain, without divulging technical 
detail, the necessity for evacuation by 12
th
 June. Site work would begin right away, 
regardless. The Army would not need the fields surrounding the decoy and access to 
livestock would be permitted. No wide scale live firing would be carried out. The question of 
potential oil pollution of the water was raised, subsequently investigated and deemed by the 





 May 1943, local landowner Major Buxton wrote to Lord Cranbrook saying that a 
reporter from the Eastern Daily Press had arrived on site, declaring he had been sent on 
instructions from the Ministry of Information; this, on 7
th
 May, before the War Office’s 
declaration of intent. This is intriguing, given the emphasis upon secrecy, and yet no further 
mention is made of this.
91
  
Lord Cranbrook continued to suggest that military construction could take place whilst the 
populace was being evacuated, to at least give people more time to make arrangements. The 
idea was that people would be allowed to store their furniture in their homes for the duration. 
Incidentally, Cranbrook refers to discussing informally with Hobart the possibility of creating 




Cranbrook expressed his concerns about the evacuation process and of its absolute necessity.  
‘The preparations for the evacuation of the Fritton area will be put into  
operation this weekend, but I am very perturbed about the whole thing. 
 As you know, the population – about 40 all told – is being removed,  
not as in the case of the Battle Training Areas because of danger to 
life and limb but for security reasons. At the same time, that which  
must not be seen will be seen by many hundreds, or possibly thousands,  
of troops undergoing training in the area, Officers and men drawn  
from the same social strata and probably of the same type of intelligence 
as the persons who are going to be removed.’ 
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Cranbrook’s words seem anachronistically elitist if not viewed in contemporary context. His 
heart was in the right place, however, as he added: 
‘I can quite see that the general public and strangers are to be prevented  
from having access, but as the soldiers are apparently prepared to give  
passes to specific and named agriculturists… I cannot see that any great  




This proved to be crucial, particularly for the local populace. Hurried negotiations in this 
respect were successful. It was proposed that a large and unclimbable fence would be built to 
separate the houses at the Decoy from the inner site and then another, outer fence. No civilian 
access would be permitted through the inner fence and passes would be required to enter the 




The Army agreed and immediately drew up plans for exactly that, applying Defence 
Regulation 51 only to the inner ‘core’.
95
 Defence Regulation14 would regulate the overall 
area.
96
 Cranbrook was able to confirm that no evacuation would take place.
97
 It is to 
Cranbrook’s credit that this volte face was achieved. 
On the basis that the houses were not to be evacuated, and that realistically lakeside house-
owners might see DD tank movement, a cover plan was devised. An armoured division 
would indeed be in residence but apparently as a bridging training camp. Equipment in tank 
parks was to be arranged such that any aerial photographs taken of the coast between 
Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth – which would include Fritton – would show no sign of 
armoured vehicles or indeed any military occupation. Even the perimeter wire was laid to 
follow natural lines along the ground. Rumours were already circulating that the area was to 
be used for training loading tanks on barges, practising loading invasion-type barges, a 
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prisoner–of-war camp and even a bomb disposal site.
98
 Householders would be required to 
sign the Official Secrets Act – and cameras and field-glasses were strictly prohibited. It 
seems the army was happy to encourage these rumours; if, at ground level, it was clear the 
military was in occupation, misleading information was welcome. And the inconvenience to 
property owners was a small price to pay for not being evacuated. 
One local landowner would regularly express discontent with the local arrangements 
however. Cranbrook consulted with Lord Somerleyton, Lord Kennet and Major Buxton. All 
except Lord Kennet felt the restrictions to be reasonable. On this occasion he  
‘…seemed quite unable to understand why he should not be able to  
have week-end visitors exactly as he liked, saying that he frequently  
had the Admiral from Yarmouth and the Bishop of Norwich to tea  
and presumed that he could continue to do so.’  
 
Cranbrook noted that he pointed out to Kennet that all should be treated exactly like, adding 
ruefully ‘I think it is likely that whoever is responsible for issuing passes will have a good 
deal of trouble with him.’  
99
 
Cranbrook also tried to assuage fears from the Ministry of Town and Country Planning about 
certain damage to the land and tree felling. He assured them that this would be minimal, and 
no more than might be expected in the normal course of forestry  
‘In fact, apart from the considerable disturbance of a considerable number  
of ducks and other birds, who would in the normal course of events, have 
led an uneventful life until they found their way onto the market via the 
Decoy pipes, I do not think there is any cause for your Department to  






 June a public meeting took place at Fritton Hall at which Major-General Hobart – 
officer commanding 79
th
 Armoured Division - addressed the residents affected, explaining, as 
far as he was able, the need for taking over their properties. Terms of the Compensation 
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(Defence) Act, 1939 would after be outlined by the Land Agent.
101
 In authoritative but 
friendly terms Hobart underlined the need for important work at Fritton, explaining, as might 
be expected, that a number of reconnaissances have been undertaken across England and 
Scotland before identifying Fritton as the most suitable.  
‘It is not too much to say that on its success will depend, certainly the lives  
of thousands of men, but also quite possibly the success or failure of some  
of our next operations’. 
  
He went on to stress the importance of discretion, the initial plan for evacuation being 
moderated ‘as we feel that you are trustworthy people.’ 
102
 Percy Hobart was an 
extraordinary, larger than life figure. His military philosophy, associated with the radical 
views of journalist and military writer Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, and Major General J. F. C. 
Fuller, centred on the importance of mobility and highly trained soldiers. Forcibly retired in 
March 1940, then joining the Local Defence Volunteers as a corporal, he was the following 
year recommissioned as an armoured divisional commander.  He was soon encouraged to 
develop the range of specially adapted vehicles known as ‘Hobart’s Funnies’ enabling the 
rapid assault of beaches, fording of rivers and clearing of obstacles, following lessons learned 
from the disastrous Dieppe Raid of 1942. His biographer writes of a ‘reckless, self-righteous 
belief in his (Hobart’s) own rectitude and a masterful zeal when ignoring the views of others.’  
A picture emerges of a man whose ‘self-confidence degenerated into foul bad-temper when 
confronted or frustrated…on occasion a savage bully.’ 
103
 It is worth noting his character 
traits for two reasons, here in context. Firstly, Hobart was obsessive about maintaining 
secrecy regarding his operations, which makes the survival of the transcript of his speech at 
Fritton, from notes taken by the parish clerk all the more unusual. Secondly, Hobart 
emphasised the importance of secrecy to the local residents by dark reference to one of his 
own staff officers who, after divulging secret information to a companion, was cashiered and 
sent to a military prison.  
 
Had the residents of Fritton been more familiar with Hobart’s background they might have 
viewed his impending visit with considerable apprehension. As it was, his address exudes a 
comradely familiarity with those attending the meeting and, thanks to the timely intervention 
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of Lord Cranbrook, no-one had to leave their homes.  Later that month, letters were sent by 
the Regional Civil Defence Commissioner to all ‘Frittoners’ explaining the precise terms of 
being allowed to remain in their homes, ending with  
‘The Military Authorities have shown their consideration for your convenience  
by allowing you to remain. I appeal to you to show yourself worthy of that  
consideration by keeping to the Regulations in letter and in spirit.’ 
104
   
 
For the local population, life would change little, save for showing security passes and being 
discreet about what they might see and hear;  and work in the surrounding farms and fields 
would carry on as before, unlike the radically different scenario in Breckland. Lord Kennet 
would continue to think himself hard done by.  
‘Local people are inclined to think that Lord Kennet is in a slightly privileged  
position... Lord Kennet receives no military favours. A short time ago, his  
car broke down, and the permit officer refused the entry of a mechanic.   
A Mr Cubitt, who lives nearby, is not so well off... his family and staff have  




The famous DD tanks went on to prove their worth in the Normandy landings in June 1944, 
but the work at Fritton was not over. Shortly after, control of the training area passed from 
79
th
 Armoured to the Woodbridge-based Assault Training and Development Centre. The unit 
commander, in response to the ubiquitous Lord Kennet whose hopes of a return to normality 
were temporarily dashed, stated that  
‘…the slack periods...are now at an end for a further period. More troops  
are to be trained in the area....Fritton was not unconnected with the invasion  
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The precise geographical extent of the Fritton Decoy training area is defined in a map and 
brief summary submitted in support of the D.R.14 application.
108
 The War Office map extract 
used for reference delineates the inner and outer areas in just two simple colour codes. 
 
       Fig.56  Site drawing for proposed 79
th
 Division training area at Fritton Lake
109
                           
        
 
Given the exceptionally secret nature of the work relatively little is recorded about day-to-day 
operations and, after decommissioning, the site was cleared and most buildings demolished. 
Foundations, trackways, hardstandings and slipways are still visible however. The lake and 
surrounding land are part of the Somerleyton estate, but administratively sits on the border 
between Suffolk and Norfolk, just to the east of St. Olaves. The body of water is meandering 
and elongated, measuring about 3.5 km by 270 metres – about 140 acres in all. The water is 
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not much more than ten feet deep and may be the result of medieval peat extraction, much 
like the Norfolk Broads.
110
 Perhaps the most significant known yet, intriguingly, not visible, 
archaeological remnant is the tank crew amphibious escape facility or ‘immersion pool’, 
comprising an underground water-filled structure thought still to contain a tank.
111
 
           
Fig.57  Slipway at Fritton Lake; rare remaining surface structure
112
  
The Fritton Lake facility is associated with a similar site more than fifty miles to the north-
west. The lake at Narford Hall was utilised briefly in March 1943 for the same ‘swimming 
tank’ training but the fifty-two acres of water proved too limiting. Thirty-six tanks could be 
accommodated at Fritton.
113
 Moreover Fritton Lake was sited about thirty miles from 
Saxmundham, where Eastern Command G.H.Q. was located. Reservations were expressed by 
senior officers about Fritton’s proximity to the coast and vulnerability to observation from 
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enemy aircraft – a valid point, which was addressed by comprehensive camouflaging of the 
tank park and surrounding area.
114
 
Summarily, key distinctions can be made when comparing Stanford and Fritton. The former 
was subject to the full extent of wartime requisition. The latter was not. Fritton was utilised 
for relatively short-term military objectives, whilst Sanford remains in perpetuity a military 
site. The populace at Fritton experienced none of the hardship and upheaval that occurred at 
Stanford. Nor does it hold any environmental conservation status. For all these reasons 
Fritton is an almost forgotten site, recorded for posterity and, indeed with a public open day 
in 2012 celebrating its history and its landscape footprint is, therefore, negligible compared to 
STANTA. 
 
Other training sites 
As well as the two training facilities explored in detail above, additional training sites fall in 
to the broad sub-categories of live or practice bombing ranges and gunnery ranges used by 
the RAF and USAAF. Any such facility was likely to prove dangerous to civilian populations 
so naturally these were sited well away from populated areas, usually at isolated coastal 
locations. The Breast Sand live bombing range, just west of Lynn Cut, was established in 
June 1942 for the use of Bomber Command under the provisions that practice would take 
place only when the area was completely clear, with no interference to public rights of way or 
navigation, and only during daylight hours.
115
 The specified area was restricted to a 1,000 
yard radius of the centre point, noting that the nearest inhabited point was 2,500 yards distant 
from the target.
116
 There was some discussion between 1947 and 1951 about re-siting the 
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Fig.58  Breast Sand, The Wash,  Practice and Live Bombing Range; land edged in red was 
requisitioned. The target is central, with flagstaffs to landward at east and south. Red flags 




range so the land could be reclaimed for agricultural purposes but the outcome is unclear, 
though the range was subsequently abandoned.
  
Bombing and gunnery ranges were to be found at most airfields and training facilities, but 
significant archaeological remains can be found at Snettisham, where an RAF Gunnery 
Range was used by the USAAF from mid-1943 to provide aerial gunnery training for bomber 
crews; particular extant archaeological features include the remains of a narrow gauge rail 
track and embankment to facilitate moving targets for heavy machine gun practice. Later the 
site became a Prisoner of War Camp, still used up to 1948. In an ironic inversion compared to 
STANTA conserving rare flora and fauna, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds’ 
ownership of the site means that considerable areas of concrete and brick buildings and 
protective banks remain extant. The RSPB features again as a steward of the landscape at 
Titchwell, where the beach and marshes were, between 1942 and 1945, utilised by the Royal 
Tank Regiment and other armoured units as a firing range. A concrete road of triangular 
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layout enabled tank transporters to off-load without having to reverse. Beneath the present 
Island Hide lie the foundations of a pumphouse, from where winches operated cables to 
present targets of opportunity for tank gunners.
118
  The rusted hulks of two Covenanter tanks 
appear occasionally at low tide. These were probably used as targets, as opposed to being 
operational.  An important and extensive site, incorporating much remnant archaeology in its 
wider landscape setting, lies on the north Norfolk coast close to potential invasion 
approaches. Established it 1937 it soon had a dual role as both a training and anti-invasion 
defence site. The detail is covered in Chapter 2 ‘Anti-Invasion Defences’.    
The landscapes of these, and similar, sites, remain relatively unchanged, for they were not 
required post-war for agricultural, commercial, industrial or residential use. Indeed, in some 
cases they continue to be protected by virtue of their nature conservation status, the standing 
features entering slow decline through weather erosion. The question of they can be 
conserved in conjunction with the preservation of wildlife habitat may rest in some form of 
multi-agency partnership approach. 
 
Conclusion 
Much like the airfields, the training areas chart clearly the major change in military strategy 
from early 1942 from that of defence to one of preparation – in the case of ground forces, for 
offensive operations in North Africa, Mediterranean and ultimately continental Europe. 
Again, in common with airfields, Stanford, the largest training area, demonstrated the 
rationale behind the appreciation and appropriation of terrain that facilitated armoured and 
infantry dispersed manoeuvring across open country; once again, the landscape of Norfolk 
accommodated a particular form of human activity that few other regions could offer. Fritton 
was not the only amphibious tank training area in Britain but its location and relative 
remoteness suited its purpose well. Both fitted the usual description of an inevitable choice of 
site.  Further, the Stanford training area impacted upon agricultural land use in an area of the 
county that, though characterised by poor soils, witnessed a variety of crops cultivated by 
essentially farming-orientated communities before and during the war. Significantly, the 
history, legacy and continued presence of STANTA has contributed to the cultural identity of 
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this central area of Breckland, an identity augmented by the permanent air bases at nearby 
Lakenheath and Mildenhall. The co-existence of civilian and military livelihoods is not 
without parallel, Flintham’s study of the Shoeburyness military testing and disposal facility 
on the Essex coast describing a smaller, less populated example.
119
 Finally, the concept of 
military environmentalism has reached its apogee within the bounds of Stanford; 11,500 
acres are designated Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Fritton, however, by nature 
of its small scale compared to Stanford, is largely forgotten as a militarised landscape and 
remains largely unchanged from its pre-war appearance.  
In conclusion, it has been shown that different categories of training facilities were 
established across Norfolk during the Second World War. Many were transitory but, 
generally, the longer the timescale of use and the larger the area subsumed, the greater was 
the change wrought upon the landscape. Stanford is the prime example not just of a relict 
landscape but a continuing, active facility which has evolved and adapted according to 
military need in the ensuing seven decades. Fritton resumed its quiet rural existence after 
short-term disruption. Both were responses to the military’s durational requirements, which 
will be further explored in the next chapter examining the infrastructure and logistics of 
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Chapter 5 : Logistics and Infrastructure 
 
Introduction                                       
 
The importance of logistics to the military cannot be overstated. Logistics is the management 
and implementation of moving resources to, and storing them at, the locations where they are 
required. In military terms, it is the organisation and movement of personnel, equipment, 
ordnance and supply to places of operational readiness. This chapter will investigate how 
existing transport and distribution infrastructure was adapted and changed by construction, 
servicing and supply needs, and how this impacted upon the Norfolk landscape.  
The efforts made by the military and civilian workforces in the Second World War to support 
the prosecution of the war are impressive by any standard.  In the eastern counties logistics 
supported the delivery of material for defensive operations from 1939 and then large scale 
offensive operations from 1942. The supply and maintenance of a network of military 
installations, above all, the airfields across Norfolk, would be logistically complex even with 
the benefit of twenty-first century technology. In the Second World War it was achieved with 
contemporary construction and engineering techniques, driven by urgent necessity. This 
chapter will assess the short and longer term physical impact of transport, delivery and 
storage facilities and their associated infrastructures, both on the landscape and on human 
activity. The materials to be discussed are primarily ordnance – ammunition, bombs and 
explosives - and fuel, oil and lubricants. Less impactful in the landscape, though culturally 
and socially important, are the movement, accommodation and provisioning of military 
personnel. Operational themes may be divided into (1) transportation (2) storage and (3) 
concealment of material prior to deployment; these three follow an operational ‘flow’.  
 
Historiography 
Several volumes of the exhaustive official histories provide detailed overviews of planning 
and management of transport, oil supplies, construction, manpower and economics at national 
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and strategic level but with little localised context.
1
 For aviation-related supply however, 
Payton-Smith’s Oil is especially useful in its explanation of the distribution methodologies of 
that most essential of lubricants to the war effort.
2
 Road transport was rather more 
sophisticated than a casual retrospective view might initially suggest. Savage’s Inland 
Transport is indispensable as a chronological and objective assessment of road, rail and sea 
transport in wartime Britain; in describing the British government’s home front transport 
policy it paints a picture of an extensive road haulage industry, operating on roads the envy of 
other European countries.
3
 Little documented record remains at local level however, probably 
because, despite national strategic direction, the sector remained almost wholly private and 
commercial, with thousands of small operators working for the military.  
The historiography of wartime railways comprises some good generalist volumes though, as 
with the official histories, include little local or even regional information about the 
involvement of the railways with military operations.
4
 A comprehensive work on Britain’s 
railways in the Second World War has perhaps yet to be written, at least according to one 
authoritative source.
5
  Even the best known authors tend to address the railways’ perspective 
rather than any deeper assessment of effectiveness of contribution to the war effort.  An 
exception is Norman Crump’s personally observed history of the London and North Eastern 
Railway’s operation in wartime which provides excellent and immediate detail.
6
  Uniquely, it 
serves almost as a primary source in itself, for two reasons. Firstly, Crump writes from 
personal wartime experience and from interviews and site visits conducted in the immediate 
aftermath of the war itself. Secondly, as Crump himself points out, the L.N.E.R simply 
discarded much of its own operating record and so little formal documentation remains. 
The most effective research approach pertaining to military operations is the information 
contained in military war diaries at the National Archives, which provide helpful detail of 
adaptation of existing infrastructure, site establishment, operations and delivery manifests. 
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Higham’s Bases of Air Strategy, Smith’s British Military Airfields and the government’s own 
The Royal Air Force Builds for War are also useful in relation to airfield construction, 
containing data not found in similar publications.
7
    
 
An integrated national transport system 
The management of war has been described as a learning process.
8
  In simple terms, it is 
difficult to plan for unforeseen circumstances. This is evident in the way in which pre-war 
and early duration provision and logistical planning had to increase exponentially beyond all 
original expectation. The 158 airfields, nationally, of 1939 more than doubled to 353 in 1941, 
and many were not well located for rail or road links. This was especially so in Norfolk, the 
topography and dispersed population, which so suited the building of airfields, giving new 
emphasis to the meaning of the word ‘isolation’. There was a need for frequent and well-
managed trans-national transportation systems, with the building of spur lines and sidings in 
strategic locations. The actual railway infrastructure already existed but new spur lines and 
sidings were needed in specific locations. The national railway network was well-established 
but nowhere near geared towards the stringent requirements of wartime; road transport even 
less so. Moreover, the weather is ever a key factor in military logistics; the winters of 1939-
40 and 1940-41 were severe and were, in their own way, as damaging as enemy action, 
because of blocked rail lines and roads and frozen machinery. 
For the duration, the term ‘inland transport’ was used to describe road, rail, and, despite the 
apparent misnomer, coastal traffic for coaling and oil supply.
9
 Coastal shipping was still a 
viable medium for transporting oil and coal around the British coastline. This gives meaning 
to its perception as an inland transport medium, as distinct from international shipping. The 
government decided that it was a resource, much like any other, to be utilised to its 
maximum. The importance of a well-managed, integrated transport system to the war effort 
was well understood. 
 ‘In a modern economy at war, the inland transport system plays an indispensable 
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 role both in the process of war-time production and in supplying the military 
 machine. The way in which inland transport is organised and managed therefore 




The situation of ‘total war’ was new, though some harbinger of it had been seen in the First 
World War. The centralised management of transportation did however prove to be a process 
of trial and error, largely because of the all-encompassing nature of need. A number of state 
controls were imposed in the early years of the war, notably that the civilian Ministry of 
Transport was in 1941 superseded by a Ministry of War Transport.  
 
The national road network 
Road haulage was not, by 1939, an impoverished poor relation of the railways. The inter-war 
years witnessed a major burgeoning of road transport, free from restriction and regulation. 
Savage calls it ‘unquestionably the most remarkable development in land transport between 
the wars.’
11
 Britain possessed a greater mileage of roads in proportion to its land area – if not 
to its population – than any other country in the world. Road surfacing was of a high standard 
on major roads nationally and effective road space was being addressed by widening and 
improvement.
12
 Roads, then, were not as archaic as popular culture often presents and, given 
the low level of private car ownership, which was not to rise dramatically until the 1950s, 
they were efficient, uncongested movers of goods. It was a serious competitor to the railways 
but, in wartime, road and rail found common cause. At the start of war, road networks out of 
London were already being improved to a standard suitable for long-distance haulage.
13
 As 
will be seen, below, however, provincial roads were less able to meet increases in traffic. 
Roadworks not directly required for war needs were suspended for the duration; those 
required for transporting weapons and machines were prioritised. 
14
 Petrol was rationed for 
private use from the outset; military and approved commercial and agricultural supplies were 
dyed red. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, road haulage was taken under the control of 
the Emergency Road Transport Organisation. Very few records of operations were kept, 
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however, due almost certainly to the diverse and individual private ownership and operation 
of road haulage. The same might be said of the railways.
15
 The road haulage industry was 
being used at full capacity by the autumn of 1940, with extra vehicles being needed for 
delivering tarmac and cement for airfield construction.  Long–distance vehicles were being 
loaded to 80% capacity, including return journeys.
16
  ‘Empty running’ had always been an 
issue and it was clear that emphasis should be given to carrying maximum loads in both 
directions.
17
   The overall history of road haulage in the early years of the war is characterised 
by conflict and tension between hauliers and the government. Co-operation proved to be 
problematic but by 1943 it was decided to take control of all commercial vehicles that might 
normally be engaged in haulage goods for distances over sixty miles. By April of 1944 direct 
control was such that general traffic was prohibited from moving more than sixty miles 
without formal authorisation.
18
  In terms of traffic density, between 1931 and 1938, 450 
kilometres of new roads were built nationally, whilst the number of motor vehicles had 
increased by more than 70 per-cent.
19
  Throughout the war private car ownership steadied at 
around two million. The end of petrol rationing combined with increased prosperity saw car 




Norfolk’s road network 
The county’s road network in the inter-war period was still recognisable in the early twenty-
first century.
21
  Strategic routes radiated to the south-east to Thetford, westwards to King’s 
Lynn via Dereham, and directly eastward to Great Yarmouth. Additional major roads led 
north and north-east to Cromer and Fakenham respectively, whilst to the south lay the 
Waveney Valley towns with Ipswich forty miles distant, and a south-east route to Lowestoft. 
This disposition served a well-placed meeting of supply routes to the airfields, to the two 
strategic coastal ports and to national rail links. What differentiates the county’s road network 
in the interwar period from the present day is the composition of road surfacing and, even in 
the contemporary period, unprecedented increases in traffic. The early part of the century had 
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seen, nationwide, the reconstruction and sealing of some road surfaces with tar and 
bituminous surfacings. Main roads were generally cobbled, wood block paved or metalled 
with macadam, on which traffic generated huge clouds of dust, incommoding bystanders and 
motorists alike. Road construction developed eventually to the modern practice of a 
cambered surface for drainage, with an asphalt or even concrete surface.
22
  
Norfolk’s experience broadly reflected national traffic trends, with increased bus services, 
encouraged by the advent of the pneumatic tyre, more private car ownership and lorry traffic 
serving both agriculture and commerce. In 1930 Norfolk County Council took responsibility 
for all roads and more than one hundred miles of minor roads were surfaced, widened and 
made safer each year and others widened and hazardous corners improved.  These measures 
failed to keep pace with the increases in traffic however, which was estimated in 1935 to be 
four times greater than in 1924.
23
  Norfolk’s roads were ill-prepared for the increase of heavy 
traffic necessitated by the Second World War. The war saw permanent road closures and 
diversions across and around airfields and training areas. Notable among these are the 
diversion of the A140 Norwich to Aylsham road, previously lying directly across the western 
flank of Horsham St Faith airfield and permanently re-directed to its present day line of 
travel, and the closure of the road between Bodney and Little Cressingham, across the 
Stanford Battle Training Area.  Curiously, a section of the road between Tunstead and 
Scottow, leading to RAF Coltishall, was re-constructed as dual carriageway, probably to 
accommodate heavy traffic to the airfield. No other plausible reason for its existence has 
come to light.
24
 It remains an anachronism as the only example of its kind in the county.  As a 
landscape feature, and compared to the steel and concrete central reservations of modern dual 
carriageways, it presents a visually aesthetic image of a road bisected by rough grass and 
mature trees.  
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Fig.59 Dual carriageway near RAF Coltishall (author’s photo)  
 
Railways – national background 
Rail freight and passenger traffic were experiencing heavy competition from unregulated 
road transport by the 1930s. The inter-war chronology of the British railway network 
demonstrated a sound base for wartime operational management between 1939 and 1945. 
Whilst the golden age of railway building had long passed, since 1923 the network had been 
consolidated into four major operators, eliminating route competition, and would remain so 
until nationalisation in 1947. The railway companies were beset by financial problems 
throughout the 1930s but still dominated inland transport carrying in 1938 some 265.7 
million tons of goods, minerals and livestock, across 20,000 miles, of which two-thirds was 
double track. Generally, the railway system immediately before the war of 1939 was 
efficient, comparing favourably with systems abroad, and the high standards of speed and 
safety of passenger trains were universally recognised.
 25
  Britain had no formal military 
railway authority however and relied almost entirely upon the existing civilian rail network 
and its operating infrastructures to support military transportation for the duration of the war. 
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Enormous pressures were put on the civilian staff and rolling stock, leading to extreme 
debilitation of rail services by 1945, with no physical re-investment in that time.   
The four railway companies retained their individual identities, but each would become 
known for a wartime ‘speciality’.  The London and North Eastern Railway (LNER), covering 
the East and North-East, would bear the burden of serving more than three quarters of 
Britain’s airfields including those concentrated in East Anglia.
26
 Whilst, however, the 
railways were efficient in peacetime, they were not geared to the exigencies of wartime 
pressure. It was the government’s responsibility to organise and manage this and it was done 
without directly taking public ownership of the railways or creating a military command 
structure. Savage describes a catalogue of initial misperceptions and unrealistic projections 
between government departments about the ability of the railways to deliver. The Committee 
of Imperial Defence believed that surplus capacity on the railways would always meet 
wartime need, whilst the Ministry of Transport was more realistic. The most authentic 
projections of need came from the chairman of the Railway Executive in May 1939, just four 
months before the outbreak of war.
27
  At midnight on 31
st
 August 1939 the railways were 
brought under government control and a Railway Executive Committee formed, comprising 
the general managers of the four main-line companies and the vice chair of the London 
Passenger Transport Board, as agents of the Ministry of Transport but were still allowed to 
generate their own direct revenue up to £40 million per annum.
28
 The pressure of expansion 
of the armed forces, from 2,212,000 personnel in June 1940 to 3,484,000 just a year later, 
along with logistical supply needs of airfield construction and military camps, was a portent 
of things to come as the war progressed.
29
  By the end of 1940 it was acknowledged that 
whilst no new routes were to be constructed, £10 million was to be budgeted for the 
improvement of existing routes. The Railway Executive Committee based this proposal on 
the awareness of a diminishing pool of labour, that military freight and passenger traffic 
would inevitably increase, and that speedy turn-round was essential.
30
 This is important, in 
that no attempt was made to significantly improve or extend the infrastructure of the railways 
to help meet expected war need. The government intended to rely upon the railways simply to 
adapt as need arose; and it did arise in the eastern counties, with the relentless programme of 
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airfield construction from 1941 peaking in 1943 and subsequent operational supply needs. As 
Savage puts it: 
‘In the long run, the railways’ contribution to the war effort turned on their  
ability to perform ordinary task and adjust themselves to change in the volume  
and flow of different types of traffic as the course of the war changed.’ 
31
   
 
Realistically, it was a case of first of all having to co-ordinate and refine the operating 
practices within the existing railway framework and, secondly, expand delivery and storage 
facilities at what might be termed military ‘hot spots’.  In the Norfolk context this would 
entail engineering works at key locations, enabling fast, efficient and effective un-loading, 
storage and turn-around.  Colliers, active along the east coast in the inter-war years, were 




The British transport system was, then, efficient at the outset of war. The increasing demands 
of the war effort were, however, to put unimagined strain upon the railways especially. By 
the autumn of 1943, logistical difficulties reached the peak of crisis in the eastern counties, 
when airfield construction was nearing its busiest, requiring the transport of both construction 
material and operational material for those sites already fully active. The LNER was, by that 
time, handling unprecedented levels of traffic, both military and agricultural.
33
 The road 
haulage sector was prevailed upon to help and lorries which carried cement to eastern 
airfields were back-loaded with potatoes for London.
34
  Despite the supply of specialist 
wagons and the introduction of imported American locomotives wagons, engines of all types 
and labour, were in crucially short supply.
35
  
The great achievements of inland transport organisation by 1944 contrasted sharply with the 
early war years’ failure to have an effective policy of management.
36
 By VE Day, however, 
Britain’s railways were exhausted. It was a story of make do, expand where immediately 
needed, but not mend. After the war, the big four railway companies were effectively 
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bankrupt. The 1947 Transport Act saw not just the railways, but also long-distance road 
haulage, costal ports and bus companies taken into public ownership by the Attlee 
government. Bitter resentment within the road haulage industry led to the Conservative 
government de-nationalising that part of the sector in 1951. It is a matter of on-going debate 
as to whether the railways were already in a parlous state in 1939, regardless of their situation 
in 1945. The practical fact was that a radical organisational solution to re-investment and re-
building was needed. There followed the 1955 Modernisation Plan which heralded genuine 
reinvestment in the railway infrastructure. Ever-increasing competition from road haulage 
and, later, private car ownership, however led in 1961 to the still highly controversial 
reassessment of the railways by Beeching.
37
  Rail passenger traffic had actually seen an 
increase in the late 1950s, thanks to reinvestment and improvement but it was all too late. 
One third of the network was said to be carrying one per-cent of the traffic. Nationally one 
third of passenger services and about 4,000 of 7,000 stations were to close. The measures 
were extreme and saw some major national routes closed which subsequently proved to be 
needed. In Norfolk an example of the opposite happened; the King’s Lynn to Dereham to 
Norwich line was closed, despite Beeching intending it to remain in business for express 
passenger and freight traffic, albeit with most small stations on the lined being closed. The 
war did not cause the dismantling of either the national or the Norfolk rail network. It could 
be said to have created conditions for their potential demise but the eventual outcomes were 
the result of political, ideological, economic and partisan decisions taken fifteen years and 
more after. 
 
Norfolk’s railway network 
There is a generalisation that Britain’s railway network in 1939, though extensive, did not 
serve geographically remote airfields well.
38
 This was not the case in Norfolk. Fig,XX shows 
the correlation between airfield locations and corresponding road and rail networks.  A GIS 
extrapolation of all 175 railways station and minor halts in contemporary Norfolk shows that 
ninety-seven per-cent of all places in the county were within 4.5 miles (7 km) of a station. 
More significantly, almost half the airfields were as little as three miles (5 km) from a railway 
station.  
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 Fig.60  Norfolk’s road (red) and rail (brown) networks showing proximity to airfields 
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The close correlation between rail and road routes further illustrates the comprehensive 
coverage of the regional transport network.
39
 Twenty-five unspecified London and North 
Eastern Railway (LNER) stations where conditions were especially problematic are reported 
to have been extended but this is likely to have been across all of ‘bomber country’, that is 
East Anglia and Lincolnshire. One group of geographically unspecified ‘little country 
stations’ are said to have handled, in the first six months of 1940, 27,152 tons of traffic; they 
handled eight times that amount during the first half of 1943. One station is cited as 
processing twenty-six times more traffic in that second time period.
40
 The rural railway 
stations across Norfolk had been built to deal with agricultural and horticultural freight and 
passenger traffic. There was not sufficient time to construct large scale extensions and some 
existing facilities were either inadequate or non-existent, and certainly not fit for wartime 
usage, requiring carriage of industrial goods on an intensive scale. Major cargo for airfield 
construction comprised rubble, bricks, tarmac and cement;  the fact that a good deal of rubble 
was furnished from the ruins of buildings caused by the London air raids of 1940 and 1941, 
then to form the basis of striking at the heart of German industry, communications and cities, 
has been described as ‘poetic justice’.
41
  Indeed Crump states unreservedly that the LNER’s 
most important contribution to the defeat of Germany was its support of the bomber 
offensive.  
 
‘Like many other people in 1941 and 1942, I often wondered when we were  
really going to bomb Germany. It was only when I came to write this book  
that I realised what a major bomber offensive really meant. First the airfields  
had to be built…. Then they had to be equipped with everything from the  
control tower apparatus to the coke for the cook-house. Next they had to be  
fed continuously with bombs and spare parts. Last but not least, they needed  




Beginning in November 1942, six trains a day were running into eastern England. By April 
1943 this had increased to nine trains daily and during that period 750,000 tons of rubble 
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were moved by 1,700 trains. In July 1943 the Air Ministry requested 14 million bricks to be 
accrued from Bedfordshire to airfield sites, requiring eighty special trains; at the same time 
the railways were charged with conveying 3,000 tons of tarmac or slag every day for eighty 
days from the Midlands to sixteen airfield sites in East Anglia, key delivery locations being 
Fakenham and Attleborough.
 
This raised a tension between rail capacity  required for military 
purposes and that for agricultural haulage.
43
 In the context of railways, it was not solely the 
logistical requirements of the airfields and military training areas themselves, but the 
limitations of railway station handling capacities which were already having to cope with 




Some new sidings were constructed however and within twelve months of their completion a 
total of 46,000 wagon loads of airfield construction traffic, on 800 special trains, had passed 
through them. 900 special cement trains were run to concentration points from August 1943. 
The railways also transported bulldozers, graders and other specialist runway construction 
equipment, often of American design of size and scale not before seen in the UK. Then 
followed lesser materiel such as asbestos sheeting, timber cladding, piping, electrical 
equipment, Nissen huts, storage tanks. Then, with the arrival of American personnel in mid-
1942, the transportation of personnel increased considerably. From the autumn of 1942 for 
the next two years, more than 460 LNER trains conveyed around 167,000 personnel to East 
Anglian airfields.
44
 Concurrent with this was the constant requirement for aviation fuel, 
petrol, oil, lubricants, bombs and ammunition. Fuel was originally conveyed in a motley 
selection of tank wagons but as the war progressed, exclusive fuel trains comprised of 
modern high capacity wagons were run from the west coast ports eastwards to the newer 
airfield distribution points. Although few consignment records survived the war, it is clear 
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Numbers of trains received      
 
 1939     1940     1941     1942     1943     1944 
                                                                                                                                                            
Total 
Thetford June 1939      6          36         48          76         280       148  594 
Massingham June 1939      6          44         17         120        180       164  531 
Hethersett July 1943 -       -            -              -           132      236  368 
Ellingham March 1944 -       -            -              -             -          148  148 
     12          80         65         196        592       696 1641 
Table.6  Trains received at Air Ministry depots in Norfolk
45
   
   
Distribution railheads were established at Lowestoft, South Lynn, Roudham, Crown Point 
(Norwich), Norwich (City Station), Downham and Dereham. Dereham handled exceptionally 
heavy tonnage, the greatest single day’s clearance in March 1944 amounting to 95 wagons, 
about a hundred tons of cement for construction work. Later, ordnance and fuel came to be 
the primary cargoes. The loads at these railheads were usually split into smaller local trains, 
releasing wagons at wayside sidings as they progressed. Late 1943 had seen new ‘wayside’ 
sidings become available at Attleborough, Dereham and Tivetshall. This last had a pre-war 
yard capable of parking twenty-six wagons; it was all that was ever needed in peacetime. 
When Tivetshall became the hub of seven airfields it had to handle up to 200 wagons at a 
time in addition to special passenger traffic for construction workers. Four new sidings were 
built at Tivetshall. One potential incident relates a bomb train, a fuel train and a third with 
bitumen, all being unloaded at the same time, after dark, when enemy aircraft passed over 
without incident. Diss had a special bulk cement handling shed built, accommodating 
uniquely designed fifty-ton steel wagons, discharging into customised lorries. Attleborough 
of course was also geographically central to airfields, including Old Buckenham and 
Deopham Green.
46
 Crump describes Attleborough as handling during construction for these two 
airfields alone, 3,500 tons of stone, 37,000 tons of cement, 3,750 tons of ashes, over three thousand 
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tons of girders and roofing; four hundred  tons of drainage and water pipes, 500 tons hangar sections; 
400 tons air raid shelters; 300 tons petrol tanks, 200 tons electrical cables and fittings and 6,350 tons 
of stores.
47
 Attleborough was extended several times  by the Air Ministry, with siding 
accommodation for 36 wagons, along with a shunting neck, later extended to 65 wagons, 
allowing total parking for 100 wagons. Another 70 wagons were accommodated with later 
expansion. Harling Road was an archetypal rural wayside station on a main line and, though 
having to serve three airfields, had fewer extensions built. Ellingham and Earsham were even 
smaller, on single track, Earsham handling 625 special trains, comprising 21,038 wagons 
carrying 200,000 tons of freight over a three-year period.
48
 Therefore, whilst many small 
stations and halts remained relatively unimproved by war needs, others were transformed 
beyond pre-war imagination. Crump, writing just two years after the war’s end, states that 
Earsham, Watton and Ellingham had already become ‘white elephants’, presumably in terms 
of their post-war over-capacity. On the other hand, the District Superintendent regarded the 
improvements made at Attleborough, Brandon and Dereham as worthwhile for future use. 
Indeed the legacy of the line extensions was such that, for example, the Tivetshall branch line 
was by then connected to the Waveney Valley Line.
49
  Large numbers of servicemen were 
entrained to airfields throughout the war, increasingly so from 1943 with the presence of 
USAAF personnel in East Anglia. It was by no means a one-way journey to the airfields 
however. Trains were constantly transporting service personnel on recreational leave and 
postings, especially at weekends. Thetford station saw the number of tickets issued from 
21,418 in 1938 to 110,389 on 1944. Diss saw an increase over the same period from 40,000 
to 330,000. The understandably cavalier behaviour of servicemen saw, on one occasion, the 
theft of front wheel valves from every one of more than a hundred bicycles parked at Diss 
station. Railway property was not always respected by troops making for short cuts back to 
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Fig.61  Dereham station, 1946.  A key reception area for mid-Norfolk airfield supply trains 
and interchange to King’s Lynn and Norwich. The main line runs south-north to the left of 
the image, with the main station buildings to top left. The green markers show the line of the 
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Petrol, oil and lubricants    
 
Petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) were the lifeblood of aviation operations. Fuel oil, 
particularly aviation fuel, was used at phenomenally increasing rates by airfields, demand 
exceeding supply until late in the war, and an airfield without the means to power aircraft is 
rendered useless. Pre-war, the RAF’s fuel reserves were never more than 8,000 tons, the 
estimated equivalent of ten days’ war supply. It proved to be no more than one day’s supply. 
This minimum requirement was increased beyond all projected need as the war progressed. 
By January 1941 the Air Ministry was holding 940,000 tons of aviation fuel in reserve; by 
September 1943, 1,337,000 tons. This all had to be stored, delivered and stored again at local 
sites.  The complexities of transporting oil under extreme wartime conditions dwarfed pre-
war requirements; in 1938 the railways handled 250,000 tons of petrol, oil and lubricants 
each month. In 1943, 350,000 tons were moved by rail each month.
52
 Civilian truck drivers 
were needed to distribute fuel locally, from railheads and sidings. The logistical paradox for 
supply to the airfields of eastern England was that of distance. Of equal concern was 
transporting oil to the UK itself. Britain had no homeland oil supply; in 1939 ninety per-cent 
of oil came across the Atlantic from the United States, Venezuela and Trinidad. The 
remaining ten per-cent came from the Middle East but the route became too dangerous by 
1941.
53
 The pre-war landfall for oil supplies to the UK was at west coast ports, for subsequent 
distribution by rail and coastal tankers. This did not change during wartime, except for the 
additional huge increase in demand for all kinds of oil products, especially aviation fuel, and 
for the hazards to shipping when delivering to the east coast ports. 
 
The Government Pipeline and Storage System   (GPSS) 
Though railways were a major conveyor of POL, increasing wartime demands led to the need 
for a faster alternative. During 1941 an ambitious project was decided upon – the 
construction of a transnational underground pipeline. The Government Pipeline and Storage 
System (GPSS) eventually measured 504 miles, consuming 47,000 tons of equipment and 
material.
54
 It is the basis of the modern-day commercial cross country pipelines still being 
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constructed in the 1960s and early 1970s.
55
 From mid-1943 it was perceived that there was no 
scope for expansion of long-distance haulage of oil movements even by rail, and road 
haulage was for relatively short haul distances. So the next, most ambitious, project was a 
major extension to the newest airfields in the east of England. By that time the USAAF 
calculated it needed 80,000 tons a month. 900 new tank wagons would have been needed and 
this was just not feasible. The Air Ministry had earlier suggested a pipeline to run eastwards 
for 100 miles to the RAF Reserve Depot at Misterton near Doncaster. Then a smaller capacity 
line would chase south to Sandy Heath in Bedfordshire.
56
 The logic to make the final 
expansion leg into the eastern counties was obvious.  
It was estimated that an additional 108,000 tons of aviation spirit needed to be supplied to the 
eastern airfields and the Storage and Development Sub-Committee sanctioned the 
construction of a pipeline from Thames Haven to East Anglia.  The pipeline was then to run 
north-west from the Estuary to an RAF depot at Saffron Walden in Essex.  From there it ran 
north-east across Norfolk and Suffolk, with a spur to Thetford, terminating at a Fuel 
Distribution Depot at Hethersett station. The GPSS pipeline reached Hethersett in March 
1944, up until which time the av-gas for Norfolk’s airfields came in entirely by rail, with site 
distribution by road tanker. The complete 125-mile link thereby provided a constant, 
switchable supply, distributable via local road and rail links. A spur ran to Thetford and the 
main was linked to the Midland circuit again at Sandy Heath.
 57
 The key feature was that 
pipelines passed within 4½ miles of sixteen existing or projected airfields connected to the 
main system.
58
 The reduced burden on rail and localised road haulage was considerable. The 
pipeline, as seen at Hethersett in 1947, was deliberately inconspicuous, although the pipe 
could be seen running overhead for several yards, high enough for aviation fuel to discharge 
into tank wagons for local distribution. An iron fence bordered the installation. Even with the 
pipeline in place fuel trains had to be backed in. The site lies on a 1 in 116 up-gradient from 
Norwich and tank wagons had to be fully secured lest they started to roll; three trains at any 
one time would cause a through blockage. Crump describes the ‘successful use of inadequate 
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facilities in order to achieve the impossible.’
59
 The disused station is adjacent to Norfolk 
County Council’s Ketteringham works depot and household waste recycling centre, half-a-
mile south of Hethersett village, bounded to the north by the main Norwich-London rail line. 
The depot and rail sidings, covering 17.5 acres and comprising eight earth mounded storage 
tanks and specialist buildings were decommissioned as recently as 2009.
60
 
Whilst Hethersett was a rural station, the Thetford fuel depot, covering about forty acres, was 
located immediately to the west of the present-day A1088 to the north of the town, just south 
of the modern, re-routed, A11 London Road. The area is now an industrial estate, in common 
with so many wartime sites across Norfolk and, indeed, the UK.  Other fuel depots, at King’s 
Lynn and Norwich Victoria, were supplied by rail as was fuel-oil for Fog Investigation and 
Dispersal (FIDO) operations at Foulsham and Downham Market.
61
  
The steel tubes for the pipe-line varied in length from 20 to 60 feet, requiring the use of 
specially constructed bogie bolster wagons. Delivery to reception areas needed to be co-
ordinated with varying speeds of excavation and pipe-laying, dependent on weather and 
geological conditions. Transportation from rail to site was another issue requiring fast but 
careful logistical planning; and yet it was achieved. One 40 mile section is said to have been 
completed in 36 days, though this seems a little unfeasible, even with much of the pipeline 
lying close to ground surface.
62
  Surprisingly, in a modern safety-orientated environment, 
much of the pipework is not far below ground, perhaps a metre at most, and can be found 
cutting through modern private residential gardens and driveways in Norfolk.  No 
documentation of its construction is available through The National Archives; the fact that 
the network is still used to supply commercial airports seventy years later suggests that 
security concerns preclude such information being available, yet the entire system was, 
controversially, privatised as recently as 2015 and the basic routes are well known.
63
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One statistical example illustrates the value of the national pipeline; the route specifically to 
serve ‘a large number of East Anglian airfields’ carried the bulk equivalent of 35,000 tank 
wagons, equal to 2,400 trains, within 12 months of completion. Even so, huge quantities of 
aviation fuel continued to travel by rail. In the three months following D-Day, 1,132 trains 
carried 100 million gallons of aviation gas to East Anglian airfields.
64
  The pipeline was a 
crucial augmentation to rail deliveries but never replaced the train, not least because the 
Hethersett fuel depot was also a road and rail distribution point. In the three months following 
D-Day, for example, 1,132 petrol trains carried 100 million gallons of white oils to East 
Anglian airfields.
65
  The remains of a lineside fuel depot still exist at Ellingham in south 
Norfolk; visible on the 1946 RAF surveys are four circular storage tanks.  Used by the 
USAAF for aviation-gas storage and distribution, and sited on the strategically important 
Waveney Valley line, the choice of site suggests that oil supplies might also still being 
delivered through the ports of Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth. ‘We used to watch the open 
trucks coming up the railway line full of bombs for Seething and Flixton. There was a huge 
petrol dump at Ellingham’ recalls a local resident.
66
 This also links the activities of the 
Ellingham fuel depot with the railway siding at Earsham installed for the unloading of 
ordnance for transit to the nearby ammunition depot. By the 1980s the tanks had themselves 
been removed and the site adapted as a grain store, with two rectangular huts, a vehicle shed 
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Fig.62  GPSS map showing spur to Hethersett.
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         Fig.63 Hethersett Fuel Depot, 2012 
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The main Norwich-London railway line runs east-west, at foot of image. The station was 
closed in 1966. The wartime sidings are clearly visible, as are the earthworks of eight fuel 
storage tanks. On the south side of the site, top of image, is the present-day Norfolk County 
Council depot and household waste disposal site. Total contemporary site measures about 
0.07 sq.km. 
 
       
Figs.64 and 65 Thetford Fuel Depot sited accessed from the Norwich-Cambridge rail line, 
lower right of photo. The 1946 image evidence of activity at the site. The 1988 aerial view 
shows the earthworks still highly visible
70
 (Norfolk HER) 
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          Fig.66 GPSS section from north of Thetford to Hethersett
71
  
                                                          
71
 Map from Airfield Research Group 
195 
 
Much of the detail of railways in this chapter relates to aviation fuel and ordnance supply. 
The army also drew heavily on rail-borne transport, particularly for the transit of armoured 
vehicles for training exercises.  Five new sidings were constructed at Two Mile Bottom 
signal box, two of which were a unique type of loading bay, referred to as ‘end-loading’, 
designed for loading tanks. These facilities were geared towards selected military personnel 
being trained in specialist techniques and experimentation in loading and off-loading tanks.
72
  
Tanks and armoured vehicles were not loaded sideways onto wagons. The first vehicle was 
driven forwards in-line with the end wagon, then driven carefully along the line of wagons to 
the front; then the next tank followed until each successive wagon was laden.
73
 Figure 64 
almost certainly shows these techniques in practice two miles south at Thetford, a centre of 
army traffic, especially that of armoured brigades. 1941 to 1944 saw two or three train-loads 
of tanks every day. The station lay on an S-curve, with the view from the signal box 
obstructed by station buildings. The Two Mile Bottom sidings were intended to relieve the 
pressure on the Thetford anomaly.
74
 The logistics of large-scale army exercise were not 
confined to the active terrain of the battle training area. Eastern Command Exercise ‘Bulldog’ 
was partly predicated on the enemy having control of Ely; sixty trains were run on alternate 
routes as far north as East Winch and Narborough, to Swaffham, Brandon and thence to 
Ely.
75
 The railways and the military would continue their close relationship post-war and 
beyond the end of the twentieth century in another part of the county. The closure in 1995 of 
RAF Swanton Morley airbase was followed by its transfer to the Army, renamed Robertson 
Barracks. The military has used the restored heritage Mid-Norfolk Railway to transport 
armoured vehicles since the late 1990s; in January 2009 for example flat- and well-wagons 
loaded with Scimitar light tanks ran to Dereham station en route to Pembrokeshire.
76
 Figure 
65 evidences flat-car armour transport practised in much the same way as sixty years earlier. 
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                         Fig.67  Covenanter tanks, 5
th
 Royal Tank Regiment, 9
th
  
                         Armoured Division entraining at Thetford, May 1942
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                            Fig.68  Scimitar light tanks, Mid Norfolk Railway, 1990s78  
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Ordnance storage, camouflage and woodland 
 
Bombs  
The narrative of provision for bomb storage from 1939 onwards is one of exponentially 
increasing requirements and a resultant lack of storage space at all distribution levels. Six Air 
Ammunition Parks were completed or nearing completion by September 1939. Each was 
sited for good rail and road access. They were considered wartime-only facilities and, as 
such, were built with simple open storage traverses, with compromises being made on peace-
time safety. The official history describes them succinctly as the ‘retail shops’ in the 
ordnance distribution chain.
79
 The imagery is helpful if the airfields are seen as the 
‘customers’ or, in marketing parlance, the end-users. By 1940 a hierarchy of three 
underground bomb storage depots had been constructed at key sites in northern, central and 
southern England. These served eight Air Ammunition Parks at regional level, all constructed 
to a common design. Sited with access to railway lines, these AAPs were each furnished with 
an enclosed component store, four stores for incendiary stores and groups of open-topped 
concrete magazines. They were dispersed sites, with blast barriers – these are the traverses 
which usually remain as earthworks. An open magazine was intended to accommodate 56 
tons of bombs. Ancillary buildings for maintenance and staff were sited accordingly. The 
sites, re-designated Forward Ammunition Depots in October 1941, were at Barnham 
(Norfolk-Suffolk border), Earsham (Norfolk), Norton Disney (Lincolnshire), Snodland 
(Kent), Southbourn (Dorset), Brafferton (County Durham), Lords Bridge (Cambridgeshire) 
and  Mawcarse (Perthshire). South Witham (Lincolnshire) came on line in mid-1942 and 
Hockering in January 1943, both for RAF use. Mid- to late-war FADs were built for specific 
USAAF use at Braybrooke (Northamptonshire), Melchbourne and Sharnbrook (Bedfordshire) 
and Bures on the Suffolk / Essex border.
80
 The significance of the geographical distribution is 
that three of the original eight, in 1941, were in East Anglia, presaging the great surge in 
airfield construction in the east of England from that same year. The FADs at Barnham and 
Hockering are compared as case studies, below. 
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The concealment of personnel, materiel and structures from enemy observation emerged as a 
combination of visual art and scientific principles from the First World War onwards. A 
government Camouflage Committee functioned in several incarnations for much of the war, 
with a specialist sub-committee for aerodromes in 1941 but no single authority had overall 
responsibility for camouflage policy. All three service departments were allowed their own 
practices and, in fairness, their operational environments were quite different in almost every 
respect.  No further research on concealment techniques was carried out after 1943 which 
surely reflects the receding threat of attack on homeland military sites.
81
 For the R.A.F. the 
objective was to conceal and disrupt the appearance of the distinctive and vulnerable features 
of an airfield – the runways, key buildings and boundaries – from the air. Definitions of safe 
height and distance were, in fine weather, 10,000 feet at six miles distance or 300 feet at two-
and-a-half miles, and in cloudy conditions 5,000 feet at three-and-a-half miles.
82
 The idea 
was to break up the angular boundaries and features of military installations. The problem is 
that nature, with the exception of water, is generally irregular in appearance, whilst man-
made structures tend towards regularity, form following function. Natural objects also exhibit 
texture or multiple shadows, and therefore do not reflect light prominently. Buildings and 
concrete, with flat facings, reflect light. ‘Scrimmed’ netting, hemp and jute was draped over 
high vertical walls to disrupt form; bold dividing lines were painted on roofs; and the 
breaking-up of the linear layout of early-war grass runways was achieved by painting 
simulated hedge lines in keeping with similar surrounding features. Field colouration was 
sometimes effected by use of black, yellow or brown powders to simulate agriculture where, 
in reality, grass runways existed. Roadways were often treated with matt paint or brick dust. 
In the end, a range of bituminous, silicate and oil-based paints was used, black bitumen 
emulsion proving effective for ‘hedging’.
83
 The later and more prolific concrete runways 
proved highly problematic. Concrete is matt in appearance close up, but from the air is highly 
visible. Experiments at Stradishall airfield, near Bury St Edmunds, led to the universal use of 
pre-coloured chippings to reduce the ‘shine’ from concrete. A more successful solution came 
from an age-old traditional source; it was found that tan bark, available in large quantities 
from tanneries, would produce an almost dark effect on concrete. The greatest success 
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however was discovered in simple wood chip, becoming the standard application. 
Camouflaging of airfields reached a peak in mid-1942, with 22 million gallons of paint being 
consumed that year, and one thousand men being continuously employed on the work. Later 
that year it was decided that even the screening of bomb stores was not worth the effort 
expended.
84
 Staged reduction of camouflaging of airfields resulted in, in August 1944, its 
discontinuation.
85
 By that time, the risk from enemy air attack was so much reduced because 
of the pursuit of the war in Europe, that concealment seemed no longer necessary. 
As to impact upon the landscape, camouflage could be said to comprise three forms. 
Temporary concealment of equipment and structures - netting, canvas covering and surface 
colouring and texturing - has no physical impact on the landscape because it is visually 
discreet; and it has no legacy in the landscape beyond its durational use. Painted-based 
camouflage applied to buildings and structures which survive the duration no longer has 
purpose, but characterises the structures it is applied to – the long-surviving but now 
demolished R.A.F. Housing at Fifers Lane, Norwich, stood out prominently in peace time 
with their camouflaged brickwork (Fig.66).
86
 Thirdly, camouflage which is the landscape 
itself exists prior, and endures, after military use. Woodland is the obvious medium, 
Hockering and Earsham Forward Ammunition Depots and the bomb dump at Wendling, sited 
within Honeypot Wood, being prime examples.  
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Fig.69  Housing off Fifers Lane, Catton in 1957. Numerous adjacent buildings survived into 






Wood, as timber, has always been a staple of military endeavours, whether for firewood or 
cover, or for building assault weapons and defensive structures. It would be a mistake 
however to assume that both World Wars saw extensive loss of woodland; there is a 
distinction between the felling of individual trees, tactical use of woodland, and complete 
clearance or loss. Indeed, in neighbouring Suffolk’s Brecks and Sandlings, more acres were 
planted in the 1930s than were later lost to wartime airfields or agriculture.
88
 Thirty woodland 
sites have been affected by clearance since the early 1920s, with 95 per-cent cleared for 
agriculture, the remainder for urban development and mineral extraction.
89
 The Second 
World War commissioned a new purpose for Norfolk’s woodland; that of the storage and 
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concealment of ordnance, on a scale which was to grow to requirement levels unimagined in 
1939. To clarify, few formal areas of existing woodland were removed for airfield 
construction, though a great many mature hedgerow and field trees were removed.
90
  
Generally, larger or contiguous woodland sites were to be utilised as Forward Ammunition 
Depots for airfield supply, whilst smaller areas adjacent to airfields were chosen for on-site 
bomb storage, prior to immediate use. Logic directed the choice of woodland for ordnance 
storage; bombs, small arms ammunition and detonators were vulnerable to enemy air attack. 
Trees served as concealment, and as rudimentary blast containment. These newly-
requisitioned, now militarised, woodlands were to be the penultimate link in the ordnance 
logistical supply chain. 
The patterns of land ownership in Norfolk had seen change in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and woodland experienced a gradual decline in the quality of management. One new 
factor in woodland industry emerged in the period between the wars however - the great 
purchasing and planting schemes of the Forestry Commission.  Relative to the Commission’s 
centralising of activities in Breckland, the creation of the Stanford Battle Training Area was 
to be the major competitor for use of the land from 1941 onwards.  Stanford Battle Training 
Area is not characterised by the use of woodland for concealment or camouflage – the 
Forestry Commission’s trees were young. Its prime function as that of training armoured 
divisions in open country battle movement – concealment was of little purpose and, by the 
time it was operating at its fullest extent, the threat from enemy airborne attacked was 
limited.  The submersible tank training exercises carried out at Fritton Decoy at the eastern 
end of the Norfolk- Suffolk border were highly secret but, whilst the bordering woodland 
helped conceal ground activity from enemy aircraft venturing inland from the North Sea, the 
prime criterion for choosing Fritton Decoy as a training location was the lake itself. 
Earsham and Barnham are the sites of Forward Ammunition Depots, already in existence as 
pre-war Air Ammunition Parks. Hockering, in central Norfolk, was the site of a new Forward 
Ammunition Depot, constructed in 1942 to meet the needs of the concentration of USAAF 
bases in the area. The best example of an airfield bomb dump being housed in existing, 
established woodland is that of Honeypot Wood, Wendling.  Rackheath, to the east of 
Norwich, Thorpe Abbotts, close to the Waveney Valley border with Suffolk, and Hethel 
airfields are characterised by the use of woodland for technical buildings, though not directly 
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for bomb storage. The point is that none of these sites were cleared of woodland, because 
woodland served as concealment, or blast containment, and sometimes both.  
All military facilities constructed in wartime represent the most basic tenets of form 
following function.  This manifested itself even before construction began, with the choice of 
sites. In the absence of formal documented policy regarding choice of site based on landscape 
characteristics yet coming to light, it might seem curious that Barnham, on the Norfolk / 
Suffolk border was an open heathland site, operational at the commencement of hostilities in 
September 1939, whilst Earsham was a woodland site, as was Hockering.  It therefore 
appears highly likely that the choice of sites for ordnance storage was based on little more 
than two basic criteria – spatial proximity to as many airfields as possible, and sited well 
away from populated areas.  Barnham in particular was close to RAFs Honington, 
Lakenheath and Mildenhall but also to Thetford and the Stanford Training Area. An open site 
could be artfully camouflaged, as could a woodland site. The advantage of the latter is natural 
concealment, with less camouflage required, and the greater benefit of blast containment in 
the event of accident or attack. 
Given the exigencies and urgency of supply needs as the war progressed, the centralised 
underground depots were, in practice, bypassed, such that the FADs often received ordnance 
direct from factory and arsenal. The FADs eventually stored far in excess of their designed 
capacities, relying on rapid outward traffic to the airfields to ease the pressure of storage 
space. In wartime practice the traversed compartments, designed to store 56 tons of bombs, 
commonly accommodated 400 tons.
91
 All this came at the expense of peace-time safety 
distances and margins. Of the three sites in Norfolk Earsham and Hockering in particular 
utilised designated roadside verges for ‘open’ off-site storage.  The sites then began to 
‘sprawl’ as ever more storage space was needed; their form and function became less defined 
as they, in part, began to merge with the surrounding countryside. At these two sites Oliver 
Rackham’s assertion that ‘…military remains tend to be less tidied away and better preserved 
in woodland than elsewhere’ holds true.
92
 At the same time however, it should be noted that 
airfields demonstrate a wider spectrum of archaeological integrity, dependent upon the nature 
of their continued or adapted use, ranging from almost total obliteration to significantly and 
extensively intact structures. 
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Airfield bomb dumps 
Every airfield had its own bomb storage area, the final stage in delivery before loading into 
aircraft for offensive operations. Spatial reasoning dictated the siting of the bomb dump as 
near to the flying area as practically possible whilst, for safety reasons, maintaining physical 
separation from other buildings.  The spatial siting of storage of associated equipment such as 
fuzes, detonators and small arms further emphasised the need for physical separation of 
components, located in prescribed buildings at safe distances from flying operational areas 
and staff accommodation. The bomb dump would, then, invariably be sited on the outside 
edge of the airfield perimeter. The dump was therefore accessible for loading into aircraft but 
also remote enough from the centre of operations to minimise potential blast damage.  The 
characteristic morphology of an airfield bomb dump appears quite distinctly on contemporary 
aerial photographs, usually as a precise ‘dog leg’ feature close to a remote aircraft dispersal 
hard-stand, characterised by serrated rows of bomb storage revetments. Paradoxically it also 
means they are ‘open’ features, visually vulnerable to enemy air attack, and required 
thorough camouflaging usually of the netting variety. The bomb dump at Honeypot Wood, 
Wendling offered the ideal site for utilising extant woodland to serve as both blast 











   
 
 
      
Fig.71 1960s image of airfield bomb storage revetments adjacent Honeypot  
   Wood, Wendling. The main bomb store is to the right off-picture. The  
   revetments are now ploughed out (Norfolk Archaeological Unit) 94 
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The need for risk awareness and adherence to safety procedures was tragically demonstrated 
on 15
th
 July 1944, when the bomb dump at Metfield exploded, detonating over one thousand 
tons of bombs and explosives, killing five men, wrecking five B-24 Liberators and severely 
damaging six more.
95
 In summary, delivery convoy crews of the 2218
th
 Quartermaster Truck 
Company (Aviation) based at Earsham appeared to have hurriedly unloaded their delivery of 
500lb bombs. Careless handling led to a chain reaction as the bombs exploded. Perhaps 
because of the sheer size of the explosion, no attempt was made to infill the resulting crater, 
said to measure 75 feet wide by 25 feet deep. Following the incident, a loop road was built to 
by-pass the crater. Perhaps unsurprisingly it subsequently became a dump for a range of 
discarded equipment and was evident for some years after the war as a water-filled lake. 
When the lake was eventually cleared, many types of equipment were found, including 
several unexploded bombs. Ordnance shards thrown into the air during the explosion have 




Fig.72  Area of bomb dump explosion at Metfield, circled. (accessed 20 July 2016) 
http://googleearthcommunity.proboards.com/thread/187/massive-explosion-raf-metfield-1944   
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Forward Ammunition Depots – case studies 
 
Barnham  
‘There is a little single line, which meanders across East Anglia, from Thetford 
 to Bury St. Edmunds, and half-way along that line there is a typical little  




Barnham station was located south of Thetford Bridge and Thetford stations on a 21 
kilometre single track line.
98
 In 1938 the site handled just 2,000 loaded wagons, totalling 
7,000 tons of freight. 
99
 Peacetime traffic amounted to six passenger trains and two or three 
freight trains daily. Overall, traffic increased by a factor of nine or ten during the war 
years.
100
 The war utterly changed its importance and appearance. Firstly, sidings were 
installed at Little Heath to handle chemical weapons traffic destined for a storage site to the 
south.
101
  Subsequently a large area of heath on the Thetford side became one of the largest 
bomb dumps in Britain. Multiple reception sidings were built, large enough to accommodate 
seventy-five wagons, radiating into the bomb dump itself, enabling bombs to be off-loaded 
directly into earth-walled revetments.
102
 From September 1939 to December 1945, Barnham 
handled 139,729 loaded wagons, containing 721,000 tons, 55,620 wagons were processed in 
Barnham station itself.  53,706 wagons travelled to the revetment sidings, 30,903 to Little 
Heath.
103
  This dramatically illustrates the heavy use of the new sidings compared to more 
conventional traffic and the ICI/chemical deliveries. The ordnance traffic comprised 
everything from 4 ½ lb. Incendiary bombs, small arms ammunition, detonators and fuses to 
massive 4,000 pounders. Aircraft were, unsurprisingly, off-loaded there and, controversially 
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in retrospect, poison gas.
104
 The potential for congestion was high, and traffic was directed in 
such a way that each trainload could be manoeuvred in, unloaded and got out again as 
quickly as possible. Crump writes of one train being disposed of in the sidings, a second 
waiting on the through line, blocking a third train, itself in turn blocking a fourth.
105
  A year 
after the cessation of hostilities, Barnham had reverted to the status of a ‘sleepy’ country 
station. The dump was being cleared but plenty of ordnance remained in situ. Crump suggests 
that Mr Hammond [the stationmaster] ‘...and his staff could look back with pride at the war 




The narrative of work undertaken at the site is worth exploring in three respects. First, the 
manner in which the site expanded into the surrounding landscape; secondly, the undeniably 
toxic imprint on the immediate environment; and thirdly the way in which this potentially 
limited future land use. Barnham Station is located at O.S. Map Ref. TL 86118 79167, 
becoming the entry point for all military rail deliveries.  The first site established was the 
main Forward Ammunition Depot immediately to the north-west of the station itself, 
bounded to the west by Aughton Spinney and Belt, later to be known as Exclamation 
Spinney, evident from its shape seen from above. RAF 94 Maintenance Unit was established 
in August of 1939 and began operations immediately, with a train-load of 5,000lb bombs 
arriving right away. Camouflage measures had not even begun and by mid-September there 
were still no camouflage coverings for huts and buildings. The only blackout measure 
specified no matches to be struck out in the open after dark. The Officer Commanding, Flight 
Lieutenant Moore’s daily routine orders of 20
th
 September stated 
 ‘It is of vital importance for the safety of the country that no service matters 
 are discussed with anyone. ALL PERSONNEL are warned that the R.A.F.  
 now  being engaged on active service, the giving of any information constitutes  
 an  act of treachery, for which the maximum punishment on conviction, under 
 Sections 4 and 5 of the Air Force Act is PENAL SERVITUDE,  
and IN DELIBERATE  CASES DEATH.’ 
107
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At the end of September, railway track and road camouflage finally began.  On 1
st
 October 
1,200,000 Browning links – that is, small arms ammunition - were received from Altrincham. 
‘Works and Bricks’ staff commenced camouflage of barrack blocks and 12
th
 October 100,000 
rounds of .303 tracer were delivered from Woolwich arsenal by road.  By the end of that 
same month almost all the buildings had been camouflaged, Flight Lieutenant Moore 
commending endeavours to break up the regularity of the storage traverses by planting 
shrubbery.  November saw defensive preparations in ‘readiness for a likely attack’ and the 
supply of 2,000 trees from the Forestry Commission to assist camouflage efforts.
108
  
December saw the acquisition, free of charge, of brushwood and larch poles from 
Herringswell Estate and the Forestry Commission at East Harling.  ‘Sanding’ - camouflaging 
- of roads and bomb areas and disguising of gantries took place.  Standing orders outlined a 
plan of defence from air attack and the need to isolate rail wagons and vehicles from bomb 
storage areas, but emphasised the need for vehicles already on the move are to be kept 
moving, thus underlining the constant flow of activity already in place. The only delays 
suffered were due to heavy snowfalls, for example in January 1940. Unit Standing Orders 
began to pay closer attention to action in the event of air raids. In July 1940 concern was 
raised repeatedly about delays to camouflage work; the officer commanding seemed relieved 
at the arrival of lorry-loads of ‘razzle’.
 109
   
Understandably, local civilian services were concerned for public safety. In May 1940 the 
borough surveyor from Thetford, senior officers from Norfolk Constabulary and military 
police officers visited the site to discuss concerns raised by the Eastern Region Civil Defence 
Officer about evacuation and decontamination procedures.
 110
  In that same month army 
representatives arrived to discuss siting an Army ammunition dump ‘as near to the RAF Air 
Ammunition Park at Barnham as possible’ on the Barnham – Elveden road to the south-west, 




In June concern was expressed about 
tarpaulins for camouflage; brushwood was being removed because of fire risk and the 
following month saw defensive pillboxes being built. In November black paint was sprayed 
over road surfaces and huts to disrupt outlines – the commanding officer flew over the site to 
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 May 1940, the new site intended primarily for anti-tank ammunition. 
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assess its effectiveness. Whilst the Summer of 1940 was rightly a period of heightened 
concern about invasion and enemy attack, and whilst an occasional enemy aircraft was sited, 
there is mention of bombs being dropped on a ‘K’ site two miles distant and a stick of 
fourteen bombs being dropped, straddling the Barnham-Elveden Road, some quarter of a mile 
distant from the Unit Rail Gate.
112
 Whilst this caused no damage, it was close by and could 
easily have hit the main site. The incident hints at both the possibility of opportunistic 
bombing of the rail line and the success of camouflage measures at the Barnham ammunition 
site. In November a Junkers Ju88 was shot down by ground defences at nearby RAF 
Honington. 
Clearly liaison between civilian and peer military authorities and the Forestry Commission 
were considered to be important at both practical and diplomatic levels.
 113
 Joint army and 
RAF exercises were to take place on site subsequently, although when the Durham Light 
Infantry started training manoeuvres in Exclamation Spinney, it was quickly pointed out to 
them they were on Air Ministry property.
114
 Later, army units were prevented from 
exercising adjacent to the unit as their vehicular tracks would betray the presence of the 
ammunition storage site.
115
 Significantly, work began on cutting a road through Exclamation 
Spinney – for chemical weapons storage - with the unit diary commenting on the ‘very 
impressive storage and camouflage’, the latter consisting of sawdust spread across the road 
surface. Two days later, an enemy Dornier Do.17 passed over the Unit at 400 feet. It is fair to 
presume that the crew saw no evidence of either the site or activity within it.
116
 Probable 
testament to the effectiveness of the camouflage measures occurred the following month 
when a Dorner 215 circled the site at 400-500 feet and then proceeded to bomb nearby RAF 
Honington. The Commanding Officer noted at the end of that month that ‘The camouflage is 
so good that that neither friend nor enemy could possibly be aware that anything was being 
stored or any work being done within the Spinney.’ 
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 November 1940 – Informal conversation with the Thetford Borough Surveyor resulted in 
several tons of rubble for site road building being donated without charge. 
114
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 December 1940, 7
th
 January 1941. 
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No. railways wagons unloaded 
November 1940 
169 Lorries loaded 419 
No. lorries unloaded 73   
Tonnage received 1,064 Tonnage issued 1,257 
Issues and receipts, Barnham  November 1940 
No. railways wagons unloaded June 
1941 
372 Wagons loaded 10 
No. lorries unloaded 14 Lorries loaded 777 
Tonnage received 2,654 Tonnage issued 2,361 
Issues and receipts June 1941 
No. railways wagons unloaded April 
1942 
1,095 Wagons loaded 90 
No. lorries unloaded 126 Lorries loaded 571 
Tonnage received 5,822 Tonnage issued 3,204 
Issues and receipts April 1942 
No. railways wagons unloaded 
December 1943 
651 Wagons loaded 161 
No. lorries unloaded 339 Lorries loaded 625 
Tonnage received 5,885 Tonnage issued 4,075 
Issues and receipts December 1943 
No. railways wagons unloaded April 
1944  
1,004 Wagons loaded 306 
No. lorries unloaded 508 Lorries loaded 508 
Tonnage received 7,354 Tonnage issued 7,502 
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In May 1944 16,649 tons were dealt with. June 44 saw 680 wagons and 1,385 lorries 
unloaded, 582 wagons and 1,787 lorries loaded, handling a total of 23,076 tons of ordnance. 
So began a cycle of supply and dispatch of bombs of all sizes, small arms, signal rockets, 
smoke bombs, detonators, tail units, oxygen cylinders and associated operations that would 
increase exponentially for the next five years.
119
  By April of 1941 considerable amounts of 
bombs were having to be stored outside the traverses. In terms of the surrounding landscape, 
this increase would also necessitate additions and extensions to the original site, the first of 
which would be Warren Wood. Consideration was first given to this additional site in August 
of 1941. Shortly after, Warren Wood was being prepared for storage and by the end of 
November was reported as capable of holding 10,000 tons of ordnance. Hockering was first 
mentioned at this time, in connection with the RAF’s search for a sub-park. September 1942 
saw a further extension of the Warren Wood site, followed by the arrival of large quantities 
of American ammunition. By the end of the year, issues of British ammunition from Warren 
Wood were minimal. 
Contamination from chemical ordnance was a constant threat and during May 1942 four 
personnel became casualties as a result of leakage from wagons. One contemporary 
serviceman refers to chemical weapons being ‘...stored in open topped trenches covered with 
tarpaulin’ and describes in a personal memoir the mental and physical tension induced by 







 May 1942, 9
th
 Armoured Division was under manoeuvres near Warren Wood and 
Barnham’s commanding officer found army units firing live rounds near the site. This was 
put a stop to but the following day more live gunfire manoeuvres took place resulting in fire 
breaking out. The day after, the army fired two smoke bombs directly into the main Barnham 
site and, following that, fifty tanks were seen to be manoeuvring at the Warren Wood 
boundary fence.  By September RAF and USAAF personnel were working double shifts to 
clear wagons and further inroads were made for storage into Warren Wood. February 1943 
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saw the RAF clearing stocks from Triangle Spinney prior to use by American units. April 
1943 saw the Little Heath chemical weapons site construction under way.
121
  
Soon after the cessation of hostilities in Europe a crisis of surplus stock quickly manifested 
itself. Nearby airfields, particularly at Mendlesham and Ashfield, were having to be used to 
store surplus ordnance. By October 1945 work was under way preparing for suitable parts of 
the site and methodology to ‘burn’ bombs. Experimental burning of chemical bombs began, 
continuing on ‘days when weather conditions are propitious’.  By February 1946 the main 
unit was described as a ‘Danger Area’ where burning of chemical bombs continued. Given 
the intensity of work required of the railways and their facilities, Barnham might have been a 
typical example of how peacetime brings swift clearance or abandonment of a site. The term 
‘clearance’ is, however, somewhat subjective. Barnham’s use as a major chemical weapons 
storage facility had significant implications for the legacy of subsequent land use. The 
operations record book of No.94 Maintenance Unit reveals a relentless cycle of post-war 
storage, removal and disposal of all types of ordnance, some by train to Cairnryan on the west 
coast of Scotland but with quantities disposed of, often in ad-hoc and clumsy fashion, on site 
at Barnham.
122
 Second World War ordnance – including chemical weapon detritus - was still 
being uncovered in the late 1990s as part of Project Cleansweep, an assessment of 




 January 2016 Defence Minister 
announced the final release of twelve Ministry of Defence sites, including what remains of 




                                                          
121
 TNA AIR 29/1031 94 Maintenance Unit and Appendices  Aug 39 – Dec 45 Operations Record 
Book   
122
 Underwater disposal was thought the most efficient method of disposal of excess ordnance. The 
largest marine dump is in Beaufort’s Dyke, a deep trough between Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 
military port at Cairnryan was the dispatch point. From 1945-46 explosives including bombs, shells, 
rockets and millions of rounds of small arms ammunition were transported from military sites across 
Britain and the continent to Cairnryan by wartime Liberty and Victory freighters and rail, then 
dropped from coastal freighters and landing craft. Dumping continued until the late 1950s and 
sporadically into the 1970s. In the mid-1990s the first items began washing ashore on beaches in 
Galloway in Scotland and County Antrim. 
http://thedownrecorder.co.uk/pages/?title=Undersea_arms_dump_is_giving_up_its_secrets  (accessed 
30
th
 March 2019) 
123
 Rogers, G and Johnson, M.   Little Heath Site Investigation  (Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory report, 1999) 
124
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-minister-mark-lancaster-announces-release-of-












By 1942, with the desperate need for more bomb storage readily apparent, a site thirty-five 
miles north-east of Barnham was chosen, initially as a ‘satellite park’, a sub-site of Barnham. 
Aerial reconnaissance revealed a compact yet, for Norfolk, large parcel of woodland and, 
indeed, the choice of Hockering makes clear a change of selection criteria. Whilst Barnham 
was an ‘open’ site, directly adjacent to rail services, Hockering was a woodland location, 
twelve miles distant from its railhead at Dereham and accessible to a number of existing and 
newer airfields. Historically, Hockering, along with Foxley is, at 220 acres, one of the larger 
tracts of Norfolk’s ancient woodland, characterised by small-leaved lime.
125
 Also now a Site 
of Special Scientific Interest, it would presently be unthinkable as suitable for military use. 
Contemporarily, natural and environmental considerations were rare. 
Constructed in the later months of 1942, the unit became operational on 1
st
 January 1943. In 
early February eighty-six wagons arrived at East Dereham ‘causing slight congestion on the 
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railway company’s sidings’. The local Movement Officer agreed to arrange for rolling stock 
to be rioted through instead of accumulating whilst waiting to be unloaded. The LNER’s 
District Goods Manager confirmed that work had started on constructing the new sidings at 
Dereham, six miles to the west, and that more use could be made of Lenwade station five 
miles to the north-west.
126
 The ‘backing-up’ or accumulation, of wagons at stations waiting to 
be off-loaded was a persistent problem across the region throughout the duration, though 
contractors, RAF Movement Officers and railway managers liaised to improve matters at key 
locations. Not until April did work really start on camouflaging the site, following a visit 
from the Camouflage and Decoy Officer. 
In June 1943 the Area Camouflage Officer flew over the site and reported that camouflage 
measures had been greatly improved by the tarring and chipping of roads, with bomb stacks 
practically invisible from 1,500 feet and not visible at all from any greater height. It was 
however suggested that camouflage netting be erected over various sections of road in the 
area for distances of 50 yards at 200 yard intervals. The effect would be to visually disrupt 
suspiciously linear features. The CO later repeated aerial inspection at 800 feet and 
determined that the site was almost entirely visually secure, apart from the main entrance.
 127
 
Even in late 1943 preparations for defence against ground attack were being considered.
128
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Fig.74  Hockering Ammunition Depot as at June 1942 Safety boundaries are drawn. 
Dispersed sites to include potential accommodation are to the far right. Attlebridge airfield 
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Fig.75   Closer detail of Hockering.  The thick black lines denote 400 ton storage areas; the 




Early storage did not extend to the whole of Hockering Wood. Unsurprisingly, the entirety of 
the wooded area would eventually be subsumed and extension work started in October of 
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1943. Work also began on storage at the eastern end of Blind Lane. Two months later came 
instructions from 42 Group HQ to finish additional temporary storage space for high 
explosives. 231 MU’s commanding officer reconnoitred local roads and found suitable 
roadside storage three miles from the main site. Norfolk County Council gave permission to 
use the highway and space enough to store 5,000 tons of HE was found. Even this was not 
enough and in January 1944 more storage space on the north side of the Wood was started. 
An additional 1,920 tons of roadside verge storage was assigned near North Tuddenham, 
slightly nearer to the Dereham sidings.
131
 The roads were not closed to public access and 
consideration was given to Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries requirements.
132
 All this 
coincides with the beginning of a period when the balance of ordnance issues from Hockering 
FAD were moving in favour of USAAF needs.
133
 The Air Ministry wanted to partially or 
totally close the roads in North Tuddenham used for roadside storage – a reasonable stance 
on security grounds and safety grounds. It presented difficulties however; whilst not much 





No. railways wagons unloaded May 
1944  
209 Wagons loaded 158 
No. lorries unloaded 627 Lorries loaded 685 
Tonnage processed        9,563 
 
No. railways wagons unloaded July 
1944  
247 Wagons loaded 107 
No. lorries unloaded 647 Lorries loaded 723 
Tonnage processed        10,057 
Table 8:  Issues and receipts, Hockering, May and July 1944 
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 March 1944. This does indicate that agricultural considerations were often 
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The pressure was on. 231 MU’s unit diary notes a ‘record handling of well over 14,000 tons’ 
for August 1944. In February 1945 a senior visiting RAF officer was ‘justifiably alarmed at 
the storage overloading and meagre safety distances’ on site. The scenario changed even 
before the cessation of European hostilities for, on 17
th
 May 1945, the airfield at Old 
Buckenham, seventeen miles southward, was allocated to Hockering as a satellite storage 
site.
135
 Subsequently, Attlebridge and Rackheath airfields were selected for surplus bomb 
storage, even with concerns that the latter had civilian residential buildings in its vicinity.  
‘Very few airmen seemed to realise that the Victory in Europe (which was  
celebrated very quietly) merely marked the end of a phase so far as the work  
of this Unit was concerned, and that there could not be, and would not be,   
any slackening off of the amount of work to be done. Only when trucks began  
to arrive in ever increasing numbers, did it begin to dawn on the majority that  
there was a still a war on in the Far East.’ 
136
      
 
This was the beginning of the post-war chapter in Hockering’s history. Different service arms 
began to compete for use of Attlebridge and Rackheath airfields. The County war 
Agricultural Committee made its own bid for resumption of agricultural work but the RAF 
wished to restrict this to ‘haymaking’.
137
  By now 6,462 tons of HE were being stored at Old 
Buckenham, whilst experienced drivers were in short supply due to demobilisation release. 
There followed a proposal to use RAF Swannington for storage but it was felt inhabited 
dwellings were too close to the perimeter, other, empty, houses were to be re-occupied by 
civilians and a closed road was due to be re-opened. 
 
Of the considerable numbers of representatives of different departments visiting Attlebridge, 
Old Buckenham and Rackheath the unit diary observes: 
‘Their enthusiasm has been somewhat damped when it has been explained 
 to them that airfields used as explosive storage areas are subject to Explosives 
 Regulations and that they cannot be used as battle practice areas etc. nor 
 even as sports fields, however suitable they may appear for the purpose. It  
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 would save a lot of embarrassment if this Unit could be notified beforehand  





August 1945 saw over 400 personnel on strength and the Hockering main site was full to 
capacity. Staff were busy cutting down undergrowth, maintaining firebreaks, and inspecting 
and stacking tail units, with 50 tons of various ordnance going to Old Buckenham each day. 
The problem was exacerbated with some of the accommodation sites at Attlebridge and Old 
Buckenham being occupied by German prisoners-of-war.  The main Unit site at Hockering 
Wood was disbanded to 94 Maintenance Unit at Barnham in early 1948, although bomb 




Barnham and Hockering were two quite different Forward Ammunition Depots from the 
landscape perspective, their different commissioning dates influencing both choice of 
location and subsequent chronologies. Both expanded into the surrounding landscape as 
logistical need arose, and both were sited away from densely populated areas. Barnham, 
opened in 1940 as a relatively ‘open’ site but with some associated areas of woodland, was 
later able to accommodate complex additional railways sidings, along with multiple storage 
facilities to include chemical weapons; Hockering was chosen as a contained area of 
woodland, comprising just 221 acres, with a view to both blast containment and natural 
camouflage, with major road and rail links nearby and, crucially, accessible to the newer 
airfields in central Norfolk not extant in 1940. It also, as demand increased, expanded to 
include roadside storage. Despite these differences, both sites required camouflage measures 
to protect against aerial reconnaissance and attack, even though in the case of Hockering the 
depot was not commissioned until the beginning of 1943 when the risk of enemy air activity 
was greatly reduced. The establishment of Barnham as an early-war FAD, along with its 
scope to expand across the landscape, contributed to its post-war use as a nuclear warhead 
storage site. Hockering was much more a temporary expedient and the comparisons are 
evident in Barnham’s continuation as a military site until much of it was released for housing 
development more than seven decades after its inception. Hockering, beset by the decreasing 
inability to disperse its cargoes to nearby military locations because of immediate post-war 
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agricultural and housing demands, was swiftly cleared and decommissioned, reverting to 
managed woodland. As with airfields and training areas, and despite the differing selection 
criteria of the two locations, the local landscape offered the terrain required by the military. 
 
Fig.76  The three Forward Ammunition Depots 
 
 
The preceding case studies are focused on two different landscapes and the ways they were 
exploited to best advantage. The third FAD in the region was located at Earsham, north of 
Bungay on the county border with Suffolk. The site was characterised primarily by its use of 
woodland and roadside storage as at Hockering, and on-going geographic expansion similar 
to Barnham. One contemporary plan shows an all-encompassing view of installations at 
Earsham, indicating they cover an area of approximately four square miles.
140
 A post-war 
official statement reports eighteen miles of roadside storage area within a three mile radius of 
Earsham Hall, extending from ‘densely wooded’ main storage areas.
141
 Concern over the 
fragile state of rapidly deteriorating stocks of ordnance on the site had led to the recent 
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removal of 420 tons of 1,000 lb bombs from overloaded bomb stacks; a prolonged drought 
had exacerbated the risk of combustion. Fire breaks were being cut and fire patrols by RAF 
and civilian police and fire services were necessary by day and night.
142
 The post-war 
chronology is similar to that of Barnham, characterised by seemingly hapless attempts to 
destroy ordnance on site, and transit to distant off-shore disposal. As with Barnham, but 
unlike Hockering, close rail access was a key factor; a siding being constructed one mile west 




Quarries and gravel extraction 
Whilst it is well-known that train-loads of bomb damage rubble were delivered into the East 
Anglian hinterland to serve as ballast or hoggin for concrete runways, local quarries were not 
used for the same purpose nor in raw form. The point of local sand and gravel extraction is 
that it could be mixed with cement to form concrete – generally for runway construction and 
buildings. No traceable records of wartime mineral extraction exist with Norfolk County 
Council. The most useful reference source is aerial photographs, comparing 1
st
 edition 
Ordnance Survey with the 1946 RAF aerial survey and subsequent 1988 survey. Larger 
mineral extraction sites are clearly visible on the 1946 survey, smaller ones less so.  
Abandoned marl pits and well-used field entrances can be mistaken for small mineral 
workings. Closer, repeated scrutiny enables elimination of most of these questionable small 
sites. In many cases, an extraction site appearing as an extended, working site in 1946 is 
shown as a pre-existent site on 1
st
 edition Ordnance Survey as ‘sand pit’ or ‘gravel. Their life 
cycles continue as the sites are expanded post-war, clearly identifiable on 1988 aerial views. 
Not all sites continued to be worked – some shown on 1946 aerial survey have ‘greened 
over’.  In the main, sites continue to be worked post war to the present, and almost always 
very expanded, or adjacent to, the original site. 
The contemporary legacy is evident in major mineral extraction sites across Norfolk. Sand 
and gravel are still the main aggregates worked in the county. Almost all the active sites, as at 
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2012, produce sand and gravel, except three carrstone quarries in West Norfolk. Sand and 
gravel is still the main aggregate worked in Norfolk. Crushed rock for asphalt production is 
still imported in to Norfolk, mainly by rail, exactly as during wartime, for no indigenous 
material is suitable for the purpose.
144
  
There is a dearth of airfield-related extraction sites in South Norfolk across the heavy clay 
areas. The Waveney valley however, is replete with extraction sites, old, contemporary and 
present-day, the valley soils being exactly what was required for pre-construction minerals. 
Comparisons between the 1946 RAF aerial photographic survey, 1988 aerial survey and First 
Edition O.S. Maps give, in most cases, clear indications of pre-extant, contemporary or later 
mineral extraction activity. Many locations present reasonable correlation with a nearby 
airfield; the Waveney Valley extraction sites would have provided a rich source of extraction 
for the concrete runways of, for example, Tibenham, Thorpe Abbotts, Fersfield, Old 
Buckenham, Hethel and Seething and further afield as needed. 
 
Conclusion 
A number of factors, then, influenced the development of logistical infrastructure in Norfolk 
and the war years demonstrate the impressive speed with which logistical requirements 
brought about infrastructure development, helped particularly by a pre-existing efficient and 
emplaced rail network. This network in Norfolk had to deal with three pressure points - 
military construction and supply, passenger and agricultural traffic. During the two years up 
to August 1944 more than 600 ‘bombs only’ trains transported 300,000 tons of bombs form 
west coast ports to USAAF airfields alone. Branch lines that normally operated only in 
daylight were kept open at night to ensure the cargo got through and passenger trains were on 
occasion not just side-lined but cancelled completely to make sure that crews were 
available.
145
 Table 6 indicates how the pressure on rail stations increased in wartime, with 
Thetford’s train arrivals increasing by a factor of twenty-five between 1939 and 1945.
146
 
Farmers who were used to accessing urban markets conveniently took second priority to the 
military. That so many rural railways stations closed in the following decades was however 
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symptomatic of post-war lack of investment in an exhausted railway network and national 
policy changes favouring road-building’
147
 Road haulage predominates as a result. The 
existing integration of rail and road services for military logistics served the military across 
Norfolk well and is a good example of ‘total war’ in the sense of civilian and military 
working together without being under formal direct control of the military. The county’s road 
network remains schematically similar, albeit with wartime and major post-war capacity-
enhancing improvements  
The natural terrain features that favoured airfields also made transport less problematic than 
in other regions of the UK and, though not thought of as a heavily forested region, woodland 
has been shown to be crucial to the concealment and blast protection of particular ordnance 
areas; and where woodland lacked presence as at Barnham, the use of camouflage proved a 
good substitute. The need for ordnance storage sites in Norfolk was clear, given the 
proliferation of airfields. This chapter has demonstrated their busy wartime function and post-
war efforts to decommission them. They still bear much evidence of busy times but have seen 
adapted use. The fuel depot at Hethersett is now a local authority service depot and recycling 
centre. The bomb depot at Hockering has reverted to managed woodland, scarred by the 
remaining structures but designated a Site of Special Scientific Interest. Barnham still retains 
a limited military presence, part of the site serving as a Cold War nuclear weapons storage 
facility in the 1950s and 1960s, now a scheduled monument considered to be of important 
archaeological importance. The importance of petrol, oil and lubricant supply to airfields has 
been explained in the context of the long-forgotten pipeline was deemed vital enough to have 
a major spur built into the heart of the Norfolk countryside.  
Finally, the quarries and mineral extraction sites to be found across the county, some pre-war, 
many of wartime origin, provided essential construction material for the airfields.  
The following chapter investigates a hierarchical and prolific feature of the Norfolk landscape 
– the country house. Many were to be occupied by the military between 1939 and 1945 and 
for some the Second World War was to be become an important element of their history. 
                                      ___________________________________ 
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The occupation and use of country houses and estates is an important feature of military 
strategic planning, operations and training on the home front during the Second World War. 
As such, the conflict, with country houses routinely being commandeered, constitutes a 
significant, though brief and intense, waymarker in the overall history of English landed 
estates and their primary buildings.  
The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of military occupation of the country house in 
Norfolk between 1939 and 1945, and to what extent the war contributed to their demise or 
decline. This involves the question of whether or not the national image presented by post-
war commentators is reflected in Norfolk’s experience.
148
 The debate about the extent to 
which military requisition contributed to the loss of country houses nationally is ongoing. In 
common with other aspects of the militarised landscape explored in this thesis, an 
understanding of the country house in context necessitates an overview of a longer timeline, 
as far back as the last quarter of the previous century.  Whilst a ‘counter factual’ exploration 
of how the country house might have fared had there been no war is subjective and 
unquantifiable, for many country houses had already faced abandonment, dereliction, 
ruination and even demolition as the result of factors pre-dating 1939. 
 
Historiography 
The major writers of the country house tend to be architectural historians, or enthusiasts of 
aristocratic ownership and lineage. Roy Strong’s 1974 exhibition and subsequent book were 
highly influential in drawing attention to decline and demise throughout the twentieth century 
and cited the Second World War as a key factor as, later, did Robinson.
149
 It has to be 
questioned whether or not concern would have been expressed for the perceived damage 
caused by military occupation had not the ‘cult of the country house’ materialised in the post-
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  Marcus Binney and Roy Strong, curators of the seminal exhibition in 1974 in 
London, estimated that 629 large country houses had been lost between 1945 and 1974.
151
 No 
direct inference to military occupation was made as a primary cause of loss however; The 
Destruction of the English Country House was more a lament for a disappearing world of 
landowning hierarchy, increasingly threatened by the advancing bourgeoisie. 
Few other volumes deal with the war as a feature of an individual house’s history, 
particularly not in gazetteer works; some make no mention even where it is relevant in the 
individual context.  Seebohm alludes to this paradox: 
‘Whilst volumes have been written about Britain’s country houses, their  
grand history, architecture, art and gardens, and the power and frivolity  
that governed them, a strange veil of silence seems to have been drawn  
over them during the period 1939-45, a major watershed in the country’s  
history. 
152
   
 
Burke’s and Savills’ series of reference volumes on English Country Houses is 
comprehensive in its coverage of architectural features and ownership histories, but makes 
almost no reference to the Second World War in individual cases. For example, Blickling’s 
well-known use as officers’ quarters from 1941 to 1945 is not mentioned, the estate passing 
to the National Trust in 1940 being seen as a more noteworthy event.  Didlington’s entry 
makes no mention of General Miles Dempsey’s use of the house as his divisional 
headquarters. Buckenham Tofts Hall is described as being within the army training area but 
not in relation to its abandonment. The Second World War seems an aberration unworthy of 
mention; it may be that architectural historians see the duration as of less importance than the 
popular writers, such as those ‘writing from the pages of Country Life’.
153
 Sayer, author of the 
Norfolk volume, does allude briefly to the longer term factors in the twentieth century, 
including two world wars, that resulted in some one hundred and ten Norfolk estates being 
sold and broken up since 1900, leaving about one hundred and twenty intact.
154
 He adds that 
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the trickle of new owners who were prepared to own and effectively manage family estates 
ended in about 1950. Only recently has a measured attempt been made to quantify the extent 
of loss and the causal factors.
155
 This suggests a baseline from which to attempt to quantify or 
otherwise assess the real effect of wartime requisitioning on the country houses of Norfolk. 
Robinson is one of the few authors who have written specifically on the issue of military 
occupation, though his viewpoint is somewhat partisan both from the architectural historian’s 
perspective and mourning for the departure of a landowning aristocracy.
156
  No individual 
gazetteer-style book records the same number or composition of country houses as another, 
thereby underlining the vagueness about exactly what constitutes a country house or an 
estate. Even a cursory tour of suburban and rural Norfolk reveals houses which have escaped 
the attention of writers and gazetteers.  Seven decades on, the property supplements of the 
provincial press regularly reveal a fascinating selection of houses that would clearly fit the 
definition but are not featured in gazetteers; this also indicates the frequency with which large 
period houses change ownership, often in good restored or maintained condition. This may in 
part reflect houses which have become recognisable only as houses, disassociated from any 
original extended estate lands that may have been broken up, piecemeal, over time. Gaps in a 
house’s history may lead to subjective interpretation of the causes of their decline and loss, 
military requisitioning becoming a likely candidate but often with mixed evidence. As 
Sproule observes: ‘…people move away, people die and the people who knew them die and 
the threads of information become twisted and broken;’ added to which many houses simply 
have no records at all.
157
   
An eccentric but illuminating source of contemporary observation is offered by James Lees- 
Milne, country house expert, architectural historian and secretary of the Country Houses 
Committee of the National Trust from 1936 to 1950. A frequent visitor to Norfolk, especially 
Blickling, his observations are personal and quirky, yet curiously dispassionate at times.  The 
National Trust took a keen interest in the fate of country houses, Lees-Milne recommending 
and overseeing many of the transfers, including that of Blickling. He understood the stately 
home but had also served two years in the Army from 1939 which may have given him a 
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pragmatic view. He never hesitated to refuse recommending a house to the Trust if he felt it 
had no aesthetic merit. 
Of the few writers who do include the war the impression given is of country houses and 
estates that were at best sullied, and at worst destroyed, by their involvement in the 
prosecution of the war. Littlejohn unequivocally states that ‘what really destroyed the stately 
homes of England was the Second World War’ adding that ‘the major destruction was 
wrought by the British government itself.’ 
158
 
The National Archives appears to hold no detailed official records of house and estate 
requisitions for Norfolk; military unit war diaries do however make passing reference to 
headquarter and leaguer dispositions where based at country houses. Family archives where 
they exist are often held in situ or at local record offices. Norfolk Record Office yields some 
information and individual estate records bear patchy witness to events.
159
 Some information 
is surprisingly inconsistent given the relatively recent timescale; this may in part to be due to 
frequent changes of ownership and imprecise understandings of even the exact identities and 
locations of some larger houses. Notable exceptions are Blickling and Wolterton, both of 
which retained extensive archives. 
The most helpful and objective sources explore both world wars as contributors to long term 
decline in association with other macro-environmental factors. Wade Martins and Williamson 
provide a clear and objective background, chronology and explanation of the series of 
economic and political events that impacted upon country houses and estates in East Anglia, 
from the agricultural depressions of the late nineteenth century though to the immediate post-
Second World War period.
160
 Littlejohn takes a similar path of investigation relating to 
England as a whole, to include the modern heritage industry and its contribution to the 
renaissance of the English country house.
161
 Williamson, Ringwood and Spooner’s recent 
work on Norfolk’s lost houses is especially thorough with focus on the twentieth century.
162
 
These recent investigations encourage greater accuracy in looking at the actual causes of loss 
and will be looked at in more detail below.  
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Definition of the country house 
 
Any assessment of Norfolk country houses allegedly lost, directly or indirectly, to military 
occupation, is problematic because it requires some clarification. The term ‘country house’ 
might refer to the house alone, the house with parkland and estate, or its sheer physical size.  
As important is the cause of loss, when it occurred and how directly it was connected to 
military use.  Clearly, some association between military occupation of a house for any 
sustained period between 1939 and 1945 and its destruction or loss during that period and 
into the immediate post-war years can be made.  Loss, destruction, ruination taken as a whole 
span a much longer chronology, and causation cannot be ascribed without proper context.  
At one end of the spectrum is the archetypal historic myriad-roomed country house, set in its 
own landscaped parkland with farms beyond, possibly with historic provenance and owned 
by generations of the same aristocratic family, notable examples being Blickling, Felbrigg, 
Holkham and Kimberley. At the other are the smaller manor houses and the more generously 
proportioned rectories. In between lie what were once, at least, the smaller houses of the 
lesser gentry and even suburban villas. To this could even be added semi-rural or suburban 
large townhouses, though few of these would possess parkland or an extended estate. 
Assumptions about what actually constitutes the country house and estate would explain 
variations in alleged numbers of property losses after 1945. Also, it was common enough for 
the house to remain, isolated, after the break-up of the estate and, conversely, for the estate to 
continue to function without its house. It is however the house which was, when extant, and 
continues in popular memory, to be the focus of loss.
163
 Added to this is the reality that, 
despite the sheer physical size and imposing presence of some houses, changes in ownership 
and the often segmented break-up of the estates led to confusion or even complete loss of 
records. 
Further still, as Williamson, Ringwood and Spooner express it, the answer to the question of 
definition is clouded by ideology.
164
  Definition is permeated by perceptions of the past, a lost 
though not forgotten world of stability and bucolic gentility, trampled upon by the modern 
world, whether that is represented by the social upheaval after the First World War, the 
alleged ravages of the Second or the rapidly changing post-war political and social landscape.  
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As Williamson et al explain, whilst Norfolk’s country house loss accelerated after 1945, less 
attention is paid to the extreme financial problems faced by a nation recovering from huge 
war debt and an almost bankrupt economy.  The Attlee government was trying to provide 
financial stability, better education and free health care for all. The nation expected 
something better after nearly six years of war, much of it on the home front. Tax breaks and 
financial incentives for the wealthy were not a priority.  
Littlejohn quotes Strong and Binney as giving a figure of 629 country houses lost, nationally, 
in the thirty years following the end of the war and Robinson opting for closer to one 
thousand in the first post-war decade.
165
 This also raises the question of why so few country 
houses appear to have actually been requisitioned, unless the subject of definition relates 
more to substantial properties with parkland and estate, at which point their potential use 
becomes clearer – that of barrack, school, hospital or headquarters. Perhaps this is the 
distinction; the larger houses were chosen because their size and capacity proved suitable for 
durational occupation. The smaller houses were suitable only for short-term billeting 
purposes and records may be long-lost. 
An holistic count of all historic houses, drawn from a range of sources, suggests a figure of 
over 450 houses in Norfolk in 1900.
166
  Recent assessment, given that there is uncertainty 
about definition, suggests about 320 country houses in the county in 1939, a very helpful start 
point.
167
 Of this, a conservative estimate of no more than fifty were directly impacted upon 
by wartime requirements between 1939 and 1945. Starting from the understanding of a 
‘country house’ as a rurally located mansion with an attached estate, the first issue when 
calculating those extant in 1939 is that gazetteers tend towards listing houses possessed of an 
estate and without. Some small country houses had long functioned as farm houses. Some 
West Norfolk tenanted farms ran to more than a thousand acres, effectively large working 
estates, whilst other holdings to the north west of the county, described as country houses, 
were no more than large farms.
168
 The largest landed estates might be defined as extending to 
more than 10,000 acres, whilst houses of the gentry might cover less than half that area of 
land.
169
 In 1871 there had been 70 estates of over 3,000 acres in Norfolk; by 1941 there were 
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forty-three estates of over 3,000 acres, amounting to 28 per-cent of the county, declining 





The image of the barbarians at the gate, the occupants of the once-sacred big house haplessly 
awaiting the invader, is perhaps a little fanciful. There is no evidence that the war offered the 
opportunity for some kind of wartime socialist undermining of the landed classes. Large 
houses proved very useful for accommodation and headquartering. As with other properties, 
owners were paid rent under the 1939 Compensation (Defence) Act, based upon the rental 
value as at August 1939.
171
 Whilst there were isolated cases of major despoliation of estate 
landscape elsewhere in Britain during the Second World War, such as open-cast mining 
sanctioned in the park at Wentworth Woodhouse in the West Riding of Yorkshire, it was rare, 
and nothing on that scale occurred in Norfolk.
172
 There is little doubt that there are examples 
of the damage caused to several prominent houses and their estates, ranging from vandalism 
to complete loss, as will be seen in the case studies, below. The question is whether the 
Norfolk experience reflected this in any great measure.  As this chapter will show, the 
arrangements worked as well as could be expected in trying circumstances, but difficulties 
were experienced and tensions arose between some owners and the military. Compensation 
was payable under the 1941 War Damages (Compensation) Act; the family archives at 
Wolterton provide a number of examples of relevant negotiations. Case studies will look at 
what the outcomes of wartime occupation were for the houses, and whether or not it was 
statistically significant. 
In the event it was by and large the greater houses that found themselves under scrutiny by 
the military from 1939, and it is these that are often seen as the victims of wanton vandalism 
and neglect – and not always at the hands of the military, as many were to function as 
hospitals, convalescent homes, schools and bureaucratic headquarters. Some owners clearly 
feared requisition, be it by the military or the bureaucracy, and offered their houses 
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voluntarily, at an early stage of the war, as refuges, schools or hospitals. This effectively 
offered some properties a new role that in respects could be said to have physically saved 
them from military occupation and offered a post-war function preventing continuing decline. 
It is however very difficult to ascertain the extent of unrecorded damage to the smaller 
houses, unless specific examples are evident. 
The Norfolk experience was not necessarily a direct reflection, a microcosm, of the national 
picture but, as with airfields, training areas and defence sites, the political and strategic bigger 
picture directed local land requirements.  In specific instances, in common with the national 
picture, the arrival of the military heralded a short, sharp regime of new use and occasional 
abuse. It may be misleading to cite the Second World War as a primary cause of the decline 
of the country house as a genre in Norfolk, and it will be useful to distinguish between 
wartime military and non-military use. Many houses were utilised for schools, hospitals and 
civil administrative centres and some of these suffered more damage than those occupied by 
the military. In some examples, such as Blickling, wartime occupation has become an 
intrinsic and marketable part of the house’s history and continued existence. Conversely, at 
Didlington, the post-war period saw the house’s decline and eventual sale, culminating in 
demolition in the 1950s. Both were heavily impacted by wartime occupation but with very 
different outcomes. In every case the relative significance of wartime occupation can be 
markedly different.  
 
Historic background 
A range of economic, political and social changes contributed to the decline of the country 
house and estate for at least sixty years prior to the Second World War; the years 1939 to 
1945 were yet another factor in abandonment or ruination for some, whilst for others the war 
years passed them by. In any event, the ultimate fate of the house is often a separate issue 
from that of its surrounding estate. The one may survive the other or be disposed of at 
different times, though the demolition or ruination of the house is often seen as a bench-mark 
for the end of an aristocratic landholding. Norfolk had its share of large country houses and 
estates utilised for war use between 1939 and 1945.  
The zenith of the English country house was the mid-Victorian period, associated with the 
height of agricultural prosperity. The long term agricultural depression, discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7 took hold from the 1870s, a major causal factor being cheaper food 
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imports arriving in Britain on an ever-increasing scale – particularly from America.
173
 
Agriculture, as a source of income for estate owners, was becoming less viable. The 
following decades saw income from tenants begin to decline as economic downturn affected 
their ability to pay.
174
 Death duties were introduced in 1894.
175
 As a result of local 
government reform local legislative, judicial and administrative offices were no longer the 
exclusive preserve of the landed classes. The country house became vulnerable to new social 
structures in which the landed classes no longer exclusively made decisions for the wider 
community but were shared by a wider range of elected members.
176
 The perceived assault on 
the invulnerability of the landed classes and their country estates gained momentum in the 
early years of the twentieth century, with radical and Liberal ideas about land reform. Lloyd 
George’s proposed land tax of 1909 and, later, Chancellor Philip Snowden’s plans for a Land 
Value tax in his 1931 budget, fed fears of nationalisation of private land. All this represented 
an assault on the hitherto unassailable position of large landowners, both urban and rural; 
Traditional landowners were beginning to feel beleaguered, politically and economically. To 
this can be added the devastating loss of the inheriting generation – the officer class that 
perished in the fields of Flanders and France in the First World War and domestic staff who 
did not return from war. It became increasingly difficult to employ or retain staff amid a 
changing social hierarchy and increasing mobility. With ever increasing death duties, and a 
perception that agriculture was not the productive income stream it once was, began to raise 
the question of the economic viability of maintaining a large house. The hold of some major 
landowners on their houses and estates became increasingly tenuous. 
The age of sales, demolitions and dereliction then, had begun, with estate lands often being 
sold to former tenant farmers, who did not have the same priorities of land use and perception 
of the status quo. Between the wars, the rate of sales hastened, which increased the prospect 
of being able to sell, though many houses and estates did not reach their reserves or indeed 
attract any interest at all, even when sub-divided into smaller lots. Littlejohn sees the country 
house and estate as a social phenomenon in itself, but one that was rapidly changing as a 
concept. He suggests that part of the problem was that owners often had no real interest in the 
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house or estate, often using it only as a weekend retreat from the London lifestyle.
177
  The 
key point is that the continued existence of country house and its environs were under threat 
long before the Second World War, and would continue thereafter as, in a changing society 
and political environment with less favourable views of those who owned large houses with 
extensive lands, sales accelerated once more. Even before the war, in 1935, Osbert Sitwell 
observed: ‘What country houses of any size, one wonders, can hope to survive the next fifty 
years?’ 
178
   
The first chosen option was to sell items or simply make economies. The next, more dramatic 
and irrevocable step was to sell the house or estate or both.  Wade Martins and Williamson 
describe a veritable revolution in patterns of land ownership in East Anglia. Norfolk saw 
seventy estates of three thousand acres or more reduced to forty-three by 1941, the 
proportionate land share declining from forty-nine percent to twenty-eight. With the sell-off 
of major land tracts, forty-three per-cent of land in Eastern England was owner occupied in 
1941, compared with an average of twenty per-cent from 1887 to 1922.
179
 Farming itself 
recovered towards the war years and this, ironically, improved the prospects for sale for 
impoverished landowners.
180
 The decline of the great estate after 1880 was therefore more 
complex than is often assumed.
181
 The sale of an estate was not necessarily its demise and, 
conversely, some big landowners actually bought up the smaller ones.  
This is the chronological background that illustrates the slow demise of many – though not all 
– country estates and this before the start of war in 1939. Moreover, some estates, though 
broken up, or partly sold, were not entirely disposed of until after the Second World War and 
not necessarily solely or even partly as a result of the war itself.  
 
The approach of war 
Norfolk possessed – and still does, despite post-war losses - an extensive range of country 
houses from every era, from numerous smaller gentry houses, and later great houses with 
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 The historic wealth of the county, followed by lack of 
industrialisation, left many houses intact through to the twentieth century.  From 1938 
onwards, with the spectre of war looming, the Office of Works began a confidential official 
register of larger property ownership, though not yet complete at the outbreak of war.
183
 
Since the presumption that large-scale aerial bombing would decimate cities and populations, 
especially in the south of England, it was anticipated that large houses in rural areas, able to 
accommodate numbers of civilian wounded, schools and government departments, would be 
needed. The War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry, Ministry of Transport, the Air Raid 
Precautions Department and Board of Education were among those departments who were 
asked to state their projected needs.
184
 All were asked to state their projected accommodation 
needs in the event of having to desert urban centres en masse. General military requirements 
were not the absolute priority in the build up to war, nor in the first year of hostilities, save 
for training purposes, which was an absolute priority. The somewhat secretive nature of the 
property register undoubtedly threatened to fulfil some of the by then traditional fears of 
estate owners; compulsory acquisition by government and the undermining of rights of major 
property owners.
185
  Priorities were to skew markedly as, firstly, civilian deaths proved to be 
a fraction of that anticipated and, secondly, the requirements of the military increased 
exponentially, with a second surge in 1942 heralding the arrival of American service 
personnel. Local authority buildings, hospitals, transport-related buildings were excluded by 
nature of their existing function. Private houses with less than four rooms on the ground floor 
were exempt.
186
 Whilst this still left considerable scope for choice, large country houses 
inevitably became the focus of attention for the military, both for house and parkland. The 
houses and estates were capacious, and numerous, relative to their size.
 187
  Most were also 
readily accessible to road, rail and towns, though this could not be said of, for example, 
Wolterton; and in the case of Blickling it was the proximity of a site suitable for an airfield – 
RAF Oulton – which was the deciding factor.  The preponderance of airfields, increasing year 
on year in Norfolk, along with military training areas and coastal and inland defences 
systems, prefaced an increasing intensity of requisitioning of country houses.  
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Case studies   
Given the number of larger country houses, it is reasonable to assume that many more may 
have been occupied for shorter duration as the need arose – but if this is not recorded within 
an estate or family archive, then it is reasonable to assume that no lasting damage was done. 
Lack of information about house histories may be explained by the frequent changes of 
ownership; breaks in continuity result in gaps in information. With frequent proximity to 
airfields and training sites, it may seem surprising that many more were not requisitioned for 
the longer duration. They may have been deemed unsuitable for all kinds of practical reasons 
– Felbrigg Hall in north Norfolk was considered by the army but rejected because there was 
no electrical lighting to the house.
188
 In two cases, Buckenham Tofts and Weeting Halls, the 
houses were not occupied but requisitioned within the Stanford Battle Training Area, and 
simply abandoned. Blickling was chosen because it was close to a major airfield, RAF 
Oulton; Wolterton because it suited the army to have accommodation near the coast for 
training and defence purposes. 
 
Blickling   
‘In spite of the RAF station Blickling seemed to me at the furthermost  




RAF Oulton and Blickling Hall are two miles distant from each other but inextricably linked 
by their wartime history. The early years of the Second World War represent a three-way pull 
of interests between the needs of the military, the continuation of the house and estate, and 
the arrival of the National Trust as prospective guardian of the property.  It is in this last 
respect that James Lees-Milne’s presence and observations figure prominently, both as 
representative of the Trust and incidental observer of the militarised landscape. 
Philip Kerr, 12
th
 Marquis of Lothian was acutely aware of the doubtful future for the fabric of 
country houses, and Blickling in particular. In a speech in July 1934 at the annual meeting of 
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the National Trust he proposed the idea of the Trust saving threatened houses as a ‘landlord 
on an ampler scale’.
190
  Lothian subsequently bequeathed Blickling, with contents and over a 
hundred houses and cottages, along with 4,700 acres of woodland. He died in post as British 
ambassador to the United States in December 1940. His possessions were vast and it was 
several years before executors were able to convey the estate fully.
191
 
Lees-Milne had been invalided out of the Army after two years’ service and did not first go to 
Blickling as representative of the National Trust until May 1942. His first impression 
describes exactly the features, bordering the approach from the south, shown on the 
contemporary Ministry of Works site plan. 
‘… leaving Aylsham we were greeted on our right by a sea of Nissen huts  
 obliterating the orangery and on our left by an amorphous brick NAAFI  
 complex in direct view from the front door of the Hall. There was likewise 
 a settlement of what were termed semi-permanent office buildings right 
 up to the west elevation which we were shortly to come upon. But just 
 past the church we were subjected, at the end of a straight drive, to the 
 breath-taking view of the south front of high, fanciful gables, tall chimney 
 stacks and central cupola between flanking square towers.... The more 





The Nissen huts obliterating the Orangery were on the main roadside accommodation site; 
the site of the Navy, Army and Air Force Institute (NAAFI) can still be seen as an earthwork 
on the opposite side of the road.  
Lees-Milne noted that the remaining furniture which had not been removed for safety was 
shrouded under dust-sheets, but that the pictures had been removed. The RAF was in 
occupation of the rest of the house, ‘seemingly packed by the hundred into bedrooms and 
attics.’
193
 The attendant risks from fire were ever present. Even a few minutes spent in the 
attic rooms in mid-summer offer an indication of how cold the accommodations must be for 
most of the year. 
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     Fig.77 RAF personnel left a record of their presence, along with those of house staff, on     
     the wall of a door-less attic room located over the main doorway to the house (author’s  
     photo) 
238 
 
         
Fig.78  Preserved RAF Hygiene and Sanitation poster on the wall of one of one  
of the attic rooms. (author’s photo) 
 
Lees-Milne’s accounts of his visits are populated by larger than life, but real, characters that 
add to the humanity of the situation, prominent of all being his picturesque turn of phrase in 
239 
 
describing the relationship between Miss O’Sullivan, Lord Lothian’s secretary, and the 
military personnel.  
‘The lusty young pilots were even more terrified of Miss O’Sullivan,  





She mercilessly scolded them for consistently vandalizing the house and anything else they 
could lay their hands on recounts Lees-Milne.
195
  And this was vandalism of a type not 
experienced at, for example, Wolterton. The airmen smashed the old crown glass of the 
windows and broke open doors leading to the staterooms. Worse still, subsequently, a group 
of airmen used a tree trunk as a battering ram to force the iron doors of the mausoleum in the 
park. In search of the Countess’s jewellery, which they wrongly supposed to have been 




‘Miss O’Sullivan’s protective instincts were roused and she was out for  
retribution. But Birkbeck (Lothian’s agent) did not in the circumstances  
like to appear too disapproving of ‘our brave boys’ who were nightly  
risking their young lives on England’s and our sedentary behalf. 
 
She regarded Blickling as a sacred trust. To her it was sanctified territory… 
The dragon of the RAF was respected by one and all. …she was not afraid to raise 
Cain with the Wing Commander. Unannounced she would boldly stalk into his office 




Mr Birkbeck, the estate manager, was also a frequent subject of Lees-Milne’s accounts. 
 
‘With two surveyors from the Ministry of Works, Birkbeck and I spent an April  
day.....crawling on hands and knees under the roof of the west wing looking  
for, I am glad to say, non-existent death-watch beetle in the rafters the  
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One evening was spent stamping out a fire in Hercules Wood, to the west of the 
house, which had either been started mischievously, or inefficiently by the Home 
Guard in constructing, unknown to Birkbeck, a bomb dump under dry bracken 




The contents which on the outbreak of war had been removed from the house to London were 
no safer than at Blickling. Three important paintings stored at Partridge’s shop in King Street 
– a Holbein copy of Henry VIII, Zucchero’s panel of Queen Elizabeth and Samuel Scott’s 
The Thames – were badly damaged in an air raid when water flooded a basement safe. In 
contrast other treasures removed to the country fared very well. Another consignment went to 
Henley hall near Ludlow, where the head housemaid kept tapestries sealed against moth 
rolled up in wax paper and sprinkled with naphthalene flakes.
200
 Lees-Milne noted that Lord 
Lothian had taken away Pollen’s Florentine fireplace and replaced it with nothing, which he 
interpreted as another kind of vandalism. Lees-Milne was so involved with and fond of 
Blickling that he spent his fortnight’s holiday there in 1945. He noted ‘overlooking the 
beautiful but unkempt, unmown, unweeded garden.’ 
201
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Nearby, Aylsham Old Hall is a house of some size of house in its own right, set by the 
roadside half-way back to Aylsham, and part of the Blickling estate. Lees-Milne describes it 
in July 1945 as a perfectly preserved red-brick house though, after de-requisitioning, it 
required a good deal of refurbishment. Of the £450 compensation given by the Army for 
dilapidation compensation, the National Trust was permitted by the government to spend 
£100 a year on repairs, with the pre-condition that the work would be started in less than four 
weeks’ time. Subsequently an ongoing expenditure of just £10 a year was allowed.  
‘How these absurdly arbitrary figures and dates were calculated is unclear.  
They merely indicate the difficulties that thwarted owners of historic                        
buildings in those lean days of privation and prohibition.’ 
203
 
The National Trust was unable to open Blickling to the public until May 1947 but not 
because of wartime vandalism. The Trust had to fulfil the wishes of Lord Lothian’s will that 
it should be let as a family residence to persons who will love appreciate and respect 
Blickling Hall and will use it not only as a private residence but as a place from which - as he 
phrased it -  public or intellectual or artistic activities go forth and in which persons or 
conferences or persons interested in such things are entertained and who have the means 
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necessary to enable them to live at Blickling and use it for such purposes. He named his title 
successor, and three sons of his friends Lord and Lady Astor. All turned the idea down.
204
  So 
it was that on May Day 1947 twenty bedraggled visitors on a cold, rainy day paid one shilling 
each to view the house.  ‘Today Blickling is very much alive and very flourishing. And the 
number of visitors is prodigious’ reported Lees-Milne in 1992.
205
 In the early years of the 
twenty-first century Blickling Hall hosts the RAF Oulton Museum, and the war is fast 
becoming a key element in the National Trust’s marketing of the Hall.  
 
Wolterton  
              ‘To the owner and occupier of the land and buildings described in the 
Schedule hereto attached: 
            I, Major General I. G. Morgan Owen, being one of a class of persons to 
whom the Secretary of State as a competent authority for the purposes of 
Part IV of the Defence Regulation, 1939, has in exercise of the powers 
contained in that Part of the said Defence Regulations delegated the 
necessary authority, give notice that I, on behalf of the Secretary of State 
take possession of the land and buildings described in the Schedule 
hereto annexed.   




The announcement that a property, with its adjoining lands, was to be requisitioned for an 
indeterminate period at a time of national crisis, was non-negotiable.  In part expected, albeit 
with some apprehension, it might not be the last such demand. In the case of Wolterton 
supplementary similar forms of requisition were to be received, relating to detached parts of 
the estate, the second significant notice of requisition occurring in July 1941, with areas of 
parkland identified for military use.
207
  At least one notice of requisition was to be reinforced 
after the war’s end. 
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 WOLT 8/140/86 Central Register Serial No. NORF/3830.  31
st
 July 1941 
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Two particular sources offer fascinating insight into the Army’s occupation of the grounds 
and part of the house.  The present Lord Walpole gives a rare, possibly unique, view of life at 
an occupied country house during World War Two.  Born in 1938, he lived through the 
‘requisition’ years at Wolterton as a small child and remembers life alongside the military as 
an integral part of his childhood.  Secondly, the family and estate records, housed in the 
Hall’s library, present not only a detailed record of correspondence between various agencies 
but also contain important site plans of the Army’s use of the location. The overall 
impression is of a pragmatic, if not actually symbiotic, relationship between, on the one hand, 
the resident Walpole family, their agent and tenants and, on the other, the occupying units 
and the Army’s land agents. The evidence draws a picture of a house and estate that suffered 
some damage, considerable inconvenience, but generally borne in good part with good 
working relationships on all sides given the imposed circumstances. As with all properties 
requisitioned over the duration, it is difficult to identify individual military units in 
occupation at any given time. The most direct approach to identification is through landowner 
and local historical records. No records for the occupation exist at the National Archives, 
wherein enquiries are redirected to the Walpole archive. 
Lord Walpole relates that the area in front of the Hall’s main entrance was reconfigured to 
establish a parade ground. The Army installed drains at the front of the Hall and he 
remembers the Horse Guards’ armoured cars moving about the place.
208
 The parkland was 
requisitioned at the outbreak of war but the house itself not directly considered for immediate 
use. Shortly thereafter however, twenty rooms at the top of the house were allocated as 
officers’ accommodation.  A sergeants’ mess was established in Saracen Park, and another 
for other ranks and Nissen huts began to arrive in numbers. Valuable pictures and portraits 
were removed for storage in a slate mine in Wales.  It is debatable as to whether this would 
have been the appropriate climatic environment for them but it is typical of valuables 
removed, stored and later returned. 
The Wolterton estate was contemporarily larger than now, encompassing estate land as far as 
the coast at Weybourne. Itteringham Mill was requisitioned as an officers’ mess for the RAF 
units at Matlaske airfield, itself part of the Wolterton estate.  At Beckham, four wooden radar 
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masts were built in the form of a square; Lord Walpole remembers them being later felled.
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Canadian army units occupied the parkland in the later years of the war, embarking from the 
east coast to Normandy several days after D-Day.  Lord Walpole recalls that, post-war, his 
father was none too pleased to return to find the parkland being used as a prisoner–of-war 
camp for captured Italians. As to the parkland immediately adjacent the Hall, that not directly 
occupied by the military was ploughed up as part of the intensified agricultural effort. A 
photograph in the family exhibition in the Hall shows land under the plough right up to the 
piazza. 
Asked about how things were for Wolterton before, during and after the war, Lord Walpole 
reports that it was;  
‘…relaxed, worked well.  The kitchen garden did well supplying the troops  
with peaches at half-a-crown a time! After the war a lot of restoration took 




As to the physical structures on site, a contemporary plan shows areas of occupation in the 
immediate parkland. Twenty-six ‘living huts’ for enlisted men and numerous associated 
buildings were located to the West of the house, with officers’ huts and mess across to the 
North, towards the church tower. At the main park entrance to the north-east were twenty-
four more living huts, more ancillaries, the guard room and SAA (small arms ammunition) 
store. The same location housed the Quartermaster’s Office and store. To the far north by the 
roadside were twenty-seven more living huts and the regimental institute. The map key 
suggests accommodation is provided for eighty warrant officers and thirty-five officers; 
clearly the enlisted ranks would have, by proportion, run to several hundred. The chlorinator 
and water tower, together with a borehole, were sited by the main road. This, though 
appearing mundane is, along with sewage disposal facilities, a crucial pre-requisite for any 
fully functioning military encampment intended for long term use.
211
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Contemporarily, RAF Matlaske was part of the Wolterton estate.
212
 These outliers of estate 
land are excellent examples of how the main house, adjacent parkland, farms and detached 
estate lands under single ownership could all be potentially subject to military requisition. 
 
 




What might be termed peripheral damage to property was inevitable. A distinctly separate 
issue is that of wanton vandalism and yet even this has to be viewed with pragmatism; there 
is a spectrum, with malicious criminal damage at one end and youthful high-spirits at the 
other. Little deliberate vandalism appears to have taken place on Walpole land, though the 
chronology of requisition at Wolterton and beyond is peppered with damage incidents. 
One item that ran continuously and never seem quite to be resolved was that of damage to a 
wall at Church Farm, Weybourne in April 1943. The farmer, Frank Dady, alleged that a War 
Department lorry pulled out to avoid pedestrians and caused an oncoming civilian lorry to hit 
said wall, necessitating £17 5s of repair work. In September that year a fence was damaged at 
Mannington Hall Farm. It was observed that the Canadian occupants abandoned the vehicle 
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and made off towards Mannington Hall.
214
 In December 1944 a number of Bren carriers were 
alleged to have smashed down a field gate whilst being washed down in the river at White 
House Farm, Itteringham, with ‘considerable damage…done to the pasture by the carriers…’. 
The Army’s District Claims Officer accepted the tenant’s claim for £2. 10 shillings 
damage.
215
 The glass houses at Wolterton were damaged by an explosion, allegedly caused 
by the Army, in May 1944 and in March 1945 the military police managed to damage the 
walls adjoining the gatehouse lodge. Damage continued after the war’s end. In October of 
1945 £75 worth of damage was caused to a main entrance pillar at the Hall, with full 
responsibility accepted by the Army.
216
  
Lord Walpole’s agent for most of the duration was one R.J.Wortley. His and the tenants’ 
correspondence with the District Claims Office at Dereham are extensive, chronicling a 
steady but not frequent run of incidents of damage. Agreement was reached in most cases but 
in November 1945 two pre-war boats at Wolterton Lake were damaged to the alleged sum of 
£58. On this occasion Captain Francis wrote that  
‘Although it is realised that troops have been in occupation of this park 
 for some considerable time it has not been possible to establish  
 conclusively that troops have been responsible for the damage  
 forming the subject of this claim, and under the circumstances it  
 is considered that only a portion of the damage can be considered  
 as War Department liability.’  
 




There are more incidents reported, some dramatic, others obscure but there was clearly an 
underlying acceptance both that such incidents would inevitably occur, that some form of 
recompense would have to be made, and that the outcome was not always a foregone 
conclusion. 
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The cessation of hostilities abroad did not mean a swift withdrawal from requisitioned land. 
Despite the post-war demobilisation programme, the British Army maintained a significant 
numerical presence both at home and abroad. Lord Walpole received yet another notice of 
requisition under Defence Regulation 52 in regard to the continued use of land at Kelling 
Heath.
218
 Captain Lewis of the Claims Office wrote to R J Wortley confirming continued use 
of the firing range at Kelling Heath stating that ‘…it is not proposed to ‘requisition’ this land, 
but only to regularise the construction of the Range and the existence of the danger area 
relating thereto.’ No rent was payable.
219
 This was intended to be more helpful than 
proscriptive for on 3
rd
 April Lewis dispatched a ‘Notice of Surrender’ explaining that 
requirement for the land would expire as from 10
th
 April 1946 ‘and that all rights of user 
conferred by the said Defence Regulation and Order will cease on that date.’ It seems the 
Army simply wished to search, locate and dispose of as much small arms ammunition and 
ordnance as it could, to make the area safe. The notice states that ‘the area has been carefully 
searched by visual means and all unexploded missiles found have been destroyed’ and offers 
advice on what to do if any suspect objects are found. It further advises of a statement made 
by the Secretary of State of War that makes provision for financial compensation for damage 
to property or person.
220
   
Wortley was nonetheless exasperated by the overall damage to estate property and particular 
to the ongoing and seemingly never to be resolved issue of Farmer Day’s wall at Weybourne. 
‘I think this damage has been going on ever since the land was requisitioned  
for the camp. One unit, the Household Cavalry, closed the road for a time in  
1943 and others have used it for parking vehicles. I think a good deal of the  
damage has been done by Bren gun carriages [sic] and lorries turning round  
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The beaches and salt flats to the north of Holkham proved ideal as amphibious landing 
training areas. The area was also at the geographic frontline of a potential invasion, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. Holkham Hall therefore was ideally suited as a base for military 
use. The 3
rd
 Earl of Leicester’s family was in residence for the duration, living on the west 
side of the house. The state rooms in the central block were put under dust covers, while the 
east side – kitchen wing, stables and outbuildings - were requisitioned by the Army, as were a 
number of farms on the estate.
222
 The kitchen court area was utilised for tank parking and the 
serials and names of individual tanks – Andon, Atlas, Albatross, Albacore, Albemarle - can 
still be seen on the walls. The Earl is said to have feared German occupation of the house, 






 Earl’s occupation of the Hall was reflective of a way of life impossible to maintain in 
modern times. He died in November1941, succeeded by the 4
th
 Earl who had already 
considered making much-needed economies in the use of the house. The former librarian 
wrote that  
‘…a tremendous task lies before you in gathering up the threads of  
   House & eastate and family matters…knowing something of the 
   conditions at Holkham , I own I am aghast when I think of  all the  




In the event, in January 1942, parts of the building and immediate environs were 
requisitioned by the Army. The Earl appeared to enjoy aspects of military company, 




The house was undamaged by occupation, though several estate buildings were left in a state 
of dereliction and practice shelling is said to have weakened the sea defences. Robinson 
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asserts that this caused tidal flooding of some low-lying farms and led to a substantial and 
successful claim against the War Office which directly funded modernisation of the estate 
farms in the following years.
226
 Whilst compensation claims included clearance of the 
defences, the primary concern was that of damage caused by wind erosion caused by military 
structures disturbing the dunes. The War Office is alleged to have ignored local advice about 
environmental maintenance; when questioning comparisons with pre-war measures against 
erosion, the estate agent explained the principle of ‘accretion rather than erosion’.
227
 The 
failure of the War Department to entirely remove barbed wire, admiralty scaffolding and 
associated anti-invasion defences is said to have exacerbated post-war compensation claims 
by the estate. Descriptions of wartime damage include ‘heavy army lorries and Bren gun 
carriers charging…. along the woodland rides and out the other end.’
228
  Such was the 
acrimony between the two parties that the estate office posted notices to visitors warning of 
the presence of defence works ‘left uncleared by the War Department’ and that the Holkham 
Estates Company accepted no responsibility for injury or damage incurred by visitors.
229
 
Negotiations with the War Office for compensation continued until 1952, culminating in a 
compromise agreement at £65,000.
230
  
It is clear that military occupation of the house did not contribute to the decline of the house 
and estate, the owners of which were living beyond their means by the late 1930s and 
consequently facing financial difficulty. It also appears the case that and damage caused by 
military exercises to outlying estate land, especially sea defences, was compensated by the 
War Office to an extent that supported recovery of the estate farms in the post-war years 
possibly beyond which that could have been achieved by the owners even in less trying 
circumstances. 
Perceptions of country house owners trying to preserve the dignity and sanctity of their 
ancestral homes can be misleading; the truth was that many felt there was little future in 
maintaining a large, draughty house simply for aesthetic purposes. Some found that trading 
their house to the government in lieu of death duties was an attractive option. The Earl of 
Leicester was no exception, being ‘bitterly disappointed’ that he was unable to dispose of 
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Holkham in that manner.
231
 Concerns about his wayward heir, long resident in South Africa 
and with no interest in living in the house, along with the financial worries of maintaining the 
estate, led to ongoing post-war discussions with James Lees-Milne with regard to transfer to 
the National Trust.
232
 ‘If you can find any means by which the Trust can take on this house 
and contents, I shall be prepared to leave it, should my staying on make the transfer easier’ 
were the Earl’s parting words to James Lees-Milne in June 1945, though the latter writes of 
the Earl’s repeated subsequent indecision.
233
 The potential for sale of outlying land, 
continuous occupancy during military occupation, the absence of a secondary house and the 
swift succession in 1949 of the 5
th
 Earl in 1949 seems to have secured Holkham’s future at a 
time when military use may have contributed to the decline of other great houses. Holkham is 
today a thriving estate and tourist attraction, with seldom any reference being made to its 
wartime use.  
The following composite examples comprise a major house and estate whose demise can be 
significantly attributable to wartime occupation; one that survived being enclosed by an 
airfield site; another that was restored and later sold by its owner, disillusioned by the effort 
and expense; a house that was occupied by the military and survived without apparent 
damage of incident; and finally, two examples of houses that illustrate how the vagaries and 
personal tragedy of war can led to ironic and tragic outcomes for the owners. 
 
Didlington  
‘It is a strange feeling to look at a wood and visualise a drawing room.’ 
234
 
Didlington Hall is said to have been very much the centre of the community, remembered as 
‘one of many whose disappearance has left a gap in their individual landscapes and a sense of 
deep loss amongst…those who knew the buildings.’  There are clear reminders of the lost 
grandeur, notably a rectangular, house-shaped grove of wild birch and cherry’ that marks the 
site with ruler-straight precision.’
235
 Didlington has been described as a reflection of three 
hundred years of British architectural history, presenting a seventeenth-century west wing, a 
Georgian south front, a north front built the year after Waterloo, a Victorian water tower and 
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 It is worth dwelling on the scale and grandeur of the house 
because its complexity may have contributed to its demise whilst military occupation, no 
conserver of the fabric and premises, certainly contributed to its final loss.  
William Tyssen-Amherst had amassed a library of antiquarian books; these and the contents 
of the house were sold in 1908 and 1909 for a total of £109,592.
237
 Amherst died the 
following year and Didlington, then comprising 7,105 acres was eventually sold to Colonel 
Herbert Francis Smith, who spent considerable sums of money on modernisation and leased 
land to the Forestry Commission.
238
  The Hall in good order just prior to the Second World 
War being set in a ‘finely-timbered park of about 1,500 acres, with a beautiful sheet of water 
of nearly 50 acres in extent, dotted with many small islands, the principal crops being rye, 
wheat, barley and turnips and the soil a light sandy loam with a chalk and sand subsoil.’  The 
estate is listed as 2,738 acres of land and inland water.
 239
   
Didlington was requisitioned by the army in 1941 and occupied as the headquarters for 
General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army during the D-Day landings. 
By 1944, 7
th
 Armoured Division was encamped in the grounds, having been in action in Italy 
and relocated to England for training in preparation for the Normandy landings. Norfolk 
historian E. C. ‘Paddy’ Apling reports that when he visited the site in September 1999 many 
of the military huts, present but disintegrating in the estate woods, still bore slogans and 





The house remained empty after the war as the damage and neglect during requisitioning had 
left it beyond economic repair. ‘Soldiers have smashed the place up with a kind of 
wantonness which defies explanation.’ 
241
 Colonel Smith died in 1949, the estate was broken 
up and the greater part of the hall demolished in 1952 after sale of contents.
242
 The remaining 
structures have subsequently been renovated and modifications made to the old stabling and 
carriage blocks.  
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A family descendant has taken a longer-term view stating that:  
‘by the turn of the twentieth century, the Hall had expanded into a sprawling  
Italianate mansion, reputedly with eighty bedrooms. In the end its sheer size  
was its downfall; the house was demolished in the 1950s as no one had the  




Even allowing for an element of questionable continuity of existence in the post-war era 
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A rare instance of a house that survived being entirely subsumed – but not damaged - by an 
operational airbase exists on the site of RAF Rackheath, five miles north east of Norwich. 
Rackheath Hall, despite parkland and estate areas being ploughed and militarised, still stands, 
albeit not as a family house. It is however an example of military occupation and use of the 
estate impacting upon the future of that landscape, although perhaps less so than the death in 
1949 of owner Sir Edward Stracey. The hall, a late-Georgian house, was remodelled in the 
mid-nineteenth century by the Straceys, who had acquired the estate from the original 
incumbents, the Pettus family.
246
 The wartime requisitioning of the estate effectively initiated 
the wholesale change in the use of the extended landscape.  A segment of amateur colour film 
footage of the site is held by the East Anglian Film Archive, and clearly shows the house, 
separated by a rudimentary fence from the operational site.
247
 The house was situated to the 
south-east of the runways but abutted by accommodation and service buildings to its east, 
North and south, these latter extending across the parkland itself and into the adjacent woods. 
As with the inter-war period, many houses failed to sell post-war. The auctioning off of the 
hall and 1,500 acre estate in 1950 led to the break-up of the estate, but fetched no bids for the 
hall itself.
 248
    Rackheath Hall may have been saved by the vagaries of the a later property 
market in which large, low-cost country houses proved suitable for such basic purposes as 
storage, expressed in one individual’s entrepreneurial necessity; antiques dealer Sydney 
Cramer needed space to store and sell his wares.
249
 The Hall functions in the early part of the 
twenty-first century, restored and renovated, as prestige apartments. The airfield’s technical 
site eventually became the modern Rackheath industrial estate with several wartime buildings 
being modified or extended for commercial and light industrial use. The major access road on 
the estate is named Wendover Road after the airbase in Utah where the 467th Bomb Group 
was formed. Other roads carry related names including those of the base commander and 
aircraft nicknames. The Control Tower was completely restored in 2007 and is used as an 
office block. The location therefore continues to present standing structural archaeological 
legacy from two key periods of its history – the Hall itself and the physical imprint of the 
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Second World War airbase. That the Hall survived integration into a busy military site is 





If the landscape bears physical witness to human activity, it also occasionally serves as the 
backdrop to incidents that would not otherwise occur outside the context of time and place. 
Honingham Hall provides a unique example that serves to underline the complexity of 
civilian and military wartime relationships in a bizarrely unpredictable manner. The hall was 
not requisitioned or occupied by the military during the Second World War but an individual 
incident links it to RAF Attlebridge in an unanticipated tragedy. From 1940, at the invitation 
of the owner, noted diplomat and explorer Sir Eric Teichman, the hall hosted a contingent of 
evacuated Barnardo’s children. The family continued to live in the statelier rooms and, in any 
event, Sir Erich was away for much of the time. So impressed was he with the behaviour of 
the children that he bequeathed the entire estate to Dr Barnardo’s in his will, with the 
stipulation that Lady Teichman would be able to reside in her quarters for her lifetime. Sadly, 
the will was to be enacted sooner than anticipated. Sir Erich had been serving as adviser to 
the British Embassy at Chunking in south-west China. On 3
rd
 December 1944, having 
returned to Honingham just six days earlier, he went outside to investigate the sound of 
gunfire and confronted two poachers, American soldiers from Attlebridge, armed with M1 
carbines. During the altercation Sir Eric was killed by a shot to the head.
251
  Privates George 
E. Smith and Leonard S Wijpacha were court-martialled at Attlebridge and found guilty, the 
former of murder. An appeal was launched and among those asking for clemency was Lady 
Ellen Teichman, widow of the victim. The pleas were dismissed and on May 8th 1945 - VE 
Day - George Smith was hanged at Shepton Mallet Prison in Somerset. Wojtacha was 
imprisoned for his part as an accessory.  
In a further twist that links two entirely physically separate militarised landscapes, Smith’s 
remains are buried in grave 52, row 3, plot E of Oise-Aisne American Cemetery, in France, 
along with ninety-four other American military prisoners, convicted of various capital crimes 
against twenty-six fellow Americans and seventy-one civilians in the UK and mainland 
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 The Hall was used by Barnardo’s until 1965, the resident boys being transferred to 
the new Teichman House in the Heartsease area of Norwich. 
Ketteringham 
The USAAF’s Second Air Division Headquarters was located at Camp Thomas, Old Catton 
from September  to October 1943, but relocated to Ketteringham, thereafter known as Station 
147, in December of that year, through to June 1945. The nearest airfield is Hethel, home to 
the 2AD’s 389
th
 Bomb Group.   
 
The Boileaus had lived in the house since 1836; some family members apparently refused to 
move out and continued to live in part of the house for the duration. The interior was 
remodelled for use as the operational HQ, whilst the ubiquitous Nissen huts and ancillary 
buildings were sited in the parkland, mostly under the cover of trees. The ground floor of the 
Hall housed the Operations Section, War Room and Intelligence Section. The Chapel, built 
by the Boileaus in 1840, was employed as the operations room and a mezzanine floor 
constructed to allow USAAF officers a view of a large operations map. Over the main 
entrance, at first floor level, was the office of the Division Adjutant General. On the same 
floor were located the offices of the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff and Deputy 
Chief of Staff. On the second floor were the senior officers’ quarters along with a small 
dining room. At any given time there about seven hundred military personnel were stationed 
at Headquarters. The Boileau family members lived in the wing facing the pond, whilst the 
Annex housed the Signals Section. The Hall was returned to the Boileau family post-war but 
the estate was sold to the Duke of Westminster in 1948. After being used as a school it was, 
in 1968, sold to Lotus Cars.
253
 No mention of the important hierarchical occupation of 
Ketteringham Hall is made in Burke’s and Savills. The house remains structurally intact. 
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Fig,82   Ketteringham Hall (www.lostheritage.org.uk)  
 
Kimberley 
Prisoner of war camps were few and far between across Norfolk.
254
 Kimberley Park was 
requisitioned for that purpose, latterly hosting Italian PoWs in designated camp number 132, 
in huts under the trees by the drive.
255
 The extent of the encampment is not clear, though the 
scale of land use was by no means as extensive as that at, for example, Wolterton or 
Blickling. Aside from military use in wartime, much of the Hall’s extensive parkland was put 
under the plough. Part of the core of the park, along with areas of the deer park to the east and 
the river valley to the north have been retained as or returned to grass whilst the remainder 
remains agricultural land.
256
 There is still a good deal of surviving woodland, boundary belts 
and plantations. The landscape is essentially unchanged from Lancelot Brown’s design of the 
1780s, with even earlier mature oaks and limes still in situ.  The house however suffered, 
presumably at the hands of the prisoners’ guardians. John Wodehouse, 4
th
 Earl of Kimberley, 
was not impressed when he returned home from active service. He wrote ‘I couldn’t have 
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dreamed of the horrendous mess it would be in. It was in a terrible state.’ 
257
 The Ministry of 
Works agreed to pay up to £10,000 compensation. The house needed re-roofing and every 
window had to be re-glazed and painted. Soldiers had apparently wandered up on to the roof 
and punctured the lead sheeting, causing leaks. The mahogany doors of the library had been 
used as dartboards by the soldiery. The Earl describes working with the estate employees to 





 Earl sold up in 1958. His bitterness and anger is clear, especially when writing of his 
outrage at having to pay death duties on his late father’s estate.
259
  
Great Glemham House  
There is one house, beyond Norfolk, that is worthy of mention because of the wartime 
connection between its owner, his civic role and changes wrought in the not so far distant 
landscapes of two separate parts of Norfolk. Great Glemham House, in East Suffolk had been 
owned by the 3
rd
 Earl of Cranbrook since 1914.
260
 The Fourth Earl, Lord Cranbrook, returned 
to the house on the outbreak of war, stowed the best furniture and paintings in the drawing 
room, and made the house ready for schools being evacuated from Leytonstone, London.
261
 
In the late Spring of 1940 the Army displaced the schoolchildren, whilst Lord Cranbrook 
took office as Eastern Region deputy regional commissioner, based at Cambridge. Officers 
were billeted at Little Glemham Hall, about three miles distant, whilst non-commissioned 
officers and enlisted men occupied the ‘big house’. There followed a classic example of, at 
best, negligence, at worst, vandalism, causing almost irreparable damage to the house. One 
night soldiers turned on all the bath taps and the resulting flooding led to serious ceilings 
damage. On another occasion, in an apparently genuine effort to be helpful, officers arranged 
for the dining room to be redecorated – in an ‘institutional, shiny, strong green up to dado 
height, and then brown – including stonework, fireplace and mantelpiece’. In 1945 the 
Cranbrooks returned to find the wet rot, banisters gone and floors wrecked.
262
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 Earl had been killed in an air raid in London, whilst a serving Army officer, and was 
himself paying off his own father’s death duties. 
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This is the same Lord Cranbrook who defended the rights of the expelled villagers of the 
battle training area north of Thetford and persuaded the military that the residents around 
Fritton Lake need not be evacuated when the area was required for secretive tank training.
263
 
There is no small element of irony in the Earl altruistically speaking up for others whilst the 
fabric of his own family home was suffering. Despite initial despair, the family proceeded, 
patiently and philosophically, to gradually restore and renovate the house. 
 
Conclusion 
Relative to the number of country houses extant in Norfolk in 1939 is the proportionately 
small number that experienced intensive military occupation, given their geographical 
proximity to key military installations. Whilst sheer physical floor space and estates land may 
appear to be a pre-requisite for military use, the relatively low level of occupation may say 
far more about the general unsuitability of the country house as a facility. In truth, a large, 
draughty country house, with little or no modern heating or lighting, was a poor substitute for 
a proper military barracks with customised facilities. There were surprisingly few country 
houses lost in Norfolk before 1939. The peak period of destruction came in the 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s.  Williamson, Ring and Spooner indicate losses in the key relevant decades as 
follows: in the 1940s, fourteen demolitions, of which one caused by fire, and two which were 
demolished after having been unoccupied for at least twenty years; then in the 1950s, nine 
losses, of which three were to fire; then three further houses which were ‘severely truncated 
or restored from dereliction.’ 
264
 Of thirty-four houses wholly or partly demolished between 
1940 and 1960, fourteen were occupied by the military but occupation did not have an 
inevitable outcome of loss; many were in a dilapidated state before the war.
265
 
Hethel and Heacham Halls were a direct consequence of military use but a great series of 
demolitions followed from 1945; twenty-eight were completely demolished in the fifteen 
years to 1960, with a slowdown thereafter.
 266
 
At least two houses may be said to have been lost directly as a result of military occupation – 
Heacham and Hethel. In the case of the former, the owner’s widow was living at the hall in 
1937 and in the same year, part of the estate was put up for sale, with the hall’s contents 
                                                          
263
 See Chapter 4 ‘Military Training Areas’ 
264
 Williamson, T., Ringwood, I. and Spooner, S. Lost Country Houses of Norfolk p.20 
265
 Ibid. p.43 
266
 Ibid. pp.38,39 
259 
 
following the year after.
267
 In 1939 more of the estate as sold, following which the hall itself 
was requisitioned by the army. Soon after, the hall was requisitioned by the army, and 
accidently burnt to the ground in 1941. Fire was ever the enemy of the country house, 
whether occupied by owner or visitor, or empty. Hethel Hall was requisitioned as part of the 
airfield site but not arbitrarily demolished.  It was a small house, not much used by the 
Boileau family of Ketteringham Hall and it could be argued that its passing was not much 
noted.  A good deal of the park and woodland were utilised for USAAF accommodations and 
technical buildings. Little regret seems to have been expressed about the passing of Heacham 
or Hethel. 
More indignation has been expressed at the loss of Didlington, a major house by any 
measure. The drama may be seen in the speed of change in the sense that the Hall had 
expense lavished upon it in the 1920s, was occupied by the army in the Second World War 
and decayed rapidly thereafter. Didlington’s demise was as a result of a chronology involving 
a number of factors, of which military occupation was a major one. 
Rackheath Hall survived, and in the twenty-first century flourishes as multiple occupancy 
units, still retaining its structural integrity and appearance. The estate has long gone; the 
estate landscape had been radically changed by the USAAF’s concrete runways and attendant 
structures. If the will to return to estate farmland had existed, perhaps the estate could have 
been restored in part, but the death of Sir Edward Stracey in 1949 almost certainly initiated 
proceedings to sell. Therefore the cause is related to military occupation by cannot be solely 
ascribed to it. 
Summarily, many larger houses were too large and too costly to maintain. Few demolitions 
occurred before the Second World War however, notable examples including Gawdy Hall in 
1938 and Stoke Hall in 1939.
268
 The real period of loss was seen post-war through to the 
1960s, with the loss of twenty eight large houses.
269
 The success of the 1947 Agriculture Act, 
which guaranteed farmers a market and prices for their produce, accelerated the post-war 
boom in farming. The sale of land became viable to an extent not seen since the nineteenth 
century and estates became easy to dispose of. 
270
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The nebulous definition of the country house makes assessment difficult; many are smaller or 
secondary houses, often as adjuncts to larger properties, and others being larger farmhouses 
assuming the title of ‘hall’ or ‘house’.
271
  Williamson, Ringwood and Spooner authoritatively 
suggest a figure of 320 at the beginning of the war in 1939, which is very valid if the 
interpretation is that of an established country house with estate or attached farms. The 
accompanying, evidence-based assertion that under one-third were occupied by the military 
or for other wartime service such as hospitals, storage, schools or convalescent homes gives a 
sound base for quantification.  
Of thirty-four houses wholly or partly demolished between 1940 and 1960, fourteen were 
occupied by the military.
272
 This equates to a correlation rate of 41 per-cent but, as the 
authors point out, some of these properties were in a parlous state before requisitioning. 
Moreover, the familial connection between owner and house was easily lost over the 
duration, leading to further lack of interest in maintaining the property.
273
   
This, then, leaves a still lesser number of houses, probably no more than fifty, requisitioned 
for military use during wartime and occupied for all or a short part of the duration and most 
surviving intact with little or no recorded damage. The early part of the war saw 
predominantly army units in evidence, whilst mid-war onwards saw an increasing, and 
longer, R.A.F. presence.
274
 Moreover, based on an approximation of around fifty properties, 
now lost or extant, the loss ratio against military occupation decreases to 28 per-cent. 
Britain’s ability to survive through the Second World War saw the agricultural economy 
focussed on two all-consuming objectives – maximising production and productivity, and 
homeland self-sufficiency. This mantra set the trend for post-war agriculture and the 
aftermath of the Second World War saw farming booming. Concurrently many of the 
succeeding generation of landowners were less attached to their familial estates, seeing more 
clearly the prospect of a good sale. Final estate break up was then often followed by 
demolition of the house.  Few mansions were physically demolished during the agricultural 
depression; this became more the pattern after the war, with many notable houses 
disappearing. Boyland, Brooke Hall, Burlingham, Bylaugh, Castle Rising, Cranmer, 
Didlington, Feltwell, Garboldisham, Haveringland, Heacham, Hillington, Honingham, 
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Lord Lothian was all too familiar with the problems that faced the owners of the larger 
country houses even before the Second World War. He observed in 1934 that ‘within a 
generation, hardly one of these historic houses…will be lived in by the families who created 
them.’ 
276
 The war was five years distant.  
John Martin Robinson, despite offering military and other wartime occupation as the primary 
cause of wartime and post-war loss of houses, still offers a contradictory, yet positive 
overview. Whilst suggesting that the despoliation of country houses in the Second World War 
can find a parallel in the architectural losses of the Reformation:  
‘there is a resourcefulness, an exhilaration, a sense of achievement in this  
unique contribution to the war effort that…marks the five years between  




The experience of the country house in wartime leads to the next chapter, which assesses the 
impact of a two-fold pressure on the agriculture of Norfolk, that of land requisitioned for 








                                                          
275
 Kenworthy-Browne, J., Reid, P., Sayer, M., Watkin, P. Burkes and Savills Guide to Country 
Houses: Volume III, East Anglia p.83 
276
 Seebohm, C. The Country House: A Wartime History p.61 
277
 Robinson, J.M. The Country House at War p.2 
262 
 
Chapter 7 – Agriculture 
Introduction 
The demands of war had a dramatic impact upon the agricultural landscape of Norfolk and 
contributed to a longer-lasting legacy of farming practices. The war ended a long period of 
relative depression in agriculture and represented an unprecedented level of state intervention 
in the farming economy. The dichotomy was the competition between land required for 
increased agricultural production and, increasingly as the war progressed, that required for 
military purposes. Norfolk, as a predominantly arable county, already had a greater 
percentage of its countryside under the plough than most other English counties. It would 
also see one of the highest concentrations of airfield construction in the six-year duration.  
The agricultural scenario might be seen as a triangular relationship between the farming 
community, the War Office and Air Ministry which required land for military purposes, and 
the County War Agricultural Executive Committee (CWAEC) appointed to implement the 
requirements of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the durational Ministry of 
Food. It will be helpful to present an overview of the diverse state of British and Norfolk 
agriculture prior to 1939 as part of the chronology. Although reclamation of grassland and 
underused land for cultivation for wartime food production was not the result of military 
requirements, it was born of the same period of national crisis. A conflict of interest in land 
utilisation was therefore inevitable.  
This chapter explores the competing needs of the military and agriculture across Norfolk, the 
role of the CWAEC, the extent to which requisitioning of land was tempered by negotiation, 
and the impact upon contemporary farming, concluding with a brief insight into the post-war 
legacy. The relative effectiveness of increasing the area under plough versus yield or 
productivity, and the soil variations across the county, The impact of mechanisation and 
permanent changes in the landscape such as at Feltwell Fen and south Norfolk are also 
important and the discussion is complicated by the all-important question, dominant 
throughout agricultural history, of whether to increase productivity by bringing more land 
under the plough, or by raising yields on existing land. In wartime Norfolk, as the narrative 
will show, the competition for land between the farmer and the military would become ever 




Whilst international developments influenced Norfolk’s agriculture as much as any other part 
of the country, historic patterns of settlement and land ownership also directed farming 
practice.
1
 Farming was not homogeneous across the fifth largest English county, measuring 
more than seventy miles across at its widest, containing 1,307,333 acres of land; the different 
soils historically directed what type of farming was best suited to a particular region of the 
county. The ‘Good Sands’ of north-west Norfolk had been transformed to become highly 
productive under High Farming during the previous century, characterised by arable root 
fodder crops, barley and wheat, based on sheep-fold fertility. To the south-west of the county 
lay Breckland, with its poor, acidic soils making arable difficult, though not impossible, and 
featuring large expanses of heath. In the inter-war years Breckland was the subject of the first 
huge tracts of Forestry Commission plantings. The northern heaths extending northwards 
from Norwich and the Greensand strip in the far north-west were similarly ‘thin’ and 
characterised by large farms and estates. The estuarine marshlands to the far west and along 
the eastern seaboard provided excellent pasture as did Broadland itself.  The biggest region 
by far is that of the boulder clay running through mid-north, central and south Norfolk – 
fertile, heavy but tractable clay with perennial problems of drainage, and generally cereal 
growing.
2
 Finally, the southern Fens would prove to be spectacularly successfully subject to 
wartime reclamation. Mosby describes a preponderance of arable in every region except 
Broadland, the Northern plain and Breckland – though the last had 27,000 acres under the 
plough just pre-war, albeit on sandy, flinty soils; he also notes the ‘vast tracts of lands’ 
acquired for afforestation by the Forestry Commission. Overall, wheat was the principal crop 
and, despite the increase in grassland in the inter-war period, had begun to return to favour, 
with an increase of wheat cultivation of two to three thousand acres per annum between 1934 
and 1936.
3
 Norfolk was already intensely arable compared with other English counties and in 
1939 the demands on local farmers seemed impractical and illusory. 
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Secondary sources for the history of wartime agriculture in the county are plentiful and 
generally mutually corroborative but with emphases on different aspects of the agricultural 
chronology.  Susanna Wade-Martins’ and Tom Williamson’s assessment of the changing 
contemporary Norfolk landscape suggests the conventional image of pre-war agricultural 
depression is not entirely accurate, certainly not for the east of England.
4
 The Land 
Utilisation Survey of 1938 provides a comprehensive overview of agriculture in Norfolk in 
1938 but does not of course provide a comparison with the wartime years.
5
  L. Dudley-
Stamp’s post-war assessment, however, does give a summary overview of the dramatic 
changes the war brought nationally.
6
 The official history provides a detailed national 
background but very little specifically on contemporary Norfolk; it also, by its nature, 
presents an unreservedly complimentary view.
7
 Brian Short’s focus on the War Agricultural 
Executive Committees does much to shed positive light on their role as local intermediaries 
but less so on the inevitable tensions that arose in practice.
8
 Foot’s study of the impact of the 
military on agriculture nationally provides both background and observational data, though 
little of Norfolk.
9
  Douet’s chronology of twentieth-century farming in Norfolk charts the 
wartime progress of food production but alludes only briefly to the inter-relation with 
military land use.
10
 Primary sources at Norfolk Record Office comprise a collection of 
‘ploughing-up’ orders and a variable collection of maps related to the Norfolk War 
Agricultural Executive Committee’s surveys and assessments of farming activity on and 
adjacent to airfields. Unfortunately, the former represent only a fraction of orders issued and 
are useful illustratively but not as a quantitative measure. Almost all the maps have no 
accompanying supporting documentation; most are undated and appear to range from the 
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early war years through to the mid-1960s and much of the annotation is informal and 
inconsistent.
11
 The remaining records of the Norfolk County War Agricultural Committee 
(NCWAEC) hold no comprehensive register of which land was ploughed up voluntarily or 
compulsorily. The National Archives contain minutes of meetings, particularly for the early 
war years, and provide a helpful insight into the mindset of local committees when 
interpreting and implementing national policy. This chapter aims then to offer perspective on 
seldom-investigated aspects of the impact on the rural environment and, in particular, the 
direct competition between agricultural and military land-use requirements which has to date 
not been fully explored.   
 
Historical background  
The background to British farming’s wartime ‘revival’ can be set against the agricultural 
depression of the inter-war years, a deadlocked period in which no prospect of improvement 
was evident. Norfolk had been a leader in agricultural advances since the seventeenth century 
but the mid-nineteenth century Golden Age of high farming was over by 1880, with 
international market forces beginning to impact heavily – notably imported grain transported 
from the United States’ mid-western farms by the expanding railroad network.
12
 The 
refrigeration of meat also allowed cheap meat to be imported from across the globe. 
Subsequent depression saw rent incomes and land values falling, with the laying down of 
much arable land to permanent grass. The impact on the landed estates contributed to their 
decline as traditional exemplars of progressive agriculture, with land tumbling to dereliction 
as less grain was grown. Revisionist historians have, however, cast doubt on the idea that the 
late nineteenth century agricultural trend was unremittingly downward, in so far as it may 
have triggered adjustments or diversification to deal with changing times; and whilst cereal 
growers were impacted upon by cheaper imports, livestock farming suffered less and fruit 
and vegetables, poultry, pork and milk were profitable.
13
 The rail network made access to 
urban markets and longer distance distribution feasible; in the first half of the twentieth 
century, almost every rural railway station and country halt had a stock shed, served by a 
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siding. While the acreage of wheat had declined in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, permanent pastures steadily increased and, whilst sheep and beef cattle numbers 
dropped, dairying expanded, especially where railway stations were close by.
14
 Likewise fruit 
and vegetable production flourished and continued to do so. In the years leading up to the 
outbreak of the First World War, farms on the loam soils of the east of the county were said 
to be in reasonable order, and the light lands elsewhere were being well cultivated. The 
higher proportion of owner-occupiers in the heavier, more fertile areas of the county were 
concentrating on dairy and horticultural production.
15
 In essence, farmers could perhaps have 
claimed to have weathered the depression but were fearful of the future. Despite modest 
uplifts in the national agricultural economy prior to 1914 however, there was a steady exodus 
of farmers in the six decades to the Second World War. With little technological innovation 
to compensate, this was illustrative of an industry which was inexorably forming a smaller 




There was little in the early part of the First World War that hinted at any significant 
government intervention in agriculture. The value of the farming sector’s contribution to the 
national economy had remained fairly constant but with a declining share; between 1911 and 
1913 it amounted to just six per-cent.
17
 The outbreak of war could not fail to bring change, 
not least with supply routes from the United States raising the price of wheat, although given 
the laissez-faire nature of government policy, the start of hostilities in July 1914 did not have 
an immediate impact as it would twenty-five years later. Although the government began to 
encourage the production of cereals instead of livestock, the farming fraternity, given that 
mechanisation would be needed to plough large acreages of pasture, expressed a preference 
for continued dairy and meat production.
18
 The recommendations of the Milner Committee 
led to the establishment of a War Agricultural Committee for each county, but this did not 
occur until relatively late in the war, Norfolk’s being  constituted at the beginning of 1917.
 19
 
Farmers were directed to plough up sixty-two or more per-cent of their cultivable land but 
there were objections and material difficulties, not least because of a shortage of labour; some 
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farms were taken over by the Committee as would be the case in 1939-45. Just two of the five 
harvests during the First World War were driven by official production programmes.   
It had taken wartime necessity to bring about a resurgence in farming profitability and a 
future trend towards government intervention had begun. From the mid-1920s however the 
emphasis was on free trade and a non-interventionist policy though with some encouragement 
towards education, research and marketing of product. As general economic recession 
deepened, landlords found themselves reducing rents to keep tenants on the land.
20
 Two 
choices presented to farmers – increasing cereal acreage and reducing labour costs with 
mechanisation, or diversification.
21
 Some pursued the former course, with noted examples on 
the light soils of west Norfolk but overall, sugarbeet was the major success story from the 
mid-1920s, a rise in global sugar prices signalling a resurgence of interest in beet production 
which continued unabated. A cash crop, grown to contract as opposed to having to find a 
market and a price post-production, by the end of the 1930s it was the principal root crop 




Legislation, notably the Agriculture Act of 1931, Import Duties Act 1932 and Wheat Act of 
1932 saw a reversal of laissez-faire policy, reintroducing import duties, guaranteeing prices 
and introducing marketing arrangements and subsidies.
23
 The acreage of wheat in Norfolk 
and Suffolk increased in the first half of the 1930s but even so the overall acreage of arable 
was in steady decline. Primarily then, an arable county, Norfolk saw a good deal of arable 
land revert to pasture or grass. Generally, through the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, large farms were decreasing in number, and mid-sized holdings were often under-
capitalised; few could afford to mechanise. This last point is significant, as mechanisation did 
not replace horse-power overnight, nor indeed directly post-war. Summarily then, farming 
was unprofitable but not all was negative, as was promulgated by rural writers such as Adrian 
Bell and Henry Williamson.
24
 The move to diversification and away from tradition in the 
1930s proved to be a marker for the coming conflict. 
 
Equally important in sustaining inter-war agriculture was a diversification into fruit growing, 
market gardening or combinations of mixed farming such as pigs, poultry, eggs and dairy. A 
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new variation on small-owner, mixed farming emerged in the early 1900s. The large 
landowners and their tenants were still a traditional feature, and the market gardeners were 
flourishing but smallholdings quickly became established against the historic trend toward 
larger farms. Susanna Wade-Martins describes the movement as of cultural and social 
significance: 
 
‘unique in modern agricultural history…the only occasion on which we see  




The rationale behind their inception, that of halting the decline in the rural population and of 
small farms, the incentivisation of agricultural workers to take on their own tenancies and 
non-traditional workers moving onto the land, is redolent of a social intervention model 
completely contrary to earlier non-interventionist government policy. Other than the fear of 
losing workers to urban employment, it presents an apparent contradiction with the interests 
of large landowners. Norfolk County Council, though dominated by landed interests, 
displayed consistent commitment to acquiring and supporting smallholdings well beyond the 
Second World War and was a model of innovation; by 1946 the Council was the largest 
landowner in Norfolk, with 31,928 acres and 1,896 tenants.
26
 Norfolk was a model example 
of smallholding innovation. Smallholdings were concentrated on the rich fen soils of the east 
of the county, largely following an established tradition of market gardening, and on the 
Broadland loams in the east, with mixed farming, bullock rearing and market gardening. 
Smallholders were inevitably affected by inter-war depression as the larger owners and 




The seminal, immediately pre-war Land Utilisation Survey is positive about Norfolk 
agriculture in the later inter-war years. Of 1930s Norfolk, Mosby remarked that: 
 ‘…important changes were taking place in the land utilisation of certain parts 
 of the county. New aerodromes and many housing estates came into being, 
             mainly at the expense of arable land. The very worst phase of the agricultural  
 depression having been passed, certain fields which had been laid down to  
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 grass were broken up again. In Breckland thousands of young trees were  
 planted…. New orchards were planted in the east and old orchards uprooted  




That observation was made in 1938, when just four airfields were in existence in the county. 
A further thirty-four such installations would appear across the Norfolk landscape by 1944. 
The Land Utilisation Survey gives a total of approximately 708,443 acres of arable land in 
Norfolk.
29
 This was to prove a key element of the competition between land for farming and 
that required for military purposes – in a highly-arable county, owner-occupiers and 
landowners alike would be pressed to find even more arable land from within their holdings 
at the same time as land was being taken over by the military. 
 
The ‘revisionist’ arguments, in Norfolk or elsewhere, should not be taken too far. On balance, 
the seventy years to 1940 was predominantly a downward path, with internationally low 
prices and competition, and farming becoming an ever smaller part of the national economy. 
As a result, Britain was chronically unprepared, agriculturally, for the outbreak of war in 
1939. David Lloyd George had acute memories of the lack of early agricultural intervention 
in the First World War. He expressed his concern in the House of Commons during a 
discussion on government defence proposals in March 1936.  
 
‘I regret very much….that the Government seem to ignore completely one  
of the most important elements in the defence of the realm, and that is the  
provision of food…. I cannot understand why, when they are thinking out  
the whole problem of war and possible dangers, that the greatest danger  




He was not alone in this. European geopolitics was beginning to ring alarm bells and, 
recognising food production as an essential staple in time of war, preparations for wartime 
conditions had begun as early as 1936 when a Food (Defence Plans) Committee was set up 
under the auspices of The Board of Trade, charged with planning transportation, storage and 
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rationing of food for both civilian and military consumption.
31
  Agriculture was still not 
regarded with the same importance as manufacturing however; even in 1938 less than four 
per-cent of the population made a living from farming and it comprised just 3.2 per-cent of 
national income. Two-thirds of foodstuffs were imported.
32
 Farming was not seen as an 
important provider of food for human consumption – the concepts of ‘food’ and ‘agriculture’ 
were actually quite different, the first being seen as predominantly import-based and the 
second domestic. In practice, home production for food was to prove crucially important, 
though the government seemed less than worried about the threat to shipping than would 
subsequently prove wise. The Food and Supply Sub-Committee recommended the practice of 
encouraging soil fertility by livestock, thereby increasing the potential for arable should the 
war require it. The 1937 Agriculture Act provided for subsidised drainage, use of new 
chemical fertilisers and increased grain subsidies. Rapidly changing continental geo-politics 
including the Anschluss and annexation of the Czech Sudetenland in 1938, followed by the 
Munich Crisis, further conveyed a sense of urgency which was soon to be manifested in the 
loss of continental imports. The 1939 Agriculture Development Act enabled the purchase of 
machinery and fertilisers but perhaps most significantly, the Act provided a payment of £2 
for each acre of pasture ploughed for arable between May and the autumn of that year, in 
preparation for 1940 harvesting.
33
 Not only had land use been in decline nationally and 
locally for some years but, significantly, decline had continued from when preparations for 
wartime food production had started in 1936, compounded by 15,000 workers leaving the 
land in each of the three pre-war years.
34
 
Two broad challenges were set before Britain’s famers; the first to increase production to 
make the nation as self-sufficient in food for human consumption as possible, and the second 
to become individually self-sufficient in terms of avoiding reliance on imported feedstuffs for 
livestock.  As Dudley Stamp put it ‘The pre-war annual import of over eight million tons of 
animal feeding stuffs practically disappeared.’ 
35
 The measures taken from then on to 
encourage and enforce conformation to regulation and intensified practices demonstrate a 
level of state direction of a scale previously unknown.  The drive for increased food 
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production was a direct response to the justifiable fear of inability to import food and 
livestock foodstuffs, in the light of wartime geopolitics. By mid-1940 European trading 
partners were inaccessible to the British market and the risk to international shipping 
precluded reliance on imports from further overseas. 
  
State intervention – the County War Agricultural Committees 
The County War Agricultural Executive Committees (CWAECs) had technically never been 
disbanded after the First World War and were formally revived in 1939 to administer, 
implement and enforce government directives from the outset. Their first task was to 
encourage the ploughing-up campaign. Arable overtook livestock production, just beef and 
dairy being retained, whilst other livestock were greatly reduced. Stability came with produce 
prices fixed at agreed rates throughout the war. Each CWAEC’s committee’s members were 
drawn from the ranks of local land agents and key figures in the county’s agricultural 
community, directly appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
36
 The key 
operational point here is that the CWAECs were directly responsible to the Ministry, thence 
working at three levels; the executive of the Committee representing and directing operations 
at county level, then District Committees liaising with farmers at local level with 
representatives from almost every parish; and finally a range of specialist sub-committees 
with responsibility for machinery, land drainage, pest and disease control, building materials, 
fertilisers and training.
37
 It was then, with a prepared policy, that British agriculture entered 
the war. This was forward-looking, a de-centralised, dispersed structure of authority that 
worked because familiar, trusted faces were seen to be deliver change. It is also worth noting 
that whilst committee members were drawn from local agricultural interests, both public and 
private, from the political spectrum and the Agricultural Workers’ Union, they specifically 
did not represent their organisations, but were appointed for their experience and knowledge. 
Perhaps the most important figure to emerge in Norfolk’s CWAEC was Frank Rayns. 
Director of the Norfolk Agricultural Station before the war, his appointment as Executive 
Officer allowed him to have direct communication upward to the Committee’s members and 
downward to the District Committees. An American newspaper described Rayns as ‘being 
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responsible for the administration of the government’s policy in the most important arable 
county in England.’ 
38
 Well respected, he was instrumental in the long-term establishment of 
the sugarbeet industry in Norfolk and declined national appointment post-war to continue 
working locally.  
‘Rayns and Mann [Assistant Director] headed a team that dominated                                
agricultural development in Norfolk in the 1930s, during the Second  




Generally, the CWAECs were not resented by the farming community; rather the duration 
was characterised by a pragmatic co-operation.
40
 The CWAECs eventually employed their 
own labour forces, amounting to 35,500 in England and Wales by the end of 1943.
41
 At the 
extreme the CWAECs could send in their own workers to repossessed farms, but more 
usually were employed on major works such as drainage schemes, or hired out to farmers. As 
the war progressed, the employment of prisoners-of-war and the Women’s Land Army 
proved crucial to achieving the necessary levels of production.  
The CWAECs had conducted their own assessments of available and suitable land in 1939 
but a much more formal and far-reaching survey was planned from 1940.  The National Farm 
Survey of England and Wales 1941-43 arose directly in response to the CWAEC’s immediate 
needs.  Based on standardised forms and reporting procedures, and administered by the 
CWAECs, it was far-sighted enough to enable a thorough assessment of resource and 
capacity and to form a basis for post-war administration, planning and policy.
42
 Such was its 
importance it has often been referred to as a ‘Second Domesday’.
43
 It followed three 
principles – that of a farm survey record, a comprehensive agricultural census as at 4
th
 June 
1941, and plans of farm boundaries and fields, surveyed on holdings  of five acres and 
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upwards, around 290,000 in total across England and Wales.
44
 The parish summary from 
Stradsett is one example among many hundreds across the county and thousands across the 
country, all following a universal survey format. An arithmetic measure of acreage, crops 
grown, livestock, machinery and labour would prove invaluable to the CWAEC in assessing 
the capability and potential and the limitations of each holding. A more controversial aspect 
of the CWAECs’ activities was the grading of farmers according to their perceived abilities, 
and the implementation of measures to expropriate their land, and have it farmed by someone 
else if necessary. Many farmers were resentful of the grading process, others philosophical. 
Lucilla Reeve, farming in the centre of what was to become the Stanford Battle Training 
Area, was livid at being graded ‘B’. 
 ‘How angry I was about the way the farms were classed A, B or C. The  
 whole thing was a farce. ‘But you don’t know what the farm is like –  
 you haven’t seen it since I’ve had it. You must see the crops – there is  




The gradings were subject to constant review, with the aim of encouraging, coercing and 
otherwise bringing B- and C-graded farms up to the next higher standard and A-grades to 
maintain their status. In June 1941 seventy-six farms in the District north of Norwich were 
classified ‘C’ of which two were described as ‘termination certain’, twenty-two ‘certain or 
probable’, seventeen ‘unlikely’ and thirty ‘unlikely’.
46
  At the same time, in the south of the 
county, forty-three ‘C’ farms were under review, with two deemed ‘termination of possession 
inevitable and sixteen 16 possible.
47
  Some ‘B’ farm reports read not unlike like school 
reports, with descriptions such as ‘very backward generally’, ‘some improvement but still 
very late’ and ‘helps others and neglects his own.’ 
48
  These perhaps reflect the emphasis that 
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The Plough–Up Campaign 
The initial national plough-up target was 1,285,000 acres but, given that in the three years 
preceding the declaration of war half-a-million acres of arable had been lost, that objective 
would achieve only a net increase of 785,000 acres beyond the mid-1930s arable acreage.
49
  
It was not just about ploughing-up land however; a sustained emphasis on the use of 
fertilisers, research and mechanisation was needed. The national plough-up campaign 
eventually achieved an extra six million acres of arable crops across Britain between 1939 
and 1945, a figure unimagined six years earlier. The war ended with a net loss however of 




The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries directed that 20,000 additional acres of Norfolk 
farmland should be ploughed up. In the event, the county’s farmers far exceeded this, almost 
doubling the requirement in the following year.
 51
 It was Norfolk CWAEC’s task to 
implement this directive, although farmers, knowing their own land, were encouraged to 
make their own judgements on which acreages could be ploughed.  By November 1939 
inspecting officers were busy issuing certificates of approval. Even so, around one hundred 
instances of badly cultivated land or derelict farms were revealed, with some owners being 
untraceable.
52
 The CWAEC, based at Sprowston Hall for the duration and post-war, 
administered fifteen district committees, based on the contemporary local government Rural 
Districts, each with a staff of seven and incorporating 276 parish correspondents in all. 
 
A total of 148 cultivation orders are held at Norfolk Record Office. All carry a formal 
statement superseding existing agreements between tenant and landowner.   
Some of the more noteworthy examples are tabulated in Appendix 1, with cultivation 
instructions in italics indicating the precise detail of instructions issued.  A very few instances 
indicate very little time for completing ploughing and sowing, and may well serve to 
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underline the seriousness with which the CWAEC’s inspector perceives the failure to have 
put larger tracts of existing arable land to good use prior to inspection. The CWAEC 
ploughing-up orders that remain in the local archives appear to be all that remain of a far 
greater quantity actually issued across the county. A separate hand-written ledger of County 
Council smallholdings lists a further separate 361 farms subject to plough-up orders, of which 
just three are identified as ‘compulsory’.
53
  It is not clear whether the local authority had its 
own version of issuing plough-up orders but their tenants were subject to the same CWAEC 
directives as private tenants and landowner. These cultivation orders represent but a fraction 
of the whole and can only be taken as illustrative. By early 1940, for example, the number of 
cultivation orders issued across the county had already exceeded 1,200. Conversely, it should 
be remembered that in the first ‘round’ of ploughing-up, the initiative was met by voluntary 
effort on the part of many, perhaps most, tenant farmers and owner-occupiers, and many of 
those would have tried to bring in additional land where they could in successive years. 
Moreover, it is highly likely, with the CWAEC represented right down to parish level that 
many a cautionary or helpful word was passed by local War Ag officials to their 
neighbouring friends and farmers, never to be formally recorded in any ledger. Clearly, there 
were farmers who had not the means, technological or physical, to work the necessary 
changes to their land. Their written ploughing-up orders were very much a late resort 
measure, though by no means the last. A further recourse would be for the CWAEC to 
undertake the work itself and re-charge the farmers or landowner, or assist the farmer with 
machinery and labour. The final resort would be to take possession of the land and there are, 
in the minutes of the Committees at the National Archives, references to such action.  The 
ploughing-up orders canvass a wide area of Norfolk, from Walpole Highway in the west to 
Hickling and Ingham in the east, from Cley-next-the-Sea on the north coast to Alburgh at the 
Suffolk border. Throughout, the Morningthorpe, Hempnall and Fritton areas of south Norfolk 
figure large. In 1945 Norfolk County Council chairman Henry Upcher spoke of ‘much heavy 
land badly drained and badly bushed in the Hempnall district’ prior to ploughing adding that, 
subsequently, ‘90-odd acres of wheat in a block was a grand sight.’ 
54
  
As stated earlier, the County Council held a considerable amount of farmland, tenanted 
largely as smallholdings, amounting to more than 31,000 acres in 1945.
55
 They played their 
                                                          
53
 NRO C/VES 59 ‘Pasture ploughed up during 2
nd
 Great War 1939’.  
54
 Upcher, H. ‘Norfolk Farming’ Transactions of the Norfolk and Norwich Naturalists’ Society p.102 
55
 Ibid. p.98.   
276 
 
part. In 1944 George Reed of Ten Mile Bank, a farm worker who had taken on a  
smallholding of 39 acres, brought back twelve acres at Southery into cultivation and had: 
‘fought and won a ceaseless battle to make the soil of Britain productive ... 
in addition to growing wheat, potatoes, sugar beet, carrots, celery and  
onions for the nation, he grows oats and mangolds for his three horses,  
his two cows, his heifer and two calves; his sow and her litter of nine pigs;  




Upcher noted that in just a few cases occupiers were summoned before magistrates for non-
compliance, though under what regulation is not clear.
57
 The County Agricultural Committee 
functioned contemporaneously to the CWAEC and, though no direct references appear in the 
local authority archives, it seems perfectly feasible that the County Council might wish to 
appear to be ‘putting its own house in order’ to set a good example. There does appear to be 
an ambivalent relationship between the two bodies; the national representative body of 
county council agricultural committees was, in 1943, petitioning the Minister of Agriculture 
to rescind Regulation 28B of the Defence Regulations which allowed for the transfer of 
certain powers and staff to CWAECs. The County Committee expressed polite indignation 
that their ongoing co-operation with the CWAEC should be so rewarded.
58
 The County 
Committee was in fact dissolved on 1
st
 October 1947 whilst the duties thereto carried out 
would be delegated to newly-formed sub-committees of the Council.
 
The CWAEC continued 
its work steadily through the immediate post-war years, and continued in existence until the 
mid-1960s.
59
    
The focus of the early plough-up campaign, from May 1939, had been on tenant and owner-
occupier farmers; the results were thought very satisfactory, the exercise of compulsory 
powers being avoided as far as possible, most of the quota being achieved voluntarily through 
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the £2 an acre incentive.
 60
 Given, however, that not all rural landholdings were owned by 
members of the farming community, attention soon turned to non-farmer landowners. 
 
‘The proper procedure is that particulars of the land should be submitted with  
a view to service of an order on the owner, requesting him to cultivate the land.  
It would then be for the owner to arrange with some farmer or other person, to  
carry out on his behalf the requirements of the order.’  
61
    
 
Executive Officer Frank Rayns reported in October of 1939 that ‘Without being too 
optimistic I think I can say that Norfolk will contribute the 25,000 acres required’ stating that 
the District Committees had received voluntary promises to plough up 25,702 acres.
62
   
At this early stage of the war there was of course considerable capacity for extra ploughing of 
grassland, along with a category of land not familiar to post-war farmers, described as 
‘derelict’. Eight thousand such acres were reported by Downham District Sub-Committee.  
An unused acreage of this size would be unknown subsequently, as more and more land came 
into cultivation. The Ministry was surprised that so little derelict land across the county had 
been taken into cultivation and was keen this should be rectified as soon as possible. Rayns 
was clearly stung by this and retorted that ‘in Norfolk a large acreage of derelict land had 
been brought back to cultivation without recourse to compulsory powers.’ 
63
 
Two key points of discussion arose in the following month. Firstly, that of how much 
grassland could be ploughed up in 1941 bearing in mind MAF had suggested a further 25,000 
acres.  Secondly, the Livestock Feeding Stuffs and Supplies sub-committee warned of the 
implications for livestock, and that the Ministry would have to clarify whether livestock or 
cereals were to take priority.
64
 Frank Rayns reported in February 1940 that the total acreage 





 Sept 1939, amounted to 24,087 and the number of voluntary ploughing orders 
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 TNA MAF 80/1864 Norfolk War Agricultural Executive Committee, Minutes 4
th
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 Ibid. Minutes 21
st
 February 1940  
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recorded already exceeded 1,200.
65
 The total that year would provide 28,700 acres, nearly 
4,000 acres in excess of the minimum requirements for Norfolk.
66
 The extent of these targets 
even in 1939 further demonstrates that the local archives retain only a small fraction of 
Norfolk’s cultivation orders. 
There appears, from national and local archives, to be an informal distinction between 
‘Compulsory ploughing-up orders’ and ‘cultivation orders’. They are not synonymous. The 
former relate to specific acreages and field parcels, whilst the latter generally relate to a 
specific farm.  Likewise, the difference between voluntary and compulsory ploughing-up 
orders is often unclear. Often, a cultivation order appears to be subsequently formalised as a 
ploughing-up order.
67
   In the first phase of the campaign, before the outbreak of war, farmers 
of their own volition set land to the plough, incentivised by the £2 per acre government grant.  
Subsequently, voluntary ploughing-up was on occasion confirmed by a ploughing-up order. 
A routine visit by a District Officer or the Executive Officer might prompt a voluntary 
agreement which again might be confirmed formally.  Finally, land remaining uncultivated 
which came to the notice of officials and was deemed suitable for crops would be subject to a 
compulsory order, the detail being either negotiated or imposed, but still confirmed 
formally.
68
 Even more confusingly, an individual reference to ‘protective orders’ is unclear 
but in context might appear to be an encouragement rather than an ultimatum.
69
  It seems 
highly likely that often achieving the right outcome was more important than the 
administrative or bureaucratic methodology. 
Moreover, if a farmer persistently refused to co-operate, the land could be passed to another 
farmer prepared to work the land. A tenant at Cawston who did not fail, but refused, to 
plough seven acres, was to be the recipient of a ‘strong letter’. If he still refused, the land was 
to be handed over to Mr Harold Jones who was willing to cultivate the land.
70 
 It seems then 
that a cultivation order might be served upon either tenant or owner, but the rationale is not 
clear; it is possible that the order was served upon the individual who the District Officer met 
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on the day and in many cases this would be the tenant. Short of the complication and distress 
caused by a farmer being formally dispossessed, his or her land could be handed over to a 
neighbouring, more able and willing farmer. 
As the war progressed, the pressure upon Norfolk’s farmers and landowners intensified. The 
national food production campaign for 1942-43 prompted the following response from one 
district committee: 
‘Maximum utilisation of land under the plough would entail heavy calls on  
both men and machinery and … a wider adoption of the ‘Help your  
neighbour’ effort as there were ample tractors in the county if they were  
all kept fully at work.  Adjustments of cropping would be necessary on  
many farms to make them self-supporting for milk production and livestock.  




The issue of crop fires caused by enemy action, deliberate or otherwise, seldom arises in 
secondary literature and there is no documented record of recommended prevention 
measures.  The protection of crops from incendiaries was discussed at district committee 
however, with the suggestion that large fields of corn could be split up by cultivating strips 
with roots or other non-flammable crops.
72
  There is no record of this ever having been 
implemented as a local policy, and it would have disrupted the efficient use of land for cereal 
growing. A more traditional threat was dealt with by a specialist sub-committee addressing 
the very real concerns about pests – rats, rabbits, rooks, pigeons, and even sparrows – whose 
depredations presented a serious threat to growing crops and stored product. Warreners were 
held in very high regard and considered a priority for military exemption.
 73
   
An example of how the CWAEC would brook no deceit or concealment is shown in the 
example of one William Harry Moore, owning land in Forncett and Tacolneston, who had 
failed to comply with Direction Order no. 1245 and not reported ownership of three other 
fields.  The CWAEC resolved to apply for consent to take possession as there would be no 
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difficulty in finding another tenant.
74
 The minutes of the District Committees also clearly 
illustrate the range of sympathy accorded struggling farmers, as well as the swift responses to 
those perceived to be less than compliant.  No immediate action was to be taken, for example, 
with regard to the ploughing up of Marsh Piece at Hall Farm, Belaugh, as the tenant only 
‘went in’ on 11
th
 Oct 1939. Sympathy was extended to Mr W Pumfrey, Field Farm, Heydon. 
‘In view of Mr Pumfrey’s age, it was recommended not to call upon him to plough’.  
Conversely, Mr Pipe, tenant of Abel Heath Farm, Blickling, was requested to plough up 24 
acres of grassland opposite Blickling Hall and, if refused, an order to be served.  Then again, 
the case of a farmer at Wood Norton who: 
‘had been farming successfully and fairly effectively on this farm for 40 years,  
and as the poor state of affairs this year was due to a very late ploughing  
season and a very poor root year, he should be helped by sympathetic  




Significantly, smallholdings of less than ten acres were to be ‘encouraged’ but not compelled; 
it may be that the small and mixed quantity of product was been considered negligible in its 
contribution to the wider market.  
 
South Norfolk has historically been known to be an area of heavy, clay soil, difficult to drain. 
A farm of 121 acres at Stoke Holy Cross, just eight of which were arable, suffered from poor 
drainage with ditches and hedges in bad condition but the new tenant was thought capable of 
bringing it to standard.  Mr Rackham at Hethel had half his cattle on low marsh and the only 
pasture good for ploughing was valued for the cattle.  Some areas of urban and suburban land 
in greater Norwich came within the remit of Forehoe and Henstead District Committee, with 
potential housing sites and ‘other lands’ being considered for cultivation.
 76
 Woodhouse 
Farm, at Saxlingham Nethergate was swiftly taken possession of as no satisfactory results had 
been achieved by the occupier and similarly at Crane’s Farm, Newton Flotman.
77
  Another 
was told that if he failed to plough within fourteen days the Committee would do so and re-
charge him. 
78
 Conversely another farmer was described simply as ‘trying hard’.  Some 
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sympathy and flexibility was accorded ‘C’ graded farmers where there was evidently not 
much capacity to improve.  
 
The Limits to Expansion 
Both contemporary commentators, and later historians, have generally agreed on the success 
of the ploughing up campaign. Working the land, however, was distinctly different to 
clearing it. As the war progressed and more tumbled-down land was reclaimed, new 
specialist types of machine appeared on the land. Perhaps the most impressive and, in an 
ecological sense, the most destructive, was the Gyrotiller. Humphrey Jennings’ short film 
Spring Offensive, 1940 presents a vivid contemporary evocation of the initial work of the 
CWAECs and the plough-up campaign in the East Anglian landscape. Filmed at Moat Farm, 
Clopton in Suffolk, but undoubtedly representative of so many farms across the region, it tells 
of the creation and purpose of the CWAECs. A radio announcer reports the Minister of 
Agriculture’s appeal to famers to ‘trust the committees as friends and as men who know their 
job and to have patience and understanding. Their task is just as vital to national defence as 
that of the armed forces.’   There are no actors. The central character, Mr Martin, is seen to 
join the CWAEC.  When his committee colleague states that one-and-a-half million acres of 
grassland are required  and that local farmers need to be told to plough up at least ten per-cent 
of their grassland, Mr Martin observes ‘That won’t make us very popular visitors’. He 
subsequently visits his neighbours and fellow farmers, exhorting them to do their bit. 
Unsurprisingly he meets a combination of good humoured co-operation and downright 
obstinacy. In suggesting to one neighbour at an upstairs window that, if he ploughs up sixty-
four acres of his grassland he will receive the government grant of £64 in return, he receives 
the blunt reply ‘I’ll give you £64 to mind your own business and clear off.’  As the film 
moves to its conclusion, images of a semi-derelict farm are shown, the question is raised of 
the CWAEC intervening on recalcitrant or on behalf of financially constrained farmers with 
its own machinery, at which point the Gyrotiller appears as the harbinger of change. The film 
conveys the sheer physical size of the new machine, much larger and more powerful than a 
contemporary tractor, with huge contra-rotating scythe wheels digging deeper into the soil 
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than a conventional plough could reach.
79
 A 1943 colour documentary ‘Power on the Land’ 
also shows the Gyrotiller at work, accompanied by suitably stentorian music.
80
  
National attention focused on spectacular war-time attempts to reclaim marginal land, such as 
the drainage of Feltwell Fen.
81
 The Fenland areas of west Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and  
`
 
Fig.83  Fowler Gyrotiller.  The 225hp engine was far more powerful than any 




Huntingdonshire – an area of some 10,000 acres in all - were poorly maintained but their 
highly fertile soil proved a tempting reclamation project for the respective CWAECs. The 
draining of Feltwell Fen is the best-known example, wherein the Norfolk CWAEC reclaimed 
1,500 acres on the eastern edge of the Black Fen for growing wheat, potatoes and beet. 
Excellent harvests were produced.
83
 Hockwold and Feltwell Fens comprised the largest block 
of 6,000 acres, derelict for many years and not having been farmed since the failure of 
drainage pumps in 1915 when the River Ouse flooded the area.  The CWAEC surveyed the 
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area in 1940 to find the land in such bad order that local owners were reluctant even to admit 
ownership. Drains and ditches were cleared with dragline excavators and pumps installed, 
twenty miles of concrete roads were built to improve access and by autumn 1941 1,200 acres 
had been reclaimed.
84
 The herculean effort in reclaiming the land included digging out many 
ancient bog oaks and the use of heavy duty Jumbotrac double-furrow ploughs.  Anthony 
Hurd’s detailed, first-hand account reflects the interest shown nationally in the project.
85
 The 
Fens were never allowed to revert to their derelict state and it can be argued that their 
reclamation changed the social and community structures of the region. There is an important 
point to be made in the context of the competition with the military for land use; the RAF 
would never consider using such vulnerable land for airfields – the nearest being RAF 
Feltwell, sited on safer ground to the east – and the army would not, for the same reason, use 
it for military training. The Fens would never be at risk of requisition by the military. Much 
the same could be said of marsh areas. Around seventy per-cent of 278 acres of Holkham 
Marshes were to be ploughed in 1940 and three years later Wiveton Marshes were said to be 
capable of cultivation after drainage by a drag line excavator.
 86
 
Other dramatic schemes of improvement occurred elsewhere. In the north-west of the county, 
five hundred acres of Massingham Heath were ploughed; Dersingham, North Wootton and 
Snettisham marshes were drained and ploughed.  In the east, land at Waxham and Palling 
between New Cut and Hickling had reeds cleared and burned, then ploughed and grassed, 
primarily for dairy production. To the north, Ridlington Common was ploughed in a 
partnership between farmer and CWAEC. At nearby Thwaite major drainage work, along 
with the removal of trees and gorse led to ‘a wonderful crop of oats’. The south of the county 
saw Wacton Common cleared by the CWAEC and four hundred acres at Woodton Hall Farm 
taken over by the committee.
87
  Not all common land was suitable for cultivation but efforts 
were made to exploit its possibilities. One hundred acres at Buxton Heath, north of Norwich, 
were considered but deemed of questionable value because of poor soil.
88
  Briston, Melton 
Constable and Sculthorpe Commons totalled 200 acres but were considered unsuitable for 
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plough-up, comprising as they did sand, gravel and heather and Sculthorpe particularly 
boggy.   
The plough-up campaign knew no class favouritism despite the presence of some landed 
figures on the committees.  Country estate owners were said to have done their share. 
Blickling, Barningham, Elmham, Felbrigg, Gunton, Holkham, Melton Constable and 
Sandringham saw some plough-up on the estate lands.
89
  The parkland immediately adjacent 
Wolterton Hall, that not directly occupied by the military, was ploughed up as part of the 
intensified agricultural effort.
90
 A photograph in the family archive shows land under the 
plough right up to the piazza.
91
 Although most of Rackheath Hall’s suitable areas were being 
grazed by cattle, in mid-1941 Sir Edward Stracey offered 57 acres for ploughing, with more 
to follow. A ploughing-up order was served for the land offered plus an order for a further 
forty-three acres.
92
  All this was to change later when the Air Ministry decided upon 
Rackheath for an Class A airfield site. Areas of Kimberley, Ketteringham and Great Melton 
parks were deemed suitable for ploughing, as were those at Beeston and Horstead.
93
  Sir 
Dymoke White of Salle Estate features repeatedly through 1941, beginning with a failure to 
use phosphates supplied and not ploughing grassland as requested; reference was made to the 
‘deplorable condition of [his] hedges and ditches’, whereat he offered to sort out the ditches 
but was happy for someone else take over the ploughing.
94
  Dunston Park sustained cattle 
across 110 acres, described as very poor land, covered with trees. Some ploughing had been 
done and the district committee decided not to ask for more. Forehoe and Henstead District 
details more such examples, where cattle were farmed, often on poorer land or marsh, and no 
more would be asked of those farmers.
95
 East Carleton Manor had fifteen acres ploughed but 
210 acres remained, given over to a large, accredited poultry flock numbered up to 5000, 
which the committee felt was acceptably productive both in quality and quantity.
96
  Though 
Henry Upcher made much of country estates being ploughed there is little evidence of this 
happening on any great scale, with perhaps Blickling and Kimberley being notable 
exceptions and part of Sandringham’s private royal golf course was ploughed to grow oats 
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 There was clearly more capacity on some large estates however; Williamson’s 
study of Norfolk’s parks’ archaeology shows numerous surviving older earthworks which 
would not now exist had they been ploughed out during the war. Gardens had already been 
simplified, many being ‘grassed down’ with little incentive to turn grassland to arable until 




Fig.84 South front of Wolterton Hall 1946 
99
 
Though there is little evidence of large-scale tillage on estate lands, in the cases of Wolterton 
and Blickling for example, extensive areas of parkland were taken up with, respectively, 
army and RAF encampments.   
The importance of fruit and vegetables to a balanced diet was not overlooked, even if the 
emphasis on arable crops as the prime means of feeding the population saw them somewhat 
marginalised. Captain Cator at Ranworth asked to plant thirteen acres of blackcurrants and 
was given permission for 4½ acres in 1939 and 1940 providing an equal amount of land was 
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grubbed up and the bushes interplanted with a food crop.
100
 Applications were received for 
small acreages of strawberry growing at various West Norfolk locations and at Cawston, to 
the east, along with blackcurrants at Cawston, Salhouse and Hickling and raspberries at Great 
Plumstead and Surlingham near Norwich. Growers were no more exempt from problems than 
arable farmers however and Allen’s Nurseries at Bracon Ash and Mulbarton were taken into 
possession for cultivation in 1942.
101
  In 1944 fruit and vegetables accounted for just 2.5 per-
cent of national calorific output but then so did milk, eggs and wheat.  42.5 per-cent of 
calories came from wheat, simply because of its share of acreage.
102
 One Norfolk farmer 
noted that, whilst her own arable fields were to be requisitioned by the Army, the otherwise 
sympathetic CWAEC official let slip that her neighbour’s fields of asparagus and 
blackcurrants were not to be taken over. 
103
  The importance of fruit and vegetable crops 
should not, then, be overlooked. 
While the arable acreage within the county did increase, the scale of expansion is difficult, in 
the absence of surviving records, to assess.  Comparisons between the RAF aerial survey of 
1946 with First and Second Edition Ordnance Survey maps and the pre-war Land Utilisation 
Survey maps indicate areas of land uncultivated pre-war. Close examination shows extensive 
areas of marginal land – heath and marsh – some of which could have been cultivated, but 
were not. This seems curious and raises questions that can perhaps only be answered 
speculatively.  First, it is entirely possible that, given the impetus of the initial plough-up 
campaign, much of the land ‘taken in’ early that already bordered working land was therefore 
easily accessible. Moreover, once the early plough-up targets had been reached and indeed, in 
Norfolk, exceeded, there was little reason to pursue a policy of taking-in all potentially 
workable land when resources would be better employed making most efficient use of the 
already-reclaimed land.  There was no need to plough every last unused field and meadow, 
drain every last marsh and fen and clear heavy scrub and thorn where the effort would 
produce no return on effort invested, or when there was no capacity to work it.  
One piece of archaeological evidence demonstrates clearly that not all permanent pasture was 
ploughed.  Ridge and furrow, closely associated with mediaeval and post-medieval strip 
farming, survived into the twentieth century at a number of locations across Norfolk, 
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particularly in the west of the county.
104
 These ridges would not have been ploughed since 
being laid to pasture and the strong presence of such sites in the west of Norfolk is explained 
by the retention of more land as permanent pasture than elsewhere; this is borne out by 
Mosby’s map of pasture in 1937.
105
 The war had little if no impact upon these areas of ridge 
and furrow. Records indicate that such damage and loss that has been incurred to ridge and 




Figs. 80, 81, 82 and 83 (below) show sections of the 1937 Land Utilisation Survey Map 
(Norfolk). Estimated additional land ploughed up in four different locations in the county 
between 1939 and 1946 outlined in RED.   
Land Utilisation Key: 
Light brown  = arable land 
Yellow          = heath, commons, rough pasture  
Green            = woodland 
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                 Fig.87  Smallburgh and Hickling area of east Norfolk 
292 
 
It should be noted that the interpretation of the RAF aerial survey is not conclusive due to the 
fact that the images are monochrome; colour photography would make land use identification 
much easier. The photography would seem to have taken place during or just after harvest - 
many fields appear to show standing stooks or sheaves waiting threshing. Other fields present 
apparent cultivation patterns, though often with different shading, perhaps indicating a 
harvested and emptied field, an area awaiting harvesting, or different types of crop. 
Woodland, marshy areas and commons are much clearer. Extant pasture can often be 
identified by clear livestock tracks, indicating contemporary use. The areas that are less easy 
to identify are pasture adjacent to arable, and therefore potentially cropped but not visually 
distinctive.
  
Mechanisation and Labour 
Mechanisation was a long time coming; despite the introduction of steam-driven traction 
engines in the second half of the nineteenth century, most of those worked ‘on the belt’ 
powering threshing machinery in the fields. By the mid-1930s, though petrol-driven tractors 
and stationary engines were well in evidence, the horse was still the predominant motive 
power throughout the farming year, with 700,000 nationwide drawing cultivators, seed drills, 
balers and threshers.
107
 Tractors were concentrated in the arable areas of the eastern counties; 
the government had taken a census of in 1937 and the following year was proposing to 
requisition tractors from the east to be deployed in other regions. An unworkable and 
unpopular scheme, this was replaced by a government contract with the Ford Motor 
Company of England to provide a reserve of tractors.
108
  Even so, by 1941 Ford would 
experience nearly a year’s backlog of orders, such was the demand. A desperate shortage of 
tractors and associated equipment was, then, a feature of the early war years and Norfolk 
CWAEC was seriously concerned about its impact upon ploughing-up capability.  
 
‘The Committee desires to call the attention of the Exec Cttee to the serious  
shortage of tractor ploughs. Although many are on order from dealers it is  
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Ransomes, Sims & Jefferies explained that large stocks had failed to meet the demand and 
that staff, working late into the night, had not been able to provide adequate output. 
Freebridge Lynn and Swaffham Districts reported early in 1940 that farmers did not have 
enough tractors and ploughs to cope with requirements. Frank Rayns subsequently placed an 
advertisement in the Eastern Daily Press and the Lynn News asking farmers experiencing 
difficulty to contact him.
110
 The shortage of plough parts and the need for temporary release 
of men from the army created its own crisis.  
‘This committee is most seriously disturbed to find that despite applications  
no key men have been released to help with Spring sowing. This Committee  
wishes to warn the Executive Committee that unless these two matters are  
dealt with at once, the required cultivations and food production asked for  
will not be secured this season.’ 
111
    
 
The shortage of tractors would continue for the time being. Even so, in early 1940 the 
Executive Officer secured the release of more than 150 tractors to Norfolk.
112
 What is less 
known is that there was also a shortage of drivers. The county’s labour force had been 
steadily decreasing since 1933. Secondly, despite agriculture being a reserved occupation, 
wartime military manpower demands had the potential to greatly exacerbate the loss.
113
 A 
third factor, particularly for the eastern counties, was the number of agricultural workers 
lured to comparatively well-paid airfield construction jobs throughout the war.
114
  Some were 
said to be earning £3 a day on airfield construction and the committee considered whether 
action could be taken to obtain their release for ploughing.
115
 Additionally, unemployed 
agricultural workers were refusing to take up available farm work and choosing to work as 
general labourers on aerodromes for higher wages; they could not be compelled to work on 
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  Contract firms were available to help with ploughing but it was only a partial a 
solution, and no precise figures of manpower loss to airfield construction have come to light. 
This manpower crisis is a prime example of resource conflict between the interests of 
agriculture and the military. There is no simple correlation that might suggest increased 
mechanisation somehow compensated for the loss of manpower to the military. The 
Women’s Land Army was not extensively present in Norfolk but as the war progressed 
greater numbers of German and Italian prisoners-of-war were deployed to the land. Their 
contribution has not been quantified but certainly in north Norfolk  PoWs workers were much 
needed for multi-tasking on small farms.
117
   
Generally, mechanisation was slow and for many farmers not an economic option and many 
large landowners lacked the finances to invest in infrastructure and technology. Whilst a 
tractor was undoubtedly faster than horses, it required oil and petrol rather than fodder and 
had nowhere near the same productive working life.
118
  Nevertheless by 1945 there had been 
a three-fold increase in their number, along with dramatic increases in associated and new 
types of machinery.
119
 The displacement of horses by tractors enabled ploughing, planting, 
cultivation and harvesting to be completed more quickly and economically, and at the right 
time. There were about 52,000 tractors working across Britain in 1939; by the spring of 1943 
this had more than doubled, to 125,000, equating to an additional 2,000,000 horsepower 
available to the land.
120
 By 1944 there were over 175,000 nationwide.
121
 Norfolk was already 
advanced in the numbers of tractors deployed across the arable landscape, with around 3,000 
in evidence at the start of hostilities, rising to 4,500 by 1942 and to 6,800 by 1944.
122
 Of 
specific relevance to arable, at the beginning of war there were about 150 combine harvesters 
across Britain; by 1943 this had increased by a factor of ten.
123
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Mechanisation would help offset labour shortages especially when combined with more 
sophisticated use of artificial fertilisers as substitutes for the traditional use of by-product 
from imported feedstuffs.  None of this should be surprising in a war characterised by leaps 
forward in the availability and application of new technology in civilian and military theatres. 
There is however additional significance in its longer-term effect on farming practice in the 
post-war years. As the official historian puts it:  
 
‘This was a change of revolutionary consequence to systems and techniques of 
 farming, not only during the war but in the succeeding years as farm workers  
continued to leave the land, as the number of hours in the working week was  





Motorised technology undoubtedly contributed to in the longer term towards larger fields and 
the modern ‘prairie’ style farming. Tractors and combines cannot easily manoeuvre in the 
same limited space as horses, and unrestricted movement is efficient. The trend to larger 
fields had started before the war but the rapid loss of hedgerow in Norfolk’s fields 
accelerated in the three post-war decades. 
 
The competition for land – the military, the CWAEC and MAF    
Laurie Lee wrote prosaically of the loss of good British farmland, describing it as a 
‘shrinking commodity…consumed and lacerated by spreading cities and aerial roads’.   
Summing up the immediate pre-war situation succinctly he wrote ‘There was never so little 
of it as when the war began. And never before did we need so much.’  Then: 
 
‘The first thing war did was to seize a great deal more… aerodromes,  
requiring thousands of flat dry fields, obliterated many farms… land  
was used up in essential preparations for defence and attack, in the  
siting of batteries, searchlights, camps, store-dumps, radio-location  
and battle-practice grounds.     
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Since war began, several hundred thousand acres have been completely  
lost to food production in this way…’ 
125
 
Professor L. Dudley Stamp put it more succinctly. 
 
‘…the very large loss of agricultural land to the fighting services, especially 
for airfields and landing grounds, must be recorded. Apart from large  
tracts many small pieces of ground were required for searchlight stations,  
anti-aircraft posts, strong-points and so on. These areas, though small, often  
caused serious hindrance to efficient farming.’ 
126
   
 
The exponential growth of airfields, described in Chapter 3, subsumed in excess of 21,000 
acres of Norfolk’s available agricultural land. The Stanford Battle Training Area alone 
accounted for 18,000 acres, controversially the permanent displacement of the residents and 
farms of six parishes. The plethora of coastal and inland anti-invasion defences – pillboxes, 
gun-sites, searchlight sites, prohibited areas, took still more. Almost all the considerable 
acreage of agricultural land taken by airfields was arable. Comparisons with the Land 
Utilisation Survey of 1931-34 indicate that thirty-one (of thirty-eight) airfields appear to have 
been exclusively so, though some with nominal, marginal sections of indicated 
meadowland/permanent pasture.  The exceptions to the rule are few. RAF Hethel appeared to 
have an equal proportion of arable and meadowland lost to the airfield; Hardwick was mostly 
meadow/grassland, located centrally in an area which came to see one of the most dramatic 
long-term landscapes changes from ‘tumble-down’ to intensively farmed cereal production; 
North Pickenham appears to have a significant proportion, perhaps one-third, of its 
operational area, as heathland. Snetterton Heath, alone, was built on an equal proportion of 
meadow/grass and heath, with a woodland covert also being subsumed in the flying area. Of 
the pre-war Expansion era airfields, Feltwell, Marham and Methwold in the west of the 
county were sited on entirely arable sites, as were West Raynham to the north, Swanton 
Morley, and Coltishall and Matlaske.  Horsham St Faith and Watton were sited on 
predominantly arable land, each with a minor element of existing meadow or grassland. The 
single RAF site which was built on land comprising entirely grassland was Pulham – not an 
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airfield, but a pre-existing airship and communications station, and from 1939 a maintenance 
unit for disposal of damaged or written-off aircraft.
127
  
By 1941, the year preceding the busiest year of airfield construction, the ‘land grab’ was at its 
keenest.   Some flexibility was demonstrated on the part of the Air Ministry in their dealings 
with the CWAEC and the CWAEC officers were engaged in land ‘trade-offs’ with the Air 
Ministry.  Old Buckenham was under discussion in September 1941 when it alleged that 
three of the four farms affected were in a good state of cultivation, and construction would 
entail the destruction of a number of buildings and cottages. The CWAEC offered no 
objection provided Deopham was not taken. It was suggested that the north-east to south-west 
runway could perhaps be moved and the companion runway designs revised.
128
 Deopham 
was of course built anyway, with 437 acres, mostly arable, and eleven farms and 
smallholdings being subsumed. On this occasion the CWAEC objected strongly at the loss of 
‘some of the finest land in mid-Norfolk, intensively farmed.’ 
129
 The airfield at Snetterton 
Heath would initially cover three farms, 356 acres of woodland and sixty-six acres of ‘waste’, 
whilst Thorpe Abbotts would entail some 448 acres and five farms. The CWAEC offered no 
objection to either on agricultural grounds.
130
 The proposed airfield site at Seething, 
described as ‘cold, heavy clay, very wet and drainage required’, would see fifteen farms and 
smallholdings disappear. Once again, the committee made no objection but asked that every 
effort be made to exclude the fields of Derrins Farm where a good herd of cows resided. In 
the north of the county, 388 acres at Sculthorpe described as ‘average, light loam soil, some 
derelict but now producing good crop’ were proposed as an alternative to the Air Ministry’s 
intended site comprising three hundred well-farmed acres at Great Snoring were left alone as 
a prospective aerodrome site.
131
 
A secret and confidential MAF memorandum regarding the Air Ministry’s 1941 expansion 
programme lists sites selected in Norfolk for development by the Aerodrome Board. Some 
were to be acquired and developed prior to harvest, with others deferred until after 
September. To ensure the minimum of wastage of growing crops the CWAEC District and 
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Executive Officers were urged to contact the Superintendent Engineer at the earliest 
opportunity. These engineers were instructed by the Air Ministry to give every practicable 
attention to local agricultural interests ‘but you will no doubt appreciate that the Air 
Ministry’s requirements must have precedence.’ 
132
   
‘...under war cabinet decisions, the Air Ministry remain [sic] the sole  
judge of their own requirements under the general directions given by  
the Prime Minister and we cannot have an independent authority to  




Frank Rayns, Executive Officer of Norfolk CWAEC wrote to the Air Ministry requesting 
clarification of decisions, specific to airfields that might unnecessarily disrupt agricultural 
production.
134
  Short notice was the chief issue. For example, the first official notification that 
North Pickenham was under consideration had been received on 26
th
 September, just two 
weeks after an informal visit from a junior Flying Officer.  There was no negotiation process 
for Deopham Green, simply a notification.   
Of Thorpe Abbotts, Rayns wrote that it had been: 
‘known for some months that (the site) is under consideration but replies  
from the Air Ministry just say no decision has been made. We have  
continually been stressing the importance of a decision at Thorpe Abbotts,  
for the time has come when land of that character must be cropped,  
much of which should go in with wheat, if the Air Ministry do not want it.’   
 
Tattersett, also under consideration for some months,  was 
‘farmed by an extremely progressive young farmer who has been looking  
for another farm since he felt he would lose his at Tattersett, but has  
been unable to make a decision for he was left in the air as to whether  
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At Seething the CWAEC had been spending considerable sums of money improving the area, 
including clearing bushed lands. Again, it was known that the area had been surveyed by the 
Air Ministry but the CWAEC could obtain no information, and staff were waiting to drill. 
‘Pending a decision of the Air Ministry farmers are naturally not inclined to  
spend money on cultivations, seeds and manures. Indecision at seeding time 
 is a most serious type of indecision, and I am most anxious to minimise the  
loss of agricultural land in Norfolk as much as possible. The total loss due to  
defence measures is really alarming, but I know of course, that defence 
measures are paramount.’ 
 
There were also problems with contractors starting work on farmland without authorisation 
from the Air Ministry. Bean, oat and barley sheaves had been cut to place under lorries to 
obtain better wheel grip. Rayns asserted that these were not isolated incidents citing Denton, 
Wendling and Shipdham in particular, and he expressed the opinion that it resulted from the 
Air Ministry’s inability to make up its mind about aerodrome sites. This is an important 
point, raising once again the issue of confusion and misunderstadning caused by poor 
communication, with contractors apparently being informed ahead of the CWAEC and 
individual farmers about the requisitioning of their land.  MAF wrote to the Air Ministry’s  
Superintendent Engineer at Cambridge in July 1941 about disruption at Shipdham and 
Wendling, asking that the  
‘procedure for local consultation agreed between our respective Departments 
may be strictly observed in order to avoid the recurrence of complaints and  




MAF was able to clarify queries to Norfolk CWAEC  about each site in question.
137
  Shortly 
thereafter the Director General of Works at the Air Ministry made it unequivocally clear to 
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It is possible that this was a particular Norfolk problem because of the density , frequency 
and number of airfield sites required. Clearly some significant agreement had been reached 
on the importance of good communications, recognising that, whilst airfield construction was 
a priority, the most effeicient use of farmland was also of great importance. An example of 
the Air Ministry’s improvement in appreciation of the CWAEC’s concerns is demonstrated 
by a letter to Frank Rayns at the end of November 1941 which, while stating that the conduct 
of the war must take priority, offered to give better indication of when work need to start on 
airfield sites, and even to defer commencing construction until after harvest. It further 
confirms that ‘fair and reasonable’ compensation would be paid if deferment proved 
impossible.
139
  Assurances were given that compensation would be properly made in 
accordance with the terms of the Compensation (Defence) Act, 1939, but without excluding 
the possibility of land being purchased outright if needed; also that Air Ministry valuers 
would fully discuss with owners and tenants requisition notices and terms for occupation. 
Further, no action to requisition would be taken until a closer estimation of required dates of 
possession could be determined.  
Of Old Buckenham the letter concludes  
‘It is appreciated that a more definite indication of the Department’s intentions  
would be of value to the Committee and the occupiers, but at present this is  
not possible and it is hoped that the foregoing represents a practical  
arrangement in the interest of food production and in the avoidance of waste  




USAAF serviceman Robert Arbib observed at first hand an altercation between a farmer and 
a construction colleague and wrote: 
‘But that farmer was an oft-repeated symbol… refusing to believe what  
he knew was true, that the field he had ploughed for years, the soil that  
he had nourished and tended, the beets that he had planted and hoed  
and weeded, would soon be under eight inches of concrete.’ 
141
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On occasion the CWAEC’s direction saw the farmer caught between two agencies; Mr 
Holman, of The Belt, Aylsham said he could not comply with a cultivation order owing to 
military activity on the site. In other instances agricultural activity was constrained by the 
state of land after the military had moved on. The difficulty of cultivating vacated searchlight 
sites was discussed and the Executive Committee asked to approach military authorities with 
a view to leaving vacated searchlight sites in a cultivable condition.
142
 The chairman of one 
district WAEC expressed concern about deterrents to enemy aircraft landing. Very large 
fields at Overlands Farm, Bawburgh had no obstructions laid out but the military seemed 
unconcerned and the so matter was left.
143
 In early 1940 the question of grassland on 
aerodromes and golf courses was raised but not pursued. The cultivation of Foulsham and 
Weston airfields was discussed two years later but it was decided that the areas available 
were too small for cropping though could be seeded for hay.
144
  
The single great section of land requisitioned was that which became the Stanford Battle 
Area, discussed in Chapter 4. Edgar Granville, Member of Parliament for Eye, Suffolk, raised 
the question of the three thousand acres of land which would have to be abandoned just 
before harvest. The blunt answer from the Secretary of State was that the land would be 
needed before the harvest was complete.
145
 There may have been a perception that the War 
Office had selected what its lands officers assumed to be relatively unproductive agricultural 
land, and therefore less of a loss to agriculture, overlooking the recent improvements in 
Breckland, notably important dairy farms at Wretham and Bodney Hall.
146
 The War Office 
originally wanted some thirty thousand acres but Hudson, the Minister of Agriculture, 
negotiated this to 17,500 centred around Stanford. Controversially, the Norfolk WAEC was 
not informed until a very late stage, whereupon Messrs. Upcher and Christie objected. Of the 
acreage the military eventually wanted to commandeer, 8,600 were agriculturally productive, 
incorporating thirty-three farms, of which sixty per-cent were graded ‘A’ by the CWAEC and 
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 Almost three hundred acres had crops growing, approaching harvest. 
The CWAEC requested a delay of occupation until after harvest but this was rejected. 
A fundamental point is that the almost exclusively arable land subsumed by airfields, and 
tracts of land taken for army training purposes, were therefore not available for agricultural 
use. The first plough-up campaign took place very early in the war, nearly three years before 
the height of airfield construction in Norfolk. The need to bring in more land for food 
production was not therefore in any way a reaction against land lost to airfields, and training 
areas. It was an objective in and of itself.  However, good arable land lost to the military 
invariably reduced the ability of the county to further increase agricultural capacity. A 
conservative average estimate of the acreage covered by a wartime airfield is 500 acres.
148
 
More precisely, the average size of an Expansion era (between 1934 and 1940) grass airfield 
was 400 acres; by the war’s end, with many airfields having tri-axial concrete runways built, 
the landing ground area had increased to anything between 600 and 850 acres.
149
 West 
Raynham, for example, is quoted at 761 acres.
150
  Significantly, these figures do not include 
the myriad dispersed sites associated with each airfield. The total acreage therefore could 
easily approach 29,000 acres -excluding dispersed sites. Although the juxtaposition of 
cultivated crops and concrete hard-standing blurred the demarcation between military and 
agricultural territory there could be some collateral negative outcomes. It has been suggested 
that the uncultivated grassland within airfield perimeters ‘may have provided a breeding 
ground for rabbits ‘wreaking havoc on surrounding crops.’ 
151
 The basic premise for 
requisitioning land for airfields was that the Air Ministry paid farmers a rent based on the 
contemporary valuation, and thence on the assumption that it would be returned at the war’s 
end. In practice, the cost of restitution to an airfield’s former status could prove too high and, 
invariably, between 1947 and 1952 much of the land was simply bought from the owners at 
£35 an acre and the land licensed back.
152
 The amount of land lost to military activity needs 
to be viewed against agricultural land use before and, indeed, after the duration. Norfolk was, 
as stated earlier, traditionally an intensively agricultural county, subject to more intensive 
arable farming than most other areas of Britain. Dudley Stamp put it succinctly: 
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 ‘In the eastern counties all land which could be ploughed in conformity  
            was, in fact, under the plough and it has only been possible to increase 




Productivity and yield 
 
Tillage nationally increased between 1939 and 1945 from 8.3 million acres to 13.75 million, 
or 65.66 per-cent. The estimates of how much extra food was produced vary but in calorific 
terms it represented an increase in output of 70 per-cent.
154
 Essentially, the ploughing of 
grassland reduced the supply of meat, milk production was stepped up dramatically, and 
cereals, potatoes and sugarbeet became the major crops. 
A further succinct remark by Professor Stamp is devastatingly blunt in its retrospective 
implication:  
‘The government’s objective to put a million new acres of old grassland  
under the plough, and then more millions, caught the public imagination.  
But a 10% yield from existing acreage would have met the same result as  




In reality, there were two factors militating against the possibility of achieving such a growth 
in yields.  Firstly, even with the application of new fertilisers and pesticides later in the war 
years, fewer fields were being allowed a ley season, the land therefore not being ‘rested’. 
Secondly, even with new science and technologies, a ten-percent increase in yield is a very 
ambitious target in the most favourable of circumstances, let alone in the short term and in 
sustained time of crisis. The plan to put a million acres of grassland under the plough, and to 
add still more, became the fervent pursuit of almost every farmer and smallholder, along with 
the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign embraced by householder in town and country. The supreme 
irony is that a ten per-cent increase in yield on the existing ploughed acreages could have 
matched the increase in production gained by the ploughing-up of an additional one million 
                                                          
153
 Douet, A. Norfolk Agriculture, 1914-1972 pp.417-418, quoting Menzies-Kitchin, A.W. and 
Chapman, W. D., ‘War-time changes in the organisation of two groups of Eastern Counties farms’  
Economic Journal, LVI, 1946, pp.37-85.  
154
 Hurd,A.  A Farmer in Whitehall: Britain’s Farming Revolution 1939-1950 And Future Prospects 
p.94.  
155
 Dudley-Stamp, L. The Land of Britain: Its Use and Misuse p.405 
304 
 
acres. Production is about outputs, whilst productivity, or yield, is a measure of efficiency. 
Undoubtedly mechanisation, labour, natural and artificial fertilisers and improved drainage 
were significant contributory inputs.  Nationally, the total acreage of crops and grass changed 
little, in fact declined slightly, between 1939 and 1945. A dramatic increase of almost 49 per-
cent in arable land was mirrored by a 37 per-cent decrease in permanent grass and the acreage 
of actual tillage cropped increased by 57 per-cent from beginning to end of the war years. 
Dudley Smith asserts that:  
‘the decrease in the overall acreage of crops and grass in the war years was  
due primarily to the huge demand from the fighting services for land for  
airfields and training grounds’. 
 
adding the proviso that the loss of agricultural land was more than offset by that gained by 
reclamation.
156
 Nationally, nearly six million extra acres were ploughed up, through to the 
war’s end, but with a net loss of around half-a-million acres.
157
   
 
Conclusion 
Henry Upcher claimed that by the end of the war some 136,000 acres of Norfolk grassland 
had been ploughed.
158
 It is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of this figure but it probably 
represents a reasonable estimate. It is likewise almost impossible to accurately quantify the 
acreage of actual and potential arable lost to the military for, whilst the acreage lost to 
airfields and training grounds is calculable, that lost to coastal defences, often to several miles 
inland, along with decoy and dummy airfields, anti-aircraft emplacements, QF, Starfish and 
searchlight sites, is for the most part ephemeral. Many such sites disrupted rather than denied 
access to farmland, or were made available again before the war’s end; some 146 searchlight 
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What is clear is that by 1945 Norfolk’s arable acreage comprised 77 per-cent of farmed land, 
compared with 67 per-cent in 1939. Vegetable and potato growing had increased, the latter 
particularly in the east of the county.  The Good Sands region had seen arable increase from 
72 to 90 per-cent. Breckland’s barley acreage roughly trebled by 30 per-cent to 1947.
160
 The 
point is that Norfolk, with its already predominantly arable farming landscape, compared to 
counties beyond East Anglia, had less capacity to bring more acreage into cultivation and 
thereby increase output.  Norfolk was also a county very much subjected long term to land 
given over to the military. In the event the land gained by ploughing up had to be off-set 
against land lost to the military – 51,000 acres all told, comprising airfields, the Stanford 
Battle Training Area, disruption to agriculture several miles inland of the coastal belt, along 
with myriad sites for searchlights, supply depots and ammunition parks. Stanford alone 
accounted for 17,500 acres. Upcher’s claim of land ploughed indicates by comparison that 
approximately of all land use change in Norfolk during the war, about 62.5 per-cent was due 
to additional land under the plough, whilst military use accounted for 37.5 per-cent.  That the 
war had a profound effect on Norfolk agriculture and farming methods is undeniable, but it 
was prompted more by wartime food production targets than the military. 
Wartime changes in land use and faming technology and practice might almost be said to 
have constituted a second British agricultural revolution, instituting radical changes in the 
status and importance of farming. It was perceived by state and farmers alike that maximising 
the efficient use of farmland in pursuit of growing as much of the nation’s food as possible, 
without significance reliance upon imports, was a priority. The 1947 Agriculture Act 
enshrined this ethos, which set standards for the following five decades. The County War 
Agricultural Committees were not disbanded; their worth had been proved in wartime and 
their relevance in the new agricultural era was signified by simply omitting the word ‘war’.
161
  
Norfolk’s committees carried on well into the 1960s, still advising and supporting farmers 
about, and with, new technologies and practices. The Walsingham District Committee for 
example was investigating derelict land at RAF Langham as late as 1954 which the Air 
Ministry apparently intended to tidy up but then planned to acquire more land to extend the 
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runway for jet aircraft.
162
 The St Faiths and Aylsham Committee records its aim, twelve years 
after the cessation of hostilities: 
‘to maintain close contact with farmers in their areas and in co-operation  
with the advisory services to give leadership in the promotion of good  




The CWAEC had become the farmers’ adviser, mentor and overseer, but also its supporter 
and champion against the insistent requirements of the Air Ministry. Nominally disbanded 
after the war’s end, Norfolk CWAEC continued to operate for many years. The impact of war 
food production is still felt in the present.  In 2006 the 2,700 acres of the derelict Feltwell 
Fen,  considered worthless and reclaimed by the CWAEC in 1941, came on to the market 
valued at almost £10 million, a figure based upon it being considered amongst the U.K.’s 
most fertile and productive farmland.
164
 
This chapter differs from earlier chapters in its emphasis on both the impact of wartime food 
production targets as well as the military. In the following concluding chapter the connective 
themes throughout this thesis will be reviewed and summarised as integrated factors in 
Norfolk’s wartime landscape. 
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    Chapter 8  -  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to assess the impact of the Second World War on the 
landscape of rural Norfolk. It has chiefly discussed the changes brought about by 
militarisation, but has sought to do so against a background of the civilian landscape. Its chief 
objective has been to discuss together – under the umbrella of the landscape approach - 
aspects of the conflict that are normally treated in isolation. 
The combination of archival and official documents, cartography, computer-aided mapping, 
assessment of upstanding structures and reference to secondary sources has brought a 
corroborative element to this study which reinforces the validity of the conclusions. This 
could not have been objectively reached by using just one individual source. It also reinforces 
the value of the inter-disciplinary nature of landscape history. The research involved has 
revealed so much more that is of interest but, firstly, is not under the direct remit of this thesis 
and, secondly, would take more time and space than allowed here. The limitations have 
excluded discussion of, for example, airfield defences, searchlight sites, decoy airfields, the 
Home Guard and civil defence measures. As indicated in the introduction, this thesis has 
focused on the rural landscapes of Norfolk; the urban landscapes of the three major towns in 
the county – Norwich, Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn – have their own histories, already 
well documented but awaiting assessment from the landscape perspective. It has been 
possible to allude only briefly to aspects of collective memory, commemoration, culture and 
heritage of the Second World War; these themes have become increasingly important and 
popular as the conflict recedes from human memory. In the same vein, space has permitted 
only passing reference to modern themes of military environmentalism, the role of the 
modern military in the conservation of flora and fauna in militarised landscapes. But despite 
these limitations, a series of meaningful observations can be made. 
This thesis has demonstrated that landscape is indivisible from the human activity, in this 
case military and agricultural, that takes place upon it. The themes explored are not concepts 
but tangible historical and archaeological realities, intricately interconnected and the inter-
disciplinary methodologies have proved invaluable in assessing and quantifying the impact 
that each had on the landscape. Aside from the politics and governance that, inevitably for 
worse, bring about the circumstances of war, the essence here is very much about the human 
experience and the landscapes in which it takes place, whether these take place directly on the 
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battlefield or in areas of defence and preparation. These are very much the elements of 
landscape history and hopefully this approach may encourage further studies of twentieth-
century militarised landscapes in Britain, not in localised isolation, but as part of a wider 
conjoined local, regional and national context. 
Despite landscape history being inter-disciplinary, some writers have taken a more 
conceptual or metaphysical view of the relationships between the land and human activity 
and, in so doing, offered generalisms rather than precise analysis. Matless writes that ‘war 
shook up the geography of England, unsettling people and their objects, transforming 
landscapes, moving things to where they weren’t before’ but makes almost no reference to 
the physical impact of the military on the landscape, focussing briefly on agriculture and 
more extensively on future post-war planning and reconstruction.
1
 He also describes a 
consequence of war as being - along with other outcomes - the transformation of agriculture.
2
 
While such observations may be true, they need to be evaluated through the lens of region 
and place - and this is what this thesis has attempted to do. 
In taking this very particular ‘landscape approach’, this thesis has shown that while the 
Second World War is normally treated, especially by archaeologists, as one datable ‘horizon’, 
it is more profitable to see landscape change in terms of two time periods. The first, from 
1939 to 1942, was largely concerned with the needs of national defence in response to 
perceived German territorial aspirations. It was in this period that anti-invasion defences were 
rapidly constructed and in considerable number. Airfields were also part of this ‘defensive’ 
landscape but with operations confined to home defence, coastal patrols and minor tactical 
forays to the continent.  The second period, from 1942 to 1945 was characterised by 
offensive operations, in preparation for taking the war to occupied Europe and Germany.  
This aspect is most evidenced in the increased number and size of airfields and the 
requisitioning of key areas of land for training areas. The expansion of airfields was 
particularly dramatic as far as Norfolk was concerned, especially after 1943 with the 
beginning of the Combined Bomber Offensive. 
The idea of two periods of time is helpful but they should not be thought of as mutually 
exclusive, for none of the themes explored in this thesis existed in isolation. The discussions 
over requisitioning land for airfields while also retaining enough for food production, for 
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example, took place concurrently. Moreover, as successive chapters in this thesis has 
explored, each individual aspect has its own distinctive pre- and post-war history for which 
the Second World War was only a short-term episode. By taking this longer-term view, it 
avoids the misleading perception of the Second World War as an isolated, single causal 
event. This is not to underestimate the war’s material impact however; a uniform 
characteristic of the war years was an unrelenting intensification of application of resources, 
and hence pressure on the landscape, a theme that has recurred throughout this thesis. With 
this broad sense of period division in mind, it is worth reprising each element in order to draw 
out the overall significance. 
The anti-invasion defences explored in Chapter Two had a very short operational lifespan, 
albeit a crucial one, but the principle of anti-invasion defence in Norfolk reached back to the 
sixteenth century and before. What is also now being appreciated is the level to which the 
coastline was fortified during the First World War and so the ‘footprint’ of the defences of 
the Second was not so much new, but rather of a greater intensity and was a response to a 
modern geo-political environment. Here the ‘big geography’ is important as the neutrality of 
the Netherlands during the earlier conflict meant that Norfolk was more in the line of 
invasion from Germany than it was during the Second, when the traditional invasion routes to 
England from France and the Low Countries re-emerged. The number and density of Second 
World War defences in the very earliest part of the conflict – especially the number of Stop 
Lines that ran across the county - can to some extent be said to reflect the thinking of the 
previous conflict. Thereafter, Norfolk was less vulnerable and this is reflected in the material 
evidence.  Although the typologies of anti-invasion defences were broadly universal across 
Britain in terms of their approved design, construction and use, there is considerable regional 
variation in the their strategic siting, deviation from Department of Works design drawings – 
notably with ECDBs and pillboxes – and use of local materials. Even operational chronology 
varies, as seen with the continued construction of pillboxes in Norfolk through to mid-1941 
when, for example, the military strategy in the neighbouring county of Suffolk had decreed 
them fully obsolete. The correlations made between military war diaries, the implementation 
of official strategy, cartography and the evidence of upstanding structures in the landscape 




Airfields by contrast have been shown to possess a much shorter antecedent history, dating 
from the First World War but with a steady expansion in the 1930s and an exponential 
increase from 1939. As has been discussed, the impact of their presence across Norfolk is 
directly related to wartime military strategy and to topography. Firstly, the proximity of East 
Anglia to mainland Europe, and especially Germany, was hugely strategically important from 
1942 onwards. Secondly, the topography of the landscape itself facilitated that strategy.  But 
while the idea that airfields were simply slammed down onto the landscape in the most brutal 
manifestation of top-down planning is a familiar one, as this thesis has shown, far from an 
exclusively authoritarian approach to the choice of locations, there was considerable 
negotiation with landowners, farmers and local authorities in the matter of their siting. The 
idea that there was a dialogue here – albeit perhaps main a one-sides one - has been endorsed 
further by the level of officialdom’s awareness of the opportunities and constraints offered by 
the landscape – a factor which has seldom been taken into account in previous studies. As 
with anti-invasion defences, the military understood the importance of topography and 
terrain. In particular with airfields, it has been shown that an appreciation of the varying soils, 
existing land use and infrastructure across Norfolk was essential. But while airfields were – 
and to some extent remain - highly visible structures in the landscape both from the point of 
view of their physical infrastructure and the role in post-war commemoration, it should not be 
thought that this visibility must mean that they automatically had greater quantitative 
representation in the landscape. As this thesis has demonstrated, evidence has shown is not 
actually the case; although almost all the agricultural land subsumed by airfields was arable, 
the relative proportion to the total, though not insignificant, was also less than might be 
expected in an already heavily arable region. Even so the landscape footprint of airfields has 
been shown to be considerable because of the durability of many upstanding built structures. 
One particular aspect that has been visited is the effect, or rather the lack of effect, on 
woodland, and its distinction from hedgerow and field trees. It is hoped that the conclusion to 
that chapter, in qualifying the extent to which airfields despoiled valuable agricultural land 
and disrupted existing patterns of life, has given more of an objective measure of their 
contemporary impact. 
The third major aspect of landscape change directly associated with the conflict concerned 
land for training. The pragmatic truth is that the military has always to prepare for war, and 
practical training requires terrain. The training areas left scars in the landscape, but were 
redeemable for future use. Here the county is unusual in that, while the vast majority of 
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training areas reverted to civilian ownership, the Stanford Battle Training Area, long since re-
named Stanford Training Area (STANTA) remains in use by the British Army. But what 
needs to be remembered here is that the area had been used during the First World War for 
military manoeuvres and so the use by the military during the Second is, historically 
speaking, entirely unsurprising. Moreover, this history of state intervention also extended to 
the inter-war period, where the planting of Thetford Forest by the Forestry Commission 
completely changed the fabric of the countryside. What makes Stanford stand out is its 
continued use beyond the Second World War and, from a cultural perspective, it is the 
reneging by the military of their wartime guarantee that displaced civilians would be able to 
return that is important. The outrage surrounding the displacement of civilians and their 
livelihoods triggered national repercussions, being discussed in Parliament and resulting in a 
post-war public enquiry relating to its retention and prosed expansion; and the controversy 
continues to the present. Therein lies the value of the inter-disciplinary characteristic of 
landscape history; the infamous evacuation was essentially a modern manifestation of 
transhumance, with whole communities being moved on, never to return. Essentially one 
form of human activity was abruptly replaced by another. 
While anti-invasion defences, airfields and military training areas are obvious manifestations 
of the conflict in the landscape, logistics and infrastructure are not ‘high profile’ subjects in 
discussions of regional landscapes in war.
3
 They are important however as the link between 
wartime production and military operations. While perhaps self-evident, without supply the 
airfields, the training areas and the overall military presence could not have functioned. 
Supply is an operational link in the chain which had its own impact in the landscape and was 
dependent on antecedent structures, that is, the existing road and rail networks.  A clear 
conclusion of this thesis is that the region’s rail network served both the logistical 
requirements of the military and the market needs of agriculture more than adequately during 
the war years. Whilst it is generally acknowledged that Britain’s railways were mechanically 
exhausted by the war’s end, it is because they did their job well.
4
 The rail network had far 
greater cross-country provision than today, with stations and freight sidings at regular 
intervals often exactly in locations where they would be needed. Only occasionally was 
enhancement in key locations such as Thetford, Dereham and Thetford, close to airfields and 
training areas, needed. Some passenger and freight services where withdrawn post-war, 
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reflecting the steady increase in road freight and private car ownership, but the swingeing 
cuts inflicted upon the railways came only in the years after 1963 following the Beeching 
Report. The evidence discussed here unequivocally shows that the transport infrastructure 
coped more easily under intense pressure than might be imagined, as evidenced by the 
regular and frequent trains delivering firstly construction materials and, later, ordnance and 
fuel into hitherto quiet areas of the county.  
This thesis has deliberately investigated the impact of the conflict on other less ‘military’ 
aspects, but whose history are often seen an inexorably bound up in the war. This is 
particularly the case with country houses. The sheer number of country houses and estates 
across Norfolk had clear potential for the military for requisitioning and their association with 
the elite and with social hierarchy and order dovetailed neatly with the authoritarianism of the 
military leadership itself. There was undoubted symbolism in senior military figures 
occupying country houses whilst lower ranks were accommodated in huts or under canvas in 
the parkland. They are also important because the extent of large landownership in Norfolk 
presents an almost feudal aspect to the wartime scenario – the traditional rural values coming 
to terms with a modernising, technological society. Country houses have always been seen as 
very ‘English and rural’ yet they represent the lifestyles of a tiny, though influential, minority 
of the population. But, as has been shown here, while the image of the ruined country house 
of the post-war period is a familiar one, it has been shown that a longer view demonstrates 
that their decline and in some cases demise is part of a much longer and multi-factored 
chronology, of which the Second World War was only one factor. Firstly not all the 
properties were of a size and capacity that lent themselves easily to headquartering and 
centralised accommodation; on occasion the same factors meant they were not suitable at all 
for the practical reasons of cost of heating and lack of electric light. Secondly, it is simply the 
case that the popular image of destruction and loss related to wartime requisition and 
occupation is inaccurate. As has been demonstrated, there were other factors in place leading 
to the decline of the country house from at least the beginning of the century, not least the 
loss of sons of the gentry in the First World War, increased taxation and the cost of 
maintaining large estates. The fact that few of the standard works listing the great country 
houses make mention of the Second World War in its history of each house, is telling. 
Certainly, some houses were damaged or ruinated by military occupation, and lost in 
subsequent decades. Very few were lost during the war itself. The point is that, once again, 
the war was part of their chronology, not the whole.  
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Turning to the farming landscape, Norfolk was a well-established agricultural county, more 
so than much of the rest of Britain, long before the Second World War.  The diversity of 
arable and livestock farming, the different soil regions of the county and the economic 
pressures of the first half of the twentieth century have been described in detail as a precursor 
to the wartime experience. An awareness of this longer history has illustrated that agricultural 
change came about due to multiple factors in the lead up to the Second World War. The war 
itself accelerated change but agriculture was not solely impacted upon by military 
requirements. The chief driver for change and intensification was the pressure of the 
government’s national food production campaign from 1939.  The purpose of detailing the 
agricultural background has been to try to quantify the two-fold, conflicting pressures on 
Norfolk’s farmers – that of the plough-up campaign and the forfeit, largely of good arable 
and, required for military purposes. It would be easy to assume that an already busy 
agricultural region could do little to extend its capacity under the requirements of the plough-
up campaign from 1939 but analysis has shown that it did, exceeding set targets. Despite the 
war years being seen as revolutionising farming, once again, as with much of the 
infrastructure of the county the Second World War was clearly one factor in a much longer-
term chronology of a region already moving through periods of economic and technological 
change. Whilst the impact of the plough-up campaign certainly imposed more dramatic 
change on less agriculturally advanced or diversified regions, the Second World War was but 
one episode in a much longer chronology of the modernisation of agriculture in Norfolk. 
The landscape history approach offers instructive analysis in investigating the complex direct 
relationships between human agency and built structures in the context of time and place. 
This thesis has demonstrated the inter-disciplinary nature of landscape history and its value in 
bringing a multi-faceted approach to investigating little researched aspects of that most 
written about conflict in human history, the Second World War. The methodology is not rigid 
one; some aspects of investigation have proved more useful through use of official 
documents and others more on cartographic comparison. This flexibility is a virtue since it 
encourages exploration of a range of diverse sources, and hopefully this thesis may serve as a 
guide to studying the landscape of the Second World War in other counties and regions of the 
country. 
 





Norfolk Record Office 
 
NRO ACC/2010/85 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Air Ministry 
Records, 1941-1970 
 
NRO C/ARP/ 1/30  Register of unexploded bombs and parachute mines 1940-44 
NRO C/ARP/ 1/31   Register of unexploded bombs and parachute mines 1944-45 
NRO C/P 8/     Papers and Files relating to Defence Works and Urban and 
Rural Development 
NRO C/P 8/1 series    Military defence works for maintenance or demolition 
following 1939-1945 war 
NRO C/P 11/1 to 15   Survey of Norfolk Wartime Coastal Defence Works  
NRO C/VES 59   Pasture ploughed up during 2
nd
 Great War 1939  
NRO DC1/1/41  Removal of Defence Works, Cromer, 1945-47 
NRO DC17/7/78  Notices of Defence Works under DR50 
NRO HNR 46/2   Ploughing up orders 1940-1948, Norfolk CWAEC 
NRO MC 2445/1, 973x3   Norfolk Minefields Nos 20, Part 18H, 1947, 1954 
NRO C/C 10/6    Agricultural Committee and Sub-Committee March 1943 –Sept  
1947    
 
The National Archives 
  
TNA AIR 2/8501  Aerodromes (Code B, 3): Supply of grass seed  
TNA AIR 2/2067                   Aerodromes (Code B, 3): Design of runways  
TNA AIR 2/7524                   Aerodromes (Code B, 3): anti-invasion measure 
TNA AIR 2/10927   Breast Sands bombing range, Norfolk 
TNA AIR 2/10925   Holbeach bombing and gunnery range, Norfolk: land  
reclamation scheme 
 
TNA AIR 8/476  Anti-invasion plans - discussions 
TNA AIR 8/481              Airfield Construction 
TNA AIR 8/1051  Airfields: construction for U.S. forces 
TNA AIR 20/2803  Aerodromes and runways 
TNA AIR 20/4326  GHQ Home Forces: anti-invasion plans 
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TNA AIR 20/4327  Anti-invasion plans 
TNA AIR 20/4328  Anti-invasion plans 
TNA AIR 20/7584 Aerodromes and Works: diagrams airfields works and electrical 
systems 
 
TNA AIR 28/70  Bircham Newton, Operations Record Books 
TNA AIR 28/386  Horsham St Faith, Operations Record Books, 1940-43 
TNA AIR 28/388  Horsham St Faith, Operations Record Books, 1940 
TNA AIR 29/1031  No 94 Maintenance Unit, Barnham: Operations Record Book 
1939-45 
 
TNA AIR 29/1065/4 No 231 Maintenance Unit, Hockering: Operations Record Book 
1943-47 
 
TNA AIR 29/1558 No. 281 Maintenance Unit, Earsham, 1949-50 
 
TNA AN 2/640 Distribution of ordnance stores through railheads 
TNA AN 2/675 Availability of wagons, North Midland Region, use of new 16-
ton steel wagons 
 
TNA AVIA 15/696 Aerodromes and airfields (Code 2): construction of satellite, 
storage and dispersal   
  
TNA AVIA 15/1751 Aerodromes and airfields RAF construction work, departmental 
responsibility 
 
TNA CAB 65/9/6      War Cabinet 6.9.1940 Aircraft production 
TNA CAB 65/28/40  War Cabinet 17.12.1942 Aircraft production 
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APPENDIX 1 to CHAPTER 2:   
TNA WO 199/85 Beach Defence Reconnaissance, June 1940  
Eastern Command 
The importance, in the early summer of 1940, of understanding the detailed vulnerability of the Norfolk coast to enemy invasion was not 
underestimated.  
 
Earlier naval reports suggested that the eastern foreshore might be accessible for tanks although ‘considerable difference of opinion exists’ and it 
was strongly suggested this should be decided by tank trials. Ships of 12 to 15 feet draught were deemed able to navigate anywhere over the 
shore of The Wash at or near high water.
1





 June Admiral Dreyer visited the Norfolk coast as far east as Bacton.
3
 ‘Experienced military officers’ considered the beach between 
Sheringham and Cley-next-the-Sea to be vulnerable to tank landing. Tanks were said to be capable of landing at Heacham at low water and 
moving inland, similarly at Hunstanton either side of high water, where they could get over sand dunes and a dyke with light bridging 
equipment, though rapid changes in weather conditions, heavy swell and surf could alter this scenario even in summer. Brancaster to Cley was 
considered unsuitable because of the saltmarsh.  Concerned that the pier at Cromer was still intact, Dreyer recommended demolition charges 
being set.  He concluded that ‘The Wash is in my opinion a dangerous area which we must be prepared to deny to the enemy.’   Even aside from 
direct assault, the enemy could land near Skegness and rush The Wash area with shallow draft motor boats laden with troops, and open sluices at 
Boston to flood the countryside to the south to block defenders moving to engage. 
                                                          
1
 The ECDB at Ongar Hill would have been unable to engage such craft. Op cit p. 
2
 TNA WO 199/85  Beach Defence Reconnaissance: Eastern Command, Jan 1942 – July 1944, Letter HF/Int/31/1 15
th
 June 1940.     
3
 Ibid. Secret letter from Admiral Dreyer. Dreyer had retired in 1939 but returned as a volunteer in the Royal Naval Reserve; in 1940 he served as advisor on 
anti-invasion measures under GOC C-in-C Home Forces. 
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Capt Croucher, Dock Master at Lynn, writes of shallow draught Dutch vessels fitted with modern navigation devices, and their masters knowing 
every channel from Cromer to King’s Lynn. Built at Groningen and Delfzyl, Germanic sympathies were suspected in that area. Mr Palmer, a 
ships’ broker, stated that the port of Lynn had been used often by German captains, their knowledge of The Wash being considerable, and one of 
their new shallow draft cargo vessels could make a very fast run across the North Sea with tanks, gear and troops aboard.
4
 Those vessels could 
anchor at Hull Sand to allow tanks to disembark on to hard, dry sand, followed by easy runs to Sandringham and RAF Bircham Newton.  
Snettisham Beach was thought an even better choice, for a ‘quick run’ to Bircham.  A boom defence across the Lynn Channel and The Wash 
was recommended. Inland topography was not ignored in the reconnaissance report – it was suggested that securing of the high ground in West 
Norfolk could facilitate disembarkation of airborne troops.  It seems the west coast of the county could not be over-protected.  
A ‘General reconnaissance of the coast from The Haven to King’s Lynn for purpose of estimating the possibility of an enemy landing 
accompanied by wheeled and tracked vehicles’ suggested that a landing in this area presented great difficulties from a navigational point of 
view. Apart from the channels themselves large craft would have to lie six to eight miles offshore from the high water mark. Much of this is sand 
at low water, so light craft would be needed before vehicles could be off-loaded into shallow water.  The characteristic small creeks and tidal 
scourings would present obstacles, though would not stop infantry. The military objectives might actually be limited if the bridges over the Ouse 
and Welland were blown by defenders.
5
 
Extensive shoal waters extend along the full section of nine thousand yards from Weybourne Hope to The Hood.  The approach from seaward 
was clear for shallow draft craft but ‘beach work’ for heavy lighters would be difficult in conditions of heavy swell and variable winds.  Dead 
calm would be needed for beaching heavy landing craft.  Inland offered several road exits, as well as cross country options, and ample aircraft 
landing grounds in the hinterland.  Tank movement would be slow however. The eleven thousand yards from The Hood to Brancaster harbour 
presented navigational hazards and, whilst the creeks were navigable at the top of spring tides they would be difficult without intimate local 
                                                          
4
 TNA WO 199/85   
5
 TNA WO 199/85   
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knowledge, given constantly shifting channels. The foreshore comprised deep sand, firm to soft and wet, backed by salt marsh and were ‘quite 
impracticable’ for the disembarkation of armoured fighting vehicles. Infantry in light vehicles could be landed if weather risks were accepted. 
Brancaster harbour to Hunstanton over a distance of twelve thousand yards offered several areas ‘with free exits from the beaches’ on firm flat 
sand. The shallow water was reported to be impractical for AFVs but suitable for infantry and light vehicles. Then Hunstanton to Stubborn Sands 
featured a small bay, less subject to variations, sheltered, but with deeper water inshore and difficult to locate except in daylight.  Finally, 
Stubborn Sands to King’s Lynn was reported to be unsuitable for armoured vehicles but the Lynn Channel was very vulnerable, with clear deep 
water approach.
 6
 In West Norfolk, then, King’s Lynn was considered to be most vulnerable and all areas vulnerable to aircraft landing airborne 
troops.   
A reconnaissance of the area from Ness Point, Lowestoft to Gorleston demonstrated a clear seaward approach, suitable for infantry and light 
vehicles but probably not tanks.  Good vehicle exits at Gorleston could be easily blocked.  The beaches were suitable for landing craft but not 
aircraft but the hinterland from Corton onwards presented possible aircraft landing grounds. There were few exits for tanks.   Scroby Sand, one 
mile offshore, offered a fine natural obstacle to the approaches to Great Yarmouth, though craft could veer south if necessary.  The harbour 
approach itself was easy and the beach suitable for infantry though not for armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) disembarkation. The piers and 
harbour would of course be useful for unloading enemy supplies and equipment.  The port facilities therefore were vulnerable and blocking and 
mining were problematic. Main road exits were available to north, south and west but the river and marshy countryside inland restricted vehicles 
to roads only. Seaplanes however had a choice of landing areas, especially with the wide expanse of Breydon Water.  
Caister-on-Sea featured dry sand and sand dunes up to thirty feet high – but with numerous exits in breaks between those dunes. Further north to 
Newport steep clay or sand cliffs reached fifty feet in height, then along to Winterton back the dune-scape returned.  There was also a concrete 
                                                          
6
 TNA WO 199/85  Secret Admiralty report to GOC CIC Home Farces 2
nd
 June 1940 ‘Reconnaissance of beaches – Weybourne Hope to King’s Lynn’ and 
report from Naval Officer in charge Great Yarmouth 31
st
 May 1940 ‘To determine whether beaches are suitable for the disembarkation and operation of 
AFVs or for landing aircraft.’ 
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retaining wall at Winterton Ness and aircraft could not land on the beach as the sand was too soft.  Free exit from the dunes to the flat, 
featureless countryside was a clear hazard however, made worse by gaps in the cliffs at Hemsby. Seaplanes could easily land on The Broads 
however.  Tank landings were considered unlikely but they would make good speed across country until hitting the line of the Rivers Bure and 
Thurne, several miles inland. The conclusion as that the whole of this section, from Kessingland to Winterton Ness, was unsuitable for tanks – 
but vulnerable to almost all other forms of enemy landing, including seaplanes.  
 
‘Taking into consideration the long stretches of coast with no or few exits for vehicles, the general nature of the hinterland, and the restricted 
sphere for tank operations due to marshy country and large areas of inland water, the section would appear to be an unlikely objective for this 
form of attack. It is however vulnerable to infantry and probably to motor bicycle motorised troops. Light vehicles also could be disembarked at 
almost any point except where a few local offshore obstructions exist. It is also vulnerable to infantry landing by seaplane or floatplane on inland 
lakes.’ 
 
Extensive shoal areas lay offshore from Winterton Ness to Weybourne Hope and deep water channels were plentiful. Nevertheless the section of 
more than twelve miles offered opportunities. The seaward approach at Happisburgh, with Haisborough Sand featuring as little depth as half-a-
fathom presented a dangerous approach for even shallow draft boats on any tide. Deep water channels to north and south were better but strong 
currents and heavy surf prevailed outside the summer months. Wide, flat, soft, dry sand at high water mark were very suitable for infantry and 
light vehicles. Friable, crumbling, sheer cliffs offered occasional exits by ladder but where there were dunes, free exits allowed passage for 
infantry and tracked vehicles.  As to the south, the flat terrain inland could be negotiated and although there were no landing grounds, the Broads 
again provided opportunities for sea- or floatplanes.  The line of the North Walsham-Dilham Canal five miles inland presented another fine tank 
obstruction, except for the road crossings.  Mundesley offered good exits inland for vehicles and useful assembly areas inland. A 250 acre field 
at Paston was said to offer a good landing ground – but this was in the process of being blocked in the prescribed manner.  The cuttings and 
embankments of the Norfolk and Suffolk Joint Railway provided excellent obstacles inland.  The coast between Overstrand and Cromer was 
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reported to be similar generally but offered numerous exits from the beach for infantry and vehicles, though the beaches themselves were 
intractable to aircraft. Inland was unfortunately assessed as ‘first class tactical country in immediate hinterland.’  Tanks would be able to make 
good progress inland.   
It was concluded then that the areas Winterton Ness to Bacton Green and Sheringham to Weybourne Hope were most vulnerable, but even then 
would require precise weather conditions.
7
  Admiral Dreyer’s recommendations in a letter dated 3rd June 1940 ‘East Coast of England’ to 
Captain J R Storey,  Eastern Command, suggested blocking gaps at Hopton and a tunnel through the cliff at Gorleston.  Similar gaps at Ormesby 
St Margaret, Hemsby and Winterton should be blocked with concrete obstacles and mines.  Dune gaps at Cromer must be blocked with concrete 
obstacles, dannert wire and mines. Road crossings North Walsham and the Dilham Canal should be prepared for instant demolition. A gap at 
Overstrand had to be attended to and Cromer Pier should have a large section removed to render it useless to the enemy. Seven gaps in cliffs and 
dunes between Sheringham and Cley must be blocked.  The sands north of Wells would provide good landing grounds for aircraft at low water 
and Dreyer concurs with much of the other report – also that Dutch officers were navigating into King’s Lynn up to September of 1939, though 








                                                          
7
 WO 199/85  [T.O.O.  1625/31/5/40.] 
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APPENDIX 2 to CHAPTER 2 
Tabulated summary of Emergency Coastal Defence Batteries along Norfolk coastline from west to east 
 
Location Established Closed Armament Condition 
King’s Lynn 
(Ongar Hill) 
TF 5901 2411 
1940 1941 2 x 6 inch guns Structural remains of observation 
tower 
Hunstanton 
TF 6744 4186 
1940 1943  2 x 6 inch guns Lost 
Brancaster (High 
Cape) 
TF 774 452 
1940/41 1944 2 x 6 in guns Brickwork remnants on beach 
Cley Eye (Wells-
next-the-Sea) 
TG 0512 4514 
Early 1941 Closed Jan 
1944  
2 x 6 inch guns 
covering Holkham 
Meals and Wells 
harbour 
Remnant on beach 
Weybourne  1940 1958 A.A.guns Part-reinstated for heritage purposes 
Sheringham 
TG 1493 4344 
1940 1944 2 x 6 inch guns Cliffside remains 
Cromer 
TG 2268 4193 
 




TG 3092 3707 
1941 ‘Care and 
maintenance’ 
1944 
2 x 6 inch guns - 
removed 1945/46 
Relatively intact except for gun 





TG 3860 3090 
1940 1945 2 x 4.7 in guns Gone 
Winterton 
TG 4970 1922 




TG 50950 13349 






TG 5307 1028 









gun moved to 




1945 Not technically an 
ECDB but an anti-
torpedo boat site 
with 2 x 12 pdrs 
Gone 
                                                          
8
 http://www.heritage.norfolk.gov.uk/record-details?MNF14142 accessed 7
th





TG 530 020 
Mid-1940 ‘care and 
maintenance 
1945 - guns 
still in situ 
1947 




TG 534 006 
1941 1944-45 ‘care 
and 
maintenance’ 
2 x 6 in guns Gone 
 
 
APPENDIX 3 to CHAPTER 2:   
List of nodal (defended) points Norfolk in 1942 
Acle Diss Melton Constable Thetford 
Attleborough Docking Mundesley Thorpe Market 
Aylsham Fakenham Narborough Watton 
Binham Foulsham North Walsham West Runton 
Blakeney Happisburgh Norwich Weybourne 
Burnham Market Holt Overstrand Wroxham 
Castle Acre King’s Lynn Reepham Wymondham 
Cley-next-the-Sea Langham Saxthorpe Great Yarmouth 
Coltishall Little Walsingham Sheringham  
Cromer Loddon Stiffkey  
Dereham Ludham Swaffham   
 
 
                                                          
9
 Hopton-on-Sea was in the administrative county of East Suffolk until local government reorganisation in 1974. 
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Several small roads closed 





Green Farm subsumed, 
along with orchard and 
roadside trees 
 
Hungate Common in 





Within general programme to provide principal 
stations with satellites, pasture at Hungate 
Common selected as satellite for Swanton 
Morley. Constructed 1941-42 with 
rudimentary grass runways. Late 1942 Costain 
redevelop site with larger, hard runways, 




1943 - assigned to USAAF and closed for 
further redevelopment as Class A heavy 
bomber base; peri-track further extended, 








Accommodation originally in local houses, 
















2000 +1400 + 1400 yards 
(x 50 yds wide).
15
 
Reverted to satellite for 
Great Ashfield, Suffolk 
(Maintenance Unit). Then 
designated as ammunition 
storage depot to 1948.
16
 
Site disposed of between 
1959 and 1962. Now turkey 
sheds; control tower is 




BARTON 340 acres immediately Often overlooked by chronologists. Built 1939, Non-specific runways, NNHER 20129 records 
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16
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adjacent to Marham. 




satellite for Marham but replaced in this role in 
1942 by Downham Market. By 1940 being 
used as a decoy site.
19
 Grass surface unsuitable 
for later heavy bombers, also too close to 
parent station, so simply abandoned1941. 
simple grassed areas. large military bunker and 2 






Farmland. Bordered by 
Honey Hills N-S to W.  
Fakenham Rd NW-SE to E. 
Bircham Rd NE-SW to SE.  
Marshy ground to East. 
Interesting slab of 
woodland to NW. 
 
As with many East Anglian 
airfields, water supply 
came from boreholes. 
Three here, supplying 






The only surviving World War 1 airfield in 
Norfolk. Bomber station 1930s. Coastal 
Command base in WW2. Built to exacting pre-
war Expansion standards. 
Focus of public engagement – in May 1939, 
5,000 people watched major air display.
21
 
Wide range of aircraft and functions for over 
forty years.  
 
Dec. 1944 accommodation for 3,000. 
Always grass runways 
(1300 yds.)  but very high 
quality buildings 
associated with pre-war 
RAF Expansion period. 
 
 
1950s – consideration 
given to 2000 yd runways 
but ‘ground undulations 




1945 to 1962 variously 
occupied by Fighter, 















Heathland. Some woodland 
removed.
25
Not too close as 
Fear of attacks on permanent stations led to 
remote locations as satellites for dispersed and 
remote functions.
26
 (Is Bodney remote, relative 
Hard-standings dispersed 




1945 de-requisitioned and 
sold to pre-war owner 
Major J C T Mills. 
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with Barton Bendish. Site 
borders Bodney Carr (N) 
and Blackwater.  
 
to any rural location in Norfolk?). Opened 
1940 as satellite to Watton. Requisitioned local 
housing. 
1943 transferred to USAAF. Accomm. For 
1700. 









Steel mat and PSP hard-
standings installed, with 
extra taxi-ways in tarmac 
and concrete to take 












specialised in re-claiming 
materials from temporary 
war-time airfields. St. Ives 
Sand & Gravel Company as 
‘both midwife and 
undertaker’ supplying 
hardcore for construction 
and removing it for 
subsequent sale and re-
use.
32
  Site completely 
reverted to agriculture but 
control tower extant. But 














Farmland / estate Built 1939 Expansion bomber airfield with 
characteristic Lutyens architecture, permanent 
buildings and 5 C-Type hangars. Changed to 
fighter base before opening in 1940.
34
 
Grass (not concrete until 
1950 and extended 1958), 
although Sommerfield 
track laid in 1944. 
Much extended and 
developed post-war. Closed 
2006 – last station in 
continuous use since Battle 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
26
 Bowman, M.  World War 2 RAF Airfields in Norfolk  p.17 
29
 Freeman, R.A. Airfields of the Eighth p.32;  Delve. K,  pp.40-42. 
27
 Delve, K. Military Airfields of East Anglia p.40 
28
 Bowman  p.17 
30
 Freeman, R A. Airfields of the Eighth pp.32-34 
31
 Delve, K. pp.40-42,  Bowman, M. p.17 
32
 Freeman, R.A.  Airfields of the Eighth  pp.32-34 
33
 Freeman, R,A.  Bases of Bomber Command  p.85 
34






















Accommodation for 2,100 by 1944. ‘Overspill’ 
















2000 + 1400 + 1400. 
of Britain. 
2012 – conservation work 
imminent. 
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Farmland.  ‘6 miles hedges, 
1,400 trees removed’ Local 
roads closed/diverted, one 
re-opened post-war 
utilising part of a runway.
36
 
‘a sandy-heath area well-






Constructed 1942-43 by Laing to Class A spec; 
500,000 cubic yds. Soil excavated, 223,000 
sq.yds. concrete laid, 32,000 sq.yds tarmac. 
 
Not occupied immediately. No clear reason for 
this but there was actually a surplus of airfields 
for the USAAF in 1943, because crews were 
still being trained in the U.S. 
 
Tech facilities and accomm for 2,900 in 
temporary buildings. USAAF occupied Jan 




Assessed for expansion in 1944, especially 
runways, but not recommended because it 
would have involved demolition of a school, a 
farm and ten cottages.
39
 
Concrete and tarmac 
 
2000 + 1400 + 1400 (x 50 
yds) 




Sunderland Farm (known 
locally as Sunderland 
Airfield) 1m NE village,  
 
LNER ran longitudinally 
below site 
Satellite for Bircham Newton. 
Coastal Command convoy protection. 
Meteorology functions. 









Grass with concrete peri. 
1730 + 1400 + 1400. 




Closed 1946, sold 1958.
43
 
DOWNHAM Bexwell (locally referred to Initially satellite to Marham; Main contractors Concrete.  Closed 1946, disposed of 
                                                          
36
 Freeman,  R.A. Airfields of the Eighth  pp.68,69 
37
 Delve, K.  p.57 
38
 Freeman,  R.A. pp.68,69   Delve, K. pp.57-59 
39
 Delve, K. pp.57-59 
40
 Bowman, M. p.37 
41








(RAF / USAAF) 




east of Downham Mkt. 
Farmland. Wimbotsham to 
Crimplesham road closed 
across North of site.
45
 
Messrs. W C French. Opened 1942 to Class A 
specification. Dispersed camp south of 
Bexwell Hall for 2000. Hall itself officers’ 
mess. 1943 second Norfolk site to have FIDO 
installed.
46




1900 + 1400 + 1400 x 50 
yds., 36 pan standings.
48
 
1957, reverting to 
agriculture
49
 but as at 2012 







‘Dry, sandy brecklands 
(sic) of south-west Norfolk 
were ideal for locating 
grass-surfaced airfields as 
no extensive under-surface 
drainage systems were 
necessary.’  ‘Immediate 





Satellite of Honington (Suffolk) 1940. Grassed 
surface could accommodate only Wellingtons 
at most, then assigned to USAAF 1943.  
Planned to bring to Class A standard but not 
done when retained as a fighter base – so grass 
sufficed. Site configuration unconventional, 
described as ‘hurriedly acquired’. 
Requisitioned local housing and temporary 
accommodation. 
 







Landing area 1880 x 
1400, grass then Pierced 
Steel Planking laid on 
1944 by USAAF. 36 hard 




Used for housing Polish 
veterans and families late 




 Most original 
building still extant. 
 





Edge of Feltwell Fen Classic Expansion period design. Opened 1937 
for existing bombers.  Grass oval and semi-
circle C-type hangars  
Grass. 
1800 + 1400 + 1200 Dec 
’44, Sommerfield track in 
1954 third runway 
considered but for ‘very 
heavy grading, severing the 
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 B1112 and the demolition 




Continuous use since WW2 
– Thor missile site 1958-63. 














Built as standard Class A bomber airfield 
1943. Not used fully but as bomber base for 
secret – and unsuccessful -  Operations 
Aphrodite and Anvil missions, which were 
abandoned end 1944, then returned to RAF but 
not used. 
 













RAF storage of Mosquitoes 
in 1945. Little trace left 




North end Manor Farm and 
remains of St Peter’s 
Church 
Opened 1942 but inspection deemed it not fit 
for purpose, with problems with mud on 
surfaces. Runways then consolidated with tar 
and wood-chip.  
Tar and wood-chip. 
1900 + 1400 +1350 




Used by USAF ground 
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 Dispersed in sites on 
farmland to south of Skitfield Road. 
 







Only 2 miles from main a/f 
at West Raynham; 
 




1940, grass, satellite W Raynham; upgraded 
concrete A 1944; minor use after war 
1943 relinquished for Unit Construction 
Company Ltd to hard-surface. Re-opened early 
1944. Extended runways led to overlap circling 





2000, 1400, 1400; 36 h/s Little post-war use and late 







(see Delve quote 
Some domestic sites in 
woodland. 
‘During late 1941/ early 
1942, another great swath 
Site originally requisitioned for RAF use 
1941.
67
 Like Hethel, planned for RAF use, site 
had 3 T2 hangars with technical buildings. 
Accomm temporary Nissen hut type. 
Concrete 
 
30 h/s increased to 50 for 
USAAF. Some pans, later 
RAF ownership continued 
and 1954 survey considered 
that any extension would 
require roads to be severed 
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about Suffolk, not 
Norfolk) 
of Suffolk countryside was 
transformed from peaceful 
agriculture to a ‘state of the 
art’ military airfield.’ 
(Delve p96) 
 
Much ‘blacked out’ on 
1946 aerial photo. 
 
Built by John Laing & Son Ltd. With ‘four 
miles of surface drains, 13 miles French drains, 
13 miles roadway, five miles sewers, seven 
miles water mains and 4,750,000 bricks’. 
68
 
1942 assigned to USAAF. 
 















runway part removed but 
site still used for aviation. 
HETHEL 
(USAAF) 
Hethel is typical S Nfk 
‘wooded’ land; this shows 
on the ’46 aerial photo, 
around the site and even 
within the perimeter track. 
 
Air Ministry plan shows 
much more tech site to East 
right up to Long Wood. 
 
Peri-track runs right 
through Stanfield Hall 
wooded area. Potash Fm in 
middle of tech site – what 
happened to it? 
Requisitioned 1940.  
Similar Hardwick – immediate hard runways 
but temporary-style buildings. Early RAF 
heavy bomber field, contracted 1941-42 by 
George Wimpey & Co Ltd. and extended to 









2000 + 14-- + 1400, 36 
h/s increased to 50. 
RAF fighters post-war, then 
personnel transit centre, 
tasked with de-militarising 
Britain; also housing 
displaced persons. 1950s 
farmed by Ministry of 
Agriculture but still 
available to military. 1954 
survey showed limited 
expansion potential as it 
would involve cutting an 
adjacent road and a 
considerable proportion of 
Ketteringham Park would 
be lost and many trees 
felled...’ the site is said to 
be very wet’
73
.  St Ives 
removed some concrete for 
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Large area of flat farmland 
but close to urban area S & 
W. Unusual in that respect. 
Main Norwich Road 
diverted to where it is now. 
Heath Fm inside site.  
 





Proximity to Norwich 
brought risk to civilian 
population, six crashes 
occurred at urban sites, 
with two child deaths.
76
 
1938 farmland to east of A140 selected for 
permanent RAF bomber station. Building 
began 1939, opened 1940.
77
 5 C-type hangars 
semi-circled around bombing circle, permanent 
brick and tile buildings with central heating 
and high standards of accommodation.   
 
Sept 1942 transferred to USAAF and upgraded 




Interesting that main runway is orientated 








2000 + 1400 + 1400 and 
50 loop h/s. 
 
RAF 1945- 1963, then, to 
present, Norwich Airport, 





Cottage Plantation to E 
unaffected although on site 
boundary. 
 
Rare dome trainer building 
remains. 
1940 grass emergency landing ground. 
1941 satellite of Bircham Newton. 




1942 raised to independent status. Variety of 
extensive operations by RAF, Coastal 





2000 + 1400 + 1400 
 
Dutch Air Force training 
school to 1947. US Army 
drone activity to 1957. Also 
emergency landing ground 
for Sculthorpe. Resurfaced 
1953, closed 1959 and sold 
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Orig satellite of 
Foulsham - 36 
loop hardstands + 
5 hangars 
1946 aerial completely 
blacked-out 
 
The Ling, Brick Kiln 
Plantation, 40 Acre Pl, 
Brookhill Pl, Lawn Pl.  
Park, Thursford Hall. 
Unaffected 
 










1942-3 built by Taylor Woodrow in seven 




Heavy bombers and also Mosquitoes fighter-
bombers – a number of Norfolk sites were 
used as post-wars storage for this marquee. 
 
Accommodation 2,200 at December 1944.
86
 
Owing to gradient of land, 







2000 + 1400 + 1400 




 1941 built as additional satellite for 
Coltishall.
88
 But also for forward deployment, 
especially for maritime operations. 
 
One of very few exclusively fighter stations in 
Norfolk. 1943 redevelopment for USAAF 
fighter units but they never deployed. Fleet Air 
Grass initially but 1943 
three concrete and tarmac 
runways and 50 new 





Scenes for Conflict of 
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heath; always held interest 
for air operations. Possible 
issues with having to close 
too many roads if old 
Narborough site chosen, so 





Farmland. ‘Frying pans’ 
going into extant fields W. 
(Chapel Hill). 
 




Moved section of A1122 at 
south-east with heavy 
bomber redevelopment. 
First World War landing ground of 80 acres 
‘revived’ under 1933 Expansion scheme. Built 
1936, opened 1937. Fully permanent station of 
200 acres with flying field and C-Type hangar 
disposition. with 13 acres of playing fields, 
church, cinema, shops – self contained 
community. 6,500,000 bricks, 3,000 tons 
cement, 100,000 sq.ft. glass, 30 miles cable, 
seven miles drainage pipe.
94
 Technical and 
barracks sites accessible from village.  
 
Redevelopment took 1,000,000 
sq.yds.concrete. workforce laid 1,850 cubic 
metres concrete each day.  Decoys at South 





Accomm. 2,700.   
 
Grass flying field. 
1940 asphalt pan h/s, at 
least 30 by 1942. 
 
1944 redevelopment as 
very heavy bomber base, 
with concrete runways: 
 
2000 + 2000 + 2000 x 
100 yds (twice width of 
Class A standard) taking 
in new land to south and 
south-west. About 1,100 
men employed for 18 










Closed 1945 for concreting 
of runways for post-war 
use. Re-opened 1946 as 






Continued extensive RAF 
use to present. 
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‘E’ dropped on many 





Hedgerow trees surely 
removed 
Requisitioned 1940, as apparent that pressure 
on fighter parking at Coltishall necessitated a 
satellite. Ultimately fully integrated with 
Coltishall. 
 
‘Hastily built’ leading to severe drainage 
problems throughout its operational life. 
 
Accomm in grounds of Barningham park, 
officers in Hall, described as ‘charming’.
99
 
Grass throughout but later 
Sommerfield net tracking 









 US Engineer 
Aviation Battalion 
underwent training work 
here, specialising in rapid 
airfield construction; they 
may have installed and 
removed PSP and SMT of 





Closed Oct 1945. 
 
Little remains overall but 
















Numerous shelter belts and 
hedgerow trees removed 
1938/39 Air Ministry seeking dispersal landing 
ground for Feltwell. Woods and plantations 





1943 closed for upgrading to Class A. F H 
Higgs Ltd main contractors. Thenceforth 
higher standard than parent base. 
 
Grass runways + later h/s. 
 
 
Concrete 2000 + 1600 + 




Lancasters based here to 
1946, retained to 1958. 
 
Reverted to agriculture 
1960s. Most of concrete 
broken up, poultry sheds. 
Much of one runway left. 
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Bunker’s Hill – farmland. 
 
Removed road running SE-
NW.  Egmere Farm to S. 
 
Burnham Thorpe to 
Walsingham road closed 
across airfield. 
 
Some h/s by Egmere Wells 
– Crabbe’s Castle road, 





Decoy for Docking from 1941 and as such 




Built 1942 to Class A standard by Taylor 
Woodrow. Flying field cost £331,000. W 
Lawrence & Son Ltd built buildings at 
£336,000. 
 
Domestic sites for 3,400 on farmland to east.; 





Considered for upgrading to very heavy 
bomber status but surveys decided against this 
and Sculthorpe was chosen.
 109
 
2000 + 1400 + 1400 yds + 
36 h/s, mostly loops.
110
 





Then reverted to 
agriculture, runways 
extensively removed. 
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restricted main runway 
length to 1,900 yds instead 
of normal 2,000 & most of 




1944, relatively late heavy bomber base  








Accomm. 2,900 in valley to east.
116
 
Tarmac and concrete. 
 




Post-war various RAF 
functions, 1945 satellite for 
Shipdham, even reverting 
to USAF 1954. THOR site 
1958-63 but abandoned 
when fixed sites seen as 
vulnerable compared to V 
Force. CND protests 1959. 
Kestrel  trials 1964, then 
closed. St Ives And & 
Gravel reclaimed some of 







Woodhall Farm right in 
middle.  
 
195 ft above sea level. 
Built 1942/43 Taylor Woodrow Ltd to Class 









2000 + 1400 + 1400, 
concrete peri and 50 
concrete and partial 




Used RAF maintenance 
units to 1960. Sold, 
extensively demolished by 
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Horsham St Faith 
1946 serial photo blacked 
out.  Oulton Hall may be 
within the site? Check  
 




Site requisitioned 1940, satellite landing 
ground for Horsham St Faith.  
 
Some accomm. In local community, some in 
Blickling Hall (great quote about nature of 
accomm at Blickling).  
 
Closed 1942 upgraded to Class A, became 
satellite to Swanton Morley.
122
 Prestige & Co. 
built some buildings.
123
 Some USAAF and 





2000 + 1400 + 1400
125
 
Storage for Mosquitoes to 








Heathland / farmland. 
Rackheath Hall and Park 
integral to site. 
 
 
Land requisitioned early 1943, largely built 
John Laing & Son Ltd. Direct to USAAF. 
556.000 cubic yards soil excavated, 14,000 yds 
soakaway drains, 504,000 yds concrete, major 








Concrete screed finish 
2000 + 1400 + 1400 
50 spectacle h/s. 
Peri track 2.7 miles.
 128
 
Early post-war disposal, 
partly to agriculture, partly 
to industry.
129
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 Delve, K.  pp.182-184 
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 Delve, K. pp.185,186 
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Surrounded by 6 other AFs 
in 5 mile radius. 
Fields with irregular trees 
in boundaries 
 
Closure of two rural roads. 




One of three in the West Raynham ‘clutch’. 
Built 1942 by Bovis and Constable Hart & co. 
to Class A.
132
 Satellite of West Raynham, with 




1944 conversion to very heavy bomber base, 
all runways replaced. Not finished by end of 
war, didn’t reopen until 1948. Some 
suggestion that very heavy status not possible 








3000 + 3000 + 2000 (x 
100 yds.) 
Used from 1949 period by 
USAAF, for nuclear and 
exercises; substantial extra 
expansion 1952, closed 
1992. Occasional present 





Accomm dispersed in 
farmland to south. 
Woodland / extensive 
farmland centred around 




Grange NE corner. 












  Sites on farmland to 
South. Dispersed sites to South near 
Hedenham Wood. 
Concrete. 3 mile peri. 




1945 used for munitions 
storage. [Possible 
connection with Earsham]. 
Sold 1959, most runways 
broken up by St Ives.
140
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Farmland, some woodland.  
 
Peri-track bends to 
accommodate Park Farm.  
Southern edge mirrors 





First USAAF heavy bomber base in Norfolk 
(1942) though originally designed for RAF.
142
 
Cost £1,100,000.  550,000 sq yds concrete, 
fuel storage for 216,000 gallons. 
 




Concrete and macadam. 
Class A 
30 h/s + 35 more later. 
 
2000 + 1400 + 1400
144
 
1946-47 transit centre for 
German PoWs en route 
from Florida to Germany. 
Sold late 1950s. Owned 
1960s by E A Savory, 






Heath.  Snetterton Heath 
and Heath Covert 
subsumed. Snetterton Hall 
to W.      Eccles Hall used  
 
Railway and A11 restricted 
siting of h/s. Minor roads 
closed. 
Built 1942 primarily by Taylor Woodrow Ltd, 
cost £950,000.    530,000 sq.yds.concrete. 
Opened 1943. 
 
Eccles Air Depot (extension across A11) 


















36 h/s for RAF use but 
increased to 50 for 
USAAF.   
 
2000 + 1400 +1400 
1945 abandoned; 1952 
bought for motor racing.
148
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Sited east of Brandiston 
Road which was closed. 
Cawston-Horsford road cut 
S of St Nicholas’ church. 
Camp dispersed between 
airfield and Hall Farm 
mostly in Haveringland 





Built late 1942/early 44 main contractor Kent 
& Sussex Construction Co Ltd.  Class A. Cost 






2000 + 1400 + 1400 
Post-war used for Mosquito 
storage, closed 1947. Intact 
until sold 1957, then 
reverted to agriculture and 





Many buildings survive 
‘Some buildings in 
excellent condition – not 







Overlooking south side of 
Wensum valley. Several 
roads closed between 





‘Ridge of well-drained soil, 
laid out to give large grass 
operating surface, not 
completely level but with 




1930s Expansion airfield but never fully 
completed. Opened 1940. More utilitarian than 
usual with no C-type hangars. Richard Costain 
& Co Ltd built the camp buildings. Some 
tarmac h/s built by Costain at £490,000.
155
 




Accomm. at max. 2,400. 





1650 + 1600 + 1350 yds.  
1954 survey suggested 
not suitable for extension 
because of its convexity. 




Continuing RAF use to 
1995 when relinquished to 
army which built Robertson 
Barracks over the very 
large grass airfield. 
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Orig satellite for 
Horham 
Farmland, lot of woodland 
on site, especially to west. 
 
Technical and domestic 
sites in woodland stretching 




Built 1942 as satellite for Horham (Suffolk) as 
Class A heavy bomber field.  John Laing & 
Son Ltd. 
330,000 cubic yds soil excavated. 149,000 








36 h/s increased to 50 for 
USAAF 
 
2100 + 1400 + 1400
161
 
Sold 1956, most reverted to 
agriculture but good deal of 






Channonz Hall on N 
boundary. Adjacent 
armoury too!  
 
Sometimes referred to as 





Site highly suitable. 
Closed minor roads, one or 
two buildings demolished, 




Built 1941-2 main contractor W & C French 
Ltd.   Operational late1943.    
 




Concrete and tarmac 








Main runway lengthened 





Demolition by St Ives’ 
competitor H Minns 1964-
65.  1978 control tower 




WATTON Griston Hall to W, Old Hall Permanent RAF station built late 1930s by Grass (250 acres), RAF post-war, electronic 
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(RAF, USAAF) Farm affected. 
 




John Laing & Son Ltd. for light bombers, one 
of four for No.2 Group. Operational 1939.  
1942 assigned to training unit - although a 
front line station there was a shortage of 
training airfields. Re-assigned to USAAF air 
maintainance1943, at which time runways 
concreted, more buildings added. Complex 








concrete from 1943. 
USAAF constructed 53 





By early 1943 pressure on 
the building programme 
led to decision not to 
build hard runways ion 
existing grass surfaces but 
1943/44 steel mat 
reinforcement was laid 
and July 1944 the 899
th
 
Engineer Battalion US 
Army laid concrete 
runway (2,000 yds.) and 











ceased 1969.  
 
Considered for major 
expansion 1954 but 
deferred.
175
 Partly site of 
HMP Wayland. 
 
Now controlled by 
commandant STANTA, 
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‘Owner of Cannister Farm 
flatly refused to move out. 
The NW peri-track bends in 
to avoid the farm; the 
Americans didn’t mind the 




Requisitioned 1941. 1942 main build by 
Taylor Woodrow for RAF to Class A standard 
with pan h/s. Most northerly US 8
th
 AF bomber 
base. 
Reassigned USAAF 1943, new loop h/s/ 
Accomm for 2,900 in Beeston area.
179
 









Closed 1961, sold 1963, 
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APPENDIX 2 to CHAPTER 3:   Airfield Gazetteer ‘B’ – Munitions, woodland, area and perimeter  
Airfield Munitions locations Woodland type & area sq 
km 




Air Min map ‘Works 
Directorate Air 




Ammo & bomb dumps in 
wooded area to NE 
perimeter, adjacent 
dispersal spectacles. Extra 
b/storage shown on 1946 
aerial c/w Air Min plan – 
not unusual.  
Small field corner stands 
end up in bomb store 
Woodland near dispersed sites 
to S 
2.07 
Dispersed sites 0.41 – 
grad. Spreading to W 
towards Hockering Wood 








Not in woodland. 
 
‘though ordnance store 
adjacent woodland far to 
SE 
Hyde Park Plantation .07 km2 
unaffected 
 Polney Plantation 
.05 km2  
Magpie Plantation .04 km2 
adjacent but unaffected. 
Tech site in wood S boundary 
of a/f (identify) 
 




1192/28   (Sep’28) 
828853/28 
BODNEY 
(RAF / USAAF) 
A & B possibly to SW, 
not woodland. BUT tech 
sites to W in Great Wood. 
Accomm borders Heater 






Great Wood.0.13 +1.73 
circum. 
Heater .02 /.63 
High Pl. .06 / 1.45 km 
5.35 16.55 2923/44   May ‘44 
 
MFC 78/24/129 = inset of 





Dispersals by Manor 
Farm 
N borders Scottow Hall + large 
Covert but not used. Steward’s 
Plantation to E unaffected. 
Likewise Durrant’s Grove & 
woods at Hall ‘though border 
peri-track 
 





Bomb & ammo below S 
peri-track in lightly 
wooded area not shown 
1
st
 ed OS 
Attleborough Wood 1km >SE, 
not used 
2.42 







Accomm on Docking -
Brancaster Rd W airfield, 
tech site near Sunderland 
House 
Bomb store E boundary 
Narrow Covert to farm 
entrance + very small area 
woodland 







(RAF / USAAF) 
Well E of site, adjoining 
but not with woodland. 
New Covert .01 / .52 + 
Old Covert 0.04/.79  




Possible woodland integral to 
banjos NE in Oak Wood. Not 
in flight path but unusually 
close. Oak Wood 0.05 / 1.88; 











Bomb store in Middle 
Plantation .09/1.71 but 




Some tech facilities and 
possible additional bomb 
storage within site of what was 
Langmere Plantation & Little 
Long Plantation on OS 1
st
 ed 
(was this cleared prior to 
WW2?) 




2.75 11.51  
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B/Stores in Birch Wood Birch Wood 0.27 / 2,36 2.28 9.5  
FOULSHAM 
(RAF) 
 Newton Wood 0.10 / 1.35 to 
NW but unused 










 Harpley Common & W 
Rudham Common way to N 




(see Delve quote 
about Suffolk, not 
Norfolk) 
Bomb & ammo dump 
NW corner adjacent 
Spring Wood. 
B/store also in field to W 
+ between 2 busy 
dispersal areas! 
Spring Wood 0.26 / 2.3 seems 
to have been replanted by 1988 
(query use and appearance as 
1946 looks different to Delve 
at this point).** Bush Wood + 
Long Wood – some facilities 
intrude here 
2.39 
** check different sources 









Bomb dump W adjacent 
woodland, Long Drive 
ammo closer in, within 
wooded belt. Admin bldgs 
appear to be in woodland 
to SE. 
 
Long Drive 0.08 / 2.41 
(Stanfield Hall).  
 
Hethel Wood adjoins tech 
sites but appears generally 
unused BUT Air Min plan 
refers to Communal Sites here. 
Water Tower just inside wood. 
 
Ayes Corner .07 / 1.16 looks 
lost to plough before airfield 

















Orig satellite of 
Foulsham - 36 
loop hardstands + 
5 hangars 
 
 New Covert 0.14 / 1.63   Dark 
Trees .03 / .73   Jex’s Covert 
.03 / 0.75 Cranepot Covert .12 
/ 1.48 all gone from OS 1
st
 ed 
but prior to airfield? 
2.64 7.56  
LUDHAM 
(RAF) 
  2.01 7.34  
MARHAM 
(RAF) 
+ small satellite 
site at Barton 
Bendish 
Bomb dump to E. 
bounded by hedge but no 
woodland 
Woodland to NW possible AA 


















Bomb stores to S but not 
wooded 
Tennis Plantation subsumed 
0.11 / 1.7.   


















Ammo & bomb dumps 
close in by S & SW 
perimeter; dispersed sites 
to E. 
Lodge belt ran N-S, truncated 
by being within peri-track (or 
already gone?) 
Grove Covert very close SW 
end main runway 
2.38 8.55 4615/44 Nov ‘44 
4616/44 dispersed sites – 








Bombs & Ammo to N, 
not wooded. 
 3.09 




4871/52  date u/k 
 
4873/52 dispersed sites 




 Large wood The Leaseland 
then N to Hercules Wood + 
Long Plantation (-> Blickling). 
Also Leechpit Plantation & 
Law Pl?  Several other 
Plantations e.g. Oxnead – 
query exact locations. 




B & A to North Accomm + tech sites in 
woodland W.  Ortolan’s 
Grove, Osier Carr, Round 
Hills, Green Plantation.  
Quarters gathered around but 
not in Heath Wood, Whitw 
Wd, Round Hills ‘Deer park’, 
Gazebo Covert, Rhododendron 
















Bomb dump to W side, 
Sashlight Farm to N 
b/stores. 
Hedenham Wood not 
used for bombs 
Some encroachment of 
accomm up to Long Wood.  
 







4706/44  Nov ‘44 
 
4706/44 Dec 44 dispersed 
sites specifying types of 





Bomb dump SW corner, 
slight encroachment into 
Brick kiln Covert and 
Letton Hall grounds (deer 
park?) 
 2.34 7.91 1012/45 (2 of 2) March 
‘45 
 














bomb storage S by 
Furthpit Plantation, past 
Moegbe’s Pl up to Crimea 
Covert. Suggests using as 
cover but not in it as such 
Facilities in Top Clump. + 












  3.62 








Orig satellite for 
Horham 
Ammo/bombs to W 
partially in woodland W 
of Billingford Wood). 
Various tech sites in 
woodland locations 
Billingford Wood appears to 
have been entirely subsumed 
by the lower perimeter of the 
AF – barracks on left side of 
wood.  Tech site in Thorpe 








Bombs and ammo in 
woodland to S 
Non –woodland trees / hedges 
lost to airfield but no 
woodland 
2.42 dispersed .33 8.93 
Dispersed 6.21 
1810/45 May ’45  
WATTON 
(RAF, USAAF) 
Bomb dump partial 
woodland to S 
The Grove - unaffected 4.66 13.74  
WENDLING 
(USAAF) 
Bomb and ammo dump in 
Honeypot Wood to SW. 
(well-documented 
represented). Extensive 
tech + accomm to W 




















 Langton Green Wood -> E just 
excluded. 
Kipton Heath -> W adjacent 








APPENDIX 1 to CHAPTER 5:   
TNA AIR 29/1031 No 231 Maintenance Unit RAF Hockering – Unit diary note 2nd and 4th February 1943 to prepare 
against air attack on munitions site 
 
Defence Operation Order No.1 Appendix ‘A’  15/10/ 
Ground attack would be preceded by heavy and dive bombing, saboteurs, paratroops and airborne troops.  With 210 RAF personnel on strength, 
supported in emergency by 1
st
 Battalion Norfolk Regiment, 231 MU could call upon six Battle platoons for defence. Also a machine-gun post at 
Church Farm, Hockering, Defence HQ at unit site, Battle HQ at Little Copse and the surrounding area split into A, B, C and D (4) sectors. This 
might seem an over-compensation, given that hindsight suggests that, by late 1943, there was little danger of a strategic invasion. Such defensive 
preparations were not uncommon however and it was as well to be prepared. In practice, late-war German attacks on British soil comprised the 
V1 ‘Doodlebug’ throughout the Summer of 1944, followed by the much larger V2. Neither posed a direct threat to airfields or other military 
installations; they were relatively randomly targeted on civilian centres. A direct threat to airfields was so-called ‘tip-and-run’ raiders – and 
camouflaging military facilities deterred such opportunistic enterprises. It could argued that there was more danger from ‘friendly’ air traffic; on 
25th July 1944 a B24 Liberator from USAAF Attlebridge with 32 100lb bombs on board developed engine trouble after take-off, and, if the pilot 
had jettisoned the payload as soon as trouble started, it would all have landed in the bomb storage area. The pilot was able to ‘nurse the aircraft 




APPENDIX 2 to CHAPTER 5:  Working gazetteer of quarries and gravel extraction sites 
Airfield Notes     (some marl pits, even field gates)      Key: FEOS = 1st ed OS 
Docking No visible gravel extraction sites in vicinity 
Bircham 
Newton 
Limited gravel extraction to NE boundary of a/f  
Large pre-existing site (look as if worked in WW2 as well) 2 miles SSW of a/f boundary. Now water. 
‘Boiler Common’ Great Bircham 
Smaller poss site 1m SSW in Sandpit Plantation but could just be clearing for wood management work 




Pre-extant gravel pit 1.5m E (on 1st ed OS) 
Barton Bendish Several hundred yds SE a/f – what looks like a gravel extraction site – but it was grass a/f throughout! 
Marham Poss gravel extraction site 1m S a/f boundary. Dubious though 
Feltwell Extraction site 1m SW a/f at Blackdike Farm. Shown (smaller) on 1sted OS as ‘gravel pit’ 
Methwold Eastern boundary – gravel workings which may be older but look contremporarily worked (tree 
boundary shown on 1st ed OS) 
Poss superficial extraction 2 mi East 
Gt 
Massingham 
No specific large sites but the area to the south seems peppered with small roadside sites which are 
not on 1st ed OS, though older, hedged/treed marl pits exist. Were trad marl pits still being used in 
1940s?? 
W Raynham Approx 1m N a/f boundary is a visibly worked area, extant on 1st ed OS as ‘lime kiln’ – still being used 
in WW2? 
Langham 2.5 m E a/f boundary Bilsey Hill gravel pit within/Bilsey Plantation FEOS,  WW2 definite large site, 
some appears still to be being worked 40 yrs later. Another site ½ mi to NE. Smaller sites between 
Saxlingham and Glanford (2nd, smaller, ‘gravel pit’ on FEOS) 
N Creake Chalk pits, Lime kiln, Chalk FEOS; WW2 site extended to Stiffkey Rd, extant 1988; small poss workings 
at Burnham Thorpe? 
L Snoring Extensive workings Gravel Pit Hill, Hempton; ‘gravel pits’ on FOSE; extant 1988; small extraction site 
at Pudding Norton (NE of Hempton) 
374 
 
Foulsham No visible adjacent sites (remember notes about construction traffic – maybe all trucked in?) 
Oulton Brick Kiln nr Lime Tree Fm N side rly btwn Oulton/Corpusty; ww2 worked out but extended W slightly 
other side rly; greened over 1988. 1m NW a/f 
Matlaske Nothing (grass airfield) 
Coltishall Nothing evident ww2 
Ludham Nothing evident ww2 
Attlebridge ½ m E on N side A47 at Hockering; small site, looks worked out by 1946, grown over by 1988 
Swannington The Warren, GT Witchingham Hall, flooded workings by 1946, nothing FOSE  2mi SW a/f boundary 
Horsham St F Pound Hill Frettenham 3 sites, one Marl Pit FEOS extended  1.5mi NE of a/f 
Rackheath Nothing evident from ww2 
Swanton 
Morley 
Large site SW corner of Billingford Hall (park). Nothing FOSE; part-grown over and part-arable 1988.   
Extensive workings ww2 Gorgate Rd Hoe (nr Beetley), ‘gravel pit’ ‘old gravel pit’ FEOS,  greened over 
1988 
Wendling Limited WW2 working on v NE edge a/f by dispersals. No prior or since. 
Small working Watery Lane, twixt Beeston and Litcham 2mi NW a/f, much extended by 1988. 
1.25mi NE a/f large site ww2 , much extended by 1988, no data FEOS Reed Lane, Bittering 
Shipdham 1m W a/f Mill Rd, Shipdham/Carbrooke WW2, extended post-war, greened over 1988. Site re-opened 
2000s 
N Pickenham 1m S a/f small working Cranbrook; gravel pit FEOS, some working + flooded 1988 
Bodney Nothing evident ww2 
Watton Large workings to NE corner of a/f; site of Corn Windmill FEOS; grown over 1988 
E Wretham Nothing evident WW2 around, except one site directly by A1075 just N of Stonebridge, Stonehill 
Plantation, no FEOS, extant 1988; 1.5 mi NW a/f 
Deopham Gn Nothing evident ww2 
Snetterton H Possible workings 1m NW a/f but flooded 1946. Site 1.5mi SSW a/f, site of Harling Hall, ‘old sand pit’ 
FEOS;  site 2mi to NNW a/f, flooded by fresh 1946, much extended 1988, no FEOS 
Old Buck’m Nothing evident ww2 
Fersfield Nothing evident ww2 
Tibenham 2mi NE a/f Randall’s Farm, ret to arable by 1988, nothing FEOS 
Seething Nothing evident ww2 
375 
 
Hardwick Nothing evident ww2 
Thorpe 
Abbotts 
Nothing evident WW2 
Waveney 
Valley 




APPENDIX 1 to CHAPTER 6:   Working gazetteer of country houses in Norfolk 
Norfolk country houses 




















Abbot’s Hall, Aylsham  No  No No  Extant present 
Aldborough Hall, 
Aldborough 
No  No   Extant 1968 
Alpington Hall, Alpington No  No   extant 
Anmer Hall, Anmer No  No   extant 





 Last inhabitants were King George VI and the Queen Mother, who 
lived in the house during a visit to Norfolk during World War II. 
a large anti-air raid structure had been constructed around the 
property during WWII and that this was unattractive and expensive 
to remove. In addition it would have been extremely costly to 




Ashby Hall, Ashby St Mary No  No   extant 
Ashwellthorpe Hall No  No    
Ashwicken Hall yes  No  1956 Ruination/partial dem.1935; rest/rebuilt 1970s 
Aslacton Manor House No  No   extant 
Attleborough Hall   No    
Aylsham Manor House No  No   Extant, now a hotel 
Aylsham Old Hall No  yes   extant 
Bagthorpe Hall No Dem 
1945+ of 





1956 Inspected and req by Air Min 1941 (nr Bircham Newton) but no real 
evidence of use; demolished post-1945 as of no use to owners 
Bale Hall No  No   extant 
Barmer Hall No  No  Dem 
1956 
1956 Dem 1956 
Barnham Broom Hall No  No   extant 
Barningham Hall No  No?    
Barton Bendish Hall No  Yes (ref)   ?? 
Barton Hall, Barton Turf No  No   extant 
Barwick House, Barwick No  No   extant 




 Poss Dem 
1963 
  
Bawdeswell Hall No  No   extant 
Bayfield Hall No  Yes   extant 
Beaupre Hall  yes Yes   1966 ‘left in sorry state’ demolished 1966 (B&S) 
Beechamwell Hall  yes ??   extant 
Beeston Hall, Beeston Regis  No  No   Extant, school 
Beeston Hall, Beeston St 
Laurence 
No  No   extant 
Beighton Manor No  No   extant 
Bergh Apton Manor House No  No   extant 
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Berry Hall, East Tuddenham ?  No    
Bessingham Manor   No   Extant, but partly ruinated 
Besthorpe Hall   No   Extant  
Billingford Hall   No   Extant  
Bittering Hall   No   Extant  
Bixley Manor   No   Extant  
Blickling Hall   Yes    Extensive info esp from Lees Milne. B&S refer to C20 events but not 
WW2! 
Blofield Hall   No   extant 
Blofield House   No   Extant  
Blo’ Norton Hall   No   Extant 
Blundeston Hall   No    
Bolwick Hall   No   Extant  
Booton Hall   No   Extant  
Bowthorpe Hall   No   Extant (Bell School?) 
Boyland Hall   ? Dem 
1947 
1947 Contents sold 1938   New house built recently, so what constitutes 
historic up to 1939? 
Bracon Ash Hall   No   Extant  
Bracondale Lodge, Nch   No   Extant  
Bracon Lodge, Bracon Ash   No   Extant  
Bradenham Hall, West 
Bradenham 
  No   Extant  
Bramerton Hall   No   Extant  
Brampton Hall   No   Extant  
Brancaster Hall   No   Extant  
Brandiston Hall   No   Extant  
Braydeston Hall   No   Extant  
Breccles Hall   No   Extant  
Bressingham Hall   No   Extant  
Briningham House   No   Extant  
Brinton Hall   No   Extant  
Brisley Old Hall   No   Extant  
378 
 
Brockdish Grange   No    
Brockdish Grove   No    
Brockdish Hall   No    




Brooke House   Poss  1952 Extant   - ‘a modern C20 house’ (B&S) 




1&departmentID=10   Colliers International estate agents accessed 4 
July 2014 AND NOT LISTED ELSEHWERE IN ANY DRIECTROIES 
Broome Place, Broome   No   Extant  
Buckenham Hall?   No    
Buckenham Tofts Hall   Yes Dw 1946 B&S – incl.Didlington est mid-C19. Dem 1946, stables survive. Site in 
Army training area 
Burfield Hall, Wymondham   No   Extant  
Burgh Hall, Burgh next 
Aylsham 
  No   Extant  
Burgh Hall (Tuttington)   No    
Burlingham Hall, B St Peter   No Su, De 1952 B&S – sold 1919, used as school, dem  c.1952 
Burlingham House, B St 
Andrew 
  No   Extant  
Burlingham Old Hall, B St 
Edmund 
  No   Extant  
Burnley Hall (aka Somerton 
House), East Somerton 
  No   Extant  
Bylaugh Hall   Yes Ruinat
ed 
1952 
1952 But restored in recent years for commercial use B&S says built 1852 
and reputedly cursed to stand for only 100 years! 
Bylaugh Old Hall   No   Extant  
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Caister Castle   No   Extant  
Caistor Hall, Caistor St 
Edmund 
  No   Extant  
Caistor Old Hall, C St 
Edmund 
  No   Extant  
Cantley Manor   No   Extant  
Carbrooke Hall   No   Extant  
Carrow Abbey, Norwich   No   Extant  
Castle Rising Hall   No  Dem 1926 -
> 
Dem 1940 nothing to do with WW2 
Catfield Hall   No   Extant  
Catton Hall   No   Extant  
Catton House   Yes Dw, 
Du 
  
Cavick House, Wymondham   No   Extant  
Cawston Manor   No   Extant. Public school 





  Just converted to farmhouse remains by WW2 (B&S)– but affected 
by airfield 
Chedgrave Manor   No   Extant  
Claxton Castle   No   Extant  
Clermont, Little Cressingham   No   Extant  
Cley Hall   No   Extant  
Clippesby House   No P 1925 Mostly dem (20 – but when and why? 
Cockley Cley Hall   No   Extant  
Colney Hall, Colney   No   Extant  
Coltishall Hall   No??   Extant. Now hotel   (must have been used RAF?) 
Congham Hall   No   Extant  
Congham House Yes  No  1938 Burnt down 1938 
Conifer Hill, Starston   No   Extant  
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Costessey Hall   N/A  1925 WW1 occupation; largely broken up (estate) 1925. Not relevant to 
WW2 
Cranmer Hall, Sculthorpe   Yes?   Extant  
Crimplesham Hall   No   Extant  
Cromer Hall   No   Extant  
Crown Point, Norwich 
(Whitlingham Hosptl) 
  No   Extant  
Croxton Park   No   Extant  
Curzon Hall, East Carleton   No   Extant  
Deepdale House, Burnham 
Deepdale 
  No   Note – C20 house   Extant  
Denton House, Denton   No   Extant  
Denver Hall   No   Extant?  Sold 1965 
Dersingham Hall   Yes   Very small, inconsequential in context? 
Didlington Hall   Yes Dw/Su 1950 B&S mentions sold 1943, dem 1950, rew 2nd Army, Gen Dempsey 
Dilham Grange   No   Extant  
Dillington Hall, East 
Dereham 
  No   Extant  
Diss Manor House   No   Extant  
Ditchingham Hall   Yes   Extant and restored 
Ditchingham House   No   Extant  
Ditchingham Lodge   No   Extant  
Docking Hall   No    
Dudwick House, Buxton   No    
Dunston Hall   No   Extant   furniture store? 
Earlham Hall   No   Extant  
Earsham Hall   Not hall   Extant. Grounds incl FAD 
East Barsham Manor   No   Extant, for sale 2014 
East Bilney Hall   No    
East Carleton Hall   No    
East Carleton Manor   No De, N  When was new hall built? 
East Hall, Feltwell   No   Dem., little history 
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East Winch Hall   No   Extant, fire 1964,  reconstructed 
Eccles Hall   No   Extant, school (used WW2? No evidence) 
Edgefield Old Hall, Edgefield   No   Extant, part of Blickling estate 
Ellingham Hall   No   Extant (? – but then Flixton used by USAAF) 
Elmham Hall/Park (N 
Elmham) 
  No  c.1950 
(B&S) 
Estate broken up c1920, house dem 1924 
The Elms, Toft Monks   No   Extant  
Elsing Hall   No   Extant  
Erpingham House      Extant  
Felbrigg Hall   No    R W Ketton-Kremer gave to NT 1969  (no elec in war!) 
Felmingham Hall   No   Extant  
Felthorpe Hall   No   Extant  
Feltwell Hall   No  1955 Demolished.  Used by RAF at all? Prob not 
Filby House   No   Extant – but ruined in part? 
Fincham Hall   No   Extant  
Fitton Hall, Wiggenhall St 
German’s 
  No   Extant  
Flordon Hall   No   Extant – but a farmhouse for some centuries (B&S) 
Foulden Hall   No   Extant – incorp into Didlington estate 
Foulsham Old Hall   No   Extant  
Framingham Earl Hall   No   Extant  
Framingham Pigot Manor   No   Extant   
Frenze Hall   No   Extant  
Fring Hall   No   Extant  
Fulmodestone Hall   No   Extant  
Fulmodestone Old Hall   No   Extant  
Garboldisham Manor   No B,D c.1955 Dem post-war (nothing to do with WW2) except for part of gabled 
stable block 
Garboldisham Old Hall   No B,N 1955 Destroyed fire 1955 and dem 
Gately Hall   No   Extant  
Gawdy Hall   No De, N 1939 Estate spilt up 1938, house dem 1939 (B&S) 
Gayton Hall   No   Extant  
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Gaywood Hall   No   Nursing home after 1935, now college 
Geldeston(e) Hall   No   Extant.  B&S adds an ‘e’ 
Gillingham Hall   No   Extant  
Gimingham, John of Gaunt’s 
Hall 
  No   ?? 
Gissing Hall   No   Extant  
Godfrey’s Hall, Hindringham   No   Extant but converted to small residential use 
Gowthorpe Manor   No   Extant  
Great Cressingham 
Priory/Manor 
  No   Extant but would have been entirely unsuitable? See similar for 
comparisons? 
Great Ellingham Hall   No   Extant  
Great Hautbois House or 
Hall 
  No   Extant  
Great Hockham Hall   No   Extant  
Great Melton Hall   No  1949...? Extant  
Great Ryburgh Hall   No   Extant, incorp into Sennowe estate 
Great Snoring Manor House   No    
Great Witchingham Hall   No    
Gresham Hall   No   Extant   (note B&S also list Gresham castle but ruin only) 
Gressenhall House   ? Dw  Dem 1948 (NHER) 
Guist Hall   No   Extant  
Gunthorpe Hall   No   Extant  
Gunton Park   No   Extant – notably refurbished and reutilised 
Gunvil’s Manor, 
Wymondham 
  No   Extant  
Gurney’s Manor, Hingham   No   Extant  
Hackford Hall   No   Extant  
Haddiscoe Hall   No   Extant  
Hainford Hall   No   Extant, semi-derelict (check local history for WW2 use) 
Halvergate Hall   No   Extant  
Hanworth Hall   No   Tom – sweet chestnut girth 29’7” and 90’ high 
Hardingham Grove   No   Extant  
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Hardingham Hall   No   Extant  
Hardley Hall   No    
Hargham Hall   No    
Haveringland Hall   Yes Dw, Su 1947 B&S  sold c1930 to 1st Visc Rothermere’s estate company and dem 
foll breakup estate 1946 
Heacham Hall   Yes B 1966 Strachan trustees owned until 1940/45 (B&S). dem. 
Hedenham Hall   Poss?   Extant  
Heggatt Hall, Horstead    No   Extant  
Heigham House, Norwich   No Su  Norwich – dem (when?) 
Hemblington Hall   No    
Hemsby Hall   Yes Dw, P 1966 Dem accor to B&S.   photo, no date.  Note extensive NHER WW2 refs 
and items 
Hethel Hall   No  1966  
Hethersett Hall   No   Private, then school 
Heydon Hall   Poss   Extant  
Hickling Hall   No   Extant acc to Br Listed Bldgs but little else. Also NHER 
Hilborough Hall   No    
Hillington Hall   No N 1966 Dem 1946, estate survives(?) 
Hindringham Hall   No   Extant  
Hingham Hall   No P, D 1966 Dem c.1947 nearly all gone 1978 v little know  (also whimsically 
'Southernwood', a 17th century house which was for twenty years 
the home of Field Marshal Edmund, Lord Ironside, until his death in 
1959., Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the outbreak of World 
War II and Commander of the Home Forces in 1940. 
Hockering House   No   Extant  
Hockwold Hall   No   Extant  
Hoe Hall   No   Extant  
Holkham Hall   Yes   No WW2 ref in extensive listing in B&S but other info availa. 
Holme Hale Hall   No   Extant  
Holme House, Holme-next-
the-Sea 
  No   Extant  
Holme Place/Voewood   No   Not extant 1900 
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Holt Hall   No   Extant  
Holverston Hall   No   Extant  ‘Holveston’ in B&S 
Honing Hall   No    
Honingham Hall   No – but 
Teichman 
incident 
Su 1966 Dem 1967   Barnardo’s up to then 
Hope House, Hindolveston   No   Extant  
Horsey Hall   No   Extant  
Horsford Hall   No    
Horsford Manor   No    
Horstead Hall   Yes Dw, P  Research more detail – relevant.    Wiki: World War II the house was 
requisitioned by the War Office and used by a cipher unit, who put 
up numerous huts in the grounds, some of which survive. The hall's 
Italianate water tower, which stood among outbuildings, now 
derelict, is visible from the roads around the park. The estate was 
sold in 1947 and most of the house came down soon after. Today 
part of the estate is used for quarrying.  
 
Horstead House   No   Extant – research more detail 
Houghton Hall   Yes   Occupation of grounds – hut remnants still there – check with Tom 
Hoveton Hall    No   Extant  
Hoveton House, Hoveton St 
John  
  No   Extant  
Hoveton Old Hall, Hoveton 
St Peter 
  No    
Hunstanton Hall   Yes  Gutted 
1949 
B&S bad fires 1853 and 1950. Sold off 1949, estate remains in family. 
Fragmented ownership of outbuildings. 
Hunworth Old Hall   No   Later part of Blickling and the Stody estate 
Ingham Old Hall   No   Rebuilt 1904 with mediaeval remains (B&S), extant, nursing home 
Inglethorpe Manor, Emneth   No   Extant   
Ingoldisthorpe Hall   No   Extant. Stands in small park on top of coastal ridge (B&S) 
Ingoldisthorpe Manor   No   Now hotel 
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Intwood Hall   No   Extant  
Irmingland Hall   No   Extant, much altered C20.  www.britishlistedbuildings.co.uk 
Irstead Hall   No   Extant, now farmhouse http://www.britishlistedbuildings.co.uk/en-
224350-irstead-old-hall-barton-turf-norfolk  
Islington Hall   No   Extant  
Itteringham Manor   No – but 
Itteringha
m Mill 
  Extant  
Kelling Hall   No   Extant (WW2?) 
Ken Hill, Snettisham    No   Extant  
Keswick Hall   Yes 
(Clarke) 
  Extant . 
Ketteringham Hall   Yes    No ref in B&S to WW2. Sold 1947  USAAF 2AD HQ 
Kilverstone Hall   No   Extant  
Kimberley Hall   Yes   Extant – history of WW2 use  PoWs 
Kirby Cane Hall   No   Extant  
Kirstead Hall   No   Extant  
Knapton House   No   Extant  
Lammas Hall   No   Extant  
Langham Hall   No   Extant  (must have been used by RAF...?) 
Langley Hall   No   Extant  
Lessingham House, Nch   No    
Letheringsett Hall   No   Extant  
Letton Hall   No   Extant (some Milit use) 
Lexham Hall   No   Extant  
Litcham Hall   No   Extant  
Little Dunham Lodge   No   Extant  
Little Ellingham Hall   No   Extant  
Little Fransham Old Hall   No   Extant, nut now a farmhouse 
Little Hautbois Hall   No   Extant  
Little Massingham House   No   Extant  
Little Melton Manor   No   Extant?  
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Little Ormesby Hall   No   Extant  
Little Plumstead Hall   No   Extant. Psychiatric hospital since 1929.  
Little Witchingham Hall   No   Extant  
Long Stratton Manor   No  1952 Dem (when?) 
Lovell’s Hall, Terrington St 
Clement  
  No   Extant  
Ludham Manor House   No   Extant  
Lynford Hall   Yes   Extant – some WW2 history 
Mangreen Hall, Swardeston   No   Extant  
Mannington Hall   No   Extant  
Marham House   Yes  1949 
??(much 
reduced) 
Mostly dem 1931 leaving small L shaped 2 storey house 
Mattishall Hall   No   Extant  
Melton Constable Hall   No   Extant  
Mergate Hall, Bracon Ash   No   Extant  
Merton Hall   Poss B, P  Gutted fire 1956, surviving wing and gatehouse 
Middleton Hall   No   Extant  
Middleton Tower   No   Extant  
Mileham Hall   No De 1949? Dem C20 but not WW2 relevant 
Morley Hall, Morley St Peter   No   Extant, school 
Morley Old Hall, Morley St 
Peter 
  No   Extant  
Morningthorpe Manor   No   Extant 
Morton Hall   No  Eliz part 
1949 
Extant  
Mulbarton Old Hall   No   Extant  
Mundham House   No   Extant  
Narborough Hall   ??    
Narford Hall   No    
Necton Hall   No Su, De 1949 Dem 1949 
Northrepps Hall   No   Extant  
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North Runcton Hall   No   Dem 1962-72 
Northwold Lodge   No   Dem u/k 
North Runcton Hall   No Du Ca1946  
Old Buckenham Hall   No B, D 1952 School, burnt down 1952 
Ormesby Hall, Ormesby St 
Margaret aka House 
  No   Dem early 1960s  name was changed from The Hall to Old Hall when 
Ormesby House became known as Ormesby Hall  (clarification 
needed re B&S and NHER) 
Little Ormesby Hall   No   Extant    
Oulton hall   No   Extant  
Overstrand Hall   No   Lutyens 1899. Christian Endeavour 1937, now nursing home 
Oxburgh Hall   No   Extant  
Oxnead Hall   No   Extant 
Pages Place, Saham Toney   No   Extant  
Paston Hall, Paston   No   Extant, hotel 
Pentney Hall   No   ? 
Petygards Hall   Yes  1949 Extensively dem 
Pickenham Hall, South 
Pickenham 
  No   Extant  
Pudding Norton Hall   No   Now farm 
Pynkneys Hall, Tattersett   No   Extant  
Quebec House, East 
Dereham 
  No   Extant , old peoples’ home 
Quidenham Hall   No   Sold 1948 Carmelite convent and children’s hospice 
Rackheath Hall   Yes   Sold, estate broken up 1949; now apartments.  
Rainthorpe Hall, Flordon   No   Extant  
Raveningham Hall   No   Extant  
Raynham Hall   No   Extant  
Ranworth Old Hall   No De  Extant  
Reedham Hall   No   ?? 
Reymerston  Hall    No   Extant  
Reymerston Old Hall   No   Extent, farmhouse 
Riddlesworth Hall   No   Extant  school 
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Rippon Hall,  Hevingham   No   Extant  
Rokeles Hall, Watton   No   Extant  
Rollesby Hall   No  1949 Extant  
Rougham Hall   No   Extant  
Roydon Hall   No   Extant  
Ryston Hall   No   Extant  
St German’s Hall, Wiggenhall 
St German’s 
  No   Extant   www.britishlistedbuildings.co.uk lists a variety of houses not 
listed in any other gazetteers.  
St Mary’s Hall, Wiggenhall St 
Mary The Virgin 
  No   Extant    ditto above 
Saham Hall, Saham Toney   No   Gutted by fire 1973 
Salhouse Hall   No   Extant  
Salle Park   No   Extant  
Salthouse Hall      Extant  
Sandringham House 
(Appleton) 
  No   Extant  
Saxlingham Hall, Saxlingham 
Nethergate 
  No   Extant  
Saxlingham Old Hall   No   Extant  
Scole Lodge   No   Extant, nursing home 
Scole House   No   Extant  
Scottow Hall   No   Extant  
Scratby Hall   No   Extant, school 
Sedgeford Hall   No   Extant; family left c.1940 
Seething Hall    No  Ca 1946 Dem acc to B&S 
Seething Old Hall   No   Extant, refurbished 
Sennowe Park, Stibbard   No   Extant  
Shadwell Park, Rushford   No   Extant  
Sharrington Hall   No   Extant  
Shelton Hall   No   Extant  
Sheringham Park (house)   No   Extant (WW2?) 




Shimpling Place   No   Extant, farmhouse 
Shotesham Park   No   Extant  
Shouldham Hall   No   Extant, care home  
Shropham Hall   No   Extant  
Shropham House   No   Extant  
Sidestrand Hall    No   Extant, care home 
Sloley Hall   No   Extant  
Sloley Old Hall   No   Extant  
Smallburgh Hall   No   Extant  
Snarehill Hall, Brettenham    No   Extant, incorp Shadwell estate 
Snettisham Old Hall   No   Extant  
Snettisham Park   No   Park Farm facility but how about house? 
Snore Hall, Fordham   No   Extant  
Southrepps Hall   No   Extant  
South Walsham Hall    No   Extant , country club 
Southwood Hall   No   Extant, farmhouse 
Sparham Hall   No   Extant  
Sparham House   No   Extant  
Spixworth Hall   Yes De 1946? Dem 1955 
Sprowston Manor   Yes   Extant, hotel 
Stalham Hall   No   Extant  
Stanfield Hall, Wymondham   No   Extant  
Stanhoe Hall   No   Extant  
Starston Place   No   Dem 1962 
Stiffkey Old Hall   No   Extant   (not suitable for milit use?? At a guess??) 
Stody Lodge   No   Extant  
Stoke Ferry Hall   Yes   Extant  (passing ref from Lees Milne) 
Stoke Holy Cross Hall   No Su  Dem c.1939 by family 
Stokesby Old Hall   No   ??? ext C20 
Stow Bardolph Hall   ?? Su, De  Extant  
Stradsett Hall   No   Extant  
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Stratton Hall   No P   
Stratton Strawless Hall   Yes   Much reduced but extant    WW2 history 
Strumpshaw Hall   No   extant 
Sturston House/Hall   Yes?    
Sustead Hall   No   Extant  
Sustead Old Hall   No   Extant, farmhouse  
Swaffham Manor House   No   Extant  
Swafield Hall   No   Extant  
Swafield House   No   Extant  
Swannington Hall   No   Extant  
Swannington Manor   No   Extant  
Swanton Abbott Hall    No   Extant  
Swanton Morley House   No   Extant  
Swanton Novers House   No   Extant  
Tacolneston Hall   No   Extant  
Tacolneston Old Hall   No   Extant – farmhouse now? 
Tasburgh Hall   No   Extant?? (B&S) 
Tasburgh Lodge   No   ?? (B&S) 
Taverham Hall   No   Extant , school from 1920 
Templewood, Northrepps   No   Extant  
Testerton House   No   Extant but reduced 
Tharston Hall   No   Extant  
Thickthorn Hall, Hethersett   No   Extant, apartments 
Thornham Hall   No   Extant  
Thorpe Abbots Place   No   Dem  accord B&S but accord Country Life 29 Mar 2007 house up for 
sale! 
Thompson Hall/Butters Hall   No   Not mentioned in B&S 
Thorpe Hall, Thorpe Market   No   Not mentioned B&S 
Thorpland Hall, Fakenham   No   Extant  
Threxton House   No   Extant   sold 1946 
Thrigby Hall   No   Extant, wildlife centre 




Thurning Hall   No   Extant but neglected (B&S) 
Thursford Hall   No  1952 Dem except for kitchen wing 1919 
Thurton Hall   No   Extant  
Thwaite Hall, Thwaite All 
Saints 
  No   Extant  
Toftrees Hall, Dunton   No De 1952 Ruinous and dem 1958 
Topcroft hall   No   Extant  
Tottington Hall   ??? 
STANTA 
  Not in B&S 
Trunch Hall   No    
Tunstead Hall   No    
Twyford Hall   No   Estate split up 1925, house extant   Fire?? 
Twyford House   No   Extant  
Wacton Hall    No   Extant  
Walsingham Abbey   No   Extant  
Washingford House, Bergh 
Apton 
  No   Extant  
Wallington Hall   No   Extant  
Watlington Hall   Yes Bn  Extant  
Wattlefield Hall   No   Extant  
Waxham Hall   No   Extant  
Weasenham Hall   No Du, N  Extant  
Weeting Hall   No Su 1952 Dem 1952 
West Acre High House, 
Westacre 
  No   Extant  
West Barsham Hall   No  1966 New hall built 
West Bilney Hall   No   Extant  
Westgate Hall, Burnham 
Westgate 
  No   Extant  
West Harling Hall   No  1947 but 
see-> 
Sold, dem 1929 
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West Lodge, Aylsham   No   Extant  
Weston House, Weston   No  1971 Extant  
Weston House, W Longville   No   Extant  
West Somerton Hall   No  1946  Occ until 1934, now dem – when? 
West Tofts Hall   STANTA   Dem mid-C20 accord B&S (battle area but not mentioned) 
Westwick House   No   Extant  
Westwick Old Hall   No   Extant  
White House, Whitwell   No   Extant  
Whitwell Hall, Whitwell   No   Extant  
Wicklewood Hall   No   Extant  
Wilby Hall   No   Part extant, farmhouse 
Windham Manor   No   Not listed B&S 
Winnold House, Wereham   No   Not listed by B&S 
Winston Hall, Gillingham   No   Extant – now known as farmhouse 
Witton Hall, N Walsham   No  1971 Dem 1927 
Witton House, nr Norwich   No  1971 Dem  
Wiveton Hall   No   Extant  
Wolterton Hall   Yes   Major long-term occupation 
Woodbastwick Hall   hosptl Su, De  Dem 1971 
Wood Dalling Hall   No   Extant  
Woodgate House, Aylsham   No   Extant  
Wood Hall, Hilgay   No   Extant  
Wood Norton Hall   No   Extant  
Wood Rising Hall   No   Present house built 1960 replacing Victorian one. 
Worstead House   No  1939 Dem 1939, estate broken up 
Wortwell Hall   No   Extant – much like a large farmhouse 
Wramplingham Hall   No   Extant  
Wretham Hall    Yes Dw, Su  Burnt 1900 rebuilt, Lived in WW2 but included in Battle Area . 
Dem.1950s 
Wroxham Hall   No Su  Demolished – estate owned by owner of Broad House 
Wroxham House   No   Burnt, demolished 





Summary: 459 houses itemised as extant at 1900 or, in one case, built in 1903.   
Of which:  32 occupied, rendered unusable (STANTA)  or known to have been surveyed by military WW2 
                    
 
B = house destroyed by fire; where B is followed by a D, that denotes when the house was finally demolished  
N = house demolished and replaced by a new house  
P = a significant part of the house has been demolished  
Pr = where the house was partially rebuilt  
S = it is a shell or ruins  
A = abandoned  
Su = surplus to requirements (ie. family had other houses or was no longer required by owners (the government etc))  
D = date of final demolition - usually following partial demolition or fire  
Du = urban development (replaced by housing estate, hospital, school)  
Di = industrial development (replaced or blighted by industrial works, coal mining)  
De = derelict (ie. had fallen into such a state of disrepair that there was either not the will or financial means to repair it)  
Dw = wartime damage (either enemy action or through requisition) too severe to be economically repaired  
Iw = insufficient wealth to maintain house - sometimes linked to conversion of stables to replace main house  
Pr = partially restored  
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APPENDIX 2 to CHAPTER 6:  Additional noted military units located at country houses 
2 Corp’s 18th Division Signals were based at Rackheath Park in July and August 1940, leaving the house itself undisturbed, and fully three years 
before the USAAF’s airfield on the same site was completed.   
 
2nd Cambridgeshires were encamped at Melton Constable at the same time, as were the 5th Suffolks at Rollesby Hall.  
 
Royal Army Service Corps units were based as The Grange, Catton, Letton Hall, Gressenhall House, East Carleton Manor and Hingham Hall.  
 
Royal Artillery troops were quartered at Crome House and The Warren, Old Catton, Merton Park near Watton, Kimberley House, Wymondham 
and Taverham Hall.  
 
Royal Engineers occupied Bryn House, Wroxham, Cawston Manor, Woodbastwick Park ,East Harling Park and Shadwell Court, Brettenham.  
 
Ambulance units were stationed at numerous locations including Bylaugh, aside from the RAF’s presence there, and Keswick Hall, Norwich.  In 
particular, Didlington was utilised as 52 Division’s HQ long before 7th Armoured Division arrived in 1943.  
 
Horstead Hall and Brandon Hall were hosting anti-aircraft units. Other occupancies among many included Brandon Hall, Westmere, Weeting 
and Glandford. 
 
Brooke Hall was HQ 4th Bn Royal Norfolk     
Part of the Haveringland estate was taken over for Swannington airfield and the Hall for officers’ quarters    
 
